# Women's Development

While African men can confine themselves to being producers, African women are not only producers but also home managers, child bearers, child rearers, and caregivers for the elderly. African women perform the bulk of the continent's work but receive perhaps one tenth of its income and have title to perhaps one one-hundredth of its property (Chinery-Hesse 1990: 3). They till land which they do not own, fetch water which they do not drink and produce children whose lives they do not direct. With African economies continuing to deteriorate in the 1990s, women will assume a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment. As the primary providers in African households, they will struggle to find the means for family survival as the gap between incomes and prices widens. Forced to enter the workforce, women will have less time to spend on health- and nutrition-related activities—precisely as deteriorating government services leave households to rely more and more on their own care-giving capacities. Cutbacks in education, reductions in food subsidies, suspensions of child care and health care services will affect women first and most heavily: they must provide substitutes for discontinued services, stretch their meagre resources (or do without) to compensate for price increases, or abandon the education which is a prerequisite for self-empowerment. As Africa sputters through the 1990s, its women will struggle hardest to do more with less: Africa's women have been and continue to be the invisible agents of structural adjustment, doing with less so that others may have more and working harder so that others may profit. Economic planners cannot continue to ignore the needs and concerns of these silent sufferers.

While anecdotal evidence points to widespread and deeply entrenched gender disparities in Africa, little effort has been made to measure these disparities with gender-disaggregated data on critical social and economic indicators (e.g. wages, unemployment and underemployment, access to services, literacy, numeracy and educational achievement (not to mention morbidity,

mortality and nutrition)). Disparities seem to be especially pronounced in Muslim communities, where women are almost completely shut out of the formal economy and legally remain minors for their entire lives, with their status based solely on marriage and motherhood. But gender discrimination is a common feature of almost all African (and non-African) cultures. Because girls are valued less, they receive less health care and less education. As women, their employment opportunities are severely constricted and their work, whatever it may be, is systematically undervalued. With men usurping control of the family, the community and society at large, there is little prospect for women's empowerment. Furthermore, if girl children have low nutritional status and low educational achievements, if they lack basic skills such as literacy and numeracy, if as mothers they are underpaid and overworked even when they find a decent job, if in addition they are expected to absorb economic hardships in the place of their more privileged brothers and husbands, it is plain that they will have less ability (and perhaps less desire) to exploit their limited opportunities.

Before policies are gender-sensitive, it will be necessary for gender-disaggregated data to be collected systematically and recorded clearly and accurately. Although this can easily and routinely be done, it has not been done for most sectors, with education the only prominent exception. Yet, collecting such data is especially critical while Africa's period of austerity continues, for recent gains on gender issues will erode rapidly as national and household economies decline unless special efforts are made to sustain women's incomes and to maintain and expand their access to basic services such as health care and education. This will require unprecedented commitment and cooperation from NGOs and international agencies, backed up with aggressive redistributive government interventions (e.g to maintain prices of fuel and staple foods at levels which low income families can afford (even if subsidies are necessary) and to protect nutrition and school

*African women are often merely the agents of development, but they should be beneficiaries as well*

feeding programmes from cut-backs).

## Women's Development

The conventional focus on women *in* development unfortunately suggests that women are merely *agents* in the development process rather than beneficiaries as well. As a consequence, perhaps, development planners often treat the African woman as a variable in the development process, leaving her to absorb an increasing number of tasks in their various projects, whatever goal these projects may have (e.g. creating economic growth, extending basic services, improving household food security). For instance, the introduction of labour-intensive high-yield hybrid crops, intended to improve agricultural yields, assumes implicitly that more labour can be squeezed out of the African woman, who provides as much as 80% of the continent's farm labour. Because women's work does not carry a price tag—our conceptual categories being too crude accurately or adequately to reflect women's contributions to the household or the larger economy—ordinary development planning does not cost out the the additional burdens which development presses onto Africa's women. Moreover, even though women are at the centre of production in Africa, they and the issues which concern them are at the periphery in development planning and execution.

This blinkered view of women's development must be corrected. Development planners must focus on women, not merely as agents working to benefit others, but also as participants and beneficiaries themselves. Women's issues need to be integrated into development, not treated as marginal additions, and women themselves need to be brought into development planning and implementation as full partners, not only because partnership will be necessary to sustain development projects but also because women deserve partnership in their own right. In brief, we must shift our focus from women *in* development to women's development.

## Women as Individuals

UNICEF-assisted programmes of cooperation

*The low ratio of women to men in sub-Saharan Africa shows that many women suffer from inequality and neglect*

which treat women as individuals traditionally focus on women's health, nutrition, education (especially adult literacy), income-generating strategies and work-reducing technologies. The bulk of these programmes are aimed mediately at improving skills, reducing workloads or enhancing access to resources and ultimately at increasing production and establishing food and income security. Also desirable are programmes promoting women's empowerment and self-employment and programmes supporting social and technical infrastructures which directly benefit women (e.g. women's health centres and management training centres).

**Health and Nutrition**: With maternal mortality rates remaining at unacceptably high levels, improved maternal health care remains a priority. But health and well-being are also important matters for girls between 5-15 and for women over 45. Reflecting this fact, development programmes should address the health needs of women as individuals, not merely as mothers and care-givers. Women should have better access to health services which are at present frequently biased to favour male admissions (UNICEF 1990d: 14). While the ratio of women to men in Europe and North America—where women suffer little discrimination in health care or nutrition—is about 1.05/1, in sub-Saharan Africa it is 1.02/1, indicating an excess mortality from inequality and neglect of about 3.2 million women in ESA alone (Sen 1990: 61). In combatting this deadly and invidious discrimination, renewed efforts must be made to involve women in health planning, to eradicate discriminatory practices followed by health practitioners and to increase the number of female health practitioners at all levels. In particular, UNICEF must be sensitive to the gender dimensions of the Bamako Initiative, which will realign health clinic management and utilization patterns in many ESA districts. Women should also be educated about their own health and nutrition requirements (not merely their children's), with emphases on family planning and sexually transmitted diseases (especially AIDS). This will help to reduce the high rate of teenage pregnancies—which interfere with women's education as well as threaten women's health. Where child health programmes involve women's participation, they should be sensitive to women's workloads (e.g. preserving work schedules and minimizing additional work as much as possible). Traditional health practices should be examined for their negative effects on women (if any), with appropriate responses framed to remove these (UNICEF 1989d).

In the area of nutrition, efforts must be made to ensure that households share food

| Table 6.1 Ratio of Women to Men | |
|---|---|
| Europe and North America | 1.05 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 1.02 |
| South-east and East Asia | 1.01 |
| South and West Asia | 0.94 |
| *Source*: Sen 1990. | |

proportionally. When households are unable to provide sufficient food for all of their members, women frequently take less (or less nutritious foods) for themselves so that others (usually males and income-earning adults) may have more. Even when a household *has* food security, socially-rooted prejudices may skew the distribution of consumption to favour males over females. (Household food security does not guarantee that all household members will obtain good nutrition any more than national food security guarantees that all households within the nation will be food secure). Girls and women should receive their proportionate share of food as a matter of course: when girls and women are the primary producers in the household, adequate nutrition is especially critical.

**Education**: In the area of education, almost uniquely, data are systematically collected on a gender-disaggregated basis. These data show that female enrolment is typically a lesser fraction of male enrolment. This disparity of course persists at the secondary and tertiary levels. It is likely that the factors resulting in disproportionately low female enrolments also result in lower female completion rates and accelerated deteriorations in female enrolment and completion rates where these rates are deteriorating generally (e.g. Somalia). Since primary education is the minimum requirement for improving female status and productivity, expanding educational opportunities for girls and women must be a priority. Hence extraordinary efforts must be made to equalize enrolment, attendence, performance and completion rates for boys and girls at all school levels (with special emphases on girls from poor or rural or Muslim families and on teenage girls who have become pregnant). At the same time, gender biases must be eradicated from the the school structure (e.g. more female teachers, professors and administrators) as well as from the school curriculum (e.g. sensitizing teachers to gender issues, removing gender biases from teaching materials, opening technical training to girls). Finally, to monitor progress in this important area, gender-disaggregated databases should be developed for all important education indicators (including enrolment, performance and completion rates) both for formal and informal education.

**Income-Generating Strategies**: Vocational training in Africa tends to focus on men, leaving women in traditional occupations (e.g. sewing, weaving, leather-craft, machine-knitting, brick-making, beekeeping, livestock farming) and therefore with fewer employment opportunities even when they are heads of households or principal income-earners. Besides opening up vocational training to



**Figure 6.1**
Gross Enrolment Ratios (1987)

female students, all women should have the opportunity to attend literacy courses and to receive training in technical and managerial skills (e.g. bookkeeping, animation, project identification and preparation)—as in Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe—which can be readily translated to any cooperative or productive enterprise. Emphasizing micro-level employment opportunities for women and neglecting appropriate management training may inadvertantly reinforce women's marginalization from the larger economy. There is no reason to suppose that women are less able than men to work in higher level positions or to manage larger enterprises and some reason to suppose that they may be *more* able. Women must be liberated from



**Figure 6.2**
Estimated Adult Literacy Rates (1990)

their virtual imprisonment in traditional and subsistence production, where they are outside the larger economy, where their work is easily undervalued and where their incomes are more vulnerable to changing economic trends.

**Work-Reducing Technologies**: In the midst of austerity measures, the need to maintain and extend access to drinkable water and adequate sanitation and to ensure sufficient supplies of basic drugs at affordable prices remains a priority. Water and sanitation projects, besides providing communities with health-improving services, typically reduce women's workloads considerably (as the water source becomes less distant and food preparation less cumbersome). To exploit this work-reducing potential fully, the women affected should choose the source to be developed as well as the maintenance and management structures. At the same time, sanitation projects should include a household sanitation component, to assist in food preparation and (more generally) to improve the living environment. Women should be assisted in improving technologies (e.g. pumps, latrines, water-carrying devices, rain catchment systems) for local use. Finally, the social and cultural impact of improvements in water and sanitation systems should be monitored (with emphasis on changes in distribution of household labour when the labour-saving devices are in place) and appropriate responses developed where the impact is detrimental to women's interests (UNICEF 1989d: 40-41).

## Women as Workers and Producers

For women, the permissible range of economic activities remains sharply circumscribed, with few opportunities for employment in the formal sector, frequent government harrassment and relatively low economic returns. The impediments to women's employment are numerous. Women are overburdened with multiple roles (mother, home manager, cultivator, wage labourer) and lack access to services (e.g. child care) or facilities (e.g. labour-saving devices) which might reduce this burden. As a consequence, working women frequently experience conflicts between family and business demands. Women also typically lack skills (e.g. literacy) and training (e.g. in bookkeeping or in management) as well as access to basic support services (e.g. banking). They are poorly represented in decision-making bodies at practically every level (home, community, district, national) and the legal, procedural, institutional and attitudinal environment is typically arrayed against them. Some of these circumstances could be changed, but lack of support from male counterparts— who control most of the relevant variables at present—continues to impede such change.

**Agriculture**: In Africa about 85% of rural women are farmers and they grow and process as much as 80% of family food consumption (Cornia 1987: 187). Improvements in smallholder farming techniques can be very effective both for improving household food security and for empowering women, but such improvements have been far to seek in Africa. Unlike Asia and South America, sub-Saharan Africa's subsistence farmers have benefitted little from new crop varieties. This may be because agricultural extension workers have a bias favouring largeholders and are usually men addressing their programmes to other men. At other times, improved crop varieties may require inputs (e.g. seeds and fertilizer) which women farmers cannot purchase on a timely basis or in affordable quantities (particularly when credit is scarce). Nonetheless there have been successes: Rwanda has introduced high-yielding, disease-resistent and input-independent potatoes to its smallholders and Kenya in the 1960s rapidly persuaded its smallholders to adopt hybrid maize by clearly demonstrating its superiority over local varieties, promoting it heavily through extension services and making necessary production inputs readily available in the private sector. Nonetheless, in ESA as a whole, more can be done to assist the small-scale women farmer: extension services must be purged of their biases in favour of largeholders and male farmers; agricultural research should be directed to secondary crop varieties and to quickly maturing crops (used to insure against crop failure and to bridge



**Figure 6.3**
Females as a Percentage of Males (1988)

Labour Force   Parliament

*Source*: UNDP 1990: 144-45.

seasonal shortages); and female farmers should have improved access to land, livestock, credit, technology (tools) and essential inputs (hybrid seeds and fertilizer).

**Business Management**: If we shift our focus to women as workers and producers in the larger economy, the primary issue is women's empowerment. UNICEF's women's development programmes are currently focused on advocacy, national capacity-building and adult (formal and technical) education with the general objective of establishing gender parity (i.e. enhancing women's social, legal and economic status and improving women's representation in economic, political and institutional fora). Progress on these issues is very slow. In Africa, men are 97.5% of ministerial decision-makers; women 2.5%. (Only in the lusophone countries do women constitute a significant percentage of parliamentarians: 15.4% in Angola and 16% in Mozambique.) At the same time, in Kenya women make up 78.9% of the people employed in the lowest paying jobs (clerk, nurse, teacher, salesperson, social worker) but only 6.1% of those employed in the highest paying jobs (finance, business and management). Even when women escape the job ghettoes in Kenya, their wages (e.g. in manufacturing) are 76.5% of men's wages (UNDP 1989).

Female exclusion from management occurs not only in private sector activities but also, sometimes surreptitiously, in development activities. Community-driven development programmes—although they nominally involve women in all critical programming aspects—frequently fail to do so in actuality. The composition of the community (and particularly its decision-making bodies) usually determines how responsive such programmes are to women's needs, since the programmes take their start from community-level inputs identifying priority issues and available resources. If women are left out of the micro-level decision-making which sets the programme agenda, it is unlikely that their needs will be identified and given priority.

**Household Management**: As more and more African women enter the national economy, the burdens of household management will need to be shared with others. In particular, there will be an increasing demand for adequate child care. This demand is already considerable in Kenya, where mothers with large families cannot enter income-generating activities without assistance for their children; in Mauritius, where women are seeking reliable low-cost day care centres near the Export Processing Zone where they work; and in Namibia, where Church-supported urban day care centres are

being improved and expanded to meet rising demand. The promotion of other labour-saving devices for the home (e.g. Mozambique has introduced fuel-saving stoves, not only to lighten women's workloads but also to reduce deforestation and to stretch family budgets) may help to relieve the heavy demands which full-time mothering and full-time employment make. But at the same time husbands and fathers will need to make larger contributions to household management: fetching water and firewood are simple tasks which men can do and which men should do as responsible parents.

## Female-Headed Households

Several unique circumstances and difficulties confront female-headed households, which may be a third of all households in Africa. Although death and divorce frequently force women to head their households, outmigration is the main cause of the rise in female-headed households in Kenya and Malawi as well as in Botswana, Lesotho and other southern African economies supplying labour to South Africa. It is worth notice that female-headed households frequently *improve* over male-headed households in at least one way: when women manage household assets independently of male interference, all members of the household benefit (particularly in nutritional status) to a greater extent than when men manage household assets (Fleuret 1990: 10). This is because women allocate their own incomes principally to the purchase of necessities. Similarly— and perhaps for the same reason—women's employment has been shown to have a positive (rather than a negative) effect on the health and nutritional status of children (Ibid.: 17). Nonetheless, women heads of households labour under many disadvantages. Typically poor, such households cannot purchase labour but must sell it; typically containing fewer adults, they have higher dependency ratios; typically lacking sufficient able-bodied

*Children in female-headed households often enjoy better health and nutritional status than children in conventional households*

| Table 6.2 Female-Headed Households (% Total/Urban/Rural) | |
| --- | --- |
| Botswana (1985) | 46/24/76 |
| Kenya (1987) | 30/25/34 |
| Malawi (1985) | 28/—/30 |
| Mauritius (1985) | 19/—/— |
| Sao Tome (1989) | 20/—/— |
| Uganda (1987) | 15/—/— |
| Zimbabwe (1988) | 36/—/— |

labourers, they must make up for deficiencies in the supply of labour by making greater individual contributions (Ibid.: 13).

Female-headed households are usually poorer than male-headed households, not because women are less educated and therefore less able to convert resources into utilities, but because they typically have less access to resources from the beginning. All the biases and prejudices which burden women in ordinary circumstances are even more crushing for women who are the sole or primary providers for numerous dependents. These women, despite their additional needs, often continue to be excluded from investment in income-generating activities (trade, large farms, transportation or education (for themselves or for their children)) and from opportunities to obtain land or productive inputs or relief assistance. This has a profound negative impact on their children, who will remain trapped in a cycle of poverty. Fortunately for some women, development projects which are sensitive to women's needs and concerns have appeared in their localities. For example, in Zanzibar a development scheme affecting nearly 3,000 hectares of double-cropped irrigated rice fields and 800 hectares of rainfed rice fields permitted women to register as tenants (receiving an allotment of one-tenth of a hectare of irrigated land or one-quarter of a hectare of rainfed land) and thus to have voices in the project's tenants' association.

*Women's empowerment remains the fundamental goal*

## UNICEF Initiatives

Advocacy for women's empowerment remains the fundamental issue and should continue as a priority. Although women's organizations have had exemplary successes, much remains to be done on a scale which is beyond the reach of most self-help groups. Women's development in Africa—as elsewhere—requires consistent long-term support from many parties, including UNICEF, other agencies, NGOs and governments. While the ultimate goal remains the integration of women's concerns into basically non-segregated programmes, it may remain necessary in the short term to maintain women-specific projects. These should be phased out only when there is a clear indication that integrated programmes are successfully addressing women's needs.

As a start to attaining full integration, women should be more involved in decision-making processes and women's concerns should be incorporated in the basic objectives of development. UNICEF must revitalize efforts to sensitize people (particularly in banking, business and government) to gender issues and to create an environment (legal, political, social and economic) conducive to

the growth and expansion of women's economic activities. Renewed efforts must be made to improve women's access to key services, to training, to agricultural extension services and to production resources. The plight of women in especially difficult circumstances (street girls, pregnant teenagers, single mothers, women heads of households) should be publicized with a view to designing appropriate responses. Finally, UNICEF should advocate for gender equality under the law, both to remove the gender biases of laws affecting status and ownership (e.g. divorce laws, inheritance laws and land tenure laws) and to ensure that women receive equal pay for work of equal value and have an equal voice in political structures. In general, all discriminatory practices—whether they are socially or legally enforced—must be broken down, in some cases with laws which mandate affirmative action.

Financial and technical support are necessary and appropriate for formulating a comprehensive approach to women's entrepreneurship. Efforts must be made to reduce women's household burdens and to include women in development planning and implementation. Institutional capacities for assisting women in their producer roles should be developed and improved. Finally, UNICEF in tandem with other organizations should contribute to the establishment of national databases which seek gender-disaggregation in all key indicators. With a comprehensive gender-disaggregated database, gender issues can be integrated into mainstream development processes.

Two other strategies approach women's development indirectly, through the girl child and through men. Since UNICEF's mandate is child development, major goals for *women* can legitimately be pursued through strategies focusing on the girl child: diligent efforts to reduce gender disparities and ensure equal opportunities should begin during the girl child's socialization, when unfair biases and prejudices blocking equal progress have not yet hardened into insurmountable obstacles. At the same time, traditional women's duties such as cooking, cleaning, caring for children and fetching water and firewood can be shared by men who have learned the meaning of responsible parenthood. The "separate purses" mentality should be replaced with a "joint purse" mentality which reflects responsible joint decision-making. To promote these deeper attitudinal changes, UNICEF should court public interest partners specifically targeting women's issues to share in its advocacy efforts. A start has already been made in Ethiopia, Somalia and Mozambique, where there are UNICEF exchanges with the local women's organizations.

# _Urbanization_

Although Africa is the least urbanized continent today, it has suffered in the past thirty years from a very high urban growth rate. Between 1950 and 1980, the populations of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam increased sevenfold (UNDP 1990: 85). Between 1980 and 1990, four countries in the region (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Tanzania) had an average annual urban growth rate of more than ten percent. At present, four countries (Mauritius, Somalia, Swaziland and Tanzania) have over 30% of their populations in urban areas and another (Zambia) over 50%. As populations shift to the urban areas, poverty will shift there as well. UNDP estimates that Africa's urban population will double between 1985 and 2000 (from 174 million to 361 million) and that less than one-half of this growth will result from the natural increase of populations already in the cities (Ibid.: 85, 87). The bulk will come from rural-urban migration, which the cities will be increasingly unable to absorb.

## Rural Outmigration

**Motivation**: Most people migrate for economic reasons. Rural-urban migration almost always raises migrants' nominal incomes, although their real incomes may not improve. Nonetheless the perception that life is better in the city persists. In part, this is a consequence of the "urban bias" (Lipton 1984: 152-56) which African governments have indulged, treating urban areas preferentially (e.g. for pricing policies, food subsidies, social services, industrial development and infrastructure investments) and so prompting rural dwellers to migrate to the urban areas to enjoy the subsidized standard of living available there (Anyang' Nyong'o 1990: 2). At the same time, the extension of basic services in the urban areas has never been rapid enough to reach all of the urban poor, particularly as incremental improvements have attracted more and more of the rural poor, effectively wiping out any gains achieved. Nonetheless, resource allocations in Africa continue to reflect urban priorities, despite their inequity and inefficiency,



**Figure 7.1**
Urban Populations in ESA (%)

because the urban sector is more organised, more articulate and more powerful than the rural sector and because the rural elite have joined the urban elite in their aspirations.

Rural outmigration has increased as young people in the rural areas have become better educated. Several studies show that the poorest and least educated rural families are underrepresented in outmigration. According to the World Bank, an educated Kenyan is five times as likely to migrate as one who is uneducated; similarly, in Tanzania, 90% of the men who left their villages were educated (World Bank 1990: 62). Finding rural customs and rural employment prospects limiting, they prefer to go to their relatives in the cities, where they hope to find a job (even if it is merely _jua kali_ employment (i.e. informal employment under the "fierce sun")) as well as greater freedom.

At the same time, it is sensible for the rural African household (particularly when it is landless and has labour as its only significant asset) to place some of its members in urban labour markets in order to shelter its food-and income-generating abilities from the hardships which sporadically affect the rural areas. The household thereby minimizes its exposure to the risk of a complete calamity: the relative stability of one market can buffer the domestic impact of the collapse of another. This is especially true in countries

_Most people migrate for economic reasons and most people migrating to the cities successfully raise their incomes_

experiencing civil strife, such as Mozambique and Somalia, where people have crowded into the urban areas to escape the insecurities of the countryside. Studies in Kenya show that remittances from those placed in the urban markets helped to lift rural households out of the lowest income bracket and to improve agricultural production, partly by smoothing out the flow of income (Ibid.).

Because rural outmigration is often entirely reasonable, it is very difficult either to stem outmigration significantly or to redirect it to secondary urban centres. Voluntary resettlement initiatives as well as agricultural development projects (intended to increase farm productivity and thus encourage people to remain in the rural areas) have deflected only a small portion of rural-urban migration (UNDP 1990: 88-89). By investing in manufacturing and industrial activities located in secondary urban centres, some governments have tried to create "growth poles" across their countries, both to smooth out the distribution of the population and to slow the growth of their largest urban centres, but inefficiencies resulting from poor infrastructure and poor linkages to markets have frequently made these efforts vain (sometimes rendering a proposed "growth pole" an economic dependent instead) (Ibid.). More desperate solutions, e.g. expelling unemployed migrants (Tanzania) or routing *jua kali* workers and bulldozing new squatter settlements (Kenya) have had little permanent effect (Ibid.).

**Family Patterns**: The prevailing paradigm shows the city dweller sending income to his relatives on the farm. It is still believed that malnutrition, low life expectancy, substandard housing and inadequate health services are more severe in the rural areas, even allowing for substantial differences in the cost of living. But sometimes the family in the rural area supports

*Government efforts to stem rural outmigration or to redirect it to secondary cities rarely succeed*

its urban members. There are growing numbers of urban poor who experience occasional or constant food and economic insecurity. The poor city dweller is less able than his country cousin to increase his own food production or to rely on his friends and relatives to provide him with essentials when the economy declines. The multigenerational household and other traditional support networks tend to break up in the cities, reducing to the margin the poor person's command over resources and leaving elderly persons (who had expected their children to support them) especially vulnerable. At the same time, traditional mores and social customs unravel as recent migrants experience increased mobility and rapidly changing priorities, adding emotional alienation to material deprivation. It is likely that an increasing number of urban households risk household food insecurity and more work needs to be done to determine how urban households cope with this risk.

While it is often true that immigrants to the urban areas have higher incomes and greater access to services (or at least not appreciably less) than they did in the rural areas, this may not mean that life has improved either for themselves or for their families. When male members of the household migrate to the towns—whether temporarily, to seek seasonal employment, or more permanently, to raise the family's income through remittances or to prepare for the arrival of the whole family—they leave the women to head the household, tend the farms and care for the children and the aged back in the country. Not infrequently, rural outmigration creates larger numbers of female-headed households in the rural areas and larger numbers of unemployed or underemployed men in the urban areas. Although working men generally send remittances to their dependents in the rural areas, these remittances will be insecure and variable, particularly as they may be diverted to unproductive expenditures. Children are often the biggest losers in these families: with absent and sometimes irresponsible fathers and over-burdened ill-treated mothers, they will grow up with little love and less care. This will be especially true in the labour reserve economies of Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia, as well as in South Africa itself, as men continue to migrate into and within that country seeking employment and perpetuating family disruptions over generations.

## Urban Life

**Employment**: Most ESA countries have experienced urban growth for the wrong reasons and therefore most ESA cities are not able to provide rural migrants with secure

**Figure 7.2**
Urban Population in Largest City (1980) (%)



| | 0 | 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 | 60 | 70 | 80 | 90 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ethiopia | | | | | | | | | | |
| Kenya | | | | | | | | | | |
| Madagascar | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mozambique | | | | | | | | | | |
| Somalia | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tanzania | | | | | | | | | | |
| Uganda | | | | | | | | | | |
| Zambia | | | | | | | | | | |
| Zimbabwe | | | | | | | | | | |

formal sector employment. Unlike (e.g.) Johannesburg, most of the cities in ESA did not develop as industrial centres but as administrative centres established for the convenience of colonial rulers (Anyang' Nyong'o 1990: 6). Nairobi was a forwarding centre for the construction of the Mombasa-Kampala railway: built in a swamp, with few geographical trade advantages, it could hardly be expected to function as an urban growth pole. As in other African countries, the rural areas were expected to support such artificial communities; it was not expected that they would support the rural areas. (Unfortunately there are no data indicating what share of their countries' GDP African cities generate.) Urban-based industries, which grew out of import-substitution policies, have benefited from the inexpensive services and facilities already available in the cities, but they have not always contributed to the extension of these services and facilities. From their genesis it is plain that these cities would be unable to absorb the flood of migrants that has recently flowed into them.

As a consequence, work in the formal sector of the economy is relatively scarce. Job tenure laws, minimum wage laws, social security levies and burdensome governmental procedures—even if their purpose is to reduce exploitation and raise welfare levels—tend to increase the cost of wage labour in the formal sector. By contrast, there are few disincentives to entry into the informal sector, which consists chiefly of self-employed persons or small-scale entrepreneurs employing a few others in manufacturing, trade or transport, mostly for domestic consumption by low-income households. The World Bank estimates that informal sector employment may account for as much as 75% of urban employment in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1990: 63). Nonetheless, labourers in the informal sector suffer many hardships which their competitors in the formal sector avoid: while entrepreneurs must struggle to avoid discriminatory government regulations and to acquire credit and land titles as well as water, electrical power and other basic services, wage earners cope with low pay, job insecurity and poor work environments. It is not surprising that the incidence of poverty in the informal sector is several times higher than it is in the formal sector.

**Services:** In the 1960s, when African economies were growing, urban authorities were not pressed to improve conditions in the urban areas. But as these economies began to decline in the late 1970s and especially the 1980s, city governments were increasingly incapable of financing basic services. In Nairobi, per capita expenditures on water and sewerage fell by 28% per year in the 1980s; in

| Table 7.1 Population Growth Rate(%) (1980-88) | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Total | Urban |
| Angola | 2.6 | 5.7 |
| Botswana | 3.6 | 8.2 |
| Burundi | 2.8 | 8.9 |
| Kenya | 4.1 | 8.2 |
| Lesotho | 2.8 | 7.0 |
| Madagascar | 3.1 | 6.1 |
| Malawi | 3.2 | 7.7 |
| Mozambique | 2.6 | 10.2 |
| Namibia | 3.1 | 5.6 |
| Rwanda | 3.4 | 7.9 |
| Somalia | 3.5 | 5.9 |
| Swaziland | 3.4 | 8.9 |
| Tanzania | 3.7 | 11.2 |
| Uganda | 3.4 | 5.2 |
| Zambia | 3.9 | 6.7 |
| Zimbabwe | 3.1 | 5.5 |

Dar es Salaam, per capita spending on all urban services fell by 11% per year in the same period (UNDP 1990: 87). Since wealthy neighborhoods tend to maintain or even expand their services during hard times, the greater part of the hardship fell to poor neighborhoods, which received no service extensions or experienced service declines. The impact on urban environments and productivity will in time be enormous. Urban deterioration has already become an enduring symbol of Africa's economic tragedy. Roads are littered with potholes, water systems are polluted, telephone services are unreliable, garbage disposal is sporadic or nonexistent, electrical power is a luxury unaffordable (in some places) even to government offices, shanty towns are choking the cities' perimeters, and growing numbers of the poor are squatting in the filth and squalor of dying cities.

Despite declining urban conditions, migration to the cities continues to increase because life in the rural areas is still perceived to be worse. At the same time, the poor migrant population is forced to adopt various survival strategies which, heavily influenced by their rural experiences, tend to ruralize urban life (Anyang' Nyong'o 1990: 7-8.). Since the formal housing sector cannot keep pace with the increasing urban population, most of the urban poor (about 76% in Dar es Salaam) live in unauthorized informal settlements which typically do not observe building codes, zoning restrictions or land use regulations (UNDP 1990: 88). Thus, mud huts and other make-shift shelters copying rural styles are frequently cramped into the peri-urban areas, along with fowl, goats and donkeys, without water or sanitation facilities even though the population density in that area requires urban services and urban

*Most African cities developed as administrative centres and cannot be readily converted into industrial centres*

infrastructure. Where city governments have attempted to cap unauthorized housing, or where rent control legislation discourages new construction, severe overcrowding is common, with many households living in a single room—in some cases alternating their periods of use throughout the day to relieve congestion (Ibid.).

Inadequate sanitation, contaminated water, chemical pollution and governmental harrassment (e.g. forcible evictions)—not to mention natural disasters such as floods and landslides—can have devastating effects on the urban poor, especially children, who are made even more vulnerable to insecurity and to vector-borne diseases than they would be in the rural areas. The lack of water and sewerage is particularly severe in most urban shanty towns. Data disaggregated according to location (e.g. rural, urban, peri-urban) are likely to show higher mortality and morbidity rates (especially for infectious diseases) prevailing in the poor urban neighbourhoods. Africa's cities, sadly, are not centres of production but centres of poverty (Anyang' Nyong'o 1990: 7-8).

**Planning**: While it is difficult to improve urban conditions in a shrinking economy, it is not impossible. Improvement requires governments to approach urban planning critically, but few African governments are prepared to do so. In Nairobi, for instance, building codes dating from the colonial period and tailored to colonial interests do not correspond with present realities. Because these codes are outdated and largely irrelevant, they are widely ignored, even by the city officials who are supposed to monitor their execution. Hence, in place of evolutionary urban plans which might promote the construction of efficient and well-managed

*A lack of urban planning has impeded the extension and improvement of basic urban services*

cities (with adequate access to light, water, ventilation and sanitation) there is effectively a lawless vacuum which permits the uninterrupted construction of concrete towers and squalid crowded slums. Many of these, lacking the most rudimentary services, breed desperation. Partly as a consequence, the urban areas are experiencing large increases in prostitution, violent crime and numbers of street children.

