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## **7. PROGRAMMING AND SOCIAL IMPACT IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR**

### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter considers the programmes and social impact of OLS Northern Sector. In so doing, it focuses on the situation of war-displaced populations in three case study areas in government-controlled territory: Greater Khartoum, Ed Da'ein Province in South Darfur, and Wau in Western Bahr el-Ghazal. The Review Team felt that a focus on war-displaced populations is justified by the scale and significance of these populations in Sudan generally, and in OLS Northern Sector specifically; a majority of OLS resources, for example, have been targeted at this group since 1989. Further, most of the war-displaced in the case study areas are from Bahr el-Ghazal Region, where famine and mass starvation in 1987/88 initially gave rise to OLS. The case studies provide an opportunity to examine the response of OLS to war-displacement over time in three different contexts: a major urban area, a rural resettlement area, and a garrison town.

### **7.2 Issues to Consider Regarding the War-Displaced**

The existence of large displaced populations in Sudan is not necessarily only a by-product of internal warfare; there is also evidence to suggest that it constitutes part of a strategy aimed at controlling territory, resources, and peoples (Keen, 1992, November). The dynamics of population movements in the South have been described in Chapter 6. Here, it is important to emphasise several points concerning these populations in the Northern Sector:

First, war-displaced populations are frequently moved to areas where they live under the authority of the same groups responsible for their original displacement. This has important implications for the role of humanitarian operations in protecting war-displaced from violence and other abuses. In Ed Da'ein, for example, Dinka from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal were displaced into areas inhabited primarily by the Rizeigat, from whom the GOS-supported Murahaliin militia have been drawn. In Wau, Fertit militia armed by the government were responsible for both the displacement of Dinka from their home areas, and for violence against them in the town. As noted earlier, massacres of Dinka civilians took place in both Ed Da'ein and Wau in the late 1980s.

Second, war-induced displacement is continuing. In Wau, evidence from UN and GOS annual needs assessments, and interviews by the Review Team, suggest that since 1992 the number of war-displaced has risen every year. There have been periodic increases in numbers of war-displaced in Khartoum since 1989, and large-scale war displacement continues in areas of the Transition Zone, particularly the Nuba Hills. This raises important questions concerning the extent to which present humanitarian operations are addressing the underlying causes of displacement.

Third, those people who have moved into government-held areas as a result of raiding and other forms of military activity have typically lost the bulk of their assets, most importantly cattle. Thus, war-induced migration differs markedly from traditional

seasonal migrations of rural people to participate in the labour economy in the North. Indeed, wage labour - once a seasonal activity in the subsistence economy - has now become a survival strategy of the war-displaced.

In this regard, the Review Team found an uncomfortable connection between the GOS's economic development policies with regard to agriculture, its policies concerning the war-displaced, and its assertion of control over land in the context of internal warfare. Economic policy in Sudan since the late 1970's has emphasised the replacement of subsistence production with capital-intensive, mechanised farming for export, and this policy continues today. For example, The Peace and Development Foundation, created in 1992, and later reconstituted as the National Development Foundation (NDF), has as one of its objectives the consolidation of government control over land through the expansion of mechanised farming (NDF, 1996, March 28; Lino Rol, 1996, March 28). The emphasis that the GOS has placed on mechanised agriculture as opposed to subsistence production fits well with the creation of "peace villages", where war-displaced populations are moved to mechanised farming schemes to act as either producers or wage-labourers. These policies are justified by the GOS on the basis of promoting self-sufficiency among the war-displaced, and of promoting a policy of "Salaam min al Dakhal" or "peace from within". It is in the context of this kind of "development" agenda by the GOS, which has been accommodated by OLS agencies, that the use of humanitarian relief to promote self-reliance needs to be analysed.

### **7.3 Responding to the Displaced: Government Welfare Policy**

Since the late 1980s, GOS welfare policy for the war-displaced has combined the provision of relief with programmes to facilitate rural integration and resettlement, and the upgrading of informal urban settlements (GOS, 1988, September 22). This section describes the origins and rationale behind these strategies in the three case study areas.

#### **7.3.1 Ed Da'ein: Paired Villages**

GOS and UN policy toward the war-displaced in North Sudan was formulated in response to internal displacement from Bahr el-Ghazal in 1988. In South Darfur, the GOS, with the support of the UN, developed what was considered at the time to be an innovative response to internal displacement, by creating "paired villages" next to existing villages.

This initiative built on a response by OXFAM in March of 1988 to the presence of several thousand displaced Dinka at Sahafa, a crossing point on the Bahr el-Arab. Having crossed the river, which traditionally demarcates Dinka and Rizeigat territory, many displaced were unable to travel further northwards. As the rainy season approached, OXFAM recognised the vulnerability of this group both to flooding of the river and to violence from the Rizeigat. They subsequently negotiated with a neighbouring group to the north - the Maalia - to provide land for the displaced. The displaced were then settled in seven settlements, and supported by a consortium of NGOs, comprising OXFAM, SCF UK, and MSF Belgium. Upgrading water supplies

was seen to be imperative in order to avert water shortages for both the displaced and host communities.

By September, the paired village scheme had been incorporated into GOS policy for the resettlement of displaced in agriculturally productive, but labour deficit areas (GOS, 1988, September 22). By the end of 1988, both the UN and GOS had transformed what was originally a moderately successful response to a specific incident of displacement into a development philosophy; indeed, paired villages were presented as a model for managing internal displacement in Sudan. Thus, the November 1988 Emergency Appeal for Sudan stated:

This approach is not simply a relief programme but an innovative initiative in problem resolution and nation-building" (UN, 1988, November 10: paragraph 162).

The villages would help to preserve traditional rural life patterns (UN, 1988, November 10: paragraph 157). Acceptance of the Dinka by the host community was linked to improvements in water supply and other services, while the presence of relief agencies would help establish a relationship of parity between the host villages and displaced populations (UN, 1988, November 10: paragraph 155). In this respect, the provision of humanitarian aid was linked to conflict reduction.

In 1992, internal divisions within SPLA, and a government military offensive in Bahr el-Ghazal, led to another mass exodus of Dinka from Bahr el-Ghazal to South Darfur. At the request of local authorities, the UN intervened to evacuate approximately 40,000 people from the Bahr el-Arab (UNEP, 1992, June 8/9). On this occasion, the displaced were disbursed to camps next to Rizeigat as well as Maalia villages from a central transition camp in Abu Matariq, according to guidelines laid down by the Provincial Commissioner.

The critical difference between the 1988 and 1992 responses is that, whereas during the first influx the priority was to move the Dinka out of Rizeigat areas, in 1992 this was not seen to be a central issue in planning movements. Given the role of Rizeigat militia in displacement of the Dinka and in the massacre of 1987, the failure to incorporate mechanisms for protection of the war-displaced was a critical omission, and one that characterises OLS programmes in the Northern Sector today.

Underpinning both responses was an attempt to stem further migration to Kosti and Khartoum, and to provide the displaced with opportunities for income-generation and agricultural production. Subsequent relief policies have continued to encourage self-sufficiency through food support during the farming season, and through the provision of seeds and tools. However, the paired villages scheme has come under considerable strain since 1988 in both Rizeigat and Maalia areas. The capacity of the UN and NGOs to sustain even minimal services has been eroded by a reduction of relief supplies to the area, and by a declining resource base for humanitarian operations. The implications of this, and the extent to which the displaced have indeed achieved self-sufficiency as well as parity with host communities, is considered further below.

At present, there appears to be a shift in GOS policy towards paired villages, whereby the camp structure is to be dismantled and the Dinka fully integrated into the host community. Underpinning this shift seems to be an attempt to normalise the situation of the displaced. A Member of the State Parliament resident in Adila reported that:

When we met with the Secretary-General of the Supreme Peace Council, he said we were not to call them "displaced" any more. Why are people trying to make the displaced special? Government policy is for them to be integrated into the population. A policy was passed at a conference in 1993 when the Secretary-General of the Supreme Peace Council said that services had to be uniform [for] displaced and host communities (1996, April 4).

There is little indication, however, that paired villages will be dismantled. On the other hand, evidence from Wau suggests that normalisation may involve reducing people's entitlements to relief, but not necessarily expanding their access to land. Given the importance to the host community of cheap labour for agriculture, a reduction in relief needs to be assessed in relation to the state of the labour market in the province.

### **7.3.2 Wau: Peace Villages**

As government-held territory has expanded, government strategy has involved the relocation and settlement of war-displaced into "peace villages". Although settlement of war-displaced near their area of origin was an explicit objective of the 1989 OLS Plan of Action, "peace villages" involved the physical separation of the war-displaced from other kinds of populations.

The idea of peace villages has been developed most systematically since 1991, as part of the Government's idea of promoting "peace from within", and from the Comprehensive National Strategy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production (UNICEF, 1996, March). In Wau, the idea of peace villages stretches back to 1989, when the Governor of Bahr el-Ghazal stated that the displaced should be camped in:

...model peace villages...where security could be provided to enable these people to cultivate for themselves (GOS, 1989, November: 8).

Although proposals to establish five satellite camps in and around Wau were discussed in 1990 (Wagner, 1990, August 13), the idea of establishing distinct areas for the war-displaced did not become explicit government policy until 1992. Prior to this, war-displaced people were accommodated within Wau town, which was besieged on three sides by the SPLA. A distinction was made, however, between displaced people "with shelter" and those "without shelter"; those "with shelter" had relatives in the town with whom they could be accommodated, while those "without shelter" were mainly, but not exclusively, Dinka from the rural areas.

In 1991, weakened by their loss of bases in Ethiopia and by internal divisions, the SPLA began losing ground to the government in the South. In 1991, a new Governor was

appointed to the region; his arrival in Wau signalled a change in government military strategy, and government policy toward the relief programme in Wau.

In October, the new Governor informed those displaced "without shelter" to prepare for relocation, and not to expect further relief flights (Deng, 1991, October 10). In February 1992, the GOS launched a military offensive out of Wau; in April, those displaced "without shelter" were relocated to camps in Eastern Bank to the east of the town, and to Marial Ajith to the north.

The relocation of war-displaced populations in Wau to the camps was presented by the GOS as strategy to promote self-sufficiency and reduce dependency on external assistance. However, the decision was taken without consultation with the UN, NGOs, RRC, or the war-displaced themselves. The fact that these bodies in Wau were told about the plan by a military officer suggests that security concerns were also important. Security aspects of the proposed plan were not discussed with UN/NGOs on the grounds that security of the displaced was not their concern (Deng, 1991, October 10). In effect, the relocation of war-displaced to camps on the periphery of the town served to consolidate the security zone around Wau.

In the town, free distribution of food was stopped and replaced by food sold at subsidised prices. By separating those "without shelter" from the town population, the Governor effectively reduced the total displaced population qualifying for relief assistance from an estimated 80,000 (Wagner, 1990, February 20) to 5,000. As the focus of the relief operation moved from the town to the war-displaced camps, the visibility of OLS declined. Consequently, there is a perception in Wau today that the emergency ended in 1992 (Apai Bal, 1996, April 10). Since then, only those war-displaced located in the camps are included in OLS annual assessments. This is despite the fact that grain prices in Wau remain the highest in the country, and that nutritional surveys indicate that malnutrition rates in the town are high.

In addition to the two peace camps, the villages of Bagaria and Abushaka were also named as "peace villages". Being indigenous villages to which the original population would return, they are distinguished from the camps. Consequently, the distinction between "displaced camps" and "peace villages" has become confused, and the terms are often used interchangeably depending on the interests of different departments and agencies. For example, the Local Relief Committee refers to settlements for the displaced as "displaced camps" (Akon, 1996, April 12), while the local Ministry of Peace and Development refers to them as "peace villages" (Apai Bal, 1996, April 10). Similarly, WFP and UNICEF refer to the sites as "displaced camps"; UNDP, on the other hand, refers to them as "peace villages". The distinction is important because "displaced camps" are perceived as temporary, and therefore eligible for relief, while "peace villages" are targeted for rehabilitation.

The December 1992 needs assessment report is interesting in this respect. By December, the security zone around Wau had been extended to 30 kilometres, and the State authorities had reported their readiness to receive returnees from other parts of the country into 35 "peace villages" to be established along the railway (RRC, 1992, December 22/23). This arrangement was intended to promote self-reliance through

agricultural production, provide the returnees with basic needs, and help in securing the strategic railway line. Despite early concerns raised by the UN, the same 1992 report recommended that:

The plans to be prepared for establishing displaced camps (7) and peace villages (35) should be comprehensively approached and all concerned parties, including the UN, NGOs, and potential donors should participate in the planning process (RRC, 1992, December 22/23).

The report also recommended "...the prompt and adequate supply of seeds and tools to encourage farmers to cultivate more land" (RRC, 1992, December 22/23). This strategy has been supported by UNICEF through its Household Food Security programme, by WFP through food for agricultural work, and by UNDP through its Area Rehabilitation Schemes.

### **7.3.3 War-Displaced in Khartoum: Relocation and Resettlement**

Greater Khartoum has the single largest concentration of war-displaced in Sudan. In 1994, there were an estimated 800,000 people displaced by war living in the three cities which comprise the capital (UNCERO, 1996, January).

Since the late 1980s, government policy towards the war-displaced has involved the demolition of informal settlements, and their relocation to temporary camps on the outskirts of the city. This policy has been implemented with special vigour since February 1990 when, following a National Displaced Conference, the government announced its intention to clear the city of all unauthorised settlements; the displaced were to be relocated to temporary camps, to paired villages, or to agricultural production sites (see 7.3.4. below).

Relocations of war-displaced are forced, and have typically taken place without warning; they have also been accompanied by violence and the destruction of property. Since 1990, for example, some 39 people are reported to have been killed during the demolition of shelters (UNHCU, 1996, February). New locations have also not been prepared in advance, and have lacked water supply, sanitation, and housing. The distance of many camps from areas of employment also means that opportunities for income-generation are limited. As a result, high levels of malnutrition have been a feature of camp populations (UN, 1994, September 12).

The scale of the demolition and relocation programme is large. By May 1992, the Ministry of Housing reported that 105,569 families (over 600,000 people) had their homes demolished, and had been moved to newly-planned "peace cities", or to temporary displaced camps. Although the GOS suggested in 1995 that the programme of demolitions was 90% complete, demolition and forced relocation continues, with an average of 850 houses per month being destroyed (UNICEF, 1996, March).

The government's stated rationale for forced relocation of war-displaced populations is that illegal spontaneous settlements are an environmental hazard, that they create socio-



economic problems, and that they threaten the security of the general population (Eldin Ibrahim Bannaga, 1992). Relocations are also justified as part of an urban renewal programme, and a solution to the problem of urbanisation (Eldin Ibrahim Bannaga, 1992).

This rationale, however, does not account for the physical separation of the war-displaced, or legislation that distinguishes their legal and political rights from those of economic and drought migrants, and from the general population of Khartoum. The current legislative framework used by the GOS is an amendment to legislation introduced by the government of Sadiq el Mahadi. In 1987, the GOS drew a legal distinction between "squatters" and "displaced" persons. "Squatters" were defined as those persons who had arrived in the city before 1984, and who in theory had the right to settle in Khartoum. Three resettlement areas - known as "Dar es Salaam" or "peace cities" - were created in Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman to accommodate relocated squatters. In contrast, the "displaced" were defined as those persons who arrived after 1984. They were given no right of residence in Khartoum, no right to own land, and no right to construct permanent shelters. For this group, displaced camps - later referred to as "peace camps" - were created (Eldin Ibrahim Bannaga, 1992). In May 1990, Decree 941 of GOS redefined the "displaced" as those persons who had arrived in Khartoum after 1990.

#### **7.3.4 Moving the War-Displaced to Production Sites**

A major impact of war-induced displacement has been the creation of an expanded pool of labour in the North. Since 1989, one element of GOS policy has been the resettlement of war-displaced in "production" sites (RRC, 1989, September 12). In August 1990, the Council of Ministers, announced in Resolution 56 its determination to eliminate the problem of displacement within one year. This was to be accomplished both through repatriation of over 800,000 displaced to "areas of origin", and through their relocation to "areas of production" in Upper Nile, Bahr el-Ghazal, Darfur, Kordofan, and Central State (GOS, 1990). The stated rationale behind relocation was to reduce dependency on relief. The displaced were expected to work as labourers on production projects, including mechanised farming schemes.

The number of war-displaced people who have been repatriated or relocated to production sites outside Khartoum are unknown. However, organised relocations were recorded in 1990, 1991, and 1994 (UNHCU, 1996, February). Repatriation programmes have also appeared to move war-displaced to displaced camps, to peace villages in rural areas, or to nearby agricultural schemes with substantial labour requirements (UNEU, 1994).

Upper Nile State in particular has been a destination for relocated peoples. This is likely linked to the fact that, following the signing of a peace charter with the Shilluk, the GOS and the National Development Foundation have invested in the development of Upper Nile, and especially in the area of commercial agriculture.

The GOS has attempted to enlist support from the UN and international NGOs. In 1993, UNDP considered a proposal to support integrated rural development programmes in "Zones of Peace", or production sites which were to be designated as demilitarised areas, monitored by UN civilian agencies (UNDP, 1993). The proposal did not come to fruition, however.

More generally, the UN and INGOs have refused to cooperate with the GOS on such resettlement programmes, due to concerns over the voluntary nature of relocations, and concerns that such programmes were intended to utilise the war-displaced as a cheap agricultural labour force (Akram, 1992, March 23). In October 1991, for example, the GOS unsuccessfully tried to enlist donors to provide food for the transport of some 60,000 able-bodied men to participate in a harvest campaign, which was intended to alleviate labour shortages in the mechanised and irrigated agricultural sector in Upper Nile. Despite pressure from the COD, INGOs also refused to assist. One donor concluded that the project was not a voluntary relocation effort, but a "profit-making venture", and as such humanitarian relief should not be provided in support (US Embassy, 1991, October 22).

Again in June, 1995, the GOS, through the Supreme Council of Peace, sought to elicit the support of the UN and INGOs for the repatriation and relocation of war-displaced from Khartoum, to agricultural production sites (UNDP, 1995, June 7); UNHCR support was particular sought for the relocation of displaced to areas that had vacated by Ethiopian refugees. UNCERO responded with a set of conditions, agreed by an informal UN and INGO task force. These conditions included: that relocations were voluntary, that appropriate employment conditions and basic services would exist at each site, that labourers would be granted land if required, and that UN staff would be able to monitor the process of relocation (Jaeger, 1995, July 20). The GOS rejected these proposals, however, on the grounds that any attempt by the UN to impose conditionalities represented a violation of Sudanese sovereignty (Ibrahim, 1995, July 30).

### **7.3.5 Issues and Implications of GOS Policy**

The Review Team noted a number of issues concerning GOS policy toward the war-displaced. First, because GOS definitions of populations in need determine OLS coverage in the Northern Sector, only those displaced who live in the four formally recognised displaced camps in Greater Khartoum are included in OLS operations, while the larger population of war-displaced outside the camps are excluded. Similarly, war-displaced in Wau who have been relocated to camps have, since 1992, been the primary focus of OLS interventions; inputs to the rest of the town population lie outside of OLS, within the framework of standard UN country programmes. Consequently, the ability of OLS to deliver relief assistance "to all needy populations regardless of their locations" has effectively been compromised (GOK, 1994, March 23).

Second, the Review Team noted the highly problematic connection between GOS welfare policies concerning the war-displaced, and the pursuit of broader military agendas. As noted above, the creation of displaced camps on the outskirts of Wau enabled the government to secure its military position around the town; in 1990, the

government stated with regard to the move of war-displaced to agricultural production sites, that the "return of citizens to (those) sites will safeguard the Armed Forces itself" (GOS, 1990). This has extremely serious implications, in terms of the violation of another key principle of OLS, namely that "Humanitarian assistance shall benefit only civilians, and shall not be used by warring parties" (GOK, 1994, March 23).

Third, GOS welfare policy has been premised on the shift from relief to development, and the GOS has asserted that OLS should move from relief to rehabilitation and development. However, this has in some cases implied that development resources should be used to translate the war-displaced into an agricultural labour force, or to justify urban renewal programmes that involve forced relocation and destruction of property, within the context of the government's overall economic agenda. As will be seen further below, in many cases this agenda is in direct conflict with OLS principles, and has served at local level to undermine the long-term food security of the very populations OLS aims to assist.

#### **7.4 The UN Response to War-Displaced in Khartoum**

The continuing crisis among war-displaced populations in Greater Khartoum, the largest concentration of internally displaced people in Sudan, represents the greatest failure of OLS in the Northern Sector. The incorporation of the Khartoum displaced under OLS has had little observable beneficial impact. Indeed, in 1995, three years after their formal incorporation, the nutritional status of displaced populations in the Khartoum was reported to be deteriorating (Dysinger et. al, 1995, April/May).

The UN response to the needs of war-displaced in Khartoum has involved a three-pronged strategy: the provision of emergency relief assistance, technical support to the government for urban planning, and attempts to increase access and assistance. The latter two approaches are considered below, while the provision of emergency relief assistance is considered for OLS Northern Sector more generally in Section 7.5.

##### **7.4.1 Support for Urban Planning**

The UN's commitment to working with the GOS on the issue of the displaced in Khartoum was established in the 1988 GOS/UN Appeal, following the devastating floods of 1988. Since then, the UN has participated in various working groups with the government. In 1990, UNDP was a member of the Displaced Persons Working Group, chaired by COD (UNDP, 1990, May), which reviewed past strategies, including OLS 1. It has also participated in the Khartoum Relocation Working Group (1991), and the Squatter Settlement Abolishment Committee (1991).

More specifically, the UN had produced a number of proposals to assist the GOS with its programme of urban renewal, which it considers will have a positive impact on conditions for the displaced in Khartoum.

In May 1992, for example, the UN embarked on a process with the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities (MOHPU) to "...re-examine the problems and propose solutions which fall within the parameters of government policy" (Janvid, 1992, May 20: 2). This led to the Urban Displaced Squatter Settlement Project, which proposed USD 11.5 million in assistance for upgrading basic social services for the displaced and squatter settlements in Khartoum, and for enhancing the Ministry of Housing's planning capacity (UNDP, 1994).

In negotiating the UNDP/OPS Urban Displaced and Squatter Settlement Project, the UN attempted to build certain conditionalities into the project framework. These included monitoring and evaluation of relocation plans by the UN, the GOS, and members of the affected community; security of tenure to be guaranteed to relocated families; and NGOs to have the option to participate in the project. These conditionalities were agreed at a meeting between the Minister Housing and Public Utilities, the Dutch Minister for Development, and UNEU (Janvid, 1994, July 18). The Dutch Minister offered his government's partial funding of the project if the conditions were met, but cautioned that donor confidence in the project would be dependent on an end to demolitions of war-displaced settlements for a six month period. Two weeks later, however, demolitions restarted, shattering donor confidence (Painter, 1996, April 16).

Having failed to obtain donor funding for the Urban Displaced project, UNDP, in collaboration with UNHCS, developed a less ambitious proposal - Project Amal - which also comprised a service upgrading element, and a capacity-building component for the MOHPU (Kramel, et al., 1995). Importantly, neither of these project documents include an analysis of the legal framework governing rights to land and security of tenure for displaced as opposed to resident populations.

Together with the 1988 World Bank Urban Renewal Project (which was not implemented, however), these UN initiatives have been used by the GOS as an endorsement of its strategy for the displaced in Khartoum. Answering the UN Secretary General's report on humanitarian assistance in Sudan, the GOS noted:

The truth is that the government is in a process of implementing a policy aimed at improving these unauthorised settlements through a city planning programme. To that end, the Government sought the expertise of a European planner in order to provide those citizens with suitable housing...(GOS, 1994, November 23).

Presently, UNDP continues to work with the GOS on urban planning and renewal strategies, including the future of war-displaced settlements (Jaeger, 1996, April 17; UNDP, 1996).

#### **7.4.2 Attempts to Increase Access and Assistance**

In addition to UNDP's work, UNHCU has since 1992 sought to increase its monitoring capacity with regard to the war-displaced in Khartoum, and to advocate a reduction in forced relocations and an increase in humanitarian assistance.

Following the demolition of the Kurmuta settlement in December 1991, and the destruction of a UNICEF water project valued at USD 2 million, the UN began to assert itself more forcefully on the issue of the displaced. Although the UN was able to observe some demolitions, many were not reported ahead of time. The lack of notification and joint planning also meant the UN could provide relief assistance only after demolitions and relocations had occurred, which raised concerns over the program and cost effectiveness of such assistance (Akram, 1992, March 23). It was thus proposed that the UN use the leverage it had by virtue of its aid resources to influence GOS policy (UNEU, 1992, February).

In 1995, following demolitions in Angola which resulted in forced relocations to Wad El Bashier, UNHCU encouraged NGOs to withhold assistance until the GOS clarified its plans for the affected population. The UN's ability to influence NGOs was constrained, however, by its limited contributions to NGO resources; rather, the bulk of NGO resources was obtained direct from donors. NGOs also felt the UN had legitimacy to co-ordinate their policies, as a consequence of what NGOs perceived to be the UN's poor visibility and lack of coherent strategy with regard to the war-displaced (Cohn, 1996, March 25; Higgins, 1996, March 27).

The UN has also attempted to increase the access of international NGOs to the war-displaced, through OLS. This has been a particular focus, for example, of the missions of Ambassador Traxler of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. In 1994, a portion of the Khartoum war-displaced population were finally included in OLS, although UNICEF and WFP has been providing assistance throughout the early 1990s. At the same time, the war-displaced included in OLS assessments are only those peoples living in formally-recognised camps.

At present, the UN appears to have reached an impasse on the issue of war-displaced, which has prompted some international NGOs to act. In January 1995, eight INGOs wrote to the UNDP Resident Representative in Khartoum, expressing concern at continued relocations by the GOS, and calling for a revival of dialogue between the UN, NGOs, and donors on the issue (INGOs, 1995, January 24). Subsequently, an Internally Displaced Task Force was created under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Meeting (UN/INGOs, 1995, June 27).

Some common ground was achieved between the UN and INGOs as a result. However, the lack of UN progress in commissioning a study of government ministries responsible for the displaced led INGOs to seek funding from the European Union to commission their own study, the aim being to determine the main operational constraints faced by INGOs (Meadows, 1996). Further, the perceived lack of UN leadership has led INGOs to negotiate new projects directly with the MOHPU. Spearheaded by MSF France, for example, a group of INGOs have proposed an urban upgrading project, not dissimilar from the UNDP/UNHCS-funded proposal for Project Amal (Mohamed, 1996, March 27). A condition for the project is that war-displaced will be allocated plots of land with guaranteed security of tenure. Whether this condition will be met is as yet unclear.

### 7.4.3 UN Withdrawal from the Khartoum War-Displaced

Aside from the provision of emergency relief, the UN's approach to war-displaced in Khartoum appears to have been informed by two parallel approaches. First, the idea that urban renewal is necessary to improve the environment for the displaced, but that the demolitions and relocations of war-displaced peoples this involves should be pursued in as humane and rational a manner as possible. This idea has underpinned various attempts by UNDP in particular to build the capacity of relevant GOS departments to implement urban development programmes. These attempts, however, have been hampered by a general decline in development assistance; more importantly, they have been compromised by the continued demolition of settlements by the GOS, involving the destruction of basic infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, and schools. Also, the failure to impose conditions on the GOS regarding the cessation of demolitions has destroyed donor confidence in UN proposals to assist the government.

Others argue, however, that the internally displaced in Khartoum are not simply part of a problem of urban development. Certain populations of war-displaced - and especially the Dinka - have been identified as having suffered disproportionately from GOS policies as a result of the political dimensions of internal warfare. Evidence to support this is drawn from GOS legislation which differentiates the rights of different groups of people to settle in Khartoum, and from the pattern of demolitions and relocations; in the case of the Ishish Fellata squatter area of Khartoum, for example, people were moved "due to the economic and political base of the inhabitants" (UNHCU, 1996, February). Consequently, the UNHCU in particular has attempted to increase access to these populations, and to enhance the protection function of humanitarian assistance. This approach has been hampered, however, by a lack of organisational capacity, by the absence of a regular field presence of UNICEF and WFP for monitoring, and by the limited co-ordination function the UN is able to assert over NGOs working in the displaced camps. More broadly, it has been undermined by the failure of UN OLS agencies to collectively work to carve out a distinct neutral humanitarian space for OLS Northern sector responses to the needs of the war-displaced.

In the absence of a framework - both within Sudan and globally - to define solutions to the problem of internal displacement, the UN has effectively reached an impasse. This impasse has not been explicitly confronted; rather, there has been an implicit but steady withdrawal from, and down-grading of, the issue of war-displaced in Khartoum. For example, WFP has largely withdrawn from Khartoum, delegating responsibility for food aid to the international NGO ADRA. UNICEF no longer has an officer in place responsible for directly monitoring the situation of war-displaced, or for monitoring the implementation of projects UNICEF supports. The UNHCU post of Urban Displaced Officer has been filled in recent years by a UN volunteer who lacks the seniority required to engage the GOS, other UN agencies, or NGOs on the issue.

The Review Team is especially concerned at this apparent disengagement by the UN, in light of the persistence of some of the highest malnutrition rates among the Khartoum war-displaced as compared with other groups.

## **7.5 The Issue of Food Security in the Northern Sector**

### **7.5.1 UN Food Policy: A Relief-to-Development Model**

The initial response of the international community to the emergency in Sudan through OLS was a large infusion of food aid. With the creation of OLS II, the objectives of the programme were broadened. From that time forward, the role of food aid came to be seen increasingly as means to enable the displaced to become both productive and self-sufficient. Accordingly, there has been a reduction in the provision of emergency food aid, and a corresponding increase in food security and development-oriented programming in the Northern Sector.

In many disasters, it is assumed that once the acute phase of the emergency is over, people will diversify food sources through own production and other coping strategies. A reduction in food aid rations over time is therefore common practice. Such thinking has also been applied in the Northern Sector, and emergency food aid rations have been reduced. In Wau, for example, as early as 1990, the UN Field Adviser noted:

Wau should/could be in the process of weaning itself from a purely relief operation which is almost exclusively dependent on outside material resources (Wagner, 1990, February 20).

Similarly, the 1994 assessment in Ed Da'ein suggested that:

It is high time to reconsider general food distribution, food should be targeted at vulnerable groups (UNCERO, 1996, January).

This thinking has been formulated, however, in the face of evidence of a continued deterioration in basic nutritional indicators among war-displaced, and in a context where the war continues to displace civilian populations. In the 1994 assessment, for example, in the paragraph preceding the above statement, it is noted that an SCF (UK) nutritional survey found that the nutritional status among war-displaced populations was actually worse than in 1992, when a major food intervention was on-going (UNCERO, 1996, January).

Consequently, the Review Team had deep concerns as to whether the standard relief-to-development approach, adopted by OLS agencies in the Northern Sector, which involves a reduction in emergency food aid distributions and an emphasis on the creation of self-sufficiency, is appropriate in the Sudanese context. Further, the Review Team felt that the adoption of this approach is a result, in part, of a failure by OLS policy-makers to understand the chronic nature of the political crisis in Sudan and its impact on food security. In line with the linear model of the relief-development continuum, policy-makers have assumed that the long duration of the emergency implies that new opportunities must have emerged for more developmental responses. However, this approach ignores the persistence of the war and associated policies which continue to threaten the food security of the war-displaced, and which require continued humanitarian support.

## **7.5.2 The Creation of Food Insecurity: Examples from Case Study Areas**

### **7.5.2.1 Ed Da'ein Province**

The economy of Ed Da'ein Province is based on pastoralism and sedentary agriculture. Ed Da'ein is one of the major cash crop markets in South Darfur. The main cash crops are groundnuts and watermelon seeds, and the main food crop is millet.

As noted above, the emphasis of government policy concerning the war-displaced in Ed Da'ein has been on increasing their self-sufficiency through agricultural production, and integrating them into host communities. According to local authorities, the war-displaced have access to land for agricultural production in three ways.

First, land may be given outright to the war-displaced by the land owner, or by the native chiefs. Second, land is made available to the war-displaced for cultivation on a sharecropping basis, wherein the land owner provides food, cash, seeds, and tools, in exchange for a share of the harvest. Third, land owners may allocate one "mukhamas" of land to be cultivated by war-displaced for themselves, in exchange for their labour on a second "mukhamas" of land for the land owner.

Confusingly, all of these systems of land use are referred to by Rural Councils as "land allocation", although they imply different degrees of security of tenure and share of production for the war-displaced. Further, not all of these arrangements operate in practice as they are described by local authorities. In the case of sharecropping arrangements, for example, credit provided by land owners prior to cultivation often leads the war-displaced into a cycle of indebtedness (Interview with Adila Rural Council, 1996, April 4). In addition, the quality of land provided to the war-displaced for production is often of poor quality. The ability of war-displaced populations to obtain income from agricultural production has also been undermined by the late arrival of seed inputs and food aid to support consumption needs during the growing season.

The structural constraints thus created on agricultural production for the war-displaced are indicated by the comparative ability of farmers to repay seed credit provided by SCF (UK). For example, in 1995, while the host population in Ed Da'ein was able to repay 90% of seed costs provided on credit, the war-displaced were able to repay only 20% (Adam, 1996, April 3). Poor harvests in 1995 reduced the ability of war-displaced to obtain adequate food and agricultural inputs for cultivation in 1996, thereby forcing many people to rely increasingly on sharecropping arrangements.

In addition to sharecropping, the war-displaced use a range of other strategies to obtain a subsistence income. For example, wage labour to remove watermelon seeds is common. Although labour-intensive, the income that can be obtained from this work is low, especially when compared to the cost of food and other necessities. It takes at least two days to cover half a feddan of land, for which labourers receive LS 1000; in April 1995,



the price of one sack of dura was LS 22,000, and the cost of one jerrycan of water was a minimum of LS 20.

The collection and sale of fuelwood has also been an important strategy for the war-displaced. However, because of its environmental impact, Rural Councils in Ed Da'ein have introduced new prohibitions on wood cutting, thereby limiting the ability of the war-displaced to utilise this option. Domestic labour is another strategy. There is also a seasonal movement of the war-displaced back to Bahr el-Ghazal to fish, or to work as cattle herders.

The ability of war-displaced populations to achieve food security is undermined by their lack of secure land tenure, which creates dependence on wage labour, and leads to cycles of indebtedness to land owners. The war-displaced in Ed Da'ein, therefore, are being integrated into the economy of the Province not as independent subsistence producers, living in parity in paired settlements, but in effect as a cheap and tied agricultural labour force. Indeed, the Provincial Commissioner has noted that the war-displaced now account for 85% of the agricultural labour force of the province (Interview in Ed Da'ein, 1996, April 7). Agricultural wage labour among the war-displaced Dinka, which has traditionally formed only one part in a complex system of subsistence, has now become the central means of survival. The structural vulnerability that this implies contrasts sharply with the GOS and UN policies objectives to promote self-sufficiency. In addition, the reduction in general food rations that is an integral part of the self-sufficiency approach, combined with untimely disbursement of seeds and tools, further undermines the food security of the war-displaced.

#### **7.5.2.2 Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Wau**

Prior to the war, the economy of Bahr el-Ghazal region was dominated by the great cattle economy of the agro-pastoralist Dinka. An essential feature of the regional economy was the articulation of the Dinka cattle economy with other production systems and with trading networks, that combined to form a complex system of economic interdependence (Johnson, 1994).

The economic policies of successive governments in Bahr el-Ghazal have centred on a fundamental restructuring of the agro-pastoral subsistence economy of the region. The area was considered to be an economically under-developed and commercially unexploited resource base. The presence in the region of oil and water, as well as land, also became increasingly attractive to both government and commercial interests; in the 1970's and 1980's, international capital was obtained for oil extraction, and investments were made in large-scale agricultural and livestock production schemes, such as the Aweil rice project, commercial ranching at Marial Bai, and the Ajak, Amenheduol, and Aliab dura schemes.

Aside from political objectives, it has been suggested that the war in Bahr el-Ghazal has been used by successive government to pursue economic policies for the region (Keen, 1992, November), including the expansion of the mechanised farming sector. The decimation of Dinka cattle herds by government-supported militia has served both to

provide a source of wealth to these militia, and to disrupt the basis for the agro-pastoral subsistence economy. The destruction of the subsistence economy has been further advanced through fuelling inter-tribal conflict, which has in turn disrupted traditional trading networks and economic relations of interdependence between the Dinka and other groups.

Having been rendered destitute by the war, displaced Dinka have, in effect, become a large pool of wage labourers that can be exploited for the commercial development of the area, in particular on mechanised agricultural schemes. As part of this process, displaced agro-pastoralists are encouraged to become sedentary agriculturists, and to change their traditional production and cultural practices, including through developmental programmes.

The appropriateness of OLS programming for the war-displaced in Wau must be seen within this broader economic context. It must also be seen in relation to the conduct of the war. Detailed research, for example, has established a strong correlation since the 1980's between population displacements and militia raiding, and this continues to be the case in Wau today. Nevertheless, displacement and food insecurity have been viewed as transitory problems, and concern has been expressed by UN OLS agencies that the provision of relief aid may be creating "aid dependence", and hence undermining the sustainability of subsistence livelihoods. However, this thinking represents a misconception of the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity in the region as a result of the war. Between January and April 1996, for example, there was an influx of between 1,200 and 2,300 newly displaced into Wau, in the wake of Murahaliin raids that brought 5,000 cattle to Wau for sale. In Ajiep, raiding by Kerubino's troops and the Murahaliin have frequently coincided with the harvest season. People have survived, but only "through partial displacement and an increased reliance on wild foods" (WFP, 1996, January: 106).

The reduction in food rations assumes that the war-displaced have other means of securing their food needs. The case of Ajiep suggests that the dispersal of household members through "partial displacement", or the temporary refuge in displaced camps around Wau, is one such survival strategy employed by rural populations. Those household members least able to fend for themselves may go to the camps. Many of the more permanent sections of the camp populations are the old, the infirm, women, and children. Women in particular often stay in the camps to earn income through the sale of wood, grass, and crafts, while men will return to rural areas to farm in the cultivation period. Income earned by the women may then be used to support farming activities (Watson, 1996, April 9). Other income sources include domestic and farm labour. In 1992, it was reported that prostitution among war-displaced women was also increasing as a "coping strategy" (Anderson, 1992, October 14). The rise of prostitution is indicative of the fact that coping strategies of the war-displaced are barely sufficient to ensure survival. A woman interviewed by the Review Team in Marial Ajith camp reported going several days without food in order that her children could eat.

Under conditions of extreme stress, people are rarely passive. The ability of people to reduce their vulnerability and survive conditions of extreme stress is well documented in the literature on coping strategies. The employment of such strategies, however, can

involve permanent losses, such as the sale of physical assets. Around Wau, wood cutting and charcoal making are causing environmental damage (Watson, 1996, April 9). Involvement in prostitution does not indicate "coping", but one of the few opportunities for women (and their children) to survive in a context where the range of options is severely limited. Hence, the idea that "relief operations cannot release people from their suffering" (RRC et al., 1993, September 22/24), and that the reduction of food aid will reduce their aid dependency, is deeply flawed. In the view of the Review Team, this approach is likely to drive the war-displaced into a dependence on unsustainable and inappropriate economic relations, which has profound implications for their future food security.

The war has also created a distinct economy in Wau town. The formal economy of the region has collapsed, although the government has managed to keep some resources flowing into the town to support civil and military administrations. Within the town, most land has been given over to agricultural production during the growing season. People's ability to obtain a subsistence income from this production has been undermined, however, by a cartel of traders and military officers who have combined to control the food market. With a monopoly on trucks and military protection, the cartel has been able to regulate the import of food to Wau from the Bagari loop to the west, North Sudan, and the Central African Republic (Wagner, 1990, February 20; Deng, 1990, July 4). Seasonally, food prices are subject to the manipulation of the cartel, and since 1989 they have consistently been among the highest in Sudan. Importantly, people living in the town do not have access to OLS food aid. They are therefore exposed to the direct effects of high food prices in the market. Nutritional surveys conducted in May and November of 1995 indicate a lower level of malnutrition among people in the camps compared with those in three health centres in Wau town (Ali Elzein, 1995).

Since 1990, the GOS and UN policies have sought to promote self-reliance among the war-displaced in Wau (Wagner, 1990, February 20). Since 1992, following the widening of the security zone around Wau and the formation of peace villages, this has increasingly taken the form supporting agricultural activities, through both food and non-food inputs. In October 1992, WFP reported that, while it would be a mistake to think that the war-displaced do not need food aid, they were nevertheless on the path to self-reliance (Anderson, 1992, October 14). The fact that after four years, the war-displaced are no nearer self-reliance raises questions over the effectiveness of this policy. Few, if any, successful harvests have been reported in the years since 1989 (Deng, 1991, October 10; Deng, 1992, January; RRC et. al, 1993, September 22/24). Delays in delivery of inputs such as seeds, as well as inappropriate choice of seeds, has been a consistent problem noted since 1990 by every annual assessment (Wagner, 1990, February 20; RRC et al., 1993 September 23/24; Gichigi, 1996, January/ February). Significantly, what is given less prominence in OLS needs assessments are the non-technical constraints to production, such as access to land, and security of production and tenure. Regarding land, one Sudanese aid worker noted:

Land which is in secure zones is not enough to support people all year round. The word "relief" should continue until there is enough land (Wau, 1996, April 11).

### **7.5.2.3 Khartoum**

As noted earlier, the war-displaced in Khartoum have been vulnerable to relocation to agricultural production sites, to effectively act as a wage labour force. More generally, the lack of secure land tenure for the Khartoum displaced undermines their ability to achieve food security in the long-term. In the short-term, a correlation has been shown between demolitions of informal settlements around the three cities, and food insecurity:

...demolitions have taken place since 1991 without stop and the malnutrition rates have shown a steady trend upwards since then (Dysinger et al., 1995, April/May: 20)

Such malnutrition rates include, in Jebel Awlia, 34% of the surveyed population below 80% weight-for-height in September 1994; and in el Salaam, 46% of the population below 80% weight-for-height (Dysinger et. al, 1995, April/May). These figures are very alarming.

### **7.5.3 Implications of Reduced Rations**

What the proceeding analysis suggests is that the aim of achieving food security for the war-displaced in the Northern Sector has been premised on assumptions that do not take into account the actual constