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December 1991

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UNITED NATIONS
OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN - SOUTHERN SECTOR

**1992 EMERGENCY NEEDS
ASSESSMENT & APPEAL**


SOUTHERN SUDAN

Nairobi, December 1991

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

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This document is the result of extensive field work by an inter-agency assessment team which included consultation with individuals from cattle camps, households, schools, traditional leadership, local authorities, NGOs, and international agencies. However the information herein is not expected to represent all opinions present in southern Sudan, but has made an attempt to represent a broad consensus. The needs assessment is accompanied by a broad definition of the OLS strategy for 1992 and an appeal for funds. This appeal is for the World Food Programme and UNICEF components of the effort in southern Sudan and is made in recognition of simultaneous appeals from UNHCR, ICRC and the NGOs for complementary activities and inputs. As a result of the fair co-ordination between agencies working in southern Sudan and of the enormous needs of this sad part of the world, duplication is considered unlikely. A detailed implementation plan, which will establish area priorities, will be worked out in association with NGOs, and in collaboration with community leaders, in the first two weeks of 1992.

SOUTHERN SUDAN
1991/92 SITUATION ASSESSMENT
Most Affected Areas

-  Returnees
-  Severe conflict
-  Floods
-  Epidemic
-  Food shortage
-  Not assessed



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this, the third year of Operation Lifeline Sudan, we find that increasingly we are dealing with emergencies within the emergency. The main problem facing the southern Sudan at the end of 1991 is the war, and this exaggerates the effect of any natural calamity. Specifically this year we have witnessed the dramatic increase of displaced persons fleeing from war or natural disasters, and large areas suffering from severe to acute food shortage due to extensive crop and livestock loss. The split in the SPLA has intensified rural insecurity. The effects of the long running civil war have been to destroy or seriously inhibit the mechanisms of trade, indigenous exchange networks and basic services that enabled the population to cope with deficit in food supply and non-food survival items. Almost all the current problems are focused in areas of southern Sudan that have been little assisted by relief services due to their remote nature and the difficulty of securing agreements for humanitarian access.

As such the primary recommendation for action by the international community in 1992 is continuous access and consolidated assistance to Upper Nile, Jonglei, Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes and Western Equatoria. Displaced or otherwise affected populations need to be enabled to return home or at least spread out to find land and security so that as many as possible can gain self sufficiency in the shortest possible time. This means providing relief and support services across a wide area. Food relief will be required for both long and short term assistance. Non-food relief requirements are agricultural tools and seeds, fishing equipment, veterinary inputs, life-saving drugs and vaccines and water supply. To reduce the chronic vulnerability of the populations in southern Sudan to their endemic state of emergency, basic service requirements are fundamental structural support in all sectors, primary health care, education and water supply.

2. BACKGROUND

Operation Lifeline Sudan was launched in April 1989 in response to the disaster of 1988 in which 250,000 civilians are believed to have died as a result of famine caused by civil conflict. Also during that year thousands of people were displaced from their homes and large numbers arrived at refugee camps in Ethiopia. The operation set historic precedents in the delivery of humanitarian relief aid based on principles of provision of emergency assistance to civilians in need in any location, however relief has been inconsistent due to largely political constraints, insecurity has once again worsened and the crisis continues. The lack of a clear agreement on procedure between GOS, SPLA and the UN has produced a cumbersome and inflexible clearance procedure, involving constant re-negotiations over every development, and resulting in an inability of OLS to meet the needs it has identified.

2.1 Insecurity

2.1.1 The Civil War

- In March 1991 significant areas of Western Equatoria were taken by the SPLA resulting in displacement of civilian populations; however the area has already begun to settle down and appears to be recovering well.
- There is continued insecurity around the garrison towns of Juba, Rumbek, Wau, Malakal etc. and militia activities formerly in Fangak and Mayom whose main effect on the surrounding SPLA-held countryside has been to restrict access for essential trade and for the homecoming of displaced persons.
- Improvement in security was reported in northern Bahr el Ghazal where a peace agreement with the government-supported Messeriya militia led to a cessation of the violence and raiding in the area south of the Kordofan boundary.
- During the whole of 1991 the rural area around Kapoeta has been virtually inaccessible to outsiders due to fighting between the SPLA and the government-supported Toposa militia. Road links have also suffered during certain periods. Peace agreements reached during the year were largely unsuccessful, but it may be that the latest of end-November will be effective.
- Bombing by GOS has continued within the SPLA-held south with deaths and casualties reported from many sites and consequent temporary dispersal of population.

Despite all this insecurity, large areas remained essentially peaceful and potentially productive until the dramatic effects of external insecurity and internal factionalism.

2.1.2 External Insecurity

In May/June 1991 the fall of the Mengistu Government resulted in severe insecurity in western Ethiopia and closure of the three large Sudanese refugee camps at Itang, Funyido and Dima. Some 285,000 southern Sudanese who had sought refuge in these camps from war, food scarcity and disease were forced to flee back into Sudan. The ex-population of Funyido, some 100,000 are almost all in Pochalla, being assisted by ICRC. The ex-population of Itang, c.150,000 are located along the Sobat and Pibor rivers (c. 96,000 around the town of Nasir) assisted by OLS, UNHCR and NGOs. The ex-population of Dima (c.35,000) are divided between Pakok (10,000) assisted intermittently by any agency that is given access by Government of Sudan (OLS/ICRC/NGOs) and the rural areas of Kapoeta/Chukudum. Many of the returnees come from areas inaccessible due to the civil war, but a further proportion come from areas that had been peaceful until affected by the devastation resulting from internal factionalism within the SPLA.

2.1.3 Internal Factionalism

In August 1991 a group of SPLA commanders at Nasir initiated what amounted to an internal coup against John Garang, leader of the SPLA. This resulted in factional fighting in Akobo, Ayod, Ler, Kongor and Bor. The fighting in Kongor and Bor has been the most serious resulting in huge displacement and loss of life, food and property:

The fighting also interfered to a critical extent with the inter-tribal exchange mechanisms of those in surrounding areas not directly affected by fighting but seriously affected by flood-induced loss of crops. It created a front line which stretched east-west across southern Sudan, effectively preventing any overland relief movement.

The hospitals in Western Upper Nile which are currently treating over 2,000 patients suffering from the fatal disease visceral leishmaniasis are not being supplied with drugs due to the fighting and will have to cease treatment if not resupplied.

Through the mediation of the New Sudan Council of Churches backed by energetic advocacy from humanitarian agencies, the two factions declared a cease-fire on 28 November. A further agreement may be possible to enable relief supplies to move across the battle line.

2.2 Environment

1991 has been a year of consistent rainfall. Rains started early in most locations and continued late (April - October). Although this is a blessing in the well drained areas in the far south, it has resulted in serious flooding in much of the low-lying clay plains that border the Sudd, notably Bor, Kongor and Waat where floods started in May and have still to recede completely in early December. Crops in these three counties were completely washed out. Ler and Sobat were able to plant early and reap a harvest before floods rose in August. Ayod, Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes have not been so extensively flooded and have reaped harvests although pest infestation and cattle disease has been quite serious in many areas on the periphery of the floods. Such environmentally-induced difficulties are not unusual in southern Sudan and there exist complex traditional coping mechanisms to mitigate negative effects. These include a shifting emphasis on a diversity of food sources including hunting, fishing and collection of wild food, kinship sharing and loan mechanisms and long distance grain/livestock trade. However the destruction of trade networks including complete absence of any internal transport other than aid vehicles and the interference of extensive insecurity with population movement patterns and inter-tribal exchange/loan systems has all but broken the normal survival response to the vagaries of the environment.

2.3 Infrastructure

Infrastructure is virtually non-existent. Roads are in very poor shape, undrained and impassable for much of the year. Only Equatoria can boast all weather access. The limited and basic water, health and education facilities are also mostly concentrated in Equatoria.

2.4 Economy

Whilst some improvement in the general economic climate had taken place during 1991 in the form of a relaxation of administrative trade restrictions and the development of small markets in many areas, the economy has come under renewed pressure as a result of both the closure of the Ethiopian camps and the internal factional fighting. Itang camp was a focal point for a trading system that included almost all of Upper Nile and large parts of Jonglei. It was Itang that supplied the grain for trade with Nuer cattle that tided people through the poor grain harvests of recent years. Through Itang Ethiopian currency was even used in some markets along the Sudan-Ethiopian border. With the insecurity within western Ethiopia and the consequent loss of a major market, the people of the region will have to look elsewhere for trade. However the factional fighting has also seriously inhibited trading patterns since people have been prevented from moving between areas claimed by the Torit faction and those claimed by the Nasir faction of the SPLA. Trade on the west bank of the Nile is beginning to pick up and will be a major factor in assisting people to survive crop losses this year.

2.5 Relief Interventions

Significant efforts have been made since 1989 to assist in the ongoing emergency. Apart from food relief, considerable quantities essential drugs, water supply parts, agricultural inputs etc. have been supplied along with basic training in critical areas such as health. Many lives have been saved amongst the destitute returnees who came from Ethiopia in

June 1991, amongst the local populations who suffered harvest failure in 1990, amongst the population of western Upper Nile suffering from Kala azar. Where relief inputs have been uninterrupted by the complications of external or internal politics the results of the integrated relief and vulnerability reduction programme have been quite successful: Torit area is a model of self-reliance at least at the moment. However lives have also been lost: access to many locations has been denied by GOS and no improvement in local coping capacity has really been achieved. Many returnees who came to Nasir have suffered seriously from repeated interruptions of needed food and non-food aid (an alarming death rate of 16/1,000/month in one site in October 1991). Other areas have been once more engulfed by conflict and as a result have lost everything once again: except for the training provided to local health workers nothing else from the international relief effort will remain.

3. POPULATION AND TARGET BENEFICIARIES

3.1 Overview

The total population of the area accessible to Operation Lifeline Sudan - Southern Sector is estimated at 3.5 million. All of these are to one extent or another beneficiaries of OLS programmes, notably the health and education activities. Areas not covered in this figure include the whole of Bahr el Ghazal region and the government held towns. The displaced population currently inside the government towns and Khartoum have also not been included in the calculation. Amongst this 3.5 million are 1.2 million who have been assessed as being in need of significant relief assistance.

3.2 Specially Vulnerable Populations

The areas requiring the greatest relief inputs can be categorised as follows:

Category	Assessed Population
3.2.1 Refugees who returned from the Ethiopian refugee camps between May and July too late to plant sufficient crops, who are living in areas with little or no food reserves, have sold most of their possessions and are now almost entirely dependent on relief aid. This group includes 14,500 unaccompanied children. ¹	
Sobat/Pibor river basin (ex-Itang and Funyido: 150,000) Pochalla (under care of ICRC: 100,000) Pakok/Kidepo (ex-Dima: 20,000)	270,000
3.2.2 Persons acutely affected by fighting and extensive floods: loss of homes, goods, crops and livestock in Bor and Kongor Areas ²	274,000

¹ Figures based on registration

² Based on calculated population of Bor and Kongor areas less the population of Mongalla which is not directly affected

3.2.3	Persons affected by severe food shortage through loss of all crops due to flood and pests, with access to livestock and fish, but lack of fishing equipment or trading possibilities: Waat Area:	108,000
3.2.4	Persons infected by or at risk of infection by visceral leishmaniasis currently epidemic in Western Upper Nile and White Nile:	200,000
3.2.5	Persons affected by food shortage through partial loss of grain crop in Lakes (Shambe, Yirol, Rumbek):	120,000
3.2.6	An unconfirmed number of returnees from Zaire in Western Equatoria; areas with fair food supply and critical health problems:	70,000
3.2.7	Refugees from Western Equatoria still in CAR, Zaire and Uganda, some of whom might return this year:	194,000
3.2.8	<i>An as yet unconfirmed number of displaced persons in Bahr el Ghazal reported by SRRA (the assessment team did not have clearance to fly to Akon, therefore it did not have the opportunity to verify these numbers produced by local authorities), which are said to include the following:</i>	
	<i>Moving from N. Sudan to S. Sudan (113,000)</i>	
	<i>Internal war displaced (66,000)</i>	
	<i>Flood/drought/locust affected (580,000)</i>	

(Not assessed: 759,000)

In addition to these known figures, the current fighting within the southern Sudan will lead to further internal displacement. As yet there is no way to predict the number of persons who will be so affected.

Breakdown:	
Displaced populations:	355,500
Displaced unaccompanied children	14,500
Affected local populations:	672,000
Refugees likely to return	194,000
TOTAL ASSESSED	1,236,000
<i>(Unconfirmed, unassessed)</i>	<i>(759,000)</i>
<i>(Total including unconfirmed)</i>	<i>(1,995,000)</i>


3.3 Future Prognosis

The situation within southern Sudan demands rapid and comprehensive attention. Returnees and most notably the unaccompanied children amongst them will need to be assisted to normalise their situation and promote their own self-sufficiency ideally through reunification with their home areas and kin. All groups listed above will need relief and their future will to a large extent depend on the response of the international community as well as the path of conflict in the region. Although it is difficult to predict anything in the continuously fluid state of war and chronic vulnerability in southern Sudan the following may perhaps be scenarios for 1992:

3.3.1 Returnees

A proportion of the returnees along the Sobat are likely to wish to move homewards during the dry season, if the factional fighting ceases. Although a large number come from areas such as White Nile and Blue Nile which are on the front line of the SPLA-GOS war they have expressed their wish to move away from Nasir and as close to their home areas as safety permits. They will carry with them very limited supplies and will depend a great deal on relief from both their kin and from the international community.

In Pochalla 60 - 70% wish to remain in the area, moving out to locations with better water supply. However, if Bor and Kongor become peaceful and services are re-established, significant numbers may decide to return to their home areas as around 60% of the 100,000 at Pochalla originate from Bor area.



3.3. Unaccompanied Minors

Those of the 14,500 unaccompanied minors still in Nasir, Pakok and Pochalla that can go back to their home areas and be reunited with parents, relatives or guardians will be assisted to do so. Meanwhile efforts will continue to protect, feed and look after the children in their current locations. A number have already made it back home or are on the way by themselves.

3.3.3 Kongor/Bor Displaced

Until the two SPLA factions cease the internal fighting, the prognosis for the Kongor and Bor populations remains very unclear and extremely worrying. It is hoped that peace will prevail and relief, already initiated in areas south of Bor, be allowed to increase and continue. However if trouble does not stop the 220,000 or more affected may even migrate as far as Uganda in search of safety and assistance. In addition further areas will become insecure and further displacement can be expected.

3.3.4 Waat and Yirol

The people of Waat Area, if assisted with some basic relief, will survive. However, without it they may also be joining the ranks of the displaced, perhaps moving to Nasir in search of assistance. Those in Yirol will suffer hardship this year and may be selling significant numbers of livestock.

3.3.5 Kala Azar

Without continuation of the Kala azar programme and related primary health care services a large proportion of the population of western Upper Nile may die of the disease. A recent survey showed that only 18% of those infected actually recovered without treatment. The prognosis for surrounding areas is not necessarily the same but should be investigated.

3.4 Most Vulnerable Groups

Within each area the degree to which the fighting, displacement and crop loss affect individual survival varies. However, the close-knit structure of society in southern Sudan is such that generally the stress is spread as widely as possible between the members of each ethnic group and sometimes intra-group as well.

- The most critically vulnerable group are the 14,500 unaccompanied children, who are completely without the usual means of support. A nutrition survey in August found 60% moderate malnourishment³ amongst the unaccompanied children at Nasir and 66% amongst those at Pakok in November. Those in Pochalla are currently doing well, but are vulnerable if they lose the protection and assistance of ICRC.
- The people of Bor and Kongor have lost nearly everything in the floods and fighting and have few neighbours to turn to for assistance.
- On the Sobat river, over two thirds of the returnees from Ethiopia (c. 110,000) are relying primarily on assistance from the local population, with only 46,000 actually in "displaced centres". The international agencies are providing assistance to both the 46,000 visible returnees and the 110,000 less visible ones. Local support mechanisms have been placed under considerable pressure during the years of war so the hosting by the local

³ Body Mass Index < 14

population estimated at 200,000 (or less) of a returnee group of some 110,000 is significant: ie. every household of 8 has an average of 4 returnees to support.

- Whilst women and children are essentially the most vulnerable amongst the affected, in their home areas they are part of a complex support system which includes milk rights for children.
- Of the 46,000 displaced returnees around Nasir, two groups are especially vulnerable: the returnees at Nordeng village who come from Blue Nile Province and the Dinka returnees at Kot village both of whom have no links whatsoever with the Sobat and consequently receive no assistance from the local community.
- In Pochalla the returnees are not related to the local ethnic group (the Anuak) and are 100% reliant on assistance.
- All people living in the *Balanites aegyptiaca-Acacia seyal* forest lands of western Upper Nile and surrounding areas are vulnerable to Kala azar. Studies indicate that women and men aged between 10 and 30 are most at risk, with degree of stress having a bearing on transmission.

4. NUTRITION, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY

4.1 Surveillance Data

A nutrition survey conducted in three locations in November 1991 found the following⁴:

Site	# measured	% < 120mm MUAC (Severe)	% 120 -130mm MUAC (Moderate) ⁵
Bor (Recent harvest failure and recent severe insecurity)	182	8.0%	21.0%
Ayod (Some harvest and no insecurity)	117	1.7%	12.8%
Pakok (Returnees from Ethiopia)	138	1.4%	10.7%

The same survey also collected mortality data:

Site	# households	Under five mortality ⁶	Probable Cause
Bor	157	7.5	Health - flooding (displacement recent)
Ayod	81	15.4	Health - poor water supply (diarrhea)
Pakok	134	14.2	Malnutrition and sanitation (diarrhea)

⁴ Epicentre/WFP nutrition assessment, Nov 1991

⁵ The study used < 120mm for severe malnourishment and 120 - 130mm for moderate to gain better specificity.

⁶ per 1,000 per month, NB. in refugee situations a under-five mortality rate of 12 deaths/1,000 children/month is considered alarming

Morbidity data from all locations underline the high prevalence of diarrheal disease and malaria both amongst displaced and local populations. Deaths from preventable diarrheal disease outweigh almost all other causes especially in the crowded and unsanitary conditions prevalent amongst the displaced. In Nasir, from June 1990 - April 1991 (local population) the following three most prevalent and serious diseases are reported:

Disease	% of caseload	% of reported deaths caused by each disease	% under five
Diarrheal	20%	31%	39%
Malaria	20%	20%	
Respiratory infection	7%	9%	

During one week in October 1991 amongst the Nordeng displaced the morbidity and mortality were as follows:

Disease	% of reported deaths caused by each disease	Approximate crude mortality rate ⁷	% under five mortality
Diarrhea	75%	16	45.8%
Malaria	4%		
Respiratory	4%		

4.2 Visceral Leishmaniasis - Kala Azar

The epidemic of visceral leishmaniasis (Kala azar) in western Upper Nile is causing unprecedented mortality. At the centre of the epidemic a death rate of 30 - 40% of the population was recorded in May 1990. Tens of thousands of people have died in the last four years and the rate of infection is increasing. An entomological survey found 10% of sand flies in one area to be carrying the parasite. The disease is known to be spreading into Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal and is reported on the White Nile. Its progress has been assisted by significant population displacement. Treatment of 2,000 patients each month in Upper Nile has been interrupted by fighting.

4.3 Health Care

The provision of preventative and curative health care is precarious. In Bor, Kongor and Ler, all inputs have been lost and health workers dispersed as a result of the fighting. Basic primary health care units were functioning at 250 sites but many have recently closed due to the factional fighting and vast areas remain either completely unserved or have only one or two functioning units and very erratic supplies of inputs due to access restrictions imposed by GOS. Health worker training continues to provide the best base for rapid re-establishment of services and is given high priority by the relief agencies. Given the prevalence of preventable diseases and the continuous disruption of health services there is an increasing focus on the village-based services of the traditional birth attendant, the village health worker and the immunisation provider. Some serious immunisable disease

⁷ per 1,000 per month NB in refugee situations a mortality rate of 6 deaths/1,000/month is considered alarming

outbreaks have been reported: polio in Ler, meningitis in Ler and Yiol and measles in Yiol and earlier in 1991 in Nasir.

4.3 Clean Water and Sanitation

Clean water is available to less than 5% of the population of SPLA southern Sudan (largely through the efforts of the MEDIC/UNICEF/SRRA/AAIN handpump repair programme) and sanitation is a major problem in the areas where displaced are congregated (Nasir, Pakok, Pochalla and Bor) yet as shown above, water-borne disease is the major killer in southern Sudan today.

5. OLS STRATEGIES

In setting priorities for interventions in southern Sudan, OLS seeks to enhance local coping mechanisms in the areas of maximum vulnerability. However activities have been influenced by accessibility, leaving the most vulnerable areas the least assisted. In 1992 OLS hopes to break this pattern and focus considerable efforts on acquiring the access agreements and the funds to work in the most remote areas of southern Sudan.

5.1. Target Beneficiaries

Relief operations will focus on the most vulnerable groups of a whole society in distress in southern Sudan. In the light of the complex interdependence of individuals within Sudanese society and the tendency to spread the burden of disaster through loan and exchange networks, in setting priorities we have assessed the overall vulnerability of the populations of each area (see below). Having established which areas are most in need of attention, choice of type of activity is dictated by the communities own perceived needs, the causes of the vulnerability and the trigger events that have pushed the population into emergency:

- i) Acute food shortages through looting or displacement
- ii) Household food insecurity caused by poor harvests due to years of drought or flood or cattle disease
- iii) Vulnerability to disease because of lack of any health services
- iv) Heightened vulnerability in areas of epidemics, poor sanitation because of crowding
- v) Greater vulnerability to disease as a result of chronic malnutrition
- vi) Vulnerability to conscription or neglect.

It is inevitable that intervention priorities will still be to some extent dictated by logistics and availability of inputs.

The identification of specific beneficiaries will continue to be undertaken by the communities of the identified areas. Traditional chiefs and elders are approached for priority interventions as well as for distribution plans for relief items. In choosing who should get what OLS has had very good experience with the fairness and strategic decision-making of the traditional authorities. Monitoring and evaluation activities include consultation with vulnerable groups in identification of ideal OLS interventions to enhance traditional coping mechanisms. For example the 1990 seeds and tools programme evaluation interviewed 500 farmers and ascertained that their greatest need was

additional agricultural tools⁸. AAIN in Western Equatoria have assisted in establishing an information and implementation system based at community level which defines and influences plans and strategies from the beneficiary upwards.

5.2. Implementing Partners

Most operations are implemented with the assistance of the SRRA as the local authority. However, because the split within the movement has complicated programme discussion, and because of the sometimes obstructive attitude of the SRRA towards community participation, especially participatory planning, OLS and NGOs will be vigorously establishing more direct links with traditional structures and community leaders not only for needs assessment but also for developing implementing mechanisms. In areas other than distribution of relief inputs, community participation has been somewhat conceptual to date, however, almost every agency canvassed during the assessment elaborated plans for turning concept to reality. Strategies include beneficiary representation on relief committees, village-based training programmes for village-based personnel, promotion of community co-ordination mechanisms, employment by communities of their own health and education workers and sharing of the burden of support for basic services between the relief agencies and the beneficiaries.

The operation will continue to be coordinated with the ever growing number of NGOs and OLS will extend the range and quantity of logistic and material support to them. The linkage with NGOs (whose personnel do a large proportion of the field implementation, especially in the non-food sector) within OLS is an important part of the special relief programme designed to maintain the transparency and neutrality of operations in a situation of civil conflict. The link also assists in minimising duplication and ensuring that the coordinated response meets all the priority needs. However, although co-ordination is already remarkably strong, there are a number of areas that will be improved, notably the establishment of clear written agreements between collaborating agencies, in particular priority setting for transport services. Without a written agreement NGOs sometimes feel that their essential requirements are given second priority on flights⁹ or that their overall field programme priorities are not represented by the UN resident project officer. In addition, commitments of resources will be clarified in order to allow effective planning. Written agreements between other partners such as community representatives and SRRA are also being developed.

Established coordinating mechanisms include regular sectoral and multi-sectoral coordination meetings at all levels, as well as multi-agency participation in field implementation. These mechanisms will not only be maintained, but hopefully extended to include agencies not yet actively participating such as WHO, FAO, UNDP. Collaboration with organisations such as UNHCR and ICRC will continue, taking advantage of each agency's specialized mandate and expertise.

5.3. Access to all those in Need and Expansion of OLS Coverage

Several large areas have been inaccessible to OLS during the last years, particularly in Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Equatoria. Due to political/military developments, as well as the interest taken by an increasing number of NGOs and the overall increase in knowledge and experience, these areas are now closer to the reach of relief agencies. While continuous and effective air access will be essential for assistance of remote and marginal areas, OLS and other agencies will attempt to reach as many locations as possible by

⁸ For some further detail of OLS experience see *A Critical Review of the Management and Impact of Seeds and Tools Programmes in Southern Sudan*, UNICEF, 1990

⁹ See the recent evaluation of the OLS Air Transport Activities

surface transport. Government of Sudan unwillingness to give flight clearance to certain locations has severely impeded - in many instances prevented - the relief effort aimed at the most vulnerable groups. Factional fighting has done the same. OLS will have to continue to advocate with all parties in the conflict unrestricted humanitarian relief and access through corridors of tranquility.

As the war continues (and even intensifies), all areas of southern Sudan are either at risk or in a state of emergency now. While in the most southern parts of the region vulnerability is lower due to improved climatic conditions, better external links and a greater inheritance of trained personnel, they are the source of potential surplus and assistance for more vulnerable neighbours. Areas which are currently considered maximally vulnerable but are not suffering immediate emergency, such as Pibor, are vital foci for vulnerability reduction programmes such as cattle vaccination. Thus through this support to the network of coping mechanisms, OLS expects to benefit, to an admittedly small extent for many, the full population of 3.5 million to whom we have at least partial access.

Clearly there will remain considerable unmet needs. Continuous advocacy to GOS and donors to provide assistance and continuous upgrading of local capacity are two keys to this dearth. Once again it will be the more remote areas that will be those whose full needs remain unmet.

5.4 Logistics

A summary of WFP anticipated logistics needs can be found in section 7. Though an estimated 84,000 MT of food is needed for those groups already identified as in need, the current carrying capacity (using a combination of road and barge transport, airdrops and airlifts) is around 50,000 MT. Barge deliveries require agreements the three sides in the current war, and for that reason cannot be relied on. Airdrops and airlifts similarly require access agreements. The main means of transport will remain truck convoys from Kenya and Uganda.

In addition to the movement of bulky items there is a very large component of the Operation that depends almost entirely on the service of aircraft. Since three-quarters of southern Sudan is inaccessible due to rains for over 8 months of the year, this service is critical. The recent evaluation of the aircraft system underlined how important it was to all the NGOs involved in southern Sudan.

Vehicle transport within each location, which includes the use of bicycles, boats and four-wheel drives is also very important. Over the years of OLS, the maintenance of the field transport vehicles has been very poor and a number of programmes have suffered accordingly - EPI, for example has often been reduced to a standstill by broken cars. Whilst the appropriateness of the reliance on cars can be questioned in some instances and EPI, for example, is placing more emphasis on bicycles, UNICEF, WVI and AAIN are committed to increasing their support to a systematic vehicle maintenance system.

Co-ordination of use of the various types of transport between UN, NGOs and ICRC is based on good inter-agency relations but is not by any means perfect.

The Lokichokio base camp is an important component of the logistics system, as is the WFP Kampala office. Loki provides significant storage facilities and a vehicle maintenance workshop. It is a transit point for agencies moving to and from southern Sudan and is utilised for a large number of co-ordination meetings. The OLS/UNICEF air fleet constitutes an essential backbone for serving staff, providing non-food items, and monitoring and evaluation for the UN and NGOs. The Kampala WFP logistics office is a key departure point for much of the food transported by road and air into southern Sudan.

Agencies in Southern Sudan

Agency	Area of Operations	Activities
Action Africa In Need (AAIN)	Western Equatoria (base in Kaya District)	Management, Health, Water, Women, Small industry
ACROSS	All areas especially Jonglei/Eastern Upper Nile	Health, all aspects of Relief
Action Internationale Contre La Faim (AICF)	Kajo Keji, Nasir, Pakok	Health
Air Serv International	All areas	Air transport
Catholic Relief Services	Torit and Kaya	Food, agriculture
Diocese of Rumbek	Rumbek, Yirol	All aspects of relief
Diocese of Torit	Torit	Education, agriculture
Farm Africa	Pibor	Veterinary
German Emergency Doctors	Yirol	Health
Health Unlimited	Torit	Health Training
Interaid	Bor	Health
International Aid Sweden	Kajo Keji, Kaya, Western Equatoria	Agriculture, Water, Education, Small industry
International Committee of the Red Cross	Pochalla, Ler, Kongor, Yirol, Nasir, Pakok	All aspects of emergency relief and protection
International Rescue Committee	Kapoeta, Nasir	Health
Medair	Akobo	Health, Water
New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)	All areas	All aspects of relief
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	Torit	Health, Education
Oxfam US	Chukudum	Agriculture, Management
Medic	Eastern Equatoria, Bor, Yirol?	Water
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)	Kapoeta, Torit, Bor	Food, general relief
Pisces	Bor, Akobo, Akon, Nasir	Fishing
Street Kids International (SKI)	All areas	Education
Save the Children Fund UK (SCF)	Pochalla, Nasir	Agriculture, Fishing, general relief
Seedcorn	Nasir	Handicapped
Sudan Interior Mission	Pibor	Agriculture
United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF)	All areas	Non-food relief
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)	Nasir	Returnee relief
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)	All areas except Kapoeta and Chukdum	Food relief
World Vision International (WVI)	Kapoeta, Chukudum, Torit, Bor, Ler, Yirol	Food, general relief

5.5. Personnel

One of the problems faced by WFP and UNICEF in 1991 was the need to rapidly redeploy field staff into new emergency areas away from other activities. It became very clear that work to reduce vulnerability was not focusing on the most vulnerable areas, in many cases the most remote, but was largely concentrated in the accessible south of the south. Therefore both WFP and UNICEF will be emphasising deployment of personnel to the less well served areas in 1992, which will have to be backed up by energetic advocacy for continuous access from GOS. The presence of UN/OLS in the more remote locations and regular access will help to encourage NGOs to establish programmes and to begin to redress the imbalance of relief.

With increased relief requirements and increased distances to cover, both numbers and calibre of staff in logistics, area based posts, technical consultancies and accountability will be necessary.

5.6. Area Based Focus

Whilst sectoral considerations are well covered by the consortia of UN and NGO agencies working within each sector and communications good, the links between sectors are still in need of strengthening if any impact is to be made on household survival. Area based and integrated programme approaches are on the agenda of most of the agencies and UN will continue to support these through co-ordination, data collection and advocacy. Examples of linkages are food for schools, clean water for health education and distribution of barter items for local acquisition of food and seed.

5.7. Training

At the same time as OLS provides relief inputs, continuous training at all levels is key to better management of the relief and to direct support of community coping systems. This is carried out by a number of NGOs and includes improving understanding of preventative health, use of oral rehydration therapy, increasing knowledge of how to make the best of changed nutritional circumstances and providing technical knowledge of water system maintenance. While the war may destroy, the trained people are the ones to rebuild.

5.8. Monitoring & Evaluation

The situation in southern Sudan seems almost inimical to accountability as access is often restricted, by political events as well as by the pitiful state of the transport infrastructure. Despite this, a number of systems have been put into place to provide accountability, continuous situation assessment and impact analysis, for example the supervision and information system of the primary health care programme which links community workers to area supervisors to SRRA and NGO area coordinators. Periodic and regular general situation assessments (such as this document), sectoral assessments such as nutrition surveys and sectoral evaluations will also be expanded. UNICEF will be establishing a system of regular sentinel site surveillance in all areas in 1992. The assessments will be planned to include more agencies undertaking simultaneous activities or working together. A more rehabilitation-oriented food distribution will require more food monitors in the field on the one hand, and increased training programmes for local storekeepers on the other. Direct distribution of food to court centres, for immediate distribution through chiefs and village leaders in addition to distributions through the SRRA has had a positive impact.

5.9. Disaster Preparedness

Since this zone of civil conflict and regular climatic extremes has and will continue to experience a series of emergencies within the emergency, (such as the return of Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia, displacement and destruction caused by inter-factional fighting within the SPLA, the floods in Waat), all in addition to the shifting frontlines and a general state of insecurity, OLS will continue to emphasise disaster preparedness through information flow, deployment of staff and resources to most vulnerable areas and continued efforts to strengthen the less vulnerable support areas. This includes continuous monitoring of indicators of potential natural disasters such as drought of floods (in continued collaboration with FAO), as well as developing capacity for preparing plans for swift response. A continuous contingency stockpile of emergency relief supplies will add to the required flexibility of organisational reaction to new emergencies.

5.10. Coordination and Advocacy

- OLS Nairobi will continue to play a coordination role, not only by collating available information and assisting with regular meetings at all levels with SRRA, NGOs, ICRC and Donors and within all sectors, but also through day to day direct contact with NGOs and other agencies involved.
- OLS will strengthen its negotiation strategies with GOS and SRRA to support the humanitarian activities in southern Sudan. The main areas of concern are corridors of tranquility, flight clearances and advocacy for the needs of the most vulnerable.
- OLS will continue to provide an air service to NGOs and will extend them to focus on the more distant marginal areas in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal where road access is not possible. OLS will also encourage and support more NGOs to work in these more difficult areas.
- OLS will continue to make available transit facilities to all associated agencies at Loki. This operation has proven indispensable for a smooth running of the relief effort and maintaining a standby capacity for emergencies within the emergency. OLS will continue to make available Loki base for committee meetings between NGOs, UN, and SRRA to discuss coordination of sectoral programmes and to develop short and medium term plans and assign responsibilities for all partners involved.

6. STRATEGIES FOR SPECIFIC VULNERABLE GROUPS

6.1. Returnees from Ethiopia (General Relief and Barter Items, Fishing)

The strategy is to continue and increase the provision of immediate relief assistance such as food and supplementary feeding, shelter, and basic health services through the communities. Basic support to health, education and water provision to the returnees local hosts and to their home areas will also be a part of the balance of interventions. OLS will help returnees to strengthen their ability to reach their homes or find self-sufficiency. Distribution of barter items, light in volume and weight but high in value, to allow returnees to purchase food or locally grown seed and to provide a stimulant for final self-sufficiency. The returnees from Ethiopia had come with quite a few belongings, which meanwhile all found their way to the resident population through barter for food. The proposed returnee package would typically consist of cloth, also for the fabrication of mosquito nets, fishing line and hooks, salt, vegetable oil, household items, and agricultural handtools to promote food production and alike. Support will be extended to NGOs to assist in monitoring of the distribution and training in improved fishing techniques. In some

present locations of returnees such as in Pakok, water situation is critical, with waterborne diseases especially diarrhea accounting for the majority of deaths. Here, but also in other areas of final settlement drilling of borewells (50, to be equipped with handpumps) is urgently required. This will also be coordinated with NGOs and ICRC which is planning to also assist. The WFP planned airlifts to Waat and Akobo intend to reduce the pressure on Waat.

UNHCR will play a major role in implementation of and assistance to the returnee programme in all areas including Nasir, Pochalla and Western Equatoria and will submit a complementary proposal. Any resettlement plans will also very closely be coordinated with UNDP in Khartoum, which will play the lead role in assisting return of war displaced, especially from Khartoum area, to southern Sudan, most likely Bahr el Ghazal. While OLS southern sector will prepare the ground in Bahr el Ghazal, UNDP will not only have to assist the returnee movement but also negotiate with the Government of Sudan for the necessary access and clearances.

6.2. Unaccompanied Minors (Education)

ICRC is the lead agency in the tracing and repatriation effort and is already providing personnel. UNICEF will assist in provision of basic school materials and education facilities which need support both in the areas where the children are now and in final reception areas in recognition of this greatest felt need of unaccompanied minors. Hence UNICEF will continue to provide basic education materials mainly in Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal, in collaboration with NGOs. The school programme already links a number of sectors through school gardens assisted through the provision of seeds and tools, water for schools and health education and will put more emphasis on these through and direct advocacy with communities. UNICEF will promote information packs for classes, with specific topics such as preventative health, sanitation, immunisation, gardening and agriculture. Return of unaccompanied minors will also be closely coordinated with the GOS through the ICRC and UN agencies, in order to facilitate crossing of frontlines where required.

Community schools usually provide one meal a day (*fatur*) for the children and teachers. Food is sometimes provided from school gardens, but more often from donations by the community in the form of grain or cow for milk. In the current precarious conditions schools frequently close down due to lack of food. WFP has in the past, and will continue to support community school feeding programmes, offering a partial ration in grain or beans, and possibly salt and oil to supplement community contributions. As the preparation of grain presents a problem in an area with few grinding mills, it is also proposed that the school feeding allocation include enough to remunerate local women who can be hired to grind the grain for school meals. They would be compensated with part of the flour they produced for use in their own families.

6.3. Bor, Kongor, Waat (areas of internal fighting and flooding) (Food Relief, Barter Items, Seeds and Tools, Feeding, Health, Water)

Strategies will focus on provision of general relief items such as food and shelter, and agricultural recovery through seed and tools. It is absolutely critical that relief reaches not just those *most accessible*, but *all those in need*. Distribution will be in consultation and participation with representatives of the benefitting communities and will include considerable support for internal seed distribution strategies through use of barter items. The rudimentary health structure, which had been so painstakingly built up by NGOs, SRRA and UNICEF before outbreak of internal fighting, will need to be re-organized. Health units will have to be repaired and basic equipment resupplied. Bor area has shown a high incidence of malnutrition and several feeding programmes were operational which

have been revived; they may have to be on a much larger scale than before. While UNICEF will provide supplementary food and logistics, established NGOs such as Interaid will supervise the operation of the feeding centers and assist in nutritional surveillance. Assistance from NGOs will be solicited for treatment of cattle whose health has been put in jeopardy as a result of the extended flooding and displacement by fighting. It is well recognized that supplementary feeding will not resolve the underlying causes nor remedy malnutrition of the scattered resident population. This can only be achieved through provision of a full food basket, which WFP is aiming to supply and support to rebuilding household food security. UNICEF will continue with its planned programme with MEDIC to repair or replace the handpumps in the area. The WFP/UNICEF base camp at Bor will also have to be repaired and re-equipped.

6.4. Yirol and other areas in Bahr el Ghazal (crop failure and possible reception areas for returnees)

The primary strategies will be to promote food security and health. Yirol has greater strengths than other areas at the moment due to its links with external sources for exchange of cattle and fish for grain and other goods. However, international assistance has been restricted by GOS who have limited access. Such access permitting, food deliveries by WVI and WFP will be complemented by provision of fishing equipment and additional food if needed by ICRC and a continuation by ICRC and UNICEF of the Rinderpest eradication campaign with assistance from PARC (Pan African Rinderpest Campaign) and veterinary services. Child immunization programmes will also be continued and extended, both through the link with cattle vaccination and through the strengthening of the primary health care network and the education programme. Diocese of Rumbek and GED has already made a commitment to assist in strengthening these essential areas and the overland route via Mundri is now a realistic proposition. In the dry season there is even the possibility of continuing overland up to Akon where preparation for return of war displaced from Khartoum. However success of the overall programme (especially in northern Bahr el Ghazal) will ultimately depend on support from UN (and ICRC) Khartoum in negotiating flight clearances.

6.5. Ler and western Upper Nile (Kala-azar)

The UNICEF/OLS strategy is to support NGOs who undertake actual treatment. In addition ICRC and UNICEF will expand support to primary health, providing training, essential drugs, monitoring and supervising. Since Kala azar is consuming disease, which requires staple and supplementary food as part of the treatment and ICRC, WFP and UNICEF will work together to ensure the transportation. The general capacity of the population to deal with the crisis with which they are living which includes the loss of untenable numbers of productive family members will be supported in provision of seeds, tools, mosquito nets, household equipment and clean water through traditional networks. The possible active involvement of WHO expertise and manpower will be followed up.

6.6. Western Equatoria (returnees from Zaire and CAR and internally displaced)

In the re-establishment of the shattered health and water infrastructure and support to returnees and large numbers of internally displaced to find their feet, UNICEF and WFP will support NGOs with supplies and logistics, including requesting GOS for at least one flight location in Western Equatoria.

7. LOGISTICS OF FOOD AID NEEDS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

7.1. Assessment of Logistic Needs

Most of the areas in southern Sudan are extremely difficult to access even in normal times, and the present war, with its constantly changing political and military scenario makes realistic supply planning over a long period nearly impossible.

The difficulty of access and the very high delivery cost are the limiting factors in determining food quantities which actually can be delivered within the WFP emergency assistance to southern Sudan. Since funding requested from the donors has to have well defined limits, costly deliveries by air have to be restricted to only such cases where the loss of human life would otherwise be unavoidable. For some areas seasonal variations exist with respect to accessibility by road and barge. Four wheel drive trucks do not exist in the local East African market because they are not economical for commercial operations and much more demanding with respect to maintenance. Therefore the use of these trucks was not considered since it would make no sense to import a large number of new vehicles to that area and have them operated by WFP without an adequate maintenance infrastructure.*

Airdrops at first sight have cost advantages compared to airlifts, but on the other hand bear many operational risks, demand time consuming and costly preparation of the cargo, entail often high losses of commodities and require a strong presence of supervisory staff on the ground. Therefore an orderly delivery by landing of aircraft is given preference where this is possible.

Although some political obstacles certainly can be overcome with the good will of all the partners and negotiating skills fully deployed, for some destinations it will nevertheless be unrealistic to assume that the most economic delivery route can be chosen. This is especially the case when cargo destined for the SPLM/SPLA held territories has to transit through government held positions.

7.2 Analysis of Logistic Capacity and Costs

The following tables represent the logistics of food aid needs in Southern Sudan. Table I provides information on the duration of assistance from January 1992 onward and the individual food rations foreseen at the different localities. These need figures are based on the absolute minimum nutritional requirements, taking into consideration possible additional local food resources and a return to a certain degree of food self-sufficiency after a period of 4-8 months, depending on the cause of the food shortage and the specific circumstances.

Table II compares the food aid needs as assessed by the survey team with a realistic assumption of the logistic capacity. Since Nasir on the Sobat river will be accessible by river barges for only 2 months (from July onward) out of the 8 months supply period, costly air deliveries had to be programmed for the first 6 months. Since only 3500 MT can be delivered by the relatively economic river transport, three scenarios have been chosen with respect to the use of aircraft in order to facilitate decision making:

- a) barge + 2900 MT by airlift

* For further details on road conditions, air strips, port facilities and an expanded air supply programme, see A. P. L. Sanders, "UN/FAO/UNICEF/NGO 1992 Emergency Food Needs Assessment Mission, Southern Sudan, Report on Transport and Logistic Needs, December 1991.

- b) barge + 7200 MT by airdrop
- c) barge + 7200 MT by airdrop and 2900 MT by airlift

It is hoped that through a revival of the inter-regional trade network the supply of barter goods to the beneficiary population will enable them to tap some of the regional food resources; thus reducing to the absolute minimum the need for bringing in basic food by air.

Further air lifts will be necessary for the destinations of Pakok and Waat/Akobo (the ICRC airdrop to Pochalla ended on 12 December and will be replaced by an overland supply operation). The share of airlifts in the total food supply to these areas is as follows:

Pakok	43%
Waat	43%

Assuming average total costs of the logistic operation to SPLM/A held territories of 24 million US Dollars, the share of airlifts/drops foreseen will be as high as 50 % for only about 25 % of the total cargo delivered by air.

Table III compares on a commodity basis the assessed nutritional requirements with the quantities which most likely could be delivered considering the technical and financial constraints of the logistic operation. Priority, however, should be given for the distribution of non-cereal commodities due to their higher nutritional value and their partial use for bartering.

Table IV indicates the food quantities to be delivered by barges and the quantity of trucks and airplanes needed for the operation. The following assumptions were made:

- Each 10 ton truck will do two round trips per month starting from transshipment points up country.
- Each 26 ton truck/trailer unit will undertake one round trip per month from and to Kampala/Uganda.
- Each plane for airdrops will make an average 1.5 trips per day with 30 tons dropped per flight.
- Each plane for airlifts will perform 2 trips a day delivering 4-5 tons per flight.

TABLE I

**Food Aid Needs Southern Sudan
(SPLM/A Held Territories)**

Area	Benef. Number x 1000	Duration Months	Daily Ration in grams		
			Cereals	Pulses	Vegoil
Refugees who returned from the Ethiopian Refugee camps between May and July too late to plant sufficient crops, who are now entirely dependent on relief aid:					
Sobat/Pibor (Nasir area)	150	8	300	40	40
Pochalla (ICRC)	100	6	400	100	60
Pakok	10	6	400	40	40
Kidepo	10	6	400	40	40
Persons displaced by floods and fighting in Kongor & Bor areas	200	10	400	60	30
Persons affected by severe food shortage through loss of all crops due to flood and pests in Waat area	108	6	300	30	15
Persons affected by food shortage through loss of grain crop in Lakes area:	120				
<i>[Supplied by WFP in Yirol county only*:</i>	70	4	300	30	15]
Unconfirmed number of returnees/displaced in Western Equatoria:	70	6	400	60	30
Sub total (Accessible areas):	788				
*WVI plans to supply full rations for 15,000 beneficiaries; ICRC will supply Yirol out of its emergency food stock of 5000 MT.					
CONTINGENCY (Areas not currently accessible)					
Bahr el-Ghazal returnees from the north:	100	8	400	60	30
Bahr el-Ghazal internally displaced:	66	8	400	60	30
Bahr el-Ghazal natural calamities	200	6	200	30	15
TOTAL	1,154				

In addition to these known figures, we can anticipate the current fighting within southern Sudan will lead to further internal displacement. As yet there is no way to predict the number of persons who will be so affected.

TABLE II
SPLM AREAS NEED + LOGISTICS (WFP APPEAL)

Area	Beneficiary Number	Need MT	Duration Months	Capacity Logistics MT	Cost Logistics US\$
Sobat/Pibor (Nasir, etc)	150,000	13,680	8	6,300* or 10,700** or 13,600***	4,800,000 7,530,000 11,300,000
Pochalla	100,000	2,550	1.5	ICRC Appeal	-
Pakok/Kidepo	20,000	1,728	6	1,450	740,000
Bor	200,000	29,400	10	29,400	9,050,000
Waat	108,000	7,400	6	2,100	162,000
Yirol	70,000	2,060	4	2,000	500,000
W. Eq.	70,000	6,174	6	2,200	540,000
Bahr el-Ghazal:					
a) returnees	100,000	11,760	8	Not accessible	-
b) displaced	66,000	7,760	8	Not accessible	-
c) afflicted	200,000	8,820	6	Not accessible	-
Sub-total		93,192		43,500*	17,250,000
Less ICRC appeal		84,372		47,800** 50,700***	19,980,000 23,750,000

Deliveries to Nasir:

* barge + airlift

** barge + airdrop

*** barge + airlift + airdrop

TABLE III
Southern Sudan (SPLM/A Areas)
FOOD REQUIREMENTS AND LOGISTIC CAPACITY

COMMODITY	AVERAGE MT	REQUIREMENT VALUE US\$	LOGISTIC MT	CAPACITY VALUE US\$
CEREALS	68,341	10,251,150	42,800	6,420,000
PULSES	10,125	3,037,500	6,550	1,950,000
VEG. OIL	5,906	4,724,800	3,7000	2,960,000
TOTAL	84,372	18,013,450	53,000	11,330,000

TABLE IV

SPLM AREAS - LOGISTIC EQUIPMENT

AREA	BARGE DELIVERIES (MT)	NO. TRUCKS + TRAILER (26 MT) X MONTHS	NO. TRUCKS 10 MT X MONTHS	AIRDROP NO X CAP X MONTHS	AIRLIFT NO X CAP X MONTHS
Sobat/Pibor	3,500			1 x 30MT x 6	2 x 4MT x 6
Pakok			10 x 5		1 x 15MT x 5
Bor	14,000	60 x 10			
Waat			20 x 3		1 x 5MT x 6
Yirol			25 x 4		
W. Eq.			18 x 6		
TOTAL	17,500	60	83	1 x 30MT	2 x 4MT 1 x 5MT 1 x 15MT

NB. The budgets which follow represent the WFP and UNICEF components of humanitarian relief to SPLM areas of southern Sudan. ICRC, UNHCR and NGOs will be submitting separate appeals.

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME APPEAL

SECTOR	US\$ ('000)
FOOD	
Required (US\$ 18,860,000) Capacity	11,330
LOGISTICS	
Food transport	23,750
Warehouses, communications, field transport	971
SUB-TOTAL	24,731
PROGRAMME SUPPORT	
Nairobi	260
Lokichokio	76
Bor	141
Pakok	40
Nasir, Waat, Ayod & Akobo	176
Kaya	40
Kampala	360
SUB-TOTAL	1,093
TOTAL WFP APPEAL	37,154

UNICEF APPEAL

SECTOR	US\$ ('000)
HEALTH	
Provision of essential drugs to 300 health units	1,260
Basic repair of 100 health units and provision of equipment	180
Programme support	405
Logistics	630
Immunisation	
Vaccination supplies	900
Vaccines	270
Training of 200 vaccinators	270
Programme support	270
Logistics	360
WATER	
Maintain 500 handpumps in Equatoria and Upper Nile	108
Survey, repair and maintain 120 handpumps in Bahr el Ghazal	54
Repair and maintain 5 wateryards	180
Drill 50 boreholes and equip with handpumps	405
Train 100 mechanics	36
Programme support	90
Logistics	135
FOOD SECURITY	
Cattle Vaccination	
Equipment and supplies for vaccinating 2 million head of cattle	270
Programme support	90
Logistics	135
Agriculture	
300,000 hand tools	540
170 MT seeds	207
30 MT vegetable seeds	162
Fishing equipment incl. boats	900
Programme support	450
Logistics	810
NUTRITION	
600 MT supplementary food	1,620
Feeding centre operation, feeding and survey kits	180
Programme support	252
Logistics	990

RELIEF & SHELTER

Cloth, blankets, shelter materials & jerrycans	1,665
Programme support	180
Logistics	630

EDUCATION

Education supplies for 200,000 children	360
Training of 40 teacher trainers	36
Programme support	90
Logistics	135

ASSESSMENT, MONITORING & CO-ORDINATION

Medium and short-term personnel	585
Base camp, office	450

TOTAL UNICEF APPEAL **16,290**

1. METHODOLOGY

The UN 1992 Needs Assessment team for South Sudan consisted of 4 WFP members, 1 UNICEF member, 1 FAO consultant, 1 nutritionist (seconded from MSF France), and 1 IRC public health nurse. Field visits by members of the team were undertaken between September 15 and November 16, visiting various sites in Eastern and Western Equatoria, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Lakes Provinces. Discussions were held with sister agencies in Nairobi, and consultations were made in the field with staff from WFP, UNICEF, ICRC, and various NGOs. Meetings were held with the local authorities in each area (administrators, SRRA and NSCC). Extensive use was also made of the accumulated UN field reports for 1991 (some of which are cited in the notes). A nutritional survey was undertaken in three locations (Ayod, Bor, Pakok).

A rapid overview was made of the food availability situation in most areas in September and October, and more in-depth research was undertaken in specific locations in October-November. Areas of investigation were population, displacement, food supply, health, water, education, economy and food assistance to community projects. Members of the team had direct access to local people and visited clinics, schools, markets, homesteads, farms and cattle camps, interviewing individuals as well as having group meetings with chiefs and local citizens.

A standard procedure for the estimation of over-all population figures has been adopted. The 1983 census has been used as a base, and has been multiplied by 2.5% growth per annum. Then figures of refugees known to be absent from their home areas (as still resident in Nasir, Pochalla, Pakok, etc.) were deducted to arrive at a final total. The 2.5% growth figure represents a slightly lower growth rate for most of the southern Sudan than was calculated from the 1973 and 1983 censuses. With the current state of information on population, no procedure gives an entirely satisfactory estimate, but this method is at least consistent. Specific figures for refugees, returnees and other displaced are derived from UN-sponsored registrations, survey samples and on the spot estimates.

2. VULNERABILITY INDEX

The vulnerability index used in the area studies is a register of those sectors in the local economy which indicate a community's ability to withstand immediate hardship and to progress beyond mere subsistence. Each sector is given a basic rating from 1-3, indicating its importance to the local economy and to prospects for development. The current strength of the sector is then assessed, 0 being given when the sector is absent, insignificant or inadequate to needs. The rating is not intended to be a precise representation of local conditions. Rather, it is a shorthand means by which the relative strengths of each sector can be gauged within an area, as well as an indication of the strengths and needs of each area in relation to the others. These criteria have been established taking the following into consideration:

- a) the current strength of animal husbandry and agricultural production (size and health of livestock herds, size of harvest).
- b) the availability of crop reserves, whether produced locally or available in markets.
- c) markets and goods available in markets (especially non-food items).
- d) ability to exploit natural resources through the availability of implements involved in production (tools, fishing equipment, mosquito nets), whether obtained commercially or as relief items.
- e) means of savings (cash, cattle, implements, clothing) which can be held in reserve to barter for food in times of shortage.
- f) transport and mobility (state of roads, means of transport).
- g) rural water supplies (which allow for greater freedom of settlement and have a bearing on the health of the population).
- h) functioning local schools (which contribute to stability of population).

- i) presence of and support for local veterinary and health workers in various categories.
- j) the access a community may have to the resources of neighbouring communities through trade, exchange or kinship support.

VULNERABILITY INDEX

Availability of items (in sufficient quantities to make a difference):








cattle	3
crop stores	3
cash	2
goats/sheep	2
fish	2
roads	2
vehicles	2
wells	2
trained personnel	2
agricultural implements	1
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	1
mosquito nets	1
schools	1
useful neighbours (per neighbour)	1

Areas are evaluated on a scale of 0 (most vulnerable) to 30 (least vulnerable). Though a maximum of five "useful neighbours" is allowed, in reality no area under study has had more than three accessible areas for potential trade or exchange.

AREA VULNERABILITY RATINGS


AREA	VULNERABILITY INDEX
TORIT	19
KAJO-KAJI/KAYA	19
YIROL	16
WESTERN EQUATORIA	14
MONGALLA/GEMMEIZA	12
CHUKUDUM	12
KAPOETA	11
LER	10
AKOBO	08
AYOD	08
PIBOR/BOMA	08
BOR	07
POCHALLA LOCALS	07
WAAT	06
SOBAT LOCALS	06
POCHALLA RETURNEES	05
NASIR RETURNEES	03
PAKOK RETURNEES	02

VULNERABILITY INDICES

-  < 16 Least vulnerable
-  11-16
-  8-10
-  6-7
-  3-5
-  > 3 Most vulnerable
-  Not assessed



200 Km



3. SOBAT AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX


SECTORS	LOCAL POPULATION	NASIR RETURNEES 10
cattle	2	0
crop stores	1	0
goats/sheep	1	0
fish	2	2
roads	0	0
vehicles	0	0
wells	0	0
trained personnel	0	1
agricultural implements	0	0
cloth/clothing	0	1
household goods	0	0
mosquito nets	0	0
schools	0	0
useful neighbours	0	0
TOTAL	6	3

3.1. OVERVIEW¹¹

The Sobat basin is an area which is difficult of access from the centres of OLS, and as a result has been almost completely neglected in the relief effort. The events of 1990 made it ill-prepared to receive the large numbers of returnees which arrived in June-July 1991. Late and ill-spaced rains in 1990 destroyed the first two plantings of maize, and produced only pockets of good harvest in a late third planting. Faced with a local food shortage, many persons from the Sobat moved to Itang. They were followed by people fleeing renewed insecurity in the Bentiu, Fangak and Malakal areas in mid-1990. Most of these latter travelled along the Sobat, and many were caught by the rains and floods of September when travel was no longer possible along the last leg between Nasir and the Ethiopian border. These persons were accommodated and fed by the local population, though they had little to give themselves. Food was airlifted in small quantities to Nasir in November 1990, but this was too little to reach the rural population. Fishing equipment supplied by SCF(UK) did improve the food producing capability of the local population to a certain extent. Food stocks were thus low when the Ethiopian refugee camps were evacuated in May 1991, and there was very little reserve to share with returnees before the harvest. Though there were fewer people cultivating along the Sobat in 1991, the maize harvest in August was generally good. It

¹⁰ Nordeng, Kot, Torpot, Mandeng, Kwarenge, P. Minor and Dordeng camps.

¹¹ Information in this section is derived from, *The Return to Southern Sudan of the Sudanese Refugees from Itang Camp, Gambela, Ethiopia. A Report on their Current Situation, Numbers, Areas of Origin and Present Location along the Baro, Pibor and Sobat Rivers of Southern Sudan*, UNICEF Operation Lifeline Sudan, August 31, 1991; W. James, *Background Report and Guidelines for Future Planning: Nordeng Centre for Sudanese Returnees, Nasir*, WFP, August 1991; W. James, *Vulnerable Groups in the Nasir Region: Update on Nor Deng (Blue Nile Returnees) and Resettlement Proposal*, WFP, October 15th, 1991.



SOBAT, BARO & PIBOR RIVERS

was not sufficient, however, to accommodate some 130,000 extra population in the area.

Some 150,000 returnees entered the Sobat basin between June and July. Of these some 11,500 ended up on the Pibor river (see Akobo Area below). About 46,000 (including just under 2,000 unaccompanied minors) are now located in four distinct camps (Nordeng, Kot, Pandanyang Minor, and Mandeng) within 15 km of Nasir. These are people from outside the area (Shilluk, Dinka, ex-Assosa refugees from southern Blue Nile and northern Upper Nile, as well as the unaccompanied minors from various parts of southern Sudan) who have no common links with the people of the area and must live exclusively on external relief. A further group of about 56,000 are Nuer who come originally from the Nasir area or nearby. These also receive supplies through the distribution centres, but they are living mainly in local villages within a radius of about 20 km around Nasir. They have kinship and other community links with the local people and therefore have access to existing loan and exchange networks. While they are thus able to receive consistent support, a portion of their share of the relief supplies is distributed over a wider area through these same networks. A remaining group of about 42,500 are living in different villages along the Baro/Sobat from Jokau to Baliat, but beyond the effective range of distribution of relief supplies from Nasir. Many of these returnees are local Nuer; some are Nuer from areas adjacent to the Sobat, such as Waat, Fangak and Ayod, who are awaiting the drop in the flood waters before they can return home; still others come from more distant places and represent a variety of the ethnic groups formerly found in Itang. All are being accommodated within existing villages. Some of returnees are living with friends from Itang who have now returned to their Sobat homes. Because food has been delivered only to Nasir and Malakal, there has been a constant movement between Akobo and Nasir and Nasir and Malakal which makes the determination of final figures very difficult.

Relief efforts since June have been mainly aimed at the 96,000 returnees concentrated around Nasir. None of the relief food destined for Nasir has been delivered along the river to other groups of returnees. Though there was a good harvest along the river this year, there is not enough food for both the local population and the returnees. Some returnees have begun to drift back to Nasir, others to Malakal.

The distribution centres around Nasir are also the sites of primary health care clinics and some feeding centres. Initially the clinics had little impact on the overall health of the returnees because of the delay of the delivery of relief food. The clinics are used by local people in the immediate area as well as returnees, and the same is true of the Nasir health centre. The health care in and around Nasir has been improved not only by the inputs of IRC, UNICEF, AICF and UNHCR, but also by the arrival of some qualified medical and health personnel from Itang. Primary health care has yet to be extended beyond the camps in part because further recruitment and training of primary health care workers is needed. There is a limited EPI programme both within the centres and in the surrounding area.

The entire education department of Itang is now in Nasir and is in the process of being integrated into the local school network. Training of personnel and increased supply of equipment are the main needs.

The UNICEF rinderpest vaccination campaign was begun in the Nasir-Ulang area early in 1991. It will continue in the coming dry season and will be of great benefit to local cattle owners.

A major problem will arise in the dry season when those returnees now congregated around Nasir begin to leave, security permitting. Some will pass along the Sobat on their way to their home districts. Others may seek sites along the river where they can settle, cultivate, and renew

a more normal life than was possible when in Nasir. These will have to be supported along with the local population. Not only will food distributions be necessary in the dry season (after the river route is no longer accessible), but some care will have to be taken in the provision of fishing equipment and barter items which the returnees might be able to use to exchange for local seeds (exotic seeds have not done well in the area). UNICEF and WFP will promote spontaneous reintegration through provision of essential items (including vegetable oil and salt) that can be used by returnees or bartered for their perceived needs. These will be light in volume and weight but high in value, a typical package consisting of cloth for mosquito nets and clothes, fishing equipment, salt, household items and agricultural handtools to promote food production. UNHCR will play a major role in the implementation of the returnee programme and will be submitting a complementary proposal. ICRC will also assist in the continued care or repatriation of the unaccompanied minors.

The challenge facing IRC, ACROSS, ICRC, WFP, UNICEF and other humanitarian agencies is to expand those limited health and educational services set up for the returnees around Nasir to the rest of the local population along the Sobat as well as to the area to which the returnees will spread. There already is a critical link between the relief to returnees and comprehensive multi-sectoral area programmes in all the most vulnerable parts of southern Sudan.

3.2. SPECIFIC ISSUES

3.2.1 FOOD SECURITY

The irony of this year on the Sobat is that, unlike previous years, the harvest was generally good and sufficient for the local population. However, it could not be made to stretch to include all of the returnees who found themselves settled along the Sobat and Baro rivers either in their original homes, or when unable to continue their journey home during the rainy season, in other locations. The problem has been how to provide for the most vulnerable of the returnee groups, and how best to circulate relief food to those who need it. Relief deliveries by air and by barge have been permitted at Nasir only (though in early December a GOS barge carrying 900 MT did distribute food at sites along the river previously recommended by the UN, and arrived with another 300 MT at Nasir itself, though food allocation is reportedly for local people, and not the returnees). Distribution has been mainly to the 46,000 non-local returnees found in the centres of Kot, Pandanyang Minor, Nordeng and Mandeng. A further 50,000 Nuer returnees, mainly from the local area, have also received supplies. The 42,000+ returnees settled in villages along the Sobat and Baro have not been directly served by relief agencies.

There has, never the less, been a circulation and exchange of food and other items between the returnees and local populations. In early June when the returnees began to arrive they were given food by local people, but their numbers soon overwhelmed the capacity of charity. Bartering of personal possessions (of which they had more than the locals) for food began very soon. Even after the arrival of relief items barter continues between locals and returnees, not always to the returnees' advantage. It has been noticeable that since June there has been a steady impoverishment of the returnees as they trade their clothes, household items and other possessions for food. This has been most notable during the frequent interruptions of food deliveries caused by the cumbersome clearance procedure required by GOS, when relief rations were either reduced or ended altogether. Some returnees were able to use Ethiopian currency to purchase firewood, food and other items, as

the local market in Nasir used to use Ethiopian money before Itang was evacuated (with the supply of goods now cut off, the market in Nasir has ended; though there has been a very small market in Nordeng). Those returnees who have no kin among the local people, or no other sort of links with them, must rely exclusively on the relief effort for food. They have been unable to accumulate significant food reserves.

There is a more active exchange between Nuer returnees and local Nuer, especially as many of the Nuer returnees have been able to use relief supplies to re-establish themselves in their home communities. Food aid, thus exchanged and distributed, has gone out to local households. There is some indication that the injection of relief items has stimulated an expansion of the customary exchange networks; there has been a movement of goods between returnees along the Khor Wakau and their relatives in Malou, some 5 days' walk away.

Not all local returnees are able to reoccupy their former homes, however. Both upstream at Jikmir and downstream around Baliel earlier displacements caused by fighting prior to 1989 have meant that many former refugees returned this year only to find their home areas occupied by the very people who had earlier displaced them. As they were either unable, or unwilling, to seek assistance from these relative newcomers, this posed a problem for reintegration into the local area and revival of full community exchange systems.

It had been hoped that the timely provision of seeds and tools would enable some returnees to plant for the second harvest; thus reduce the need for relief food inputs. This has not been as successful as hoped. Many of the returnees found themselves settled on marginal land, and the continuation of heavy rains and a rising river swamped many of their late attempts at cultivation. There was also the problem of local cattle, which walked freely among the gardens at Nordeng. Attempts by the returnees to curb their grazing were resented by the cattle owners.

A large quantity of fishing line has been delivered by SCF-UK and by UNICEF, to both local people and returnees. This has been put to particularly effective use by the Shilluk at Mandeng. Food security is thus very uneven. The Dinka at Kot, the ex-Assosa refugees at Nordeng, and the children at Pandanyang Minor still remain the most vulnerable groups. The state of malnourishment at Nordeng and Kot is a measure of the failure of the relief effort to cope even after several months¹²:

NUTRITION STATUS FOR SITES AT NASIR SEPT 1991 & SEPT 1989

Site	# measured	% <70% wt/ht (Severe)	% 70-79% wt/ht (Moderate)	Mean
Nordeng	428	3.9%	21.9%	86.9
Kot	121	2.5%	25.6%	85.6
Average (all Nasir sites)	902	3.4%	17.9%	87.7
Baseline ¹³	437	0%	11%	89.7

It is anticipated that most non-local returnees will try to return to their homes once dry season travel is possible, security permitting. Many will go, as they have already gone, whether they are assisted by the relief agencies or not. Yet there remain whole groups who will require assistance if they are to have a more than even chance to survive their journey and the process of reintegration.

¹² UNHCR/UNICEF nutrition assessment, Sept 1991

¹³ IRC nutrition survey, Oct 1989

3.2.2 LOGISTICS

The remoteness of Nasir and the lack of road access in the rainy season meant that the only way food and other bulky inputs could be brought to the area quickly was by airdrop. After that barge deliveries from Kosti began, delivering food to both Malakal and Nasir. A total of 1,400 MT of food was delivered by air and 1,400 MT by barge under UN auspices between June and November 1991.

No blanket permission was given to bring in the required amount of food or non-food items the returnees needed to get them through the rainy season. There were frequent interruptions in deliveries, and restrictions were placed on the type of food which could be brought and the amount of food which could be brought by air. The provision of unground wheat, suitable for urban populations, caused particular problems of preparation. The mortality rate went up during those periods in which deliveries were halted or delayed. In the end the barges were able to deliver no more than the airdrops.

River deliveries will not be possible beyond January (and possibly not even beyond December), but there will still be food needs for some of the returnees settled along the Sobat until the next harvest (August/September 1992). Three overland routes are possible: from Waat along a track to Ulang and Abwong; from Malakal along the Sobat road; and from Gambela to Jokau. All three of these routes now present political difficulties. A WFP airlift is planned to begin on 17 December.

3.2.3 SERVICES AND PERSONNEL

The Itang refugee population contained a number of trained personnel in various sectors who are already providing a significant boost to essential services. The failure to provide adequate food supplies to the most vulnerable returnees (the 40,000 encamped around Nasir) had the effect of putting extreme pressure on the clinics and feeding centres, since so many people fell ill for lack of nourishment. Thus the primary health care programme failed to extend its influence much further than the area within immediate reach of Nasir. With the dry season, IRC and SRRA, supported by UNICEF, UNHCR and AICF will be pushing the boundaries of the basic health care system to locations along the Sobat and also linking it with that run by Medair/SRRA at Akobo. EPI and cattle vaccination has already been expanded, but both are still limited by transport capacity. Schools are functioning and work will continue for teacher training and basic supply. These programmes are linked to the provision of relief in order to promote self sufficiency and reduce the vulnerability of all those living along the Sobat river.

5. AKOBO AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX


cattle	2
crop stores	1
cash	1
goats/sheep	0
fish	2
roads	0
vehicles	0
wells	0
trained personnel	0
agricultural implements	0
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	1
mosquito nets	0
schools	0
useful neighbours	0
TOTAL	8

4.1 OVERVIEW

The Pibor river area of Akobo country initially accommodated some 11,500¹⁴ returnees from Ethiopia well, as people from the area had prepared for the return of their relatives through cultivating maize along large stretches of both banks of the river. The maize harvest was good, fish were abundant, and these local returnees (mainly Gaajok and Lou Nuer, but some Anuak as well) were quickly assimilated into their home areas mainly to the north of Akobo town. Since August there has been an increase in the returnee population of perhaps up to 8,000, coming mainly from Pochalla. Some came to Akobo before the ICRC relief operation began there. Others left Pochalla after the split in the SPLA, fearing attack. Some of the newcomers are local Anuak who are settling around Tirgol, across the Pibor river inside Ethiopia. A significant number of the new arrivals are Nuer from Waat, Ayod and Fangak districts who preferred to base themselves in Akobo until the beginning of the dry season in December-January when travel to their home areas should be possible. These newcomers, who are not local to the area, clearly do not have the same access to food as the earlier returnees and will be trying to return home now. There is a small group of returnees from both Itang and Punyido whose home areas are Kongor, (Dinka), Doleib Hill (Shilluk), and even Equatoria. These will experience greater difficulties going home, either because of the distances involved, or the insecurity which will face them on the way. The split in the SPLA has put some of these returnees at risk; some thirty Dinka civilians were killed during the takeover of Akobo town by the Nasir faction of the SPLA in September. In the immediate area of Akobo town itself there has been a further drain on food stocks as a result of military movements following the SPLA split.

Permission was not granted to transport relief food by barge to Akobo when the river level allowed such travel. It is now too late to attempt such a journey. Akobo is joined

¹⁴ See *The Return to Southern Sudan of the Sudanese Refugees from Itang Camp*, p.12, where some 20,000 not registered in Nasir arrived in Akobo in June, but some 8,500 of those had come to Nasir by July.



by road to Waat and to Pibor, but these roads have not been used for several years, and in any case their use now raises political difficulties. Medair, ACROSS and UNICEF have been able to bring in a number of non-food items (medicine, seeds, fishing equipment) by air and have been assisting in expanding basic services to meet the needs of both locals and returnees. It should be anticipated that the air route will be the only feasible avenue of supply, even in the dry season, unless an agreement can be reached on the use of the Bor-Ayod-Waat road.

With the onset of the dry season most of the non-local returnees will attempt to return home, as their districts (Waat, Ayod, Fangak) are accessible from Akobo and are all under the control of the Nasir faction of the SPLA. The task already being undertaken by Medair and ACROSS supported by UNICEF is to facilitate their return and reintegration into their home areas, which will require not only the provision of non-food items such as tools and fishing equipment, but the rehabilitation of health and educational facilities. Supply of items to returnees in some cases may have to be done after their arrival in their home areas). The planned WFP airlift will cover Akobo as well as Nasir and Waat, and can transport some food and non-food items for use by this group of returnees on their homeward journey. The departure of this group will reduce the strain on the food supply. The remaining non-local returnees, especially those from areas currently controlled by the Torit faction of the SPLA, will require special consideration. If safe passage cannot be arranged for them, some provision for their safety and welfare will have to be made until political conditions allow for their return home. The main task then confronting the agencies working in Akobo town is to direct their programmes increasingly towards the local population, especially in primary health care and education. ACROSS is hoping to spend some US\$3.6 million in southern Sudan in 1992, much of it focused on general relief and vulnerability reduction in areas of Upper Nile such as Akobo (but also including locations such as Pibor, Waat and Ayod and general sectoral inputs such as medical supplies to all locations). UNICEF is working closely with ACROSS to ensure that programmes complement one another.

5. POCHALLA AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

SECTOR	LOCAL POPULATION	RETURNEES
cattle	1	0
crop stores	3	0
cash	0	0
goats/sheep	0	0
fish	1	1
roads	0	0
vehicles	0	0
wells	0	0
trained personnel	0	1
agricultural implements	1	1
cloth/clothing	1	1
household goods	0	1
mosquito nets	0	1
schools	0	0
useful neighbours	0	0
TOTAL	7	6

5.1 OVERVIEW¹⁵

Pochalla is another area which has been neglected in the general run of the OLS relief operations. Pochalla is the home of the Anuak, many of whom moved across the border to Ethiopia during the last few years in order to escape Murle raiding and the ravages of war. It is a well watered and usually productive area, the main problem it has faced in recent years is the instability of its population due to insecurity. Its current population is estimated at 35,000. This is to be contrasted with some 100,000 returnees from the Ethiopian refugee camps of Itang and Punyido who must now be accommodated in the same area. Due to a combination of insecurity and climatic factors, the returnees are unlikely to return to their homes soon.

Of the 100,000 persons who have registered in Pochalla, about 65% are Dinka from the Bor/Kongor area (about equal numbers from each district), 20% are Dinka from Bahr el-Ghazal (Yirol and Akon), 10% are Nuer and others from Bentiu and Upper Nile, and 5% are from Equatoria and other places. Within this group are some 10,175 minors at the camp at Gorkuo, of which 3,499 are from Bor, 3,153 are from Kongor, 2,251 from Bahr el-Ghazal, 995 from Bentiu, and 278 from elsewhere. None of these persons have any pre-existing contact with the local Anuak and cannot be expected to participate equally in any local kinship exchange system.

To date they have been supplied by a massive and well-organized airdrop/airlift relief effort by ICRC, which has provided a full food basket (grain, pulses, oil and salt), supplementary foods, fishing equipment, mosquito nets, seeds, and tools. UNICEF has been providing medical supplies and educational materials for use by both the returnee and local populations. ICRC has plans to provide the returnees with supplemental rations for a further three months in 1992 and hope to begin road

¹⁵ All information on the Pochalla area and returnees is derived from ICRC sources.

deliveries via Boma within a month. The provision of both food and non-food items on a substantial scale has meant, moreover, that a flourishing barter system has grown up between the returnees and the local Anuak, whereby the returnees have been bartering part of their food ration against cattle and local seed. This is putting them in a good position to move towards self-sufficiency in the near future.

The main relief effort will be turned towards reintegration whether in an area near Pochalla, or allowing returnees to go home. If circumstances permit the return of most people to their homes, ICRC proposes to survey the road from Pochalla to Pibor to Bor with the intention of repairing old wells or drilling new ones so that water can be provided on the way. Such a project will be of benefit to those people through whose land the returnees must pass.

The security of these people is uncertain should they stay or should they leave. Some of the returnee camps were attacked by a force of Anuak of the Gambela Liberation Front from Ethiopia on 10 December 1991, and it is not yet known what the outcome of this fighting will be. The estimated 65,000 Dinka from Bor and Kongor cannot return home as long as their home districts remain disturbed by fighting. The 20,000 from Bahr el-Ghazal and the 10,000 from Upper Nile¹⁶ may also find it difficult to travel across the battle lines of the two factions. The 10,000 minors are a special case. (A number are not "unaccompanied", having some member of their extended family close by among the returnees at Pochalla) The main problem will be to maintain their security, whilst providing them with their full needs, until such time as they can be repatriated. A much smaller percentage than originally anticipated will have to have their families traced. As with the other cases of unaccompanied minors at Nasir and Pakok, ICRC is undertaking to maintain regular contacts with all parties to the current conflict so as to keep them informed about any evolution of the situation and any action which the ICRC will take for the protection of these children. It will pursue its co-operation with other concerned humanitarian organisations in order to improve the children's current status and safeguard their future.

¹⁶ We do not know exactly how many Nuer from this figure may have already removed themselves to Akobo.

5.2 UNACCOMPANIED MINORS

BACKGROUND TO THE SEPARATION OF CHILDREN FROM THEIR HOMES

The reasons given by the SPLA authorities for the disproportionate number of unaccompanied children in the camps in Ethiopia are various. It would appear that the history of these children is not simply a case of the gathering together of potential child soldiers. From interviews with both the children themselves and local chiefs in areas where many of the minors originate from, it would seem that there were three major reasons why these children left home.

i) The Ethiopian camps were the only locations which until recently offered education to the children of SPLA southern Sudan. In addition to a genuine desire on the part of boys and their parents for advancement through education, a number of chiefs have reported that the male children were coerced to leave for Ethiopia.

ii) Certainly a proportion of these children departed their homes due to insecurity and were assisted by local authorities to travel to Ethiopia as the only place where relief food and other care was available.¹⁷

"Childrens' involvement in hostilities can extend from indirectly helping combatants to actually taking part in fighting or even being enlisted in the armed forces. To categorically prevent children from taking part in hostilities [according to the Geneva Conventions,] would have been neither realistic nor even possible. However, the protocols of the Geneva Conventions aim at excluding their doing so as far as possible, especially by forbidding the recruitment of young people under fifteen (Article 77, 2 of Protocol I and article 4, 3, c of Protocol II)."¹⁸

Without the normal coping strategies of a family, the survival of the unaccompanied children remains in jeopardy. The children are not good at grinding maize, at carrying heavy firewood or at constructing shelters and rely to a great extent on the care of outsiders.

BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE CARE OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN:

- Children are best-off with their own families, cultures and communities.
- Children need the continuous care of nurturant adults.
- Children should be provided care that meets their age-related development needs.¹⁹

Southern Sudan is a strongly traditional society. The people are linked together by a highly developed network of extended families and kinship groupings. Entire sections of linguistic groups are treated as one family. The system is patriarchal and the elders are the grandfathers of their groups. The whole social system is based on extending the power of the family and obligations through distant relatives for assistance in times of difficulty. This does not only provide support during times of food scarcity, but is also, for example, a means of providing a future for orphaned children, as orphans within this society are not uncommon.

¹⁷ It has also been suggested that food scarcity may have driven the children to the camps. This was a contributing factor for many, but does not explain why the boys were unaccompanied. ICRC report that tracing activities already underway have identified a considerable number of children who do indeed have relatives in the immediate vicinity.

¹⁸ Protection of Children in International Humanitarian Law, D. Plattner, ICRC, 1984

¹⁹ Ibid

6. PIBOR/BOMA/PAKOK AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

SECTOR	PIBOR/BOMA	PAKOK RETURNEES
cattle	3	0
crop stores	3	0
cash	0	0
goats/sheep	0	0
fish	1	0
roads	0	0
vehicles	0	0
wells	0	0
trained personnel	0	1
agricultural implements	1	0
cloth/clothing	0	0
household goods	0	1
mosquito nets	0	0
schools	0	0
useful neighbours	0	0
TOTAL	8	2

6.1. OVERVIEW

The situation in Pibor and Boma counties is generally good at present. The lowland area, where the cattle are kept, did not experience excessive flooding in 1991 and the highland area has produced good crops. Amongst the population of c. 99,000 there exists a complex mechanism of exchange between the mainly cattle-owning plains people and the crop-growing highland groups. Thus, although vulnerable to environmental or security changes due to lack of external support or trade, the Murle (c. 90% of the population), Jie and Kichepo are essentially self-sufficient within themselves.

One of the most difficult long-term problems in the area is the absence of educated local people to provide basic services. There has been a history of animosity between the local people and their SPLA and SRRA administrators and services have not extended far outside the two main centres. This division has also resulted in the closure of NGO programmes in both Boma and Pibor in the past. Whilst nutrition is largely good and no significant diseases are reported, health status is precarious, partly due to the absence of clean water.

The Murle, Jie and Kichepo were not amongst those who went to Ethiopia. However significant numbers of Sudanese have returned from the Ethiopian refugee camps to the neighbouring area of Pochalla, and may be resettled in the border area close to Murle in the dry season (see above, Pochalla Area). In addition there are 9,931 ex-refugees currently in Pakok (50km NE of Boma), of whom 2,548 are unaccompanied children. No permission has been granted by GOS to assist this group who are almost completely without means of supporting themselves. A nutritional survey in November revealed a malnutrition rate of 12.1% among the under 5 year old children, with only 1.4% at risk of death. However, there was a high mortality rate, with 11.3% of the population surveyed having died since October 1990. Most of those deaths took place

after the refugees left Dima²⁰. They are expected to stay in the area but have no food supplies and are threatened with a serious water shortage in the dry season. ICRC is able to assist the 2,500 children.

It appears that there has been a division amongst the Murle with regard to the current split in the SPLA. Because of the essential vulnerability of the population, if insecurity does occur in Murleland the situation amongst the locals may change from fair to critical very rapidly.

The ICRC will continue to assist the 100,000 returnees in Pochalla towards self-sufficiency. They will also survey the need for water supplies along the road from Pochalla to Bor, and this will benefit both returnees and locals. ICRC/AICF/UNICEF and WFP will assist Pakok if given permission to do so. An ICRC convoy of eight four-wheel drive vehicles recently delivered 30 MT of relief supplies food to Pakok, so the problem of supply should improve as overland transportation becomes increasingly possible. Farm Africa will be working in Pibor with a comprehensive veterinary programme and ACROSS and UNICEF will be providing inputs to the health and education sectors there. UNICEF will provide a consistent presence at Boma focusing on health, education and water. In both centres, the links between the new administration, the church, the local chiefs and their people will be a primary focus for management of integrated activities. The main strategy is to provide consistent monitoring of the situation whilst assisting with strengthening food security, basic education and training of local people in fundamental health care.

²⁰ Loic Flahet, *Nutritional Assessment in Upper Nile South Sudan. Bor-Ayod-Pakok Areas 29 Oct - 17 Nov 1991. Results*, pp.3-4.

7. WAAT AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	3
crop stores	0
cash	0
goats/sheep	0
fish	1
roads	0
vehicles	0
wells	0
trained personnel	0
agricultural implements	0
cloth/clothing	0
household goods	0
mosquito nets	0
schools	0
useful neighbours (Ayod, Wunalam)	2
TOTAL	6


7.1. OVERVIEW

The 108,000 Nuer of Waat area have experienced a near-total crop failure due to the combination of heavy late flooding, locusts, and stemborers. The eastern, western and southern parts of the area were flooded, while the central part remained relatively dry. Most crops were weakened by standing in water after heavy rains in June; thus succumbing more readily to an attack of locusts and stemborers in July. A second period of heavy rains in August increased local flooding and an increase in flood-related diseases among cattle was reported. The waterlogging of late rainy-season grazing areas has reduced the amount of nutritious grasses available, which is reflected in lower milk yields. Despite this, the general condition of the cattle is good, and should improve as the flood waters recede. The one benefit of pervasive flooding is the general availability of fish. The main sources of food now are fish, wild plants and milk. Grain was being obtained through cattle for grain exchanges with the Dinka of Wunalam (near the Sobat), but by early November stocks there had been depleted and were no longer reliable. The current political situation has rendered inaccessible other areas, such as Akobo and Duk Faiwel, which might otherwise have offered some food surpluses.

The people of Waat are ill prepared to receive any influx of displaced persons: some Dinka from Duk Faiwel have already fled fighting in their area and sought refuge with the Nuer of southwestern Waat. In addition to this, the return of some 23,000 ex-Itang refugees to Waat and Akobo is expected in the early dry season. Further, it is possible that a significant proportion of the Sobat population may have to seek refuge in Waat if there is fighting along the Sobat in the coming year. This possibility of fighting has made most people reluctant to go to the Sobat for their normal dry season sojourn, but they also hope to be able to remain inland well into the 1992 dry season, anticipating that the late flooding will bring in its wake good grazing and fishing along the inland watercourses.

The priority requests are for grain, fishing equipment, and cattle vaccines. Grain and fishing equipment can be distributed by the SRRA through the existing infrastructure of sectional chiefs, and Waat would be a suitable distribution centre for the entire area. As

WAAT



Flooded areas 1991

Track

Khor

N



a result of recent political events, many local workers and much of the basic health and education equipment have disappeared from health units and schools. Veterinary staff and health workers will have to be located and retrained before any child/cattle vaccination and health programme can be effectively undertaken. The return of unaccompanied minors to the area will necessitate the rapid re-establishment of basic school services and a strengthening of the links between the schools and the primary health care activities. This might be more easily accomplished after the return of the ex-Itang refugees, some of whom may have the requisite work experience. These services will have to be as far as possible community run in order to allow them to continue even if insecurity threatens.

7,400 MT of grain²¹ and fishing equipment for 13,500 families would meet standard dietary requirements, yet the delivery of any relief items in significant quantities will be a problem and WFP estimate that only 2,100 MT will be feasible under current circumstances. This predicted shortfall of grain in the diet, if not countered by a protein intake through fish and milk, could contribute to a decline in the health status of the population. Barge deliveries along the Sobat and Pibor rivers will not be possible after December, and in any case items delivered along the riverbanks are unlikely to reach the people of the interior. Potential overland routes in the dry season, from Bor to Waat via Ayod, and from Malakal to Waat via Wunalam, are subject to political constraints and cannot be relied on at present. The only route currently open is by air, and an air lift of relief items is feasible any time from now on. A WFP air lift of food throughout January-February will be implemented. Other items can be airlifted by small planes, and continued air access will be required.

The natural problems Waat area face this year are exacerbated by the fact that the area has received virtually no relief items of any description throughout the last three years of OLS. The split in the SPLA has cut the only overland route to areas served by OLS to the south, from which significant quantities of relief items might be supplied. If Waat is not included in the relief effort this year, not only will the people of Waat suffer, but their resulting discontent may well add to the instability which is jeopardising the relief operation further south. The constraints on grain deliveries (both the cost of the air lift and the political constraints on the use of the Bor-Ayod-Waat road) may inhibit the delivery of sufficient grain supplies; therefore UNICEF plans to provide sufficient quantities of fishing equipment for both the local population and the expected returnees. Waat will be included along with the Sobat, Akobo and Ayod in an expanded anti-rinderpest vaccination campaign in 1992. Attention to cattle will go a long way in convincing the people that their needs are at last being recognized.

7.2. SPECIFIC ISSUES

7.2.1 FOOD SECURITY

The Lou Nuer of Waat depend on their cattle, their crops, and on fish. The area is bounded by the Sobat and Pibor rivers in the north and east, and is intersected by numerous inland watercourses which, in years of heavy rain or high rivers, can provide fish and inland grazing well into the dry season. Because of the precariousness of agriculture the Lou must maintain access to neighbouring areas where grain production is more reliable. They frequently have recourse to the Dinka of the Khor Fulluth and the lower Sobat (Luac and Ngok Dinka), the Gaajok of the Sobat and Pibor, the Dinka of Duk Faiwel (Nyareweng Dinka), and the Gaawar Nuer of Ayod. Access to these places is often secured through

21 Calculated as minimum requirement in addition to local sources of fish, meat etc.

intermarriage; the most numerous marriage ties being between the Lou and Gaajok Nuer, and the Lou and Nyareweng Dinka.

This year heavy rain flooding in June severely damaged crops in the east (Walgak, Paddoi, Diror, Kaikwi, Yedid, and Nyerol), the south, close to Kongor area (Pieri, Muot Did, Pathai), and the west (Dangriang, Pading and Ket). Only the central area around Wunbil, Muot Tot, Waat and Weideang remained relatively dry. It is to this area that many cattle have been brought to avoid the floods.

The floods weakened the growing sorghum, which was then attacked by locusts in July, about a month before the harvest. This was followed by an infestation of stemborers, affecting the entire district. Small amounts of grain were harvested in a few households in some areas, but by November this food had clearly been used up. Very few crops of any type survived the flood; even pumpkins and beans were eaten by grazing cattle who were brought in from the flooded pastures in July. By November no household the assessment team visited had any stored grain whatsoever. There was no grain spread out on drying platforms, as there was in Ayod, which claimed a reduced harvest. Rather, people were busy collecting various wild foods, an activity usually associated with the mid to late dry season rather than with the end of the rains and the final harvest period. Because of the nature of the soil people in Waat area do not normally have second planting, and they do not plan one now.

In these circumstances the Lou must have recourse to their neighbours, but both climatic and political factors have limited their options. The area around the Sobat is too flooded to admit access; and in any case there is little extra grain available there. People in Waat confirm that the area north of Akobo on the Pibor river (Wangding) had a good harvest this year, but the word has gone out from Akobo that no food is available. This may be due to a combination of new arrivals from Pochalla and recent troop concentrations in the area following the takeover of Akobo by the Nasir faction of the SPLA. There is some food to be had in the northern part of Ayod district, and many Lou (including those from close to Akobo) have gone there for small amounts of food. This source, too, is now proving unfruitful. Many southern Lou would now be going to Duk Faiwel and Pok Tap, as they have for the last two years, to get food from the Nyareweng Dinka, but the recent fighting in that area, following attacks by the SPLA garrison at Ayod, has closed that avenue. The Nyareweng have even come to the Lou for protection from the Gaawar of Ayod. Only the Dinka at Wunalam remain accessible and willing to give or exchange grain. Many persons were seen in early November travelling to and from Wunalam, but this source is not open to everybody, and many expected that the people of Wunalam would cease trading soon.

The rate of exchange in November was 1 heifer for 1 sack of grain (5 x 18kg tins). A pregnant heifer, which previously could be exchanged for 4-5 sacks of grain, now fetched only 2 sacks, or only 1 sack plus 1 18 kg tin. Very little cash is used in Waat area, though some seems available in Wunalam (being closer to Malakal). Prices for grain in Wunalam were quoted as £S250 = 1 tin, and £S1000 = 1 sack. This can be compared with the remembered 1989 prices for cattle (when merchants still operated in the area out of Malakal), where 1 pregnant cow = £S400. No traders have been in the area since Waat fell to the SPLA in 1989. There are no local markets, no cattle auctions, only local exchanges. People have also used local tobacco and dried fish to exchange for small gourdfuls of grain, but tobacco is not in high demand. Unfortunately the Lou have very few personal items, such as cloth, clothing, cooking utensils, mosquito nets, or agricultural tools with which they could also barter for food.

The cattle have been affected to some extent by the lack of grazing and by floodborne diseases such as CPBB (*jongpuoth*) and liver fluke (*noi*). There are also some cases of rinderpest. While people complain of the diseases and some cattle deaths, there are no epidemic deaths, as there are in Bor. Rather, the problem is that the low nourishment and weak state of the cattle has reduced milk production. There is milk available, and people

who are keeping their cattle in the central area come some distance to get milk for their young children, who are the main beneficiaries of what milk there is.

The only benefit of the inland flooding is that watercourses and pools are full, and fish are available. It is widely assumed that the watercourses will remain filled with water late into the 1992 dry season, and this will not only provide fish, but it will provide good grazing and good water for the cattle, whose condition should improve as the land begins to dry out. The main complaint is that the water is now too deep for the use of the fishingspear (*bith*), and that hooks, lines and nets are needed. These will be useful if the Lou move further afield to the main rivers in the dry season.

Some seed is probably stored, and some of the grain brought from Ayod and Wunalam will also be used for seed, but there is no prospect of a harvest before August 1992. The Lou should be well off for protein and oil (through fish, milk and meat), but they will need some source of grain.

7.2.2 LOGISTICS

Waat is currently cut off from the Sobat by floods, and all who were interviewed suggested that any food delivered by boat along the river would be unlikely to find its way into the interior. River deliveries will cease by January in any case. There are only two roads which connect Waat to the outside world: from Malakal across the Sobat and via Wunalam, and from Bor via Ayod. Both roads are clear (they are in fact little but tracks), but there are political difficulties now in their use. Waat was always at the far end of the OLS supply line along the Bor-Ayod road, and this is one reason why little relief ever reached the district. If access by road cannot be negotiated, then an airlift can be tried. The area is flat, the ground is already becoming hard, and a landing strip can be cleared to take both small and large planes. WFP will begin an airlift and will have at least one food monitor based in Waat, which is a central place and can supply a wide area. The people of Waat are well aware of their limited options and their isolated position, and do not view their immediate future with any enthusiasm. They are likely to welcome any option that works.

7.2.3 SERVICES AND PERSONNEL

The split in the SPLA has affected Waat, in that most of the old administrators and SRRA personnel are no longer present. This has a direct bearing on any future relief operations, and on current health, veterinary and educational programmes. There are only 2 veterinary assistants for the area, both of whom had gone to neighbouring counties during the assessment team's visit. There are only 2 medical assistants (but no functioning clinic), 6 nurses, and 3 Kapoeta-trained CHWs. The 26 or so teachers are mainly drawn from the local churches. A training programme will have to be implemented if any of these services are to be revived. Health, schools, and rinderpest vaccinations should have a high priority in the coming year; they are all services desperately needed and wanted by the community.

There are 15 health clinics throughout the area which had not been non functioning due to lack of supplies and then to the change in administration. These will be supplied with essential drugs and monitored by UNICEF and SRRA, but efforts to improve the preventative health care system require an NGO to assist. None is yet known who wishes to provide this service. More personnel will be trained/upgraded at the Equatoria training programmes, but this will only go part of the way towards improving health in the area.

The schools will be of particular importance when unaccompanied minors and other children from Itang return in large numbers in the dry season (some have already returned home). There are currently 13 primary schools established in Waat overall, with 700 registered pupils. The schools meet only irregularly (they are now all closed due to lack of food). Included in the support for schools should be a school-feeding programme.

Waat district is usually bone dry during the dry season. It used to be served by a series of boreholes (some with Lister engines) at the main court centres. Most are no longer functioning. Waat will be included in a general survey of wells north of Bor. Functioning wells will give the people greater choice in the areas where they can settle. This will be of increased importance when the ex-refugees come home.

8. AYOD AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	3
crop stores	2
cash	0
goats/sheep	0
fish	1
roads	0
vehicles	0
wells	0
trained personnel	0
agricultural implements	0
cloth/clothing	0
household goods	0
mosquito nets	0
schools	0
useful neighbours (Fangak, Wunalam)	2
TOTAL	8


8.1. OVERVIEW

Ayod area was also affected by heavy rain flooding this year, mainly in the southern half of the district. The worst flooded areas are those lying between the Jonglei Canal and the Duk ridge, but flooding was not so severe in the northern part of the area and in the area west of the canal, where a greater supply of food is to be found. Grain is in short supply in the south of the area and is not expected to last beyond February. Yet problems in Waat have meant that many persons from that area have come to Ayod for food, drawing further upon available reserves.

1991 was the first year that any significant quantities of relief supplies came to Ayod. The **550 MT** of maize was delivered in April and was useful to those whose cultivations were later damaged by floods. There is no evidence available, however, which indicates that relief food was distributed beyond a small radius around the court centres of Kuacdeng (in the south), Ayod and Wau (in the centre of the country). 1991 was also the first time that there was a UNICEF/SRRA rinderpest campaign in the area, vaccinating some **8000** head of cattle out of an estimated total population of **55,000**.²² This figure should be contrasted with the 146,000 head of cattle vaccinated in Kongor, and the 73,000 head vaccinated in Bor during 1991 alone (over 450,000 head of cattle have been vaccinated for rinderpest in Bor and Kongor since 1989). Aside from these interventions there has been little in the education, health or water sectors, certainly when compared to other areas further south where OLS has been more active. Local food supplies have generally been sufficient, and this is reflected in the 1991 nutritional survey, but the lack of health facilities and clean water is also reflected in the higher mortality rates recorded in Ayod than in Bor, where malnutrition rates are higher, but where health and water programmes are more advanced.

²² United Nations Lifeline Sudan, *An Investigation into Production Capability in the Rural Southern Sudan. A Report on Food Sources and Needs*, Nairobi, June 1990, p.25. This estimate may be low.

Map 9



See Map 2
for area surveyed

AYOD

The Nuer of Ayod, who number some 94,000, feel strongly that they have been ignored by the relief operation, and this is a continuation of the feeling they had before the war that they were being denied the development which was then being concentrated in the Kongor and Bor areas. This feeling was a factor in the decision of local Nuer to join the Nasir faction SPLA based in Ayod when they raided Kongor and then Bor in October, November and December 1991. Having gained cattle and some grain in the general looting which took place in those districts, the people of Ayod are nonetheless cut off from further assistance from the south, whether through the older inter-community exchange networks which used to operate between the Nuer and Dinka of the area (and which have been used by both peoples in the last three years), or through relief convoys forwarded from Bor.

The events in Ayod which followed the split in the SPLA in August now pose grave problems to any relief effort. The Anyanya II garrisons at Doleib Hill and Fangak had already defected to the SPLA before the split, and the population of Ayod town has now increased dramatically as these troops transferred their families there. The fighting to the south has involved not just the soldiers in the two SPLA factions, but local Gaawar as well. The countryside around Ayod is increasingly insecure. Efforts are now underway by local chiefs to bring this feuding to an end.

Ayod is well stocked with cattle, not only local but those looted from the south. There was a widespread anticipation in the area that the looted cattle could be sold to merchants based in Malakal, who have not traded in the area since 1987, but by early December it seemed clear that there would be no such commercial contact with Malakal. By early December local chiefs were also expressing the feeling that captured Dinka cattle should be returned in order to re-establish peace in the area, and local initiatives have been started to bring the chiefs of Ayod, Kongor and Bor together.

Cattle will provide a major source of protein, the other main source being fish. Fish are available in large numbers, but Ayod still lacks sufficient fishing equipment for use in the deeper watercourses, or along the river during the dry season. The main request was for fishing equipment rather than food, followed by requests for cattle vaccines.

The health service has improved little since 1989. There is only one qualified medical assistant for the entire area, and medical supplies to the Ayod clinic have been erratic and incomplete. There is a strong demand for better health facilities, which would include improved water supplies as well as increased support for the health service.

Some 1,000 returnees from Itang arrived in Ayod between June and November. The rest (a relatively small number) will arrive in the early dry season. There were over 50 unaccompanied minors who had stopped in Ayod on their way to their homes in Fangak and Bentiu. Ayod will be an important transit centre for others proceeding to Fangak, Bentiu, and farther destinations. If this movement does occur, Ayod will not be able to feed the returnees from its own resources. Ayod school is already accommodating unaccompanied minors who are in transit, and there is strong local support for a strengthening of the education service. This will be needed for local children as well as those minors coming from Itang and Punyido, and will require text books, school equipment (which UNICEF have been supplying), and teacher training.

Under current circumstances Ayod is not a candidate for large scale food interventions (except for food targeted at schools where local children and unaccompanied minors are already being fed). The provision of fishing equipment for 8,000 families would help to offset the shortage of grain. Any improvement in the health and educational services would require the selection and training of suitable personnel. At present the only access to Ayod is by small plane, and this may continue even in the dry season if there is no resolution to the current split in the SPLA.

Ayod is not seriously lacking in food, but it has been seriously neglected by the relief programme in general. This has contributed to the problems now facing the relief effort in Bor and Kongor. It is imperative that some effort is now made to redress the balance, despite the very great difficulties which exist concerning the movement of relief supplies to the area.

8.2. SPECIFIC ISSUES

8.2.1 FOOD SECURITY

The harvests throughout Ayod area in the last two years have been generally good. In 1990 the northern half (from Wau up through Mogogh) was reported to have suffered from drought, while the southern half did well. This year the reverse seems to have been the case, due to rain floods which seem to have been heavier in the south than in the north. The floods began in May, and Ayod was still surrounded by water in late October. It is said to be the heaviest flood in the area for the last eight years. As in 1988 the effect of flooding was exaggerated by the presence of the Jonglei canal²³, as water between the Duk ridge (on which Ayod is located) and the canal has not been able to drain away west to the river (as in former days), but has been left standing. The area west of the canal is reported dry, and there is good cultivation in many areas. Only the eastern village of Pagau, neighbouring Waat area, was reported to have been afflicted by locusts.

In the villages surrounding Ayod cultivation had been confined mainly to homestead plots of 1-2 feddans in size. Few families cultivated far fields. This was partly due to the extent of the flooding, which restricted the cultivation area or flooded fields, and partly due to manpower constraints: many men are absent from the outlying villages. Some larger families did cultivate on land west of the canal (about 5 hours' walk away), and reported good results. Sorghum was being dried on drying platforms in the homesteads, but not in great quantities. In almost all homesteads visited the families claimed that the harvest would last until the January or February at the most. There were a few other crops in small quantities (maize, beans, pumpkins, groundnuts, melons, okra). In contrast with the previous year, when there were two good crops of groundnuts, there was little evidence of groundnuts grown or harvested. The UNICEF/SRRA seed swap was undertaken in Ayod in 1990, but any records kept concerning the results were either lost or destroyed when the previous SRRA secretary fled after the SPLA split. Interviews with local farmers indicated that the seed was all redistributed, but production was naturally affected by local conditions of flooding.

The only crop which was flourishing was tobacco. This has been used in the past as a trade item, either being sold in Malakal, or in the various towns to the south, all the way to Bor. Since the attack on Kongor by the Nasir faction based in Ayod, it has no longer been possible to take anything to the south. There is no market in Ayod, and no cash in circulation. All exchanges within the area are through barter of firewood, milk and grain.

Ayod received 550 MT of relief maize in April. This was distributed through the court centres of Kuacdeng, Ayod and Wau. Most of the maize was distributed by June, but some 40 partly spoiled bags were still inside the Rubb Hall and were being used in the town itself (one of the main beneficiaries being the school). Some quantities of relief maize were seen in homesteads close to Ayod, but the radius of distribution was quite short; almost no homesteads within an hour or two walking had received any maize. Many women were taking headloads of firewood to Ayod to exchange for a gourdful (c. 2 kg) of maize. Others were trading gourds of milk (c. 2 lt) for 2 kg maize. Because of the poverty of personal

23 Ibid, p.22.

possessions (cloth, clothing, tools, mosquito nets), there are no other items available for barter.

Though most persons expected to run out of cultivated food early in the new year, there was no widespread anxiety about famine or starvation. All seemed to be planning to make use of other sources of food, such as wild foods and fish. As in other areas the flood had made fish abundant and accessible. The water in the canal is deep and said to be full of fish. Fishing line, hooks, and nets are needed to exploit fishing efficiently. In fact, once it was realised the difficulties involved in bringing in large amounts of relief food, some people stated that fishing equipment was all that they needed.

There are enough flood-free sandy areas in the area (unlike Waat) where cattle can be kept. Cattle had suffered from the flood, and there were complaints about lack of cattle medicines, but there were no reports of widespread cattle diseases or deaths. This year for the first time there was a rinderpest vaccination campaign in Ayod, but it lasted a short time and vaccinated only 8,000. There is certainly a feeling in Ayod that their cattle have been neglected by OLS (the request for vaccine has been made repeatedly in 1989 and 1990). In early December 1991 there were claims that cattle were dying, and that this was one reason why the men of Ayod joined the Nasir SPLA in raiding the Dinka of Kongor and Bor. Any new population of ailing cattle in Ayod were probably imported from Kongor. No mention of any special problem with cattle was made to any members of the assessment team in October, after the first raid had been launched.

A nutritional survey of Ayod and surrounding villages revealed only 14.5% of children under 5 as malnourished, and only 1.7% severely malnourished (at risk of death).²⁴

8.2.2 LOGISTICS

Ayod has been reached by road from Bor. There are now two problems facing the use of this road: 1) Floods throughout the region will make it impassible until February or March at the earliest. The road crosses the Jonglei Canal at Pok Tap, and water may remain in the bottom of the canal for some time, as it has no outlet. The land north of the canal is higher and drier than the land to the south, but it will be some time before the entire road is passable. 2) The current fighting between the two factions of the SPLA, which now includes the civilian population of the area, means that convoys will have to cross a battle line to be able to go from Bor to Ayod. There is a local initiative to bring a halt to the fighting to allow relief supplies to pass.

The road to the north, from the Sobat following the line of the old "Cape-to-Cairo" road has not been used for some time, and still has landmines along some sections of it. Nevertheless, if it becomes possible for relief supplies to be sent to Waat from Malakal, it might also be possible to supply Ayod as well.

A new landing strip has been made (the old one was still under water in early November). It will be suitable for small planes only, bringing in medical supplies, fishing equipment, educational material, and food supplies for the school (maize, beans, salt and oil).

8.2.3 SERVICES AND PERSONNEL

The health, veterinary and water services of have suffered from neglect during the last three years, with little or no inputs from OLS. As in Waat and Ler, Ayod has also been affected by the split in the SPLA as many of its administrative and relief personnel (including the SRRA secretary, the education co-ordinator, and the store-keeper) left when the Ayod garrison declared for the Nasir faction.

²⁴ Flachet, *Nutritional Assessment in Upper Nile South Sudan*.

The two highest priorities are health and water. The Ayod health clinic is in little better state now than it was in 1989. There is one trained medical assistant, who supervises a number of untrained staff. The clinic is supposed to supply clinics in 9 court centres (Wau, Mogogh, Cuilbong, Pagil, Kandak, Kuacdeng, Weibol, Woi and Bi), but it received supplies only three times this year (June, August, October). It has been supplied with dressings for wounds, but it has no scissors, sterilizing equipment, medicines, injections or syringes.

The 1991 nutritional survey concluded for Ayod that "health improvement should be a priority as mortality rates are quite high."²⁵ The main reasons for death given were malaria, respiratory infections, and diarrhoea, with 8 suspected Kala azar cases. The UN assessment team received more requests for medical treatment than for food. Support for the health service in Ayod area will have to be in training as well as in basic supplies. UNICEF has been supplying the clinic at Ayod, but at present there is no health NGO in the area.

Ayod and other court centres in the area used to be served by borehole wells and Lister engines. The wells in Ayod were destroyed when the army evacuated the area in 1987. The absence of clean water has contributed to the poor health state of the population. As reported in September 1989 there are 2 destroyed boreholes in Ayod, 1 in Kuacdeng, 1 in Wau, 1 Lister engine pump in need of repairs in Mogogh, and 1 destroyed Lister engine pump at Cuilbong. The 3 destroyed CCI single cylinder boreholes (in Ayod, Kuacdeng and Wau) could be replaced by handpumps. As the siting of wells affects the movement of cattle as well as the settlement of people, Ayod will be included in a water survey.

The school in Ayod has continued to function and does have some school equipment, but no textbooks. The new education co-ordinator is a former refugee from Itang, and the school is now taking care of some 50 unaccompanied minors from Itang and Punyido (all coming from Fangak and Bentiu counties). The Ayod school will be of increasing importance for the education and support of returnees from Ethiopia, especially any unaccompanied minors who are unable to travel all the way to their homes. Many schools in the area are now closed (the school at Kuacdeng court centre has been closed because of the fighting in the south of the area). There were about 600 pupils registered in 5 different schools in 1990. The number will grow with the return of the Itang refugees. There is much local enthusiasm for the schools, and community support (in the form of cattle) would be forthcoming if the schools were kept open and supplied on a regular basis. The schools will need training for teachers, equipment (including textbooks), and a supplementary ration from a school feeding programme.

The rinderpest vaccination programme will be continued. There may be a need to train further veterinary assistants. Cattle are a very sensitive issue, and it is the perceived imbalance in the OLS the cattle vaccination programme which has led to more resentment than anything else, and appears to have been a contributory factor to the civilian participation in the fighting in Kongor and Bor. The irony is, of course, that the UNICEF/SRRA veterinary programme covers only rinderpest, and the sick cattle the Gaawar have brought back with them from the Dinka are suffering from ailments untreated by OLS, and fall outside the scope of the rinderpest vaccination campaign. Nevertheless, a more systematic inclusion of the Ayod cattle in the rinderpest campaign should go a long way to help restore confidence.

25 Ibid., p.20.

9. BOR AREA


VULNERABILITY INDEX

SECTORS	BOR/ KONGOR	MONGALLA/ GEMMEIZA
cattle	1	2
crop stores	0	2
cash	0	0
goats/sheep	0	0
fish	2	2
roads	1	1
vehicles	0	0
wells	0	0
trained personnel	1	0
agricultural implements	1	1
cloth/clothing	0	1
household goods	0	0
mosquito nets	0	0
schools	0	1
useful neighbours	1 (Mongalla)	1 (Torit)
TOTAL	7	12

9.1. OVERVIEW

Bor area has been hit by a series of natural catastrophes and the return of insecurity. It was badly affected by rain flooding this year which destroyed most crops from Bor up to Pok Tap (on the Jonglei Canal). The floods brought in their wake an infestation of tsetse fly and a severe outbreak of trypanosomiasis, which has increased livestock mortality. The area between Duk Fadiat and Kongor was raided in October by a coalition of the Nasir-faction SPLA and Nuer recruited from Ayod, leading to a further degradation of food stocks and loss of cattle. From late October to early November large numbers of refugees from Kongor moved south into Bor, bringing with them their remaining cattle. From mid-November to early December there was severe fighting around Bor itself, and south towards Gemmeiza, resulting in heavy loss of life and the theft of livestock by the raiders. There was a further displacement of people towards Mongalla. The combined loss of cultivated crops, household goods and livestock, coupled with this refugee flow has created a severe food crisis in the area. The entire Dinka population of Kongor and Bor has been affected in some degree: most seem to have fled into the toic, while many others have fled to the Mongalla/Ngangala areas. A total population of up to 274,000 persons could be involved.

The heavy rain flood had destroyed most crops by July. Cattle began dying in large numbers due to trypanosomiasis the same month. The disease started from the south of the area and spread northward into Kongor as flood waters brought the tsetse fly with them. As people moved their cattle southwards to escape the flood, they began to settle in the drier land of Gemmeiza and Mongalla, the epicentre of the tsetse concentration. Other flood-borne diseases affected the cattle, who were further weakened by the lack of good grazing, either through waterlogging in the north, or overgrazing in the far south. This weakness has rendered cattle more vulnerable to disease and reduced their milk yield to almost nothing.



KONGOR/BOR

The floods also inhibited the movement of people and the exchange of goods. In drier times there would have been extensive north-south movements within both Bor and Kongor counties as people searched for relief from relatively unaffected areas. This year no such reciprocal movement was possible, and such small markets as used to function in the area no longer operated. The fighting which began in October then gave people no choice but to abandon their homes. The customary exchange networks were thus first restricted by the floods and then shattered by the fighting.

The main foods available have been aquatic plants, wild foods, and fish. A large harvest of small fish from shallow pools was made in October and November, but already in some areas supplies were running low. Fishing nets and hooks were needed in able to exploit the fish available in streams and rivers.

The fighting has displaced large numbers of persons. Some 60,000 were observed in the area between Bor and Ngangala in early September, and it is expected that more will emerge from the toic and other hiding places which so far have been inaccessible to relief workers. In so far as this displacement has meant that people have also lost much of their cattle and their personal property (cooking pots, hoes and tools, fishing nets, etc.), it has led to further impoverishment and increased vulnerability. Some attempt had been made at a second planting of crops around homesteads in October and November, but the fighting has affected the prospects for a second harvest in many places.

Mongalla and Gemmeiza, which are administratively part of Bor, have been spared the worst of Bor's experiences this year and are now serving both as a reservoir and as a refuge to many of the Bor and Kongor people. The local population there consists of some 50,000 Mundari plus a number of southern Bor Dinka who have established their cattle camps in the flood free land during the last few years. In the late rainy season some of the Gok Bor Dinka were able to receive food from this area. Many cattle were also sent here to escape floods and raiding. The area has not been spared the effects of trypanosomiasis, having been affected before the Dinka areas to the north. The unusually large numbers of Dinka and Mundari cattle now being herded here are beginning to create problems of overgrazing. The area began to receive large numbers of displaced persons in November. The local population has itself been dislocated by the incursion of fighting into the area north of Gemmeiza in late November and early December. There are already problems in supplying all the displaced persons now residing between Ngangala and Gemmeiza, and local food supplies are bound to be affected.

Until recently Mongalla and Gemmeiza have served as a secure area for other people who have been beset by natural and manmade disasters. The main problem will be to distribute food and other relief items in such a way so that displaced persons do not congregate in one place, causing hardship for local people. Every effort is being made to disperse both the human and cattle population to other secure areas, wherever possible, preferably as near to their home areas as security permits.

Kongor, Bor and Mongalla had a relatively well-developed network of schools and health centres before the renewal of fighting, but many of these had already closed down because of the earlier floods and shortage of food. Feeding centres had been set up in Mareng and Malek by Interaid to deal with some of the flood displaced. The fighting has caused further dislocation of all services. The revival of such services will have to await the return of any trained personnel who have fled the area, but the work done by Interaid, UNICEF, GED and the SRRA will assist greatly in the relief effort.

There is no locally produced food left in Bor and Kongor now, and only a little in Gemmeiza and Mongalla. There is no prospect of any to harvested before January 1992 at the earliest. This harvest may be

good but certainly will not meet full food needs of the increased population in the area. The entire population of Bor and Kongor and parts of Gemmeiza are affected by this food shortage to varying degrees. Local services have been dislocated and must be revived. The two most urgent requirements are food aid and cattle medicine for trypanosomiasis. Relief inputs must, however, be balanced against needs of areas further north.

9.2. SPECIFIC ISSUES

9.2.1 FOOD SECURITY

Most of Bor area, from Pariak (south of Bor) to Duk Fadiat (south of Ayod) is highly susceptible to inundation in the wet season, both from rain and river floods.²⁶ The 1990 harvest was affected by light rains throughout the region, localized flooding from Jalle to Paliau, and extensive bird damage in various locations. In the north of the region the areas of Duk Fadiat, Duk Faiwel, and Pok Tap generally had a good harvest, while in the eastern most villages of Panyok and Panyang, bordering Waat and Akobo districts crops failed due to drought. The harvest was also generally good along the western embankment of the Jonglei canal from near Aborom to Wernyol. In Bor area itself the harvest was generally bad from Baidit to Jalle, but improved in the south, from Makuac to Cueiker. The groundnut harvest around Gemmeiza and Mongalla was especially good and was traded or sold to people in Torit.

As the 1990 harvest for the entire region was inadequate to last through to the next harvest expected in August-September 1991, buffer stocks of WFP maize and beans were accumulated in Bor, Jalle and Kongor for distribution in the 1991 dry season. 350 MT of maize was distributed in a food-for-seed swap between Jalle and Wau (Ayod district) between January and March 1991. 513.8 MT was distributed from Gok to Paliau in the early rainy season (April-June 1991) when local food stocks had run out, and when problems due to flooding began to make themselves felt.

The whole of Bor-Kongor area was affected by heavy rain flooding, the extent of which became evident in late May (as reported by UN and NGO field staff). Permanent settlements and cultivations from Pariak to Wernyol were flooded and destroyed, the worst affected area being between Baidit and Kongor. Virtually the entire first crop of sorghum and maize was lost, and only a few crops planted close to homesteads (mainly okra, pumpkin and tobacco) survived, but in very small quantities. Emergency food distributions of 308.6 MT were made to people immediately surrounding Bor from mid-May through June. The area between Ngangala and Gemmeiza, which was not so badly affected by floods, but which is better served by the main road, received 1363 MT food between April and September (the SRRA secretary of Ngangala described his area as "comfortable" when visited in September).

Large numbers of persons from Baidit, Akuaideng and Jalle were displaced by flooding and have moved to the south of the district. Market activity, never very active, ceased. Households visited by the assessment team were seen to have *no food* in the granaries. In the Mareng/Anyidi area farmers are beginning to reclaim their homesteads plots as the floodwaters recede and are planting a mixture of sorghum (local and serena varieties), katumani maize, cowpeas and pumpkins. They are planting as much as seed as they can and are steadily extending the areas under cultivation. The areas observed in the Mareng area were still small, most being only about 1/4 to 3/4 feddans in size, the largest being about 1 1/2 feddans. The harvest from this second planting, where possible, should begin in

²⁶ See Howell, Lock and Cobb (eds.), *The Jonglei Canal. Impact and Opportunity*, Cambridge, 1988, especially Appendices 1 & 2.

January, but even then the quantities available per family will be little more than 1-2 sacks (90 kg) of food. There are, however, much larger areas under cultivation in the Gok region, especially east of Cueirker, Anyidi and Mokolcui. This may produce a substantial harvest.

Kongor was similarly affected by rains, but the full damage caused by floods cannot now be assessed. Pok Tap, Duk Faiwel and Duk Fadiat were reported to have suffered the least from flood damage and had some harvest (probably comparable to that obtained in Ayod).

The main degradation of food stocks came about from the October raid by Nasir faction SPLA troops based in Ayod and local Nuer auxiliaries who are reported to have looted homesteads and burned houses where grain was stored. The first wave of refugees from Kongor came with no grain. The second wave, who began to enter Bor area around the 5th of November, were those who earlier escaped to the farther grazing areas with some of their cattle. They brought with them some small amounts of sorghum (not much more than 1/4 to 1/3 of a 90 kg sack per family group of about 4-6 persons). This is the only sorghum which is entering Bor and is shared with a few local people at homesteads where the refugees have stopped to rest. Those refugees seen coming from Kongor had markedly fewer personal possessions with them than the returnees who came to the Sobat from Itang earlier this year. Fighting was intensified in mid-to-late November when the Nasir faction troops entered the area again, and managed to push past Bor, almost to Gemmeiza. Many more houses were burned, a number of civilians were killed. The standing crops seemed to have been spared.

In response to this large-scale population displacement WFP brought in 640 MT of grain to Malek, Bor and Mareng in November. In early December a further 2000 MT was brought in as relief and distributed directly to the camps of displaced persons along the road from Ngangala to Bor (970 MT by WFP, 170 MT by WVI, 700 MT by CRS).

The number of displaced persons is hard to estimate at present. The entire population of Kongor and Bor, including part of the population of Gemmeiza, has been affected to some degree. Many fled to the toic; a number living around Bor crossed the river to Aliab for safety; the Mundari took their cattle and food to the islands in the middle of the river. 60,000 displaced persons were seen by the UN/NGO/SRRA team along the road between Ngangala and Bor in early December. As 40-50,000 had already been observed and catered for in the Malek area prior to the invasion of Bor area in November, it should be expected that more displaced persons will emerge in time. Some will have salvaged both their cattle and food, some only their cattle, some only their food, and some will have nothing. A follow-up assessment will be required as soon as security permits. In the unsettled state of the country at present food distributions should be closely monitored. WFP has earlier assessed that it could meet the needs of 200,000 displaced people in Bor, giving a full ration for ten months. The amount which can be brought in, under the current logistical capacity, is 29,400 MT of food (grain, pulses and oil).

A nutritional survey of local children under five in Bor-Mareng-Anyidi area in November 1991 revealed 29% malnourished children, with a total of 8% being severely malnourished (at risk of death). The global mortality rate, however, was less than in Ayod, where the nutritional status is better. This may be attributable to the more developed health care and water services in Bor.²⁷

Animal husbandry is the main economic activity. Cattle predominate, but goats and sheep have, in the past, contributed greatly to household economy. Cattle population figures as of January 1991 are based on UNICEF and ICRC rinderpest vaccination campaigns carried out in 1989-91. For Bor (Mongalla to Jalle) c. 278,197 head of cattle, of which about 250,000 are found on the east bank, and the rest among the Aliab Dinka on the west bank. For

²⁷ Flachet, *Nutritional Assessment in Upper Nile South Sudan*, p.3.

Kongor (Jalle to Duk Fadiat) a total of 217,424 head of cattle were vaccinated in 1989 and 1991, and an estimated 22,000 remain unvaccinated (vaccination figures for 1990 are unknown). This would give Kongor a total herd of c. 240,000. The goat and sheep population in the area used to be extensive (about 109,000 in 1976), but declined between the years 1983-89, and have now dwindled to an insignificant number.²⁸

The floods have covered a number of essential wet season grazing areas, killing the grass there. The goat and sheep population has been further diminished through death by drowning. Of more serious consequences is the spread of cattle disease by the flood, particularly haemorrhagic septicaemia (HS) and trypanosomiasis. There are some cases of anthrax and Contagious Bovine Pluropneumonia (CBPP) reported. The mortality rate is quite high. Some cattle camps report 50% losses, and other cattle camps have been seen to have at least 30% losses. Dead cattle have been seen (and smelt) nearly everywhere. The losses to raiding, on the other hand, seem to be rather less than first feared.

People are desperate about their cattle. There has been a specific request for the anti-trypanosomiasis drug, Ethidium Bromide. Though the tse-tse infestation is declining, deaths from trypanosomiasis are likely to continue for another couple of months. Veterinary services will be supported by UNICEF and NGOs working in the cattle camps with trained veterinary personnel and with stockmen from the communities themselves.

As in Waat, one of the main consequences of the flooding of the pastures and the spread of disease is that milk production has declined markedly, and there is very little milk available, even for small children. This may improve as the floods recede and the dry season pastures emerge, but there could be considerable disruption to the normal grazing pattern through the combination of flooding and raids.

The extensive flooding has increased the availability of small fish along the road and in inland pools, and people were very industriously catching and drying fish in from September through early November. To exploit the fisheries in the deeper pools, watercourses and river fishing line and hooks will be supplied through local relief committees. Bor area has received considerable quantities of fishing equipment in the past two years, but it is not yet known how much of this was lost during the recent fighting and subsequent displacement.

The main survival input apart from food will be shelter materials, cloth, salt, household goods, blankets and fishing equipment. These can be used by families directly or if need be for bartering for needed items from neighboring areas. It is expected that these barter items will be the means used to acquire local seed and even perhaps to help to offset the loss of cattle with the purchase of a small number of livestock by groups of households.

9.2.2 LOGISTICS

The main overland convoy routes to Bor are Kapoeta-Torit-Ngangala-Bor and Nimule-Torit-Ngangala-Bor. The road is open throughout the year, but is in need of repair after the rainy season. The road north of Bor to Jalle, Kongor, Pok Tap and Ayod is impassable in the rains, and currently no traffic can go beyond Jalle. There is another road running to the east from Bor-Anyidi-Pengko-Pibor.

Considerable work has to be done on the roads after convoys pass to keep them in good repair. Local road gangs are responsible for the upkeep of their own section of road, and some food is given to them to support this communal self-help activity. People recognize in general that if the roads are left in disrepair, no relief supplies of any type will get through.

²⁸ United Nations Lifeline Sudan, *An Investigation into Production Capability in the Rural Southern Sudan*, pp. 10-11, 15-16.

The main logistical obstacle to moving food north of Jalle is the damaged flood embankment which runs west parallel to the road. This has been breached in many places between Jalle and Maar, and the consequent floods not only make the main road impassable for long stretches of time; it also floods former settlement area between the embankment and the road, rendering them unsuitable for habitation or cultivation.

9.2.3 SERVICES AND PERSONNEL

The recent fighting and displacement will mean that many services which have been functioning in Bor for the last two years will have to be revived or reconstructed. The health units in the area are already being reopened where possible and where health staff can be found. Interaid and UNICEF will continue to provide supervision and monitoring of the distribution of essential drugs and will focus on training of community-nominated home visitors who will promote the correct use of oral rehydration therapy and other basic messages. These messages, along with child immunisation, are expected to be the main life-saving activities complementing the curative service. EPI will continue to be linked with cattle vaccination and the cattle milk productivity will be given major focus as a primary means of combatting the current high levels of malnourishment.

Bor still has a problem in supplying clean water. It had 45 functioning borehole (handpump) wells prior to the insecurity, and 36 boreholes which are out of order (10 of which are due for repair). The pre-insecurity requirements are already covered by a USAID-funded UNICEF project.

Of particular importance will be the school system, which was already partially shut down in the rural areas during the floods. There are reported to be 30 schools in Bor and 35 schools in Kongor area. These schools are observed to have about 30-40 pupils at any given time, but they will have to accommodate a possible 6,600 returning minors from Pochalla. In addition to needing school equipment, the schools will stay open only if there is a school feeding programme in place, which supplements the community support for the schools.

10. KAPOETA/CHUKUDUM AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX


SECTOR	KAPOETA	CHUKUDUM
cattle	3	1
crop stores	1	2
cash	1	1
goats/sheep	2	1
fish	0	0
roads	1	1
vehicles	0	0
wells	0	1
trained personnel	0	0
agricultural implements	1	1
cloth/clothing	0	1
household goods	0	0
mosquito nets	0	0
schools	0	1
useful neighbours	2 (Chukudum/ Boma)	2 (Kapoeta/Torit)
TOTAL	11	12

10.1. OVERVIEW

Like the peoples of Boma and Pibor, the **230,000** nomadic Toposa of the semiarid Kapoeta area are essentially self-sufficient and rely little on outside assistance. During 1991 the well spaced rains have resulted in good grazing in almost all parts of the area, and livestock are healthy. Crops, which take second priority in the food production system have also done well. However, the population of Kapoeta town (c. **15,000**), who are largely non-Toposa, did not plant much due to insecurity and to an expectancy of food aid in 1991, and they have no livestock. This group has been assisted with food, seeds and tools by WVI. Relaxation of trade restrictions by local authorities and inputs of relief have contributed to a revival of the market, although this is only when security permits. Kapoeta area has been seriously insecure all year as a result of conflict between the Toposa and SPLA. A certain amount of the insecurity seems to be the result of a general dissatisfaction on the part of the Toposa with their share of relief. As a highly mobile population, who have very few educated individuals, provision of even the most basic services has been a struggle. This has been compounded by the bad relations between the administration and the Toposa stemming from the activities of the GOS-supported Toposa militia. Services in Kapoeta town, by contrast, are very good.

Chukudum count is inhabited by around 71,000 Boya and Didinga, and has a mixed pastoral and agricultural economy which vacillates between surplus in years of even rainfall and security, and deficit in years of poor climatic conditions or raiding by neighbouring peoples. Crops have been good in all areas except lowland Didinga where excess rainfall has resulted in waterlogging and vulnerability to pest attack. WVI estimate that around **15,000** in Chukudum will be suffering food shortages as a result.

Otherwise there is a general improvement in the conditions in the area with good health care coverage supported by SRRA, IRC and UNICEF; repair and maintenance of water



KAPOETA, KIMATONG & CHUKUDUM

supplies by MEDIC/UNICEF; agricultural inputs and general training by OXFAM-USA; and school supplies by UNICEF/SKI. A critical turnaround in the economy has occurred with the relaxing of administrative restrictions for trade within Kapoeta Town, and vegetables and other food crops are traded there.

It appears that there are around 25,000 returnees in Eastern Equatoria who came from Dimma (some are in Pakok). Of these some 18,000 are said to be in Kidepo, which lies on the Didinga/Boya boundary on the road to Torit. The people at Kidepo have access to shelter and firewood but, not being related to neighbouring populations, are not part of an existing exchange network. Estimates of the number of persons at Kidepo vary, but WVI has allocated food for 10,000 persons on full rations. It is thought that most of these are returnees from Dimma camp in Ethiopia, although the SRRA report the presence of returnees from itang and Punyido as well. Kidepo can offer returnees shelter but little else. Others living in the village (which SRRA reports as 25,000) have established cultivations (except perhaps the 750 Torit teachers undergoing reorientation training). It is not known where the remainder of those who were at Dima are, but it is thought that they are mostly from Equatoria and have reintegrated themselves into other areas.

Education includes the mission school outside Kapoeta, with some 3,000 unaccompanied minors.

Kapoeta is the SRRA administrative centre for South Sudan and is also, along with Chukudum and Torit, a centre for training of a variety of workers in all sectors.

11. TORIT AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	0
crop stores	3
cash	2
goats/sheep	0
fish	0
roads	2
vehicles	1
wells	2
trained personnel	2
agricultural implements	2
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	1
mosquito nets	1
schools	0
useful neighbours (Uganda, Mongalla)	2
TOTAL	19

11.1. OVERVIEW



There are few significant natural problems in 1991 in Torit Area. Harvests by the 300,000 mostly sedentary cultivators have been good in most areas except some difficulties in southern Bari. Trade is beginning to increase. However, almost all the community schools have been closed this year as the teachers went for "political reorientation". Children were unwilling to attend any classes in the community schools lest they themselves be recruited to attend one of the three large FACE²⁹ boarding schools in the District. It is reported that these schools, which house over 3,000 children from all over southern Sudan, are facing difficulties in management.

Displacement within the area is limited to movement of people out of Torit town due to bombing (8 occasions in 1991). No accurate figures are available for total numbers of returnees from Ethiopia, but it appears insignificant. There are some 4,000 Ugandan refugees at Parajok and at the same time a number of Sudanese have moved to Adjumani in Uganda and registered as refugees. This movement is largely of people whose ethnic group is to be found on both sides of the border and accurate assessment of numbers of people moving in or out as refugees is clouded by the movements across the border for trade. Small numbers of people reportedly continue to move out of Juba into Torit Area.

Those locations that reported problems last year managed to get by by trading, an activity which was supported by various agencies. Beans, for example, were bought in Acholi area and distributed to the refugees at Parajok. Tools remain in short supply although a number were distributed this year by UNICEF, DoT, and CRS. Meanwhile CRS report that imported seeds did not do well in 1990 and in 1992 they plan to focus on local seed production systems and use of barter items to purchase these seeds. CRS have identified some 72,000 persons in need of relief assistance, mainly in southern Bari and Madi who will be targeted with 6,800 MT food. In addition World

²⁹ Friends of African Children's Education

TORIT



Source: SRRA

Vision will continue to assist those in difficulty in Torit town itself, estimated at 10,000.

The general health situation is reported as good. Torit along with Kajo Keji/Kaya is one of the most progressive of all areas in the development of primary health care, for example CHWs meet their supervisors monthly at health centres and health committees are present in most locations. However, those directing PHC are still not reaching right into the villages on a consistent basis.

The level of education and presence of trained personnel is relatively high and there are a number of agencies working with them with a fair degree of co-ordination between one another. Activities are becoming more and more oriented to the community level now that some of the essential central infrastructure (such as the hospital) has begun to function fairly independently. In order to strengthen the abilities of the people of the area to cope with the unknown contingencies of war which include displacement to or from the area, destruction of infrastructure and loss of food supplies, the agencies are expanding their operations to cover such areas as preventative health care through low level health workers (for example, traditional midwives), community support to basic services and promotion of small scale marketing. All these activities combined with continued relief support, where necessary, are part of the preparations for future problems as well as regeneration of what has been lost. This approach is not confined to Torit, but has generally been adopted by all working to strengthen local coping mechanisms in southern Sudan.

12. KAJO-KAJI/KAYA AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	0
crop stores	3
cash	2
goats/sheep	0
fish	1
roads	2
vehicles	1
wells	1
trained personnel	2
agricultural implements	1
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	1
mosquito nets	0
schools	1
useful neighbours	3
(Uganda, Zaire, Yirol)	
TOTAL	19


12.1 OVERVIEW

The two towns at the border of Uganda were taken by SPLA forces less than two years ago. Situated in the green belt, the inhabitants of the region are mainly Bari-speaking peoples. Although a few cattle are kept by the Kuku, the main activity is shifting cultivation with a potential for surplus production. Since the days of the Sleeping Sickness Regulations people used to settle along the roads. The centre of the area is Yei town, which is held by GOS. The revised population estimate for Yei Area is 414,987. Kaya used to be a centre for coffee traders from the north, and though commerce is much reduced in activity since its takeover by the SPLA early in 1990, it is still a bustling town with cross-border trade from Uganda. Bicycle traders bring imported goods upcountry as far as Yambio and Mundri, and cattle traders drive their cows down from Yirol for sale, or to be exchanged for clothes and other basic necessities. WFP provided 230 MT food assistance to Kajo-Kaji in early 1990, and UNICEF, IAS and AICF provided agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools, and supported the health sector and schools. Food production has since then considerably improved; there are no verified reports of malnutrition. The social services, however, need long-term assistance.

Friction between the military administration and the civilians has developed since the split in the SPLA. Attempts at forced conscription into the army drove thousands of residents into northern Uganda. One UNHCR report gives as many as 50,000 since October 1991.

Kaya, on the other side, has received thousands of displaced persons from Yei area and Western Equatoria, which led to food shortages. CRS, IAS and NSCC are supplying relief items. AAIN is supporting the health sector; there are growing complaints about sanitation problems resulting from over-crowding. An over-emphasis of Kaya as the main port of delivery has meant that even more people have been attracted there in search of food. Current deliveries are henceforth to be distributed over a wider area.

MAP OF KAYA AND KAJO KEJI AREAS



The town of Kaya is of further importance in logistics operations for the whole west bank. All land transport into this area, as well as into Western Equatoria, Lakes/Bahr el-Ghazal has to go through Kaya, as it is the only road. Strengthening of logistical support as well as the administrative structures of the two implementing bodies (SRRA and NSCC) is therefore of great importance. AAIN has set up workshop facilities for repairing and servicing convoy trucks, and some light 4WD trucks were made available for bridge and road repairs into Western Equatoria, as well as for recovery services.

The administrative set-up consists of the Joint Relief Committee (JRC) in Kaya and the Area Relief Committees (CRC) in places like Yambio, Maridi and Mundri. All relief items coming into Kaya are registered, and re-allocation proposals, if necessity arises, are forwarded to the donors in order to respond in time to emergencies. All NGOs, the SRRA, NSCC and other authorities involved in relief and rehabilitation are members of the JRC. However, the administrative set-up is lacking funds and training, especially on the CRC level, and is in need of support for capacity-building.

CRS will be bringing in approximately 11,000 MT of food (maize, beans, oil) for an estimated 30,000 beneficiaries in areas where the first crop was disappointing (particularly Nyori, Tore, Rubeke, Yaribi, Pokula, Panyme and Kopera) to fulfill their 1991 pledges only. The number of beneficiaries will be reassessed after the second harvest is in (December-January). CRS have no plans for further regular food distributions in 1992.

UNICEF will provide spare parts for the water programme under AAIN and IAS, and other support to the implementing agencies will comprise school materials and basic health kits. Since the cancellation of flights to Kajo Keji there is no air access to the west bank at the moment. AAIN and IAS are transporting all these essential supplies by road through Uganda.

13. WESTERN EQUATORIA AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	0
crop stores	2
cash	1
goats/sheep	0
fish	1
roads	1
vehicles	0
wells	0
trained personnel	2
agricultural implements	1
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	1
mosquito nets	0
schools	1
useful neighbours (Kaya, Yirol, Yambio)	3
TOTAL	14

13.1. OVERVIEW

Western Equatoria, with its fertile soils and generous rainfall pattern, has good agricultural potential and used to be one of the breadbaskets of the Southern Sudan. The people are cultivators, supplemented by extensive hunting and the seasonal gathering of wild foods. They do not possess livestock. Since the outbreak of hostilities normal life has been disrupted in most parts of the region. Military convoys moved between Juba, Yei, Maridi, Yambio and Tambura to supply the garrisons. Mundri area was cut off from external supplies since 1987. People living along the roads left their settlements and fled to less accessible parts of the countryside where they re-established their villages. In addition tens of thousands have fled into Zaire and the C.A.R. Social services and markets collapsed and the formerly besieged towns are deserted. Forestry and cotton projects no longer operate. Once one of the better developed regions of the Sudan, Western Equatoria has lost virtually everything. The SPLA brought the area under control one year ago, and the new authorities are looking forward to rehabilitating the economic and social infrastructure.

The food production by now is far from self-sufficiency. Cultivation requires continuous clearing and weeding; this nowadays is problematic because agricultural tools are in short supply. Displaced families living in the bush have difficulties in extending their gardens (often times seeds were lost when they were displaced). Therefore cultivated crops have to be supplemented with wild foods (e.g. mushrooms and wild yams). Gathering and preparing this food is time-consuming and interferes with the necessary extension of food cultivation.

The marketing of agricultural products was hampered by several factors:

- the dispersal of producers,
- the absence of imported trade goods,
- the absence of buyers/consumers (town population),
- requisitions made by soldiers

However, the assessment team observed the re-opening of some roadside and town markets, where producers offer small quantities of food like cassava, groundnuts or vegetables in an attempt to obtain basic commodities like soap and salt which are occasionally brought from Kaya by bicycle traders. The markets are further supplied with meat by cattle traders from Yirol. All this indicates that market activities and surplus production are gradually increasing. It appears that the region is undertaking its own recovery strategies and would benefit most from assistance rather than relief inputs, in the absence of renewed insecurity which could rapidly destroy any recovery. The following are recommended:

- large scale inputs of agricultural tools (and seeds where appropriate),
- marketing strategies for basic trade items (salt, soap, clothes, household goods),
- improvement of road communication and transport facilities,
- incentives for resettlement in areas of easy access (along roads),
- revival of social services (health, education),

These long-term strategies have to be implemented by responsible indigenous bodies such as the SRRA and NSCC. Both of them lack funds and trained personnel to do so and need a sound backing from external NGOs.

These efforts have, however, little impact on the current availability of food for vulnerable groups of displaced and returnees. The number of refugees from Western Equatoria in Zaire reaches 57,000 and in C.A.R. 7,000 (according to UNHCR). The refugees represent about 15% of the entire population of 437,000.

Support to the population will help to boost local coping mechanisms in the initial rebuilding period. Assuming that the returnees will come back to Western Equatoria in an orderly manner, they will be able to maintain some self-help strategies. Taking into account logistical constraints, notably precarious state of the roads and bridges, the total of 2,200 MT of relief food can be allocated to the area. This would serve 50,000 people, providing them with a half ration for six months.

It must be noted that the area will only be accessible to April 1992. Buffer stocks have therefore to be built up for May and June. The roads and bridges have deteriorated further under the impact of the convoys which have already come in during 1991. Although food was given to local people for road repairs, it is obvious that a serious improvement can be reached only by the use of heavy equipment.

13.2 SPECIFIC ISSUES

13.2.1 DISPLACED AND REFUGEES

To adequately anticipate the necessary interventions in Western Equatoria one must look into the specific patterns of internal displacement and movement across the border. Western Equatoria is inhabited by the Azande (west of Ibba up to the province boundary of Tambura area) and the Moro in Maridi and Mundri area. The Sudan-Zaire-CAR border is not a tribal boundary as the Azande have relations in both neighbouring countries. In the current fighting, as in the previous civil war, people have been driven into inaccessible areas of the forests and bush. The Azande have crossed the border into Zaire and CAR either to stay with relatives or to be registered as refugees under the care of UNHCR. The latter are reported to be 57,000 in Zaire, divided between three camps (Dungu, Doruma, Aba), and 7,000 in CAR (Nboki camp). Many have also settled in border areas near to where they used to cultivate (using the shifting cultivation pattern of opening a new field every 2-3 years, and letting old fields return to the bush for 10 years). It is mainly this group which is expected to return to the Sudan after the harvest (December-January), assuming that a benign security is maintained by the SPLA. UNHCR figures, on the other hand, indicate an increase in registered refugees in Zaire (from 49,300 in October 1991 to

57,000 in November), mostly in the Dungu camp. The number of refugees in CAR is reported to have decreased, with a movement into Zaire, which only partially explains the reported increases.

The displaced within Western Equatoria are more difficult to assess, and the figures depend on the definition of displacement. MSF France/GOS estimated a number of 139,000 in July 1990, living in the government held towns of Tambura, Nzara, Yambio, Maridi and Mundri. This was the basis for the request for 5,000 MT food aid which was later made by the SRRA after the SPLA took control of the province. Field visits in August and October 1991 to the towns where the displaced persons were formerly said to be revealed that these places were now deserted, except for soldiers, some traders and some destitute persons. Where the people are whom the government claimed lived in the towns has yet to be established.

13.2.2 LOGISTICS

The road network in general is not capable of accommodating relief deliveries in substantial quantities. The once well-maintained murrum roads have been neglected since the outbreak of the war, are washed out by rains, and the drainage ditches are blocked, turning the roads at their slopes into river beds. The underlying rocks are breaking the springs of the trucks. Many of the concrete bridges crossing small streams are eroded or were blown up during the fighting. Although the main roads are now free of landmines, there remain various bottlenecks, mainly on the detour round Yei (still under government control) in Kagelu forest: a muddy stretch of clay soil with deep ruts. The crossings at Kdogo and Dandame rivers need the assistance of recovery trucks. The Yei river bridge in Mundri is blown and leaves half the population of this area inaccessible by road transport for at least 9 months of the year. Compounding these problems is the fact that many vehicles travelling to Western Equatoria are already in extremely poor condition, delaying or rendering impossible the delivery of relief goods. There is a chronic shortage of fuel for recovery trips and monitoring.

14. YIROL AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	3
crop stores	1
cash	1
goats/sheep	0
fish	2
roads	1
vehicles	0
wells	1
trained personnel	1
agricultural implements	0
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	1
mosquito nets	0
schools	1
useful neighbours (W. Eq., Akon, Rumbek)	3
TOTAL	16

14.1. OVERVIEW

The population of Yirol and Rumbek counties (approximately 556,000) have suffered substantial grain crop losses due to locust infestations and flooding. The long maturing sorghum varieties which are the staple grain crop are especially vulnerable to uneven rainfall. The locusts left little of the first and second planting and the yield of the third will be insignificant for many farmers. However groundnuts and sesame planted in June have done well and cassava is available. The Aliab area on the west bank of the Nile, which has served as a grain reserve in recent years, is also affected by floods, according to reports from both Bor and Yirol. Staple grain is already in short supply and the price for 1 tin of dura (sorghum) has risen from £S100 in May 1990 to £S150 in November 1991, a time when prices should be reduced after the harvest. No grain was seen for sale in the Yirol market. ICRC estimate that some 120,000 people have lost their grain crop and will be in need of assistance.

Despite a spread of flood-related cattle diseases, notably tripanosomiasis, the livestock of the local Dinka population remains an important food source and their most valuable exchange item and is traded as far as Kaya at the Ugandan border and Zaire. It is exchanged for cash and clothes and gives purchasing power. However the lack of vehicles moving between the areas where grain is available and places of shortage mean that grain itself does not seem to be transported. The almost complete loss of small stock (sheep and goats) in the whole of Bahr el Ghazal has reduced the ready availability of meat. However, fish as a source of protein is abundant temporarily in the flooded areas as well as constantly in the lakes and streams. Dried fish serves as an important exchange commodity and is traded into Western Equatoria.

As families divide for the dry season, the main sources of food will differ according to social grouping. Women with infants and the old generation stay in the homesteads and will subsist on groundnuts and wild food like leaves and nuts. The grain shortage will therefore affect primarily old people, infants and nursing mothers. The men and the young generation will move with the cattle and live mainly on fish and milk. At

present the young men are bringing milk and fish from the fishing and cattle camps which are currently nearby.

Due to the crop losses, grain is the priority request. Since traders left the area with the outbreak of hostilities eight years ago, fishing equipment is also in high demand. ICRC has assisted in this regard and will continue to do so, thereby increasing the high protein food availability, reducing the requirement for costly grain deliveries through Uganda and increasing the supply of barter commodities.

The health sector was temporarily supported by ICRC and a network of basic health facilities established providing mainly curative care. The hospital in Yirol is the only one in the SPLA-held Bahr el Ghazal and a substantial number of health staff is present. However drugs supplies to the hospital and dispensaries have now run out. EPI and cattle vaccination activities have recently ceased due to lack of vaccines. over 1 million cattle were vaccinated by SRRA/ICRC between 1989 and 1991 in Yirol and Rumbek counties. ICRC plans to expand EPI and veterinary vaccination. The educational sector has continued to function but only on a very basic level.

WFP are requesting 2,000 MT grain. SEOC (Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium, of which LWF is a member) is currently preparing to dispatch 230 MT maize to Yirol from Kampala, with another convoy of 500 MT planned for Rumbek early in 1992. ICRC is appealing for around 0.5 million fishing hooks, 27,000 spools fishing line, mosquito nets and other essential items targeted at 120,000 people in Yirol and Rumbek Counties. The Diocese of Rumbek, GED and ICRC will continue to support health care, education, veterinary activities and clean water supplies.

Overland transport from Kampala via Kaya and Mundri is possible, but serious efforts have to be undertaken to rebuild or protect the vital road and bridge links and a small ferry across the Lau river. Time constraints for access to the area are set for the beginning of the rainy season in April.

15. LER AREA

VULNERABILITY INDEX

cattle	3
crop stores	2
cash	1
goats/sheep	0
fish	2
roads	0
vehicles	0
wells	0
trained personnel	0
agricultural implements	0
cloth/clothing	1
household goods	0
mosquito nets	0
schools	0
useful neighbours (S. Kordofan)	1
TOTAL	10

15.1. OVERVIEW

The epidemic of visceral leishmaniasis (Kala azar) in Western Upper Nile is running out of control. The disease was endemic until 1984 when it started to spread at an alarming rate and it now is affecting an untenably high proportion of the population (Some 80% infected in epidemic areas). The disease with its sandfly vector is known to be spreading into Bahr el Ghazal and Kordofan and is reported on the White Nile and along the Sobat. The sickness has been hitting all age groups but particularly those between 15 and 30 and has thus, along with the war, had a serious effect on local productive capacity. It seems to be associated with a weakened population and so feeds on itself.

Western Upper Nile had a census population of 304,000 in 1983. By 1991, at the average Sudanese growth rate of 2.5% per annum it would be expected to have a population of 370,000. However at the centre of the epidemic area a recent survey found 30-40% mortality. Many thousands left the area for Khartoum, some 8,000 are now in the Sobat and Pochalla, having returned from Ethiopia along with 2,600 unaccompanied children from the area. Thus a considerably smaller population may be the case. It is estimated that 200,000 are at immediate and serious risk of Kala azar. (Although the area of transmission is *Acacia seyal/Balanites aegyptiaca* forest occur only in the north of Western Upper Nile, local food strategies considerable movement to and from the epidemic zone.)

After a poor harvest in 1990 and a difficult year, the area has had a good harvest in 1991 and livestock were reported healthy. SRRA report that with the help of ICRC that some 238,000 cattle were vaccinated since 1989. However, coverage is not complete as since 1988 the areas around Bentiu and Mayom have not been accessible due to insecurity (in addition most of the roads are under water between April and January).

There were over 2,000 patients under treatment for Kala azar in November (the treatment lasts 24 days and then the bed is taken by a new case). The hospital at Ler was completely looted in the course of fighting between the factions of the SPLA and treatment there has stopped. In addition the split has caused a changeover of personnel within the local SRRA with the loss of a number of key persons.

Strategies for Western Upper Nile include comprehensive support from ICRC, WVI and UN and other agencies for strengthening the ability of the population to resist not only Kala azar but other threats such as food shortage. This includes expansion of primary health care and EPI as well as the Kala azar treatment, mosquito nets, fishing equipment, tools, seeds and other basic items. It will be essential to increase the knowledge of the people regarding maintenance of health, linking health care with education. 180 MT food a month is needed for provision of patients and their families to support the Kala azar programme. WVI is planning to supply a full ration for 15,000 beneficiaries (mainly Kala azar patients and their families) in the budgetary year ending in September 1992. ICRC is planning to provide non-food items (seeds, tools, fishing line and hooks, material for mosquito nets) to approximately 17,500 farm families in Ler

Assistance to education will include appropriate arrangements for the return of 2,600 unaccompanied minors to the non-Kala Azar areas, if the area is considered suitably secure, which in the current circumstances it is not.

16. NORTHERN BAHR EL-GHAZAL

Northern Bahr el-Ghazal (Akon) has not been included in any substantial relief programme since 1989. The area was described by ICRC as the epicentre of the 1988 war-related famine. Since 1990 a local truce between the SPLA and the Missiriya militia of South Kordofan has brought some peace to the border, allowing many displaced Dinka to return to Bahr el-Ghazal from the northern Sudan. Since the end of 1989 some 100,000 persons are believed to have returned from various locations in the north. There will continue to be pressure on the displaced southern Sudanese population to leave Khartoum, and we must anticipate the likelihood of a continuing flow of returnees to northern Bahr el-Ghazal.

There are no reliable figures for the numbers of persons presently in Bahr el-Ghazal who have either returned from the north, or who have been affected to some degree by the war and natural calamities. An unconfirmed SRRA figure for the whole of Bahr el-Ghazal gives a total of 759,000 returnees, war displaced, and otherwise afflicted persons. Khartoum-based relief agencies have given the lower (but equally untested) figure of 266,000.

Plans to supply part of the area with relief food by train from Babanusa to Aiwel have failed. There is now the possibility of an overland route from Uganda through Yirol, which has yet to be surveyed and could only be attempted by small trucks. SEOC plans a convoy of 500 MT to go to Akon/Gogrial early in 1992.

The truce which still holds between the SPLA and Missiriya has meant that many cattle owners have been able to bring their cattle back to the area around Akon. ICRC intends to give priority for EPI and veterinary vaccination programmes to Akon provided access is granted in 1992.