The typical structure of urban government complicates these problems. Most urban areas are governed from a single city hall which is itself under the direct control of the central government. Few elect their own administrations or control resources directly. This reflects the importance which African governments attach to their urban centres, but it also typically places decision-makers at a distance remote from the problems which they need to address. It impedes both the administrator's ability to understand the issues confronting the urban dwellers and his ability to implement and monitor reforms. In addition, corruption has ground down urban governments in many African countries as civic authorities have come to regard the state as a *duka* ("shop") which the governor uses to enrich himself (Anyang' Nyong'o 1990: 5). People harbour low expectations from a city hall which "doesn't work" and once this perception becomes widespread, officers in the city hall increasingly and remorselessly indulge in corrupt practices. Since central governments rarely initiate legal proceedings to punish the misuse of public funds, such misuse generally goes unchecked. Without an independent professional management group with adequate authority and access to resources, it will remain impossible for African cities to plan, build, maintain and administer the complex service systems which they need.

## Urban Reform

There are no easy solutions to the problems attending urban growth in ESA. The only effective solutions will require several huge and interrelated efforts: (i) building a productive base for planned urban development, (ii) establishing each city's fiscal and administrative independence by replacing central government grants with locally-raised revenue sources, (iii) promoting self-reliant strategies for the construction of housing and the extension and maintenance of infrastructure and (iv) reforming urban political institutions with a view to responsible

**Table 7.2**
Urban/Rural Access to Services (1980*, 1985) (%)

| Country | Health | Water | Sanitation |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Angola | 100/ 8* | 87/15 | 29/16 |
| Burundi | — | 98/21 | 84/56 |
| Ethiopia | — | 80/ 5 | 96/— |
| Mozambique | — | 38/ 9 | 53/12 |
| Rwanda | 60/25* | 79/48 | 77/55 |
| Somalia | 50/15 | 58/22 | 44/ 5 |
| Tanzania | 99/72* | 90/42 | 93/58 |
| Uganda | 90/57* | 37/18 | 32/30 |
| Zambia | 100/50 | 76/41 | 76/34 |

and accountable government (Anyang' Nyong'o 1990: 9; UNDP 1990: 7, 90-93).

Of these, the fourth is a prerequisite for adequate realization of the first three. While urban residents are usually willing to pay for the use and extension of city services, they must be able to see a direct link between payment and service delivery (UNDP 1990: 91). Plainly, if they have no faith in the will or the ability of the city government to make improvements, payments will not be readily forthcoming. Progress will remain elusive as long as city officials continue to view their offices as sinecures and employment outlets for their unqualified relatives. Officials must be trained to do their jobs well: they must be accountable for their actions, transparent in their use of public funds and responsive to the aspirations of their constituents. Promotions should be based on performance. If they were compelled to face the people in open and honest elections, their excesses might be checked: they would have an incentive to attend to the basic needs of their constituencies rather than the caprices of their relatively well-to-do friends.

To enable poor city residents to house themselves, city governments must be willing and able to increase the supply of urban land to the poor, guarantee their tenure, address their needs and conditions with innovative rules and regulations, and arbitrate disputes concerning ownership rights and landlord-tenant relations (Ibid.: 92) At the same time, building codes must be brought into line with present-day realities, roads and walkways should be improved, water and sanitation projects must be mapped out rationally, essential health services must be extended into the peri-urban areas and urban educational facilities must be constructed or improved.

Bringing democracy into Africa's largest cities will require a substantial devolution of fiscal and administrative power. Because communication systems in Africa are underdeveloped, and because public officials in Africa at present enjoy too much power over others, decentralizing these metropolitan governments into a federation of smaller units will promote the citizens' control of their representatives and therefore promote accountability. These smaller governments could levy their own taxes and establish their own budgets within the limits of a regulatory framework drawn on a city-wide basis. Lines of authority and accountability could be mapped out more clearly. At the same time, intercity transfers of resources—with the rich

neighborhoods subsidizing the extension of services to the poor neighborhoods—should also be mandated. In every case, the critically needy urban communities should have "first call" on communal resources.

Building a productive base for the cities is a still larger task, which will require the reconstruction of national economies in most ESA countries. Legislation will be needed not only to protect nascent import-substitution industries and to encourage (rather than suppress) the informal sector, but also to direct growth in these activities into the urban areas. Transport linkages to markets (both for sale and for the purchase of raw materials) should be improved. At the same time, industrial and residential areas should be carefully zoned to avoid unnecessary intercrowding, with its negative effects on health and well-being.

## UNICEF Initiatives

In this context, UNICEF's primary role will continue to be supporting the extension and improvement of urban basic services. UNICEF's efforts will be most effective if they provide assistance to strategies already adopted by urban people themselves. Programmes should focus on the protection of the whole child and involve full communities in planning and implementation. They should extend already existing basic services (including nonformal education) rather than invent new ones and they should operate within family and community structures rather than institutional ones. By complementing the survival strategies developed by the poor themselves, programmes are more likely to be continuous and sustainable as external funding is withdrawn. A key objective should be the integration of NGO and government programmes both to reduce duplication and to enhance complementarity.

At the advocacy level, UNICEF should persuade central governments to grant city managers greater autonomy and, in a parallel effort, promote responsible government among city managers. Urban planning (especially for water and sanitation projects) should be widely encouraged and assisted. The informal sector of the urban economy should be recognized and harnessed for the publication of information about health and education and for the spread of health services. Where small and intermediate cities already have strong rural links, investments in their public infrastructure and services may

*Reforming urban political institutions is a necessary component of any long-term solution to the problems attending urban growth*

enhance nonfarm employment opportunities for surplus rural labour as well as shorten migration distances.

Finally, central governments should be encouraged to reverse their urban development bias. In the past, excessive concentration on urban development has shifted resources away from rural development activities which would promote growth *and* assist the poor towards activities which would accomplish either objective (if at all) at the other's expense (Lipton 1990: 154). The agricultural and industrial sectors have a symbiotic relationship: that is, efficient industrialization is nearly impossible without a prior transformation of the rural sector (through major resource inputs), not merely for the sake of urban-industrial growth but also for the sake of the rural poor themselves. Rural development will also promote self-reliance in the production of basic necessities and slow the rate of rural outmigration by encouraging people to remain in the rural areas.

# Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances

Children under fifteen years of age comprise 46% of the ESA population. In ESA, perhaps 20% or more of children under fifteen are in especially difficult circumstances—circumstances which deny their most basic human rights. These are the street children, working children, abandoned children, neglected and abused children and children exposed to armed conflicts or natural disasters. Increasingly, they include HIV-infected children and AIDS orphans.

## Street Children and Working Children

Perhaps the largest group of children in especially difficult circumstances are street children and working children. Because most street children are working children, these two groups are typically treated together. By juxtaposing socio-economic statistics correlated with "streetism" (i.e. statistics on unemployment, urban poverty, school (non-) attendence and female-headed households), it is possible to estimate the range of children who are vulnerable to life on the streets (UNICEF Namibia: 1991). Unfortunately, no ESA country has conducted a compre-hensive study of street children and few have systematic local studies. Namibia and Zimbabwe, with relatively detailed studies of street children in selected urban centres, are important exceptions.

Children's work may be necessary and beneficial to the child (socializing her and increasing her capacity for responsible behaviour) but it should not be exploitative and it should not interfere with the her schooling. (Ironically children are sometimes forced to work in order to pay school fees which their families cannot afford (UNICEF 1990c: 200).) A child's work becomes exploitative when it encroaches on her development, e.g. when she labours under unsafe and hazardous conditions (mining, quarrying, lifting heavy weights, etc.) or when she is forced into labour at an early age or at the expense of her education (UNICEF 1986a: 8). Exploitative work may retard a child's growth, increase her exposure to accidents and environmental hazards, entail prolonged

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**Box 8.1**

**Estimating the Number of Street Children in Namibia**

Approximately 470,000 of Namibia's 1.6 million people are under fifteen years old. About 27% (or 127,000) of these children are urban. On the assumption that poverty, school non-attendence and female-headed households place urban children at a higher risk of "streetism", we can estimate the range of children who are at risk in Namibia. About 55% (or 70,000) of Namibia's urban children have families living in "absolute poverty" and about 40% (or 51,000) have parents who are unemployed. At the same time, between 16% and 25% of urban children (or 20,000 to 32,000) do not attend school and between 20% and 57% (or 25,000 and 72,000) live in female-headed households. Taking the mean between the lowest and highest figures above indicates that perhaps 46,000 children are vulnerable to life on the streets in Namibia. Assuming that one in twenty of those vulnerable are in fact street children, Namibia has about 2,300 street children (UNICEF Namibia).

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separations from her family, restrict her access to basic health and education or foster unhealthy psychological and emotional dependencies. Some child "work" is so exploitative that it should be eliminated completely, e.g. bonded labour, military service, prostitution and drug trafficking.

**Working children with regular family contacts:** Most working children (about 75%

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**Table 8.1**

**Some Statistics on Street Children in Harare**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Male 69.5% | Female 30.5% | |
| Age | 0-6 yrs 17% | 7-13 yrs 44.5% | 14-18 yrs 33.5% |
| Address | outside 15% | inside 85% | |
| Education | none 22% | primary 57% | secondary 21% |
| Custody | alone 7.5% | parents/ relatives 80.5% | friends 9.5% |
| Work | vending 46% | guarding or washing cars 16% | escorting disabled 15% |
| Work group | alone 41.5% | with peers/ friends 16% | with parents/ relatives 12% |
| Earnings (daily) | Z$0-5 53% | Z$6-10 20.5% | Z$11-15 15.5% |
| Spending | clothes 32% | food 32.5% | school 12.6% |
| Time on streets | < 1 yr 33.5% | 1-2 yrs 19.5% | 2-3 yrs 16.5% |
| Motivation | poverty 60% | parents 20% | abuse 3.5% |
| Parents' schooling | none 12% | primary 32% | secondary 16% |
| Parents' status | employed 25% | unemployed 58% | unknown 17% |

FORCES OF DISINTEGRATION      FORCES OF INTEGRATION

Loss of family    Children of    Street and special
         the street      child services

Increasing risk    Children on    Street and urban
of family loss      the street      basic services

Increasing risk    Children in    Integrated urban
of family weakening    their homes    basic services

*Source*: UNICEF Namibia 1990: 3.

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(UNICEF 1986a: 9)) are employed within the family, on the farm or in the home, and turn over their earnings to family uses. This is especially true of girls, who often work on the farm **and** do household work or care for younger children. Such work may not be intentionally exploitative. Often death, divorce or the departure of the father has left the mother reliant on children's contributions to the family income. Even in very poor two-parent families, child labour may be the result of structurally-imposed necessities as the family struggles to maintain its real income in a declining economy. In ESA, this problem is particularly acute in poorer rural communities, where children provide critical labour as herders, farm hands or water and firewood gatherers but miss the education system as a consequence. Others who attend school— and may be working in order to afford school—are usually one or two grades below their expected level.

Children in this first and largest category

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of working children typically go home to a family or a household and therefore do not feel abandoned. For these children, interventions increasing family or community awareness of exploitative labour and its ill effects as well as improving family and community environments (e.g. through improved access to basic services, credit institutions, income-generating activities and family planning services) may be most helpful (Ibid.). In some cases, nutritional services or financial aid for education purposes may be especially effective.

**Children with casual and inadequate family contacts**: A second group, who constitute about 20% of working children, work outside the family as labourers in factories or on commercial farms, or as indentured servants or apprentices, earning poor wages (or none at all) and suffering extremely unsafe or unhealthy conditions (Ibid.: 9-10). These children frequently have casual and inadequate ties to their families and frequently operate on the wrong side of the law. The working conditions of such children typically escape regulation because they are concentrated in the informal sector (which consists in illegal or unregistered shops and factories largely concealed from labour inspectors) or in the agricultural or domestic service sectors (which are usually exempted from child labour legislation (UNICEF 1990c: 201)). Others engage in petty trade or petty services (e.g. shoe-shining, car-parking and car-washing) to earn a few dollars and stay ahead of the law by packing up shop and fleeing whenever the law threatens.

**Children with no family contacts**: A third, more powerless group of children (the remaining 5%) have no family support whatsoever, because they have abandoned their families (runaways) or because their families have abandoned them (e.g. because their parents are too young or too old to care for them) or because circumstances (deaths, "disappearances", incarcerations or sudden and confusing evacuations) have separated them and their families (Ibid.: 9-10). As growing urbanisation continues to rend the fabric of Africa's traditional multi-generational families, abandonment and separation will become more common. These children have no experience of an ordinary "home" environment and, unlike the first two groups, there is little or no prospect for reintegrating these children into their families. Children who lack the support of a loving family, especially in war contexts, suffer emotional alienation and economic marginalization which may push them into anti-social work (such as begging, stealing, drug trafficking, prostitution or military service) simply to survive. For the eight or ten year old child prostitute, the risk of HIV infection is as high as 50% and the use of protective prophylactics

virtually nil. Intra-venous drug use—which frequently brings HIV infection—is also a growing problem.

These children are the real street children: the street is their only home. They live together in gangs under one or more gang-leaders; they suffer continual police harrassment; they survive on food found in dust-bins or bought from meagre earnings; when there is no food, they drug their bodies to conceal the pain of hunger; they view any job as honourable and see no wrong with dishonourable activities when their survival hangs in the balance. Typically their parents were poor, possibly alcoholics, possibly child-abusers, often street people themselves. They lived in crowded shanties in peri-urban areas zoned for industries or higher-income housing estates; their belongings have been bulldozed and burnt to ashes; their communities have been ravaged by epidemics; their businesses have been reduced to rubble.

These street children need to be reintegrated into family-like environments which provide humane working and living conditions as well as access to basic health and educational services. Abandoned children should be taken into willing families through adoption. Child and parent tracing projects should be strengthened—preferably with the use of computerized databases—to reunite lost children with their families and thus restore family life as much as possible. Where these alternatives are unavailable, special services must be provided to improve the survival skills of these children, to improve their working and living conditions, and to link them with child-related institutions (e.g. schools and community resource centres). In some cities (e.g. Addis Ababa) the sheer numbers of street children may mean that providing a caring instutition, education and vocational training and health and nutrition services is the most that is possible, with limited success being normal.

All working children would benefit tremendously from either of two educational strategies (if there were the political will to implement them): (i) provide free primary education to poor children and (ii) make school hours (or children's working hours) more flexible to accommodate the workplace (or the classroom) and integrate the standard curriculum with practical work-related instruction tailored to the specific needs of the children (UNICEF 1990c: 202). This strategy seeks to convert work from an obstacle into a vehicle for child development (UNICEF 1986a: 10). Most working and street children have never attended school or have dropped out as a consequence of gender discrimination, work demands, socio-political disadvantages or negative perceptions of the value of literacy. With older students who need to work at least part-time and who suffer

severe socio-economic disadvantages, educational programmes will need to be informal and highly flexible with respect to students' ages, grade structures, attendence requirements, course duration, teaching methods, class times and locations and demands for accreditation. Curricular content will require substantial revision to meet situational needs, with special emphasis on obedience to the law, health (especially AIDS and drug abuse), and basic arithmetic and accounting. Teachers will also need to be atypical, with nonprofessionals such as former street children perhaps providing the best frontline offensive. Vocational training (e.g. through apprenticeship to local artisans) should also be promoted.

For working children of every category, working and living conditions should be improved. Informal recreation in youth clubs or sporting clubs would help to discipline these children and add some joy to their lives. At the same time, programmes should be created with the objective of empowering the child worker to enhance his self-esteem and his economic return (e.g. fair wages and regulated work hours) (UNICEF 1986a: 10). Community-based projects which reduce the risk of separation of children from families should be strengthened. Assistance to single parents (e.g. food supplements, education grants) should be more regularly forthcoming. Governments should raise their citizen's awareness of working children, emphasizing the detriments which occur to the child's long term development, and should give more authority to labour inspectors and child welfare workers to monitor and enforce strengthened child labour protection laws.

## Abused and Neglected children

A second category of children in especially difficult circumstances are children who have been neglected or abused. Children are neglected when they do not receive even the minimally necessary amount of proper physical, emotional and psychological support: that is, their guardians take a passive role in their upbringing. A frequent result of such neglect is malnutrition or disease and, in

*Street children and working children should be reintegrated into their families and provided with secure access to basic health and educational services*

extreme cases, death. Abused children are children who have been subjected to physical, sexual or psychological mistreatment (battery, rape (especially incestual rape), or lack of love or interest in the child), usually by a parent or a teacher or some other person close to the child—in a family or an institutional context—and charged with the child's protection and assistance. Child abandonment is probably the most destructive and permanent form of child abuse and neglect. Children who are especially likely to be abused or neglected are girls, orphans, adopted children, sick and handicapped children, or children with physical or behavioural disorders (UNICEF 1986a: 11).

Perhaps ten percent of the region's children suffer from abuse or neglect, but it is difficult to make a reliable estimate. Data collection concerning child abuse and neglect in ESA continues to be unsystematic, existing (in fragmentary and unreliable form) chiefly in police records, hospital records and social workers' reports or in the files of organizations such as the African Network on Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect. (For instance, 1984-88 hospital records for children under 10 admitted to Nairobi's Kenyatta National Hospital with a diagnosis of rape or battered child syndrome show that, of 30 cases, most (18 or 60%) involve children under one and a slight majority (53%) involve boys (Nduati 1989: 43). But such information, however interesting, will provide little programme guidance without substantial additions.) Until data are collected routinely and systematically from a wide range of sources and for a wide range of incidents, the extent of child abuse and neglect can only be estimated, its causal complexities only vaguely understood, and preventive inter-ventions only weakly determined or assessed.

Improved data collection is urgently required, particularly as some UNICEF country offices (e.g. Mauritius) have reported apparent increases in child abuse and neglect. These countries are advocating child protection legislation both to promote awareness of the problem and to curtail its occurrence. Such efforts should be extended to all countries: UNICEF must promote efforts to build awareness (among families, communities, non-governmental organisa- tions, labour unions, law enforcement authorities and government policy makers) and to share experiences, both to improve detection and to gather data on the numbers of children affected and the severity of the abuse or neglect which affects them.

Designing appropriate cost-effective interventions to combat child abuse and neglect presents a huge challenge: approaches in the developed world tend to rely on high- cost professional assistance which is not feasible in the developing world. In ESA,

prevention and treatment are likely to rely heavily on family support, legislative responses, national health policies and community education and mobilization. For abandoned children, as for street children, family-like groupings (such as caretaker families and group homes within a regular community) should be promoted to return these children to a normal environment. The implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child needs to be monitored and abuses of the Convention must be identified and stopped.

## Children Exposed to Armed Conflict

A third category of children in especially difficult circumstances are children who live in the midst of armed conflict. These are child refugees, displaced children, stateless children, children suffering from war-related handicaps or war-aggravated malnutrition and children who have been orphaned or separated from their parents by war. Recent hostilies in Rwanda and protracted conflicts in Uganda, in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan) and in Southern Africa (chiefly Angola and Mozambique, but also Namibia and Zambia, not to mention South Africa itself) have condemned huge numbers of children to upbringings with no experience of plenty or peaceful times. While Namibia is emerging from Southern Africa's nightmare, the reintegration of 44,000 returnees into their local communities (where they need food rations, agricultural kits, improved health services (i.e. essential drugs, vaccines and cold chain equipment) as well as emergency school programmes for the adjustment period) gives some indication of the immense scale of this problem in ESA.

Perhaps most pitiable in this category is the child soldier. In Uganda between 1980 and 1986, soldiers cared for hundreds of orphaned children between the ages of 4 and 16: as many as 90% of these, out of desperation, became "soldiers" themselves (Kasosi 1988). Such children are typically socialized away from their families and communities and indoctrinated with a set of cramped moral values which make a virtue of inhumane behaviour. In some cases, children have been forced to turn against their own families, even to the point of killing them. Particular efforts must be made to demobilize these child soldiers, both physically and psychologically: UNICEF must help to rehabilitate them, to adjust them to civilian life, to treat their emotional trauma and to give them schooling and skills training.

UNICEF's unifying theme for inter- ventions intended to assist children exposed to armed conflict is "Children as a Zone of Peace". Under this theme, UNICEF country offices in armed conflict situations work to promote compliance with international laws protecting women and children, to protect

*Developing cost- effective interventions to prevent and treat child abuse and neglect presents a large challenge*

services and institutions directed to children's needs and to extend and improve children's access to these services. Much of this work profits enormously from the collaboration of other agencies, especially ICRC and UNHCR, as well as NGOs and religious groups.

## Children Exposed to Natural Disaster

Children who are victims of natural disasters are a fourth group in especially difficult circumstances. In ESA, drought-induced famines in Ethiopia and Somalia and (potentially) Angola, Mozambique and Zambia continue to afflict millions of people. Many of these natural calamities occur (or are exacerbated) not simply because climatic and geological events conspire terribly, but also because warring parties use famine as a military weapon (e.g. Ethiopia in 1984-85 and Mozambique in 1983-84) or because poverty and rapid population increases force people in marginal localities to engage in environmentally destructive activities as part of their effort to survive.

Although UNICEF can do little to prevent depraved governments or rebel groups from using natural calamities to murder whole populations indiscriminately, it can help willing parties to design preventive programmes which aim to reduce vulnerability, to inculcate environmentally sound resource exploitation, and to strengthen family and community capacities to survive natural disasters (e.g. improving early warning systems and disaster preparedness). In all cases, relief efforts should consist in appropriate supplies targeted to the most needy and they should be kept to minimal amounts to preempt dependency. Relief interventions should also be linked to sustainable development—they should not undermine traditional coping strategies or accentuate social and political divisions and they should continue beyond the emergency period to rehabilitate services, restore livelihoods and improve community and family life. Making maximum use of local inputs and talents as well as existing administrative structures, relief efforts should aim above all to help people to help themselves. Throughout the emergency period, family and community structures should be protected as much as possible to enable them to continue or resume functioning as natural units once the emergency passes. Refugee camps should be a last resort. Once again, collaboration with NGOs, other agencies (WFP, WHO, UNHCR) and religious organizations will bear the most fruit.

## HIV-Infected Children and AIDS Orphans

Children who are victims of AIDS constitute a fifth category of children in especially difficult circumstances. These include children who are AIDS orphans (i.e. whose parents have died of AIDS) as well as children who are themselves infected with HIV or

AIDS. For the AIDS-infected child, life is a futile struggle against powerful wasting illnesses which ends in death, usually before the age of two. Very little can be done for him, either to relieve his pain or to extend his life: his ill-birth sharply limits his potential, giving him life in exchange for continuous suffering and premature death. The AIDS orphan, even if he has escaped perinatal infection, will often be a vagabond, shuffled from one guardian to another—from aged and infirm grandparents to aunts and uncles, who may themselves soon die of AIDS, or to slightly older siblings who (at the age of thirteen or fourteen) may be forced to become heads of households. For the teenage girl who has missed perinatal HIV transmission, there is the additional threat of coercive relationships with older men who seek sexual relations which carry a low risk of HIV infection. Since such men have frequently had other sexual partners, they may themselves be carriers: hence their girl partners are exposed not merely to the risk of early pregnancy but also to a greater risk of HIV infection.

The struggle against AIDS is chiefly a struggle against prevailing attitudes and behaviour patterns. WHO, UNICEF and other agencies must spread correct information about the disease, with special efforts to reach teenagers before they become sexually active, to help people to protect themselves from HIV infection. Women's control over their sexual lives must be increased both because they are the primary victims of HIV/AIDS in Africa and because the most effective way to prevent the spread of HIV in children is to contain the spread of HIV in women. At the same time, community-based and culturally-acceptable caregiving systems are urgently required for AIDS orphans, expected (in

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**Box 8.5**
Other Categories of Children
in Especially Difficult Circumstances

To the (relatively well-researched) sub-groups of children in expecially difficult circumstances we may add five others, which have been largely overlooked. These include (vi) *institutionalized children* who, whether they live in prisons or orphanages or mental hospitals, often live in very poor conditions; (vii) *children of minority parents who are subject to discrimination* and therefore confronted with fairly intransigent socio-economic barriers to their advancement; (viii) *children of nomads*, who rarely benefit from basic health services and who often miss the educational system (e.g. Somalia); (ix) *disabled children*, whether the cause of disability is war, disease or injury (e.g. war-shattered Angola, which has the largest number of amputees per capita in the world (Inter-Agency Task Force 1989: )); and finally (x) *children of migrant workers*, who live in families contorted by generations of the migrant labour system, typically with absentee fathers and overworked mothers (especially in Lesotho, southern Mozambique and northern Namibia).

central Africa) to include between 3.1 and 5.5 million children under 15 by the year 2000 (Preble 1990: 679).

## UNICEF Initiatives

Six working principles have guided UNICEF's response to children in especially difficult circumstances since 1986 (UNICEF 1986: 3). These include: (i) reducing the risk of child victimization through the introduction of family- and community-oriented preventive strategies; (ii) treating the victimized child as a whole person, with attention to the child's physical, emotional and psychological needs; (iii) nesting interventions within family and community structures rather than institutional ones; (iv) adapting and strengthening traditional communal values rather than introducing individualistic "modern" ones; (v) extending and improving existing services rather than introducing parallel ones; and (vi) adding new services targeted on the unique difficulties which victimized children encounter (e.g. informal education). For all strategies, it is critical to realize that the children themselves are the main resource.

Whatever sort of difficult circumstances children may face, special efforts must be made to ensure that such children have access to basic government services, particularly health care and education. This requires advocacy: governments and non-governmental agencies must review policies and adapt and extend them to reflect this aim. Such children would also benefit from the passage and subsequent enforcement of appropriate protective legislation (e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child) addressing the difficult circumstances which they confront. As a general preventive measure—difficult to achieve but most effective if achieved—families and communities in difficult circumstances should be empowered (by building family and community capacities and promoting their self-reliance) to fulfil their nurturing and caring roles.

Interventions intending to benefit working children will take a variety of forms. Where working children continue to live with their families, efforts to improve family and community environments and to increase awareness of the ill effects of exploitative child labour would be most helpful. Where children have only casual links with their families, efforts should focus on maintaining and strengthening these links. Where children are without family contacts, they need to be reintegrated into family-like environments which provide access to basic health and educational services as well as to special services directed to improving their survival skills. For all types of working children, initiatives designed to improve working and living conditions and to reduce (or rearrange) working hours to enable them to attend school and to be with their families are critical.

Nonetheless, special programmes which are tailored to the needs of specific localities must be created and implemented. Some of the UNICEF country offices in ESA are pushing forward with these. Such programmes frequently employ preventive strategies, both at the family and the community levels, with a focus on improving school enrolment and completion rates. In Kenya, for example, CEDC strategies aim both to improve children's access to education and to build family capacities for raising children. Women's groups are being encouraged to develop and manage pre-schools in squatter settlements; parents of street children are being loaned money to help keep their children in school; regular schools (as well as vocational and skills training programmes for school drop-outs) are being strengthened and supported; and graduates of training programmes are being provided with tools and start-up funds to ease their transition into the work force. Where children are forced to remain outside of the school system, working as hawkers or beach boys, efforts are being made to improve the marketing of their wares and to obtain relief from government harrassment.

In Mozambique, with the continuing war, similar efforts remain a major preoccupation. UNICEF is training additional staff for community-based pre-schools as well as expanding the social welfare task force with additional child care professionals. Pilot projects focussed on disabled children and urban street children in the bairros of Maputo and the Northern provinces are building pre-schools and community resource centres which will provide mothers with teaching materials, locally made toys and training for income-generation as well as act as a focal point for pre-schooling efforts. As nascent research centres, these community centres will also produce children's books concerning subjects such as local folk tales, child rights and Facts for Life. At the same time, liaisons with local church groups may promote children's activities such as pottery, weaving, and child newspaper reporting as well as lead to improved water systems and greater access to health clinics.

*Interventions should rely on existing community structures and traditional communal values*

# Conflicts and Wars

**Military Spending**: In 1987 seven of the ten most militarized countries in sub-Saharan Africa were in ESA. These include Angola (1st), Ethiopia (2nd), Mozambique (3rd), Zimbabwe (4th), Somalia (7th), Tanzania (8th) and Zambia (10th) (Deger 1990: 27). All of these countries are involved in inter- or intra-state conflicts either in the Horn of Africa or in Southern Africa. For five ESA countries, military spending more than doubled over 1975-80, with Ethiopia recording 197% growth, Kenya 176%, Malawi 110%, Zimbabwe 114.5% and Mozambique an alarming 692% (Ibid.). Military spending fell through 1980-88 in most of ESA (excepting Angola—which showed positive growth of 129%—Botswana, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia), with most of the fall coming after 1986-87, when it became apparent that cutbacks in social services alone would not stem Africa's economic crisis (Ibid.). Yet, even when growth in military spending slowed, because the demand for military security dominates the demand for social welfare improvements in many ESA governments, it slowed less than spending in other sectors and remained high as a percentage of total government spending. Over the whole period (1975-88), the quantity and quality of weapons in sub-Saharan Africa has increased markedly, with the stock of tanks and military aircraft doubling and with missile systems moving into nineteen countries in addition to Nigeria (the only holder in 1975).

**War-Related Death and Disaster**: The military buildup in ESA has occurred in a period of human history which has seen unparalleled proof of man's barbarity. While an almost chivalrous soldier's ethic kept civilian casualties below 10% in World War I, modern military machines waging "total war" do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, with the result that civilian casualities have accounted for 80-90% of all casualties in recent wars.

War kills and in ESA the majority of those killed are children, dying directly from pangas, bullets and missiles, or indirectly from the

| Table 9.1 Average Annual Rate of U5MR Reduction (%) | | |
|---|---|---|
| Country | 1960-1980 | 1980-1989 |
| Angola | 1.2 | -0.9 |
| Ethiopia | 0.6 | 0.1 |
| Kenya | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| Mozambique | 1.2 | -1.8 |
| Zambia | 2.2 | 1.7 |

destruction of essential services or the disruption of relief and commercial supplies. Not surprisingly, there appears to be a negative correlation between military spending and mortality rate reduction. Recent studies show that the average annual rate of reduction in under five mortality rates slowed considerably for seven of ESA countries between 1960 and 1987. Of these seven, five are in war-affected regions (Ibid.). War also brings higher rates of disability, not merely from injury but also from war-induced malnutrition. These disabilities can be permanent. Children are especially at risk because rehabilitation services typically favour adults (especially soldiers and working males). UNICEF estimates that fewer than 20% of the war-disabled children in Angola and Mozambique receive prosthetic devices (UNICEF 1990c: 195). For the 80% without, deformities worsen as their skeletons grow.

War also brings anxiety, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, unrelieved stress over long periods and the collapse of ordinary family life. The resulting psychological trauma may extend over generations. Children become violent, defiant, war-obsessed—in play, in conversations, in attitudes to human life. Child soldiers (often recruited by conscription or forceful abduction) are socialized away from their families and communities and inculcated with warped moral values which make a virtue of killing. Rudely treated themselves, they extend the same inhumane treatment to their victims. At times they are even forced to betray or to murder their own parents or siblings (UNICEF 1990c: 195). Other children, who escape

*Military expenditures continue to dominate social expenditures in many ESA economies*

**Table 9.2**
**War-Related Deaths in Southern Africa (1980-1990)**

| Country | Infants & Children | All deaths |
|---|---|---|
| Mozambique | 666,000 | 1,100,000 |
| Angola | 453,000 | 650,000 |
| Zambia | 52,500 | 55,000 |
| Namibia | 35,000 | 57,000 |
| Malawi | 27,000 | 27,100 |
| Tanzania | 25,000 | 25,250 |
| TOTAL | 1,258,500 | 1,914,350 |

Source: *Children on the Front Line III* (draft).

direct involvement, may be separated from their families by death, conscription, abandonment, incarceration, "disappearance" or the confusion of evacuation (Ibid.). Such children—confronting the nightmare of warfare alone—are doubly disadvantaged.

War also distorts national production tremendously. War spending competes directly with social spending for government revenues and the largest portion of the war budget is spent on unproductive purchases such as the salaries of military personnel and the acquisition and rehabilitation of military infrastructure. At the same time, the wanton destruction of productive infrastructure (especially schools, health clinics, water and sanitation facilities, power and transportation networks) is frequently a key tactic of one or more of the warring parties. As the juggernaut

of war advances through the countryside, pushing waves of refugees ahead of it, production in rural subsistence economies collapses, throwing many very poor people onto the threshold of starvation.

**Refugees and Displaced Children**: The situation of illegal refugees and internally displaced children is especially urgent. These children suffer many of the same difficulties which beset legal refugee children: poverty, disease, malnutrition, interrupted educations, unsanitary camp conditions and emotional trauma which may engender behavioural complexities such as distrust, anxiety, vengence, aggression (ANPPCAN 1990: 11). They too may be deprived of access to objects and symbols which are central to the maintenance of their socio-cultural identity. But, while UNHCR assists legal refugees—displaced persons who flee across borders and receive refugee status from their host governments—those who remain within their countries must look to their own governments for assistance and those who are "illegal" can make no official claim for assistance anywhere. WFP, UNICEF and other organizations typically await an official government request for assistance before responding to such emergency situations. When one or another warring party refuses to cooperate with relief workers or cannot guarantee their security, relief and rehabilitation services are effectively cut off, leaving these children severely alone.

## Southern Africa

**Lost GDP Growth**: Over 1980-90, South Africa's total military engagement in Southern Africa—designed to destabilize the SADCC countries socially and politically and to entrench their dependency on South Africa economically—has cost the SADCC countries (including Namibia) over $95b in lost GDP (counting lost growth), with Angola ($42.5b) and Mozambique ($22.7b) bearing the brunt of the loss.[1] This sum is about three times Southern Africa's total production in 1990 or about $1,085 per person. War-related expenditures in all SADCC countries were running at about $10b (or 43% of achieved GDP) per annum through-out the 1980s, with Angola and Mozambique reporting losses of about 90% and 110% of achieved GDP in 1988 (Ibid.: 4, 6). For weak economies with limited financial resources and large populations living below the poverty line, such losses have been devastating in human terms. At the same time, South Africa has extended soft loans and other favours to African countries beyond the front-line states to divide Africa's response to *apartheid*. This combination of bribes and punishments was part of South Africa's "total strategy" for

**Figure 9.1**
**War-Related Deaths in Southern Africa (millions) (1980-1990)**



Adults    Infants and Children
Total Adults    Total Infants and Children

Source: *Children on the Front Line III*, (draft).

making itself a regional superpower to be feared by its neighbors and ignored at their peril.

**Inflated Child Mortality**: Destabilization may be the largest single contributor to infant and child deaths in Southern Africa (Morgan 1990: 1), with many of these resulting indirectly from the destruction of essential services or disruptions of relief and commercial supplies. In Mozambique, mass terrorism has damaged or destroyed about 40% of rural water systems as well as health care facilities previously serving about five million people (Inter-Agency Task Force 1989: 21). About 500,000 children have been cut from school enrolments and about 250,000 children have been orphaned or separated from their families (Ibid.). In Angola as much as 25% of health and education facilities and 75% of communal water supplies have been destroyed, affecting as many as two million people (Ibid.: 27). Counting deaths resulting directly from pangas, guns and missiles and indirectly from war-aggravated famine as well as the "excess" in infant and child mortality rates resulting from the breakdown of essential services, war in the SADCC countries claimed the lives of more than 1.25 million children and 650,000 adults between 1980 and 1990. South Africa's aggression has cost Angola and Mozambique alone over 12 children's lives *per hour* for most of the last decade.

**Refugee Populations**: In addition, the war has displaced over seven million people, with 1.3 million crossing borders, and the remainder—1.5 million in Angola and 4.6 million in Mozambique (including about 1.5 million nominally resettled *affectados* (Green 1990a: 21))—internally displaced. Half the populations of Angola and Mozambique (12 million people) have been forced from their homes at least once, often with the loss of their possessions (Inter-Agency Task Force 1989: 15). Frequently they have had to rely on food aid for survival. Large concentrations of Mozambican refugees in Malawi (850,000), Zimbabwe (100,000), Tanzania (100,000)[2] and Swaziland (60,000) have seriously upset ecological balances and deteriorated basic water, health and education services in the over-crowded border areas (UNICEF 1991). Zambia has similar problems coping with over 300,000 refugees, 80% Angolan and 20% Mozambican. Since external aid for refugees is weak, they place a heavy financial burden on host households (who pay about 50% of their costs) and host governments (who pay another 25%).

**Disrupted Trade Patterns**: The key component of South Africa's destabilization strategy has been the destruction of the sub-region's trade routes, public utilities and large

**Figure 9.2**
Trade with South Africa (as a percentage of total trade) (1985)

*Source*: Van Staden 1990.

foreign-exchange-earning production units (plants, mines, commercial farm estates). Coastal Angola and Mozambique have been the main targets, suffering direct South African commando raids as well as insurrections mounted by South African proxies (RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA—also receiving U.S. support—in Angola). Mozambique's railway corridors, the trade lifeline for landlocked Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, have been extensively and repeatedly bombed in a campaign which has been broadened to a general assault on Mozambican society and government authority. Mass terrorism has reduced the Mozambican economy to one-half of its peace-time strength, cutting deeply into rural production levels, absorbing entirely the narrow food security margins of poor rural households and preventing emergency relief from reaching those who need it most. At the same time, poor urban households (joined by about one million migrants fleeing the insecurity of the countryside) can no longer rely on rural food surpluses for food (Ibid.: 21).

By diverting the sub-region's natural trade flows into its own territory, South Africa has brought sharp losses in trade and export revenues to the SADCC ten. At the same time, it has increased revenues to its own economy, found a means to evade sanctions and gained an economic weapon over critical neighbors (i.e. it may block trade, withdraw railway services or delay critical import and export flows—as well as expel migrant workers). Trade data show clearly that the sub-region's economy exhibits a dependency structure with South Africa and (to a lesser extent) Zimbabwe at the core and the remaining SADCC countries on the periphery.

*South Africa's military aggression cost Angola and Mozambique more than twelve children's lives per hour for most of the 1980s*

## Box 9.1
### Inside South Africa

By June 1991, President De Klerk and his government had repealed the Land Acts, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act, submitting apartheid to its final agony. The Land Acts (promulgated in 1913 and 1936 and intended to purge white South Africa of its "black spots") had reserved 87% of South Africa's land for the white population and divided the remaining 13% into ten "black" bantustans. The Group Areas Act (as amended in 1966) segregated residential communities according to race and the Population Registration Act (promulgated in 1950 and the key to the apartheid regime) classified South African citizens according to the colour of their skin.

Although these announcements were greeted with joy in many parts of South Africa, the road to a post-apartheid South Africa is still filled with obstacles. The government's failure in May 1991 to meet ANC ultimata has resulted in a breakdown in the talks preparing for formal negotiations. In addition, although the government and the ANC agree that the new constitution should recognize a unitary state governed on the principle of one person one vote, they harbour many substantive and procedural disagreements, with the government insisting both that it is able to oversee constitutional negotiations with disinterest and that any constitutional agreement must decentralize power radically and incorporate structural guarantees for the protection of minority interests.

At the same time, violence has intensified in South Africa, with almost 26,000 murders and culpable homicides in 1990 alone. Many people, particularly children, are living in insecure neighbourhoods with no hope for effective protection. Right-wing violence has increased significantly, especially since the government amended its white paper on land reform to acknowledge that reparations may be due to the 3.5 million people who have been forcibly removed from their land since 1960. The economy is also suffering as investors keep their capital out of an unstable market and as unemployment and inflation reach new highs (30% and 16% respectively). Nonetheless, the desire to conclude formal negotiations before the present constitution forces another election in the white parliament suggests that a post-apartheid South Africa will exist by 1994.

Despite being the focus of economic sanctions, South Africa has increased its exports to Africa four-fold in real terms, from R890 in 1984 to R2,800 in 1988 (20% of its total exports). Over the same period, it increased its imports from Africa two-fold, from R404m to R870m (Van Staden 1990: 26). These figures also show that South Africa runs a trade surplus with the rest of Africa.

Against this background, SADCC has reduced regional dependence on South Africa modestly, expanding non-South African, intra-regional trade by several hundred million dollars (Green 1990b: 4). Recent efforts to expand economic coordination beyond the transport and communications sectors are encouraging. Nonetheless, within the SADCC ten, trade is concentrated on a Botswana-Zimbabwe axis with Zimbabwean exports dominating generally (Ibid.: 10). Thus there has been little progress in reducing regional disparities within SADCC. Zimbabwe, starting from a position of comparative industrial advantage, has exploited regional tariff agreements to raise manufacturing's contribution to GDP from 26% at independence to 40% now (Van Staden 1990:

27). Lesotho and Swaziland—almost wholly embraced by the South African market—continue to have as their only reasonable economic option managed dependency on South Africa.

**Recent Improvements**: Recent reforms in South Africa suggest that its military engagement in Southern Africa is ending. South Africa has largely withdrawn its military forces in the sub-region since its 1988 defeat at Cuito Cuanavale and, although private financing continues to support hostilities in some places, the prospects for peace seem better now than they have been at any time since 1975. In Mozambique, reconstruction has outpaced destruction for four consecutive years. RENAMO's military position is deteriorating north of Maputo province and—since June 1990, when South African forces finally heeded their government—in Maputo province itself (Green 1990b: 14). At the same time, RENAMO is very unlikely to enjoy electoral success in the proposed 1991 multi-party elections. As its external backers fall away, RENAMO will be forced to negotiate peace from a weakening bargaining position. In Angola, the governing MPLA and the UNITA rebels have observed a UN-policed cease-fire since 30 May 1991, ending sixteen years of civil war. As part of the cease-fire agreement, Angola will guarantee freedom of the press, permit multi-party elections (now scheduled for late 1992) and integrate rebel and government forces into a unitary army. At the same time, U.S. military assistance to UNITA will end.

Despite destabilization, Southern Africa's general economic and agricultural balance has improved remarkably since 1985, with total economic output and food production both growing more quickly than population (Ibid.: 3). But regional GDP growth of about 3% per annum obscures large intra-regional disparities, with Botswana's positive growth of 12-14% per annum in 1985-87 offsetting Mozambique's negative growth of 1.7% per annum. Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia, while enjoying positive overall growth, have not yet attained positive per capita growth, although the shortfall has been decreasing over 1988-1990 (Ibid.: 9-10). Mozambique, by contrast, achieved positive per capita growth by early 1990—a remarkable achievement for this war-weary state (Green 1990b: 9). The sub-region's grain surplus is also unevenly distributed, with surpluses in Malawi, Tanzania and especially Zimbabwe offsetting deficits in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zambia. The threat of famine will hit hardest in Angola (with poor transportation links to the surplus producers) and Mozambique (with

little ability to finance imports, especially as international aid declines). Nonetheless, for a debt-distressed region which continues to face declining terms of trade, progress has been remarkable.

**Peace Dividend**: With a real decline in South Africa's military aggression in the region, and with good prospects for a post-*apartheid* South African government in 1993 or 1994, speculation about the size of the "peace dividend" for the region is growing. Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have the most to gain. The cessation of a full-scale conventional war against openly intervening South African forces will save Angola about $1b per annum in defense expenditures while also permitting additional revenues of perhaps $100m in trade and $500m in exports.[3] If peace restores natural trade patterns to the sub-region (requiring about two years of railway reconstruction), Mozambique will gain about $250m per annum in trade transport revenue as well as save about $250-300m per annum in defence spending. In addition, the sale of electrical power from the Cahora Bassa dam to post-*apartheid* South Africa may generate $40m per annum. For Zimbabwe, a return to pre-1965 trade patterns, which sent 90% of non-South African regional trade through Mozambique—rather than 66% through South Africa—will save about $100m in transport costs. At the same time, the demobilization of 12,500 troops in Mozambique may free up to $400m in defense expenditures. The net effect for Zimbabwe would be a budgetary surplus (since the current account of the balance of payments is already in surplus) permitting more imports for a growing manufacturing sector.

Peace will bring the remaining SADCC countries smaller economic gains or (in the case of Lesotho) possible losses. Malawi will save about $30m in food, land and unemployment costs as 800,000 Mozambican refugees go home (Green 1990b: 21) and its transport premium of $150m—as 90% of present trade is routed illogically through South Africa rather than directly through Beira and Nacala—will disappear (Ibid.). Sending 250,000 refugees home will relieve Zambia of perhaps $15-20m per annum in refugee assistance while restored transport networks will save $25-30m per annum and secured borders with Angola, Mozambique and Namibia will save a further $100m per annum. For Tanzania, savings of about $125m per annum ($25m assisting refugees and $100m supporting 4,000 troops in Mozambique and 6,000 troops on the southern border) will be partially offset by losses in trade on its southern transportation links. Lesotho and Swaziland would save about $10m per annum in defense expenditures, but post-*apartheid*

| Table 9.3 | | |
|---|---|---|
| Peace Dividend In Southern Africa | | |
| Country | Dividend ($ Millions) | Per capita ($) |
| Angola | 1,600 | 168 |
| Mozambique | 540 | 36 |
| Zimbabwe | 500 | 55 |
| Malawi | 180 | 21 |
| Zambia | 140 | 18 |
| Tanzania | 100 | 4 |
| Swaziland | 10 | 13 |
| Lesotho | 10 | 6 |

South Africa is unlikely to have room for Lesothan migrant labourers in its economy, entailing a loss of up to one-half of Lesotho's GDP. The economically efficient solution—full economic and political integration into South Africa—is probably psychologically unacceptable after more than a century of national opposition to its larger neighbour (Green 1990b: 8).

**Reconstruction**: For Angola and Mozambique, savings in transport and excess defense expenditures will be consumed by resettlement and reconstruction costs, as both countries attempt to restore access to services and decrease inflated malnutrition and mortality rates—the continuing legacy of more than a decade of war. Namibia provides an example of the progress which is possible in a peace-time economy, as it has redirected government spending from defense (falling from about 11% to 5% of the total) to community services (increasing from 34% to 40%) with prospects for reducing morbidity, mortality and malnutrition rates significantly (Morgan 1990: 4). Yet with open employment running at about 30%, Namibia is struggling to absorb some 20,000 excombatants (through a combination of retraining and resettlement) and 15,000 noncombatant exiles (with perhaps 100,000 dependents) which have swelled the population seeking employment.

Progress will be most precarious in Mozambique, with only one-fifth of Namibia's GNP per capita and a peace dividend (about $36 per capita) which is half of Namibia's ($64) and a quarter of Angola's ($168). At the same time, Mozambique faces much greater costs than either Angola or Namibia, as 100,000 national and 25,000 rebel forces are demobilized (affecting about 500,000 dependents) (Green 1990a: 20) and over one million externally and five million internally displaced people return home. Resettlement costs may run as high as $500 per household for transport, basic capital inputs (seed, livestock, fertilizer), basic farming and building tools and food until the first harvest, with an additional cost of $100

*Peace in Southern Africa may save the SADCC economies more than $3 billion a year in unproductive war-related expenditures*

per household for rehabilitating rural infrastructure and restoring human capital investments (health and education facilities) (Ibid.: 22). In a country which has been locked in resistance or liberation movements for the past three decades, the transition to peacetime activities will be difficult. If it is managed badly, destitute ex-combatants will remain reliant on relief, with prolonged idleness and economic insecurity possibly resulting in residual free-lance banditry. That Mozambique in 1990 has experienced a 60-75% decline in war-time *emergencia* assistance (Ibid.: 16, 24)—which logically should go over to reconstruction in peacetime—bodes ill for the future. Angola, like Mozambique, will face resettlement and reconstruction costs of about $250-300m per annum over the next five years (Green 1990b: 19). But, with a higher GNP per capita, higher peace dividend and greater government revenues, it starts from a better position than Mozambique. Nonetheless, transferring war-related technical expertise to peace-time (development) uses will not be straightforward.

**Emerging Problems**: Peace will force the region to face some tough questions. The chief among these concerns SADCC relations to post-*apartheid* South Africa. An urgent problem for Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and especially Lesotho—countries which have a relatively high dependence on remittances from migrant labourers in South Africa—will be the prevention of massive economic dislocation if a majority government in South Africa expels transborder employment to reduce high domestic unemployment. This may affect as many as 700,000 workers and 3.5 million dependents. At the same time, if South Africa comes into the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) as a full partner, its economic hegemony threatens to submerge the independence of its neighbours. The half-belief that *apartheid* alone has obstructed natural Southern African trade patterns which

*Nonetheless, rapid resettlement and rehabilitation in Southern Africa, even in peace-time, will require extensive external aid*

would work to the benefit of all parties equally is obviously a vanity. On the other hand, if the SADCC ten stand together, South Africa should not be able to assert a dominant position. But it is uncertain whether SADCC solidarity will prevail: the economic ascendency of Zimbabwe within SADCC may lead to intra-SADCC rivalries as the common front of absolute opposition to South Africa dissolves.

At the same time, violence has intensified in South Africa itself since the National Party initiated its reforms, with the government less and less able to control its own police and security forces. UNICEF work in a free South Africa will need to address situations already encountered in other contexts, including rapid urbanization; precarious social stability; massive unemployment and underemployment; low achievements in education and literacy; underfunded basic services with large inequalities in access; large numbers of children knowing little beyond the trauma of war; widespread child malnutrition and high infant and child mortality rates; family structures deformed over generations by the migrant labour system; alienation of agricultural land from rural producers; and rapidly-growing recorded incidence of HIV infection and AIDS (Morgan 1990: 5). Should dramatic constitutional changes be forged in violence, the country may be increasingly misshapen by war-induced capital flight, steady deterioration in the productive base, inefficient parallel bureaucracies supporting different racial and tribal groups plus continual diversion of government expenditures to military and security purposes.

Although the war in Southern Africa may be ending, the war's end will not be enough to undo its destructive legacy: for this rapid resettlement and rehabilitation will be critical. Zimbabwe, because it has pursued a conservative fiscal policy since independence, should be able to attract sufficient credit and investment flows in a peace-time environment for sustainable recovery. By contrast, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and especially Mozambique are in desperate need of external financing to sustain a broad rural recovery. Malawi's situation will improve as refugees leave the heavily-burdened border areas and Mozambican transport routes are restored, but these transitions will require two aid-financed years at a minimum. Tanzania will need help to reconstruct its transport and manufacturing sectors, which have been neglected for more than a decade. Zambia's jerky experience with a series of chronically underfunded adjustment programmes has worn out the patience of its population and, unless more stable financing becomes

**Table 9.4**
South Africa's Trade with Africa+
(Rand millions at 1984 prices)

| Year | RSA Exports to Africa | RSA Imports from Africa |
|------|------|------|
| 1984 | 890 | 404 |
| 1986 | 1790 | 630 |
| 1988 | 2800 | 870 |

+ Excluding Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
*Source*: Van Staden 1990: 26.

available, may lead to political explosion. In brief, broad-based reconstruction in Southern Africa—even in peace-time—will require extensive external aid. Recurrent costs for basic services—water, health, education, sanitation—already strain national budgets: capital expenditures to repair and extend these services are completely out of reach. International aid advocates such as UNICEF must ensure that appropriate financing is forthcoming: we cannot afford to lose the best prospects for Southern Africa's recovery in more than a decade.

## The Horn of Africa

**Natural and Man-Made Emergencies**: Complex man-made emergencies, together with widespread poverty, rapid population growth, abrupt climatic changes and over-exploited ecosystems, continue to ravage Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti. These conditions have claimed about five million (mostly civilian) lives in the last three decades. Low per capita GNPs ($120 in Ethiopia and $170 in Somalia) and high military expenditures (67% of total government expenditures in Ethiopia and 56% in Somalia) have interrupted immunization programmes in large areas and squeezed access to basic services. Drought and war have driven millions of people (including many unaccompanied children) from their homes into already marginal environments, where resource depletion (particularly water and firewood) is increasingly critical. Record food deficits in 1990-91 have placed fourteen to fifteen million people at risk of starvation. Many people in the war- and drought-affected areas have withdrawn from productive labour and become reliant on outside relief. At the same time, decades of civil war and deteriorating economic performance have left large parts of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan practically ungovernable, with unofficial leaderships dislodging and replacing parallel official government structures in large parts of these countries. Moreover, because the govern-ments (or their adversaries) cannot or will not guarantee security, humanitarian aid has not been able to reach large parts of the populations they control.

The effort to establish national and household food security underlies many of the conflicts in the region. With populations growing at 3% per annum and food production per capita declining steadily (as a consequence of poor rainfalls, environmental degradation, export crop promotion, discriminatory pricing policies and inadequate markets and transport networks), the Horn suffers from chronic food deficits, making famine a regular visitor and motivating millions of people, past and present, to seek more fertile pastures. The search for food security aggravated the Tigrean conflict, the resettlement programmes of Sudan, and the clashes between highland cultivators and lowland pastoralists as well as among different pastoralist groups. (The most serious clash at present is the fratricidal war between the Ogaden and Ishaq clans of Somalia, feuding for most of this century over the rich pastures of the Ethiopian Haud.)

Competition for deep sea ports and water resources also underlies regional conflicts. Maintaining access to the Red Sea through the port of Massawa is at the core of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. The loss of Eritrea would leave Ethiopia landlocked—a condition endured for centuries but not readily embraced again. Similarly, the port of Djibouti is a potential flashpoint, as both Ethiopia and Somalia may reach for it when the opportunity arises. At the same time, since natural flows from the Ethiopian highlands are the primary source of irrigation water in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia's announcement of its intention to divert these waters for irrigation purposes—together with its constant refusal to join regional agreements governing the use of Nile waters—has escalated tensions in the Horn, prompting Egypt to threaten war.

At the same time, economic and social policies have sharpened regional disparities and cultivated independence movements. Colonial policies continuing into the present elevated commercial agriculture to dominance in the Horn economies and favoured urban centres with service and administrative activities, spreading wealth very unevenly in otherwise destitute and underdeveloped regions. At the same time, state policies have impeded the natural and historical trade patterns in the region. The natural marketplace for Ogaden is northern Somalia, for lowland Eritrea it is eastern Sudan, for southern Sudan it is Uganda and for southernmost Ethiopia it is northern Somalia, yet the Horn's governments have, for fiscal and administrative reasons, channelled all trade through the centres of their respective states and attempted to block its unregulated flow across the borders. The consequence has been frequent market failures, very limited official trade and persistant unofficial trade through smuggling. Finally, the attempts of successive governments to mold their countries into a single ethnic and cultural tradition (Amharic and Christian in Ethiopia, Arabic and Islamic in Sudan) have backfired, creating a political climate which disvalues ethnic and cultural pluralism and provoking subordinate groups to assert their own cultural attributes and their own form of nationalism.

These ethnic rivalries have become more obvious since the Barre and Mengistu governments were overthrown. When Barre

*Complex man-made emergencies, aggravated by widespread poverty, rapid population growth and abrupt climatic changes, continue to ravage people in the Horn of Africa*

withdrew to his home village (Garba Harre) in late January 1991, he left a devastated Somalia to be divided between three fractious clan-based rebel groups. With an arsenal of deadly Cold-War weapons, these groups have reduced large parts of the country to rubble in their battles for dominance. The Somali Patriot Movement (SPM), dominated by the Ogadeni tribe, now controls the southern part of Somalia. The Isaak-based Somali National Movement (SNM), now controlling the northern part of the country, has declared independence for the newly-formed republic of Somaliland and elected a provisional president. At the same time, the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC), which controls Mogadiscio and its surroundings, claims to be the ruling party for the entire country. Even though most Somalis are culturally, linguistically and religiously united, clan rivalries run very deep and as a consequence prospects for unity appear very dim. As the search for unity continues, widespread looting and sporadic fighting have destroyed much of Somalia's infrastructure and impeded critically necessary humanitarian assistance. With growing scarcities of food, fuel, water and essential drugs, helpless Somalians are sinking deeper and deeper into disaster.

In Ethiopia, Mengistu's flight to Zimbabwe (May 1991) precipitated the collapse of his army and the occupation of Addis Ababa by the Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Although the occupation was effected rapidly and—by comparison to Mogadiscio's experience—with minimal violence, the presence of the Tigrean-dominated EPRDF in that mostly Amharic city may lead to serious clashes. Moreover, the Tigreans—who until recently espoused hardline communist principles—are not believed to support the

*Ethnic rivalries in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan have inflated child mortality rates and reduced children's access to health and education services*

independence movements of the other rebel groups, namely the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which now occupies the whole of Eritrea and has formed a provisional government pending a referendum on Eritrean independence, and the Oromo Liberation Front, which seeks autonomy or independence for a large part of southern Ethiopia. EPRDF intransigence may find support in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which now seem to agree that each of the Horn countries will find salvation in a loosely federated but nonetheless unitary political structure. For the U.S., this desire is especially strong with respect to Ethiopia, as an independent Eritrea with strong Arab links is seen as a threat to Red Sea shipping. But, after thirty years of civil war in a nation of more than seventy ethnic groups speaking more than one hundred languages, unity is likely to remain elusive.

**Mortality Rates:** The human costs of these man-made emergencies—though difficult to estimate *in toto*—have been enormous. In Sudan, civil war between the Arab and Islamic North and the African, Christian and animist South—with neither side espousing separatist aims—has continued since June 1983, killing more than 500,000 people and disabling more than 50,000, with about 250,000 children dying in 1987 alone, when famine was exploited as a political weapon. In Ethiopia, more than 20,000 government troops have been killed on the Tigrean front since August 1989 and 30,000 government troops were killed during the EPLF seizure of Massawa in February 1990. In addition, large numbers of Ethiopian troops are prisoners of war, with 55,000 taken in 1989 alone (12,000 at Enda Selassie in February and 20,000 at Afabet in March). losses to the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and EPLF have also been high, with many amputees. At the same time, Mengistu's drive to create the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa (300,000 army and 150,000 militia fighting about 60,000 rebel troops) forced the government into seven conscription drives since 1983, with press-ganging and child conscription frequently reported.

Although there are no reliable estimates of "excess" infant and child rates, reported numbers suggest that they are heavily war-inflated. Infant and child mortality rates in the Horn are among the highest in ESA. Child malnutrition has also been extremely high, affecting 60% of the children in Ethiopia—10% severely—during the prolonged droughts of 1984-85 and continuing to threaten large numbers, especially as immunization rates are very low (between 6% and 26% for DPT over 1980-88). In the

**Figure 9.3**
Five Highest Infant and Child
Mortality Rates in ESA (1989)

Ethiopian famine of 1984-85, as many as 60% of child deaths were attributed to the combined effects of malnutrition and measles, an immunizable disease. Increased susceptibility to malaria and meningitis has also been reported, with Somalia and southern Sudan particularly at risk in 1991. At the same time, Ethiopians have the lowest life expectancy in ESA, with Somalis and Angolans coming in as close seconds. Finally, reflecting the scant attention which women's issues receive, maternal mortality rates in Ethiopia (2,000 per 100,000 live births) and Somalia (1,100) are the highest reported in the region by far. (Madagascar is a distant third at 378.) With women having more than six children on average, as many as one in eight women will die in childbirth. Since only 2% (Somalia) to 14% (Ethiopia) of births are attended by trained health personnel, the explanation for this statistic may not be far to seek.

Many deaths in the Horn result indirectly from the interruption of basic services and essential supplies. In 1985, only 27% of Somalis and 46% of Ethiopians had access to health services. In 1989-90, only 11% of Ethiopians had access to safe water and only 3% had access to adequate sanitation (the lowest rates in ESA). Net primary school enrolment in Somalia fell from an already low 25% (32% male and 18% female) in 1980 to an alarming 11% (14% male and 8% female) in 1985, the lowest in ESA, while adult literacy rates, at 12% (18% male and 6% female) in 1985, were the lowest in the world. These worsening educational trends can be traced back to a sharp decline in Somali government expenditures on education (12% in the 1970s, 6% in the 1980s and 2% in 1990). In southern Sudan, war has closed or destroyed over 83% of the schools, 45% of the health clinics and 25 of 31 hospitals. As a consequence, literacy rates in the region are a very low 15% and children's health has declined precipitously. Diarrhoea and measles remain the greatest killers of children in southern Sudan (28% and 26% respectively), pushing the under two mortality rate in the South to 234 per 1,000 live births—six times the rate in the North.

**Refugees and Displaced Persons**: In 1989, more than half of Africa's 4.8 million refugees were in the Horn, with 800,000 in Ethiopia, 840,000 in Somalia, 807,000 in Sudan and about 13,000 in Djibouti (Bakwesegha 1989: 65-66) and with each country reciprocally hosting its neighbor's refugees. Almost half of these were unaccompanied children. The 700,000 mostly Christian Ethiopians who have taken refuge in Muslim Sudan, where shari'a is law, live in suspended animation. Household surveys found that 30-50% of these refugees fled their

**Table 9.5**
**Life Expectancy at Birth (years)**
**(Total/Male/Female 1988)**

| | |
|---|---|
| Ethiopia | 41/40/43 |
| Angola | 45/43/46 |
| Somalia | 45/44/47 |
| Mozambique | 47/45/48 |
| Malawi | 47/47/48 |

homelands to escape war or war-related difficulties (e.g. conscription, destruction of property). About 75% are under 30 years old and uneducated. Incomplete family structures are common, resulting from divorce, breakdowns and missing spouses. Women, who head between 15% and 30% of the households, are unemployed about 2.5 times as frequently as men. About 40% of refugee children over five are working (Ibid.: 77).

Officially more than 350,000 people have fled Sudan (with the bulk going to Ethiopia (330,000), Uganda (22,000) and Kenya (1,300)) and about four million people—half of whom are children—have been displaced. Many of these are unskilled peasants or pastoralists who have lost their productive assets and migrated to economically stagnant refugee-saturated cities, with Khartoum sheltering 800,000 war-and drought-fleeing refugees (and about 40,000 street children) and the southern cities of Wau, Juba and Malakal collectively sheltering another 500,000, tripling their populations. Resettlement efforts—forcing people to start over, sometimes for the third time—have been unsuccessful as livestock herds are depleted, markets interrupted, government services almost non-existent and migratory routes cut off by security measures and agriculturalists. Southern (mostly Christian)

*Almost half of the Horn's 2.4 million refugees are unaccompanied children*



**Figure 9.4**
**Distribution of Displaced Persons in Sudan (88/89)**

Khartoum 800,000
Upper Nile 1,041,000
Equatoria 748,000
Central 520,000
Bahr al Ghazal 412,000
Northern 150,000
Kordofan 70,000
Darfur 60,000

children who take refuge in the Muslim north encounter special hardships. They are increasingly unwelcome in Khartoum: the Sudanese army drove 30,000 displaced persons out of Khartoum in October 1990 and food ration cards are generally unavailable to those who remain. A 1987 survey of children's health in 23 refugee communities surrounding Khartoum found that only 7% of the children were immunized and at least 23% were malnourished. At the same time, these children are effectively excluded from the education system as the North's language of instruction is Arabic and as enrolment regulations require students to show a birth certificate and records of previous education—items which they typically lack.

**Impending Famine**: With the Horn recording a huge food deficit this year, between fourteen and fifteen million people— the bulk of them children—presently risk starvation. In Sudan, failures of rainfall in Kordofan and annual flash-flooding in the Red Sea Hills—where 400,000 acres has not been planted for the first time in 96 years— appear to herald a 1.2 million tonne food deficit and the third famine in six years. As many as eight million people will be directly affected. Although the rains in southern Sudan have been more plentiful, destroyed transport networks and land mines blocking farming activities as well as pastoralist migrations have severely restricted rural production, forcing many people to rely on relief. Plans to transport food into Sudan (800,000 tonnes through Port Sudan and 300,000 tonnes through neighbouring Kenya) at an estimated cost of $180m have been repeatedly delayed, both as world attention was rivetted to the Gulf War and as the Government of Sudan refused to cooperate with relief efforts, preventing food relief from reaching parts of the Christian south and reputedly attacking food distribution centres controlled by the SPLA. Moreover, with grain pledges offsetting less than half of the total food deficit, there are real fears that the international community has responded to this crisis too late.

In Ethiopia, war-disrupted rural production and rainfall below one-tenth of the expected amount have opened a food deficit of 1.1m tonnes, leaving five to six million people in Northern Wollo, Tigray and Eritrea in need of emergency famine relief (food, fuel, building equipment, hospital and medical supplies). The destruction of food stockpiles in the 1990 battle for Massawa has needlessly aggravated this situation. Because many of the affected people live in or beyond contested areas, as in Sudan, there is some fear that UN relief operations will not be able to reach them (as rebel factions, by declining

cooperation in the relief efforts, may create pockets of civilian hostages to the war effort in areas under their control). The EPLF's promise to open Massawa to relief operations has been a welcome signal, but war damage has reduced it to one-half its capacity. At the same time, the EPRDF in May 1991 could offer no assurances that the Addis Ababa airport or the roads between Addis Ababa and the port cities of Assab and Massawa could be secured and opened for relief purposes. As civil war has engulfed the entire country, international organizations have fled, bringing relief efforts to a virtual halt.

**Heavily Damaged Infrastructure**: Coinciding with the 1983 start of the present conflict in Sudan were a crippling structural adjustment programme, a two-year drought affecting seven million people and the introduction of Islamic law (shari'a). Together these led to a virtual collapse of the formal economy in the southern provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal, where the fighting has been heaviest. Major roads, bridges, railways and water transport routes have been rendered inoperable. Manufacturing in 1987 operated at 20-30% of capacity and all large-scale mechanized agriculature in the South has stopped. All major oil companies have withdrawn from oil-mining in the South, bringing losses of about $2m per day. Prospects for an economic recovery are very dim. As inflation reached 70% in 1988-89 and GDP fell to about $50 per capita, Sudan continued to suffer from U.S. and European Community economic embargoes imposed as a consequence of IMF disapproval, alleged human rights violations and the unremedied overthrow of an elected government. Only Iraq and Libya remain friendly to the government.

Before the collapse of Mengistu's army, both Tigray and Eritrea were at a virtual standstill during the day, with towns and markets active only between sunset and sunrise. The legacy of Mengistu's struggle to dominate Ethiopia's rebel groups is tragic, particularly as famine again visits the country. The Massawa-Asmara railway, which formerly carried 160,000 tons of cargo and 175,000 passengers annually, does not function any longer. The Addis-Asmara road is closed and the Addis-Djibouti and Addis-Assab roads are badly deteriorated. As early as February 1990, when the EPLF seized Massawa—the principal access to the war- and drought-affected areas—all ordinary relief efforts along the "northern line" were brought to a stop, necessitating a major UNEPPG-headed airlift to provide food to Asmara, the country's second major city and key industrial centre. With deteriorating water and electrical supplies, Asmara became a garrison city

*Between fourteen and fifteen million people—most of them children—presently risk starvation in the Horn*

relying on airlifts from Assab—until December 1990 Ethiopia's only operable port—to supply its food needs.

In an effort to ensure continued supplies in this difficult environment, a consortium of churches known as the Joint Relief Partnership (JRP) opened a "southern line", trucking food from the port of Assab to destinations in Northern Wollo and Tigray. While the JRP and other NGOs concentrate on the provision of food aid, UNICEF has assisted in the provision of non-food aid (e.g. tents, essential drugs, medical supplies, vaccines and immunization services). Many of these relief operations were suspended during and after the EPRDF assault on the capital. On the eastern borders, international NGOs, Rest (TPLF's relief wing), and the Eritrean Relief Association (EPLF) supported displaced persons in cross-border food aid operations from Sudan, but their capacity continues to shrink as Sudan faces its own food emergency and as civil unrest permeates that country. In addition, the suspension of UNHCR operations in Ethiopia following the collapse of Mengistu's regime has stranded some 900,000 Somali and Sudanese refugees who previously relied almost entirely on that agency's assistance.

The situation is Somalia—as the country slips into anarchy—is still bleaker. War activities in north, central and southern regions of the country, together with a collapsing economy, have resulted in massive dislocations, especially into Mogadiscio. UN food supply operations and emergency programmes focusing on nutrition, water and sanitation, immunization and basic health services have been suspended since December 1990. Furthermore, peace-time relief and development operations leading up to the war period were already very limited. UCI 1990 campaigns existed in only six regional capitals (Baidoa, Jowhar, Kismayo, Merka, Mogadiscio, and Beletweyne), leaving 75-80% of the population (including the very large nomadic population) with no coverage. At the same time, donor interest has dwindled precipitously since the end of the Cold War, with Italy and the UN—the only donors remaining in late 1990—both suspending activities in 1991.

## UNICEF Initiatives

In regions such as the Horn and Southern Africa, a substantial part of UNICEF's work consists in emergency programmes extending non-food aid (health care, education, immunization, water and sanitation, supplementary feeding and family livelihood restoration) to war- and drought-affected women and children. While the provision of emergency food aid may be unconditionally necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure good health or even survival. In Ethiopia and Sudan, more child deaths are attributed to immunizable diseases (especially measles) and lack of clean drinking water than to starvation. Hence a monofocal injection of food aid into a complex emergency environment is severely unbalanced. Non-food aid is also critical and it is UNICEF's particular mandate to mobilize donors (who are typically more attentive to visible food aid requirements) to assist in the provision of the specialized staff and complex equipment which is necessary for such aid.

UNICEF must also respond to the particular needs of displaced and refugee children. To minimize the abnormalities in their situation, such children, ideally, should be fully socialized into foster homes in stable environments where they may have access to health, educational, and environmental services. Governments will rarely be able to accomplish this financially or logistically, especially when they are responsible for a very large number of displaced persons and already beset with immense civil problems causing such displacement. Hence, UNICEF must make special efforts to design appropriate and low-cost "normalized" environments for such children (necessarily with the support of international aid). At the same time, it must ensure that teachers and health workers who work with displaced children are highly motivated and sensitive to these children's needs.

For orphaned or abandoned children, tracing systems must be developed to promote early family reunions. As a preventive measure, family and community structures should be strengthened. Where war has left children physically and mentally disabled, rehabilitation services must be provided, with maternal and child care activities taking on a mental health component. Child soldiers, child prisoners of war and war-traumatized children (those who have been abducted or raped or forcibly separated from their parents) will also benefit from mental health programmes, as well as focused rehabilitation and recreation services.

As governments and rebel groups in the Horn are once again tempted to manipulate famine to their political and military advantage, UNICEF's notion of "Children as a Zone of Peace" must gain universal assent and compliance. UNICEF must seek and obtain the endorsement of all conflicting parties to its programmes to ensure effective and immediate responses to rapidly changing circumstances. Children must be excluded from military service and protected from terrorism and armed attack. Their families must not be broken up. They must continue

*In addition to food aid, basic services are also needed to ensure survival and good health*

*Promoting the notion of "Children as a Zone of Peace", UNICEF attempts to protect services and institutions directed to children's needs*

to have secure access to basic health and educational services. Even when they are shuffled between camps and subject to military control, their lives must be normalized as much as possible, with play and laughter. With war and drought subjecting children to a double hardship, UNICEF and other agencies must have the right to provide assistance to all needy women and children, without discrimination according to politics or localities. All of these "musts" do not express new demands: they merely repeat old resolutions already incorporated in international humanitarian laws, in their specific provisions protecting children. If these resolutions were fully observed, they would be adequate. "Children as a Zone of Peace" merely attempts to secure for children in armed conflict those protections which even their own governments agree are their legal right.

Where governments and rebel groups agree to honour the notion of Children as a Zone of Peace, further work needs to be done to identify the groups most significantly affected by armed conflict, to determine appropriate interventions (making maximum use of local resources and capabilities) and to integrate high priority needs into ongoing programmes. Continual consultations with

military leaders, government officials and other persons with high national and local credibility will be necessary to ensure flexible responses to the emergency. Relief should be channeled through non-military and non-paramilitary organizations and linked to long-term CSPD programmes wherever possible. Collaboration with ICRC—which can be a valuable partner in emergency situations—as well as NGOs, other agencies and religious organizations should be sought and preserved. The provisions of international legal instruments (e.g. the Geneva Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child) should be used as advocacy tools. Wherever possible, institutions should receive training in disaster preparedness, with special focus on the needs of children.

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1. UNICEF, *Children on the Front Line III* (draft). All statistics in this publication—as in the ECA's *South Africa Destabilization* (October 1989)—are based on available data, which may be incomplete or outdated, and which frequently incorporate projections. Hence they represent orders of magnitude.

2. Tanzania is burdened with an additional 250,000 refugees from conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi.

3. Unless otherwise noted, all peace dividend estimates are derived from war expense estimates offered in United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force 1989.

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  1989d: "Women's Economic Activities and Integration Network" (UNICEF ESARO, 1989).
  1990a: "Strategy for Improved Nutrition of Children and Women in Developing Countries", A UNICEF Policy Review (New York: UNICEF, June 1990).
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# UNICEF
# *Eastern and Southern Africa*

**Seychelles**
U5MR 22 (1988)
IMR 18

**Uganda**
U5MR 167
IMR 100

**Ethiopia**
U5MR 226
IMR 133

**Somalia**
U5MR 218
IMR 129

**Sao Tome and Principe**
U5MR 80
IMR 49

**Rwanda**
U5MR 201
IMR 119

**Kenya**
U5MR 111
IMR 70

**Burundi**
U5MR 196
IMR 116

**Tanzania**
U5MR 173
IMR 103

**Comoros**
U5MR 132
IMR 96

**Madagascar**
U5MR 179
IMR 117

**Angola**
U5MR 292
IMR 173

**Zambia**
U5MR 125
IMR 78

**Namibia**
U5MR 171
IMR 103

**Botswana**
U5MR 88
IMR 64

**Zimbabwe**
U5MR 90
IMR 65

**Malawi**
U5MR 258
IMR 147

**Mauritius**
U5MR 29
IMR 22

**Mozambique**
U5MR 297
IMR 173

**Swaziland**
U5MR 170
IMR 115

**Lesotho**
U5MR 133
IMR 97

*Note*: U5MR and IMR 1989.

# *Statistics*

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## EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PROFILE 1990

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GOAL 2000: Reduction of Under Five Mortality Rate by One-Third of 1990 Levels or to 70 per 1,000 Live Births (whichever is less)

Baseline U5MR

Goal 2000 U5MR

## Under Five Mortality Rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000 live births)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 261 af | 281 a | 238 f | 288 cf | 292 ac | 292 c | 70 |
| Botswana | 110 a | 100 a | 96 cf | 95 cf | 92 ac | 88 c | 58 |
| Burundi | 215 af | 200 af | 196 cf | 192 cf | 188 af | 196 c | 70 |
| Comoros | 152 a | 137 a | 132 cf | 132 c | 129 a | 132 b | 70 |
| Ethiopia | 260 a | 264 a | 255 cf | 261 cf | 259 a | 226 c | 70 |
| Kenya | 133 a | 121 af | 118 cf | 116 cf | 113 a | 111 c | 70 |
| Lesotho | 161 a | 145 a | 140 cf | 139 cf | 136 a | 133 c | 70 |
| Madagascar | 216 a | 193 a | 94 cf | 187 cf | 184 a | 179 c | 70 |
| Malawi | 300 a | 276 a | 270 cf | 267 cf | 262 af | 258 c | 70 |
| Mauritius | 42 af | 32 af | 30 ac | 30 ac | 29 a | 29 c | 19 |
| Mozambique | 268 a | 284 a | | 295 c | 297 a | 297 c | 70 |
| Namibia | 202 a | 185 a | | | 176 a | 171 c | 70 |
| Rwanda | 231 a | 215 a | 210 cf | 209 cf | 206 a | 201 c | 70 |
| Sao Tome | | 91 ac | 129 f | 136 f | | 80 f | 53 |
| Seychelles | 24 a | 24 f | 21 cf | 21 cf | 22 af | | 14 |
| Somalia | 247 a | 232 a | 255 cf | 255 cf | 221 a | 218 c | 70 |
| Swaziland | 200 af | 183 af | 178 cf | 177 cf | 174 a | 170 c | 70 |
| Tanzania | 201 af | 185 a | 179 cf | 179 cf | 176 a | 173 c | 70 |
| Uganda | 187 a | 178 af | 174 cf | 172 cf | 169 a | 167 c | 70 |
| Zambia | 146 a | 135 af | 132 cf | 130 cf | 127 a | 125 c | 70 |
| Zimbabwe | 132 af | 121 af | 118 cf | 116 cf | 113 a | 90 c | 60 |

*Sources:*

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

*Symbols:*
* From a year other than the year shown
( ) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

GOAL 2000: Reduction of Infant Mortality Rate by One-Third of 1990 Levels or to 50 per 1,000 Live Births (whichever is less)

Baseline IMR

Goal 2000 IMR

## Infant Mortality Rate (deaths of children under one per 1,000 live births)

| | 1980 | | 1985 | | 1986 | | 1987 | | 1988 | | 1989 | | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 155 | a | 166 | a | 140 | f | 169 | cf | 173 | a | 173 | c | 50 |
| Botswana | 79 | af | 71 | a | 69 | cf | 68 | cf | 66 | ac | 64 | c | 42 |
| Burundi | 127 | af | 118 | af | 116 | cf | 113 | cf | 111 | af | 116 | c | 50 |
| Comoros | 93 | a | 84 | af | 81 | cf | 114 | b | 79 | a | 96 | c | 50 |
| Ethiopia | 154 | a | 156 | a | 151 | cf | 155 | cf | 153 | a | 133 | c | 50 |
| Kenya | 84 | af | 76 | af | 74 | cf | 73 | cf | 71 | a | 70 | c | 46 |
| Lesotho | 117 | af | 105 | a | 102 | cf | 101 | cf | 99 | a | 97 | c | 50 |
| Madagascar | 140 | a | 125 | a | 61 | cf | 121 | cf | 119 | a | 117 | c | 50 |
| Malawi | 170 | af | 156 | a | 153 | cf | 151 | cf | 149 | a | 147 | c | 50 |
| Mauritius | 33 | af | 25 | a | 24 | cf | 24 | cf | 22 | af | 22 | c | 14 |
| Mozambique | 157 | a | 166 | a | | | 170 | c | 173 | a | 173 | c | 50 |
| Namibia | 121 | a | 111 | a | | | | | 105 | a | 103 | c | 50 |
| Rwanda | 136 | af | 127 | af | 124 | cf | 123 | cf | 121 | a | 119 | c | 50 |
| Sao Tome | 80 | a | 66 | a | 76 | f | 56 | f | 70 | f | 49 | c* | 32 |
| Seychelles | 18 | a | 18 | f | 17 | c | 17 | c | 17 | af | 18 | c* | 12 |
| Somalia | 146 | a | 137 | a | 151 | cf | 133 | cf | 131 | a | 129 | c | 50 |
| Swaziland | 134 | af | 123 | a | 120 | cf | 119 | cf | 117 | a | 115 | c | 50 |
| Tanzania | 120 | af | 110 | a | 107 | cf | 107 | cf | 105 | a | 103 | c | 50 |
| Uganda | 113 | af | 107 | a | 105 | cf | 104 | cf | 102 | a | 100 | c | 50 |
| Zambia | 91 | af | 84 | af | 82 | cf | 81 | cf | 79 | a | 78 | c | 50 |
| Zimbabwe | 83 | af | 76 | af | 74 | cf | 73 | cf | 71 | a | 63 | c | 42 |

*Sources:*

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

Symbols:  * From a year other than the year shown
(.) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

Births (thousands)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 364 a | 416 a | | | 450 ac | 460 c | |
| Botswana | 45 a | 52 a | | | 57 a | 61 c | |
| Burundi | 199 a | 220 a | | | 236 a | 254 c | |
| Comoros | 18 a | 21 a | 21 b | 19 b | 22 a | 19 b | |
| Ethiopia | 1753 a | 1844 a | | | 2019 a | 2383 c | |
| Kenya | 905 a | 1111 a | | 1100 b | 1238 a | 1062 c | |
| Lesotho | 56 a | 64 a | 65 b | | 68 a | 70 c | |
| Madagascar | 404 a | 471 a | | 501 b | 516 a | 532 c | |
| Malawi | 326 a | 382 a | | | 419 a | 475 c | |
| Mauritius | 23 a | 21 a | | | 21 a | 19 c | |
| Mozambique | 552 a | 626 a | | 672 b | 669 a | 683 c | |
| Namibia | 59 a | 68 a | | | | 76 c | 58 f+ |
| Rwanda | 273 a | 317 a | | | 347 a | 356 c | |
| Sao Tome | 4 f | 4 f | | | | 4 f | |
| Seychelles | 1.8 a | 1.7 a | | | 1.6 a | | |
| Somalia | 283 a | 336 a | | 347 b | 353 a | 358 c | |
| Swaziland | 27 a | 32 a | | 34 b | 35 a | | |
| Tanzania | 969 a | 1159 a | | | 1291 a | 1329 c | |
| Uganda | 665 a | 785 a | | | 868 a | 942 c | |
| Zambia | 299 a | 360 a | | | 400 a | 417 c | |
| Zimbabwe | 311 a | 352 a | | | 380 a | 389 c | |

*Sources:*

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

Symbols:
*   From a year other than the year shown
(.)   Less than half the unit shown
+   Estimate

# Under Five Deaths (thousands)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 95 a | 117 a | | | 131 a | 134 c | |
| Botswana | 5 a | 5.2 a | | 5.2 b | 5.2 a | 5 c | |
| Burundi | 43 a | 44 a | | | 44 a | 50 c | |
| Comoros | 2.7 a | 2.8 a | 2.8 b | 2.9 b | 2.9 a | | |
| Ethiopia | 456 a | 487 a | | | 523 a | 539 c | |
| Kenya | 120 a | 134 a | | 139 b | 140 a | 118 c | |
| Lesotho | 9.1 a | 9.3 a | 9.1 b | | 9.3 a | 9 c | |
| Madagascar | 87 a | 91 a | | 94 b | 95 a | 95 c | |
| Malawi | 98 a | 105 a | | | 110 a | 123 c | 173 b |
| Mauritius | 1 a | 0.7 a | | 0.6 b | 0.6 a | 1 c | |
| Mozambique | 148 a | 178 a | | 235 b | 199 a | 203 c | |
| Namibia | 12 a | 12 a | | | | 13 c | |
| Rwanda | 63 a | 68 a | | | 71 a | 72 c | |
| Sao Tome | | | | 2 f | | | |
| Seychelles | (.) a | | | | (.) a | | |
| Somalia | 70 a | 78 a | | 78 b | 78 a | 78 c | |
| Swaziland | 5.4 a | 5.8 a | | 6 b | 6 a | | 6 f+ |
| Tanzania | 195 a | 214 a | | | 227 a | 230 c | |
| Uganda | 124 a | 140 a | | | 147 a | 157 c | |
| Zambia | 44 a | 49 a | | | 51 a | 52 c | |
| Zimbabwe | 41 a | 43 a | | | 43 a | 35 c | |

*Sources:*
a)  Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b)  UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c)  The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d)  World Development Report (1987-90)
e)  Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f)  Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g)  UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

*Symbols:*  
\*   From a year other than the year shown  
(.)  Less than half the unit shown  
+   Estimate

## Infant Deaths (thousands)

| | 1980 | | 1985 | | 1986 | | 1987 | | 1988 | | 1989 | | 1990 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 56 | a | 69 | a | | | | | 78 | a | 80 | a | | |
| Botswana | 3.6 | a | 3.7 | a | | | 3.7 | b | 3.7 | a | 3.8 | a | | |
| Burundi | 25 | a | 26 | a | | | | | 26 | a | 29 | a | | |
| Comoros | 1.7 | a | 1.7 | a | 1.7 | b | 1.8 | b | 1.8 | a | 2.2 | b | | |
| Ethiopia | 270 | a | 288 | a | | | | | 309 | a | 301 | b | | |
| Kenya | 76 | a | 84 | a | | | 85 | b | 88 | a | 76 | a | | |
| Lesotho | 6.6 | a | 6.7 | a | 6.6 | b | | | 6.8 | a | 6.8 | a | | |
| Madagascar | 57 | a | 59 | a | | | 61 | b | 61 | a | 62 | a | | |
| Malawi | 55 | a | 60 | a | | | | | 62 | a | 70 | a | 67 | b |
| Mauritius | 0.8 | a | 0.5 | a | | | | | 0.4 | b | 0.5 | b | | |
| Mozambique | 87 | a | 104 | a | | | 134 | b | 116 | a | 118 | a | | |
| Namibia | 7.1 | a | 7.5 | a | | | | | | | 7.7 | a | 1 | f+ |
| Rwanda | 37 | a | 40 | a | | | | | 42 | a | | | | |
| Sao Tome | (.) | a | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Seychelles | | | | | | | | | (.) | a | (.) | f | | |
| Somalia | 41 | a | 46 | a | | | 46 | b | 46 | a | 46 | a | | |
| Swaziland | 3.6 | a | 3.9 | a | | | 4 | b | 4 | a | 4.1 | a | | |
| Tanzania | 116 | a | 127 | a | | | | | 136 | a | 138 | a | | |
| Uganda | 75 | a | 84 | a | | | | | 89 | a | 95 | a | | |
| Zambia | 27 | a | 30 | a | | | | | 32 | a | 33 | a | | |
| Zimbabwe | 26 | a | 27 | a | | | | | 27 | a | 25 | a | | |

*Sources:*

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

*Symbols:*
* From a year other than the year shown
(.) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

## Mothers Breast-Feeding at 3/6/12 Months

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | — 96 — a | — 91 — a | | | | | |
| Botswana | 97 90 75 f | 97 90 75 f | 97 90 75 f | | | | |
| Burundi | — 95 90 a | | | — 95 90 a | — 95 90 f | | |
| Comoros | | | | 96 — — b | 98 97 93 b | | |
| Ethiopia | — 97 95 f | — 97 95 f | | | | | |
| Kenya | 89 84 44 f | 89 84 44 f | 89 84 44 f | | | | |
| Lesotho | | — 87 — a | | | | | |
| Madagascar | 95 95 85 af | 95 95 85 f | 95 95 85 f | 95 95 85 f | | | — — 85 b |
| Malawi | — 95 f | — 95 af | — 95 af | | | 92 — — f | |
| Mauritius | 79 55 40 f | 59 49 38 f | 59 49 38 f | | | | |
| Mozambique | | | | 99 96 — a | | | |
| Namibia | | | | 98 88 73 b* | | 98 88 73 a* | |
| Rwanda | 94 85 74 f | 97 97 74 a | 97 97 74 f | | | | |
| Sao Tome | | 88 85 30 af | | | | | |
| Seychelles | 80 40 10 af | — 55 — af | | | | | |
| Somalia | | 92 78 54 af | 92 78 54 f | | | | |
| Swaziland | | 98 91 81 a | | | | | |
| Tanzania | 100 90 70 f | | 100 90 70 f | 100 90 70 a | | | |
| Uganda | 85 70 20 af | 85 70 20 f | 85 70 20 f | | 90 — — f | | |
| Zambia | | — 93 af | — 93 f | | | | |
| Zimbabwe | | 98 96 84 af | 98 96 54 f | | 95 82 52 b | | |

Sources:
a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

Symbols:
\* From a year other than the year shown
(.) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

GOAL 2000: Reduction of the Rate of Low Birth Weight (2.5 kg or less) to Less than 10%

Baseline Low Birth Weight Babies (%)

## Babies with Low Birth Weight (2.5 kg or less) (%)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 19 a | 17 cf | 21 f | 24 f | 17 af | | |
| Botswana | | 8 c* | 8 af | 8 ab | | | |
| Burundi | 14 f | 14 c* | | 14 f | 9 a | | |
| Comoros | | | 14 a | | | 13 b | |
| Ethiopia | 13 f | 13 f | | | | | |
| Kenya | 18 f | 13 f | | 11 b | | | |
| Lesotho | 15 a* | 11 a | 10 c* | | | | |
| Madagascar | 10 f | 11 f | 10 f | 10 f | 10 a | | |
| Malawi | 12 f | 10 f | 10 f | 20 a | | | |
| Mauritius | 11 a* | 9 f | | 9 f | 9 a | | |
| Mozambique | 16 a* | 15 c* | | 20 a | 16 f | | |
| Namibia | | | | | | | 13 f+ |
| Rwanda | 17 f | 17 c* | | 17 f | | | |
| Sao Tome | | 8 f | 7 f | 8 f | 11 f | | |
| Seychelles | | 10 f | 10 f | | | | |
| Somalia | | | | | | | |
| Swaziland | | 15 b* | | | | | |
| Tanzania | 13 a* | 14 f | | 14 f | 14 a | | |
| Uganda | | 10 f | | 10 f | 10 b | | |
| Zambia | 14 a* | | | | | | |
| Zimbabwe | 15 f | 15 f | | 15 f | | | |

*Sources:*

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

*Symbols:*
* From a year other than the year shown
(.) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

GOAL 2000: Reduction of Malnutrition by One-Half of 1990 Levels

Baseline
Moderate & Severe Malnutrition (%)

Baseline
Severe Malnutrition (%)

Goal 2000
Moderate & Severe Malnutrition (%)

## Children under Five Suffering From Moderate and Severe/Severe Malnutrition (% underweight)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | | | | | | | |
| Botswana | | 15 — ac* | | 15 — a | | 15 — c* | |
| Burundi | — 3 a | 30 5 c* | | | | 38 10 c* | |
| Comoros | 30 8 a | | | | | | |
| Ethiopia | | 60 10 c* | | | 24 6 b* | 38 — c* | |
| Kenya | — 2 a | 30 2 c | | | | | |
| Lesotho | 16 2 a* | | | | | 16 2 c* | |
| Madagascar | | 33 8 a* | | | | 33 8 c* | |
| Malawi | 22 — a* | 30 — c* | | | | 24 — c* | |
| Mauritius | | 24 7 a | | | | | |
| Mozambique | | 57 8 a* | | 25 7 b | | 57 8 c* | |
| Namibia | | 28 6 a | | | | 30 6 ab* | 30 6 f+ |
| Rwanda | | | | | | | |
| Sao Tome | | | | | | | |
| Seychelles | — 1 a | 7 1 c* | | | | | |
| Somalia | | | | 8 1 a | 6 — a | | |
| Swaziland | | 10 — b* | | | | | |
| Tanzania | | 42 6 c* | | 48 6 a | | 48 6 c* | |
| Uganda | — 4 a | 15 4 c* | | | 23 8 b | 23 5 c* | |
| Zambia | | 28 — a* | | | | 28 — c* | |
| Zimbabwe | | | | | 12 — a | 12 2 c* | |

Sources:
a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries. (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

Symbols:
\* From a year other than the year shown
(.) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

## Prevalence of Wasting (children below minus two standard deviations from median weight for height)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | | | | | | | |
| Botswana | 19 a | 19 cf | 6 a | | | | |
| Burundi | 36 f | 36 f | 36 f | | | | |
| Comoros | | | | 10 a | 10 f | | |
| Ethiopia | | | | 14 b | | | |
| Kenya | 36 f | 36 f | 36 f | 19 f | 20 b | | |
| Lesotho | 8 f | 8 f | 10 f | 10 f | | | |
| Madagascar | 7 f | 7 f | 7 f | 7 f | | | |
| Malawi | 8 f | 8 f | 10 f | 10 f | | | |
| Mauritius | 28 f | 8 a | 28 f | 8 f | | | |
| Mozambique | | 16 a | 20 b | 20 f | | | |
| Namibia | | | | | | | |
| Rwanda | 23 af | 23 f | 23 f | 17 b | | 17 a* | |
| Sao Tome | | | | 23 f | | | |
| Seychelles | 5 f | 5 f | | | | | |
| Somalia | 64 f | | | | 5 a | | |
| Swaziland | | 10 f | | | | | |
| Tanzania | | 17 f | 17 f | 17 f | 17 a | | |
| Uganda | | 3 af | | 3 f | 4 f | | |
| Zambia | 47 f | | | 12 f | 1 a | | |
| Zimbabwe | 9 b* | | | | | | 9 f+ |

*Sources:*

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa:  From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

*Symbols:*  
\* From a year other than the year shown  
(.) Less than half the unit shown  
+ Estimate

## Prevalence of Stunting (children below minus two standard deviations from median height for age)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | | | | | | | |
| Botswana | 51 a | 51 c | 25 a | | | | |
| Burundi | 52 f | | | 60 a* | 60 f | | |
| Comoros | | | | | | | |
| Ethiopia | 70 f | | | | | | |
| Kenya | 42 a* | | | | | | |
| Lesotho | 23 a* | | | 23 f | | | |
| Madagascar | | 41 a* | | | | | |
| Malawi | 55 f | 61 af | 61 f | | | | |
| Mauritius | | 22 a | | | | | 30 f+ |
| Mozambique | | | | | | | |
| Namibia | | | | 32.4 b | | 32 a* | |
| Rwanda | 39 f | | | | | | |
| Sao Tome | | | 41 f | | | | |
| Seychelles | 42 f | 42 f | | | 7 a | | |
| Somalia | 27 f | 30 f | | 27 f | | | |
| Swaziland | | | | | 38 b | | |
| Tanzania | | 32 af | | 27 f | | | |
| Uganda | | | | 41 f | | | |
| Zambia | | | | | 29 a | | |
| Zimbabwe | 28 b* | | | | | | |

Sources:

a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

Symbols:  * From a year other than the year shown
(.) Less than half the unit shown
+ Estimate

## Daily Per Capita Calorie Intake (% requirements)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Angola | 92 a | 86 cf | | 83 f | | | |
| Botswana | 94 f | 95 cf | 98 f | | | | |
| Burundi | 101 a | 99 cf | | | 97 f | | |
| Comoros | 89 a | 80 f | 82 f | | | | |
| Ethiopia | 77 a | 94 cf | | | 60 b | | |
| Kenya | 95 a | 87 cf | | | | | |
| Lesotho | 103 a | 101 ac | | | | | |
| Madagascar | 109 af | 111 cf | 109 b | 102 f | | | |
| Malawi | 104 a | 95 f | 102 f | | | | |
| Mauritius | 120 a | 118 cf | | | | | |
| Mozambique | 77 a | 69 a | | | | | |
| Namibia | 84 a | 82 a | | | | | |
| Rwanda | 89 a | 87 cf | | | | | |
| Sao Tome | 99 a | 105 f | | | | | |
| Seychelles | | | | | | | |
| Somalia | 90 a | 91 cf | | | | | |
| Swaziland | 108 af | 105 af | | | | | |
| Tanzania | 98 a | 99 cf | | | | | |
| Uganda | 92 a | | 99 d | | 95 b | | |
| Zambia | 95 a | 85 cf | | | | | |
| Zimbabwe | 90 a | 84 cf | 84 f | | | | |

*Sources:*
a) Statistics on Children in UNICEF-Assisted Countries (1990-91)
b) UNICEF Annual Reports 1990
c) The State of the World's Children (1988-91)
d) World Development Report (1987-90)
e) Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth
f) Regional Information System data (from UNICEF country offices)
g) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1990

*Symbols:*  
\* From a year other than the year shown  
(.) Less than half the unit shown  
\+ Estimate

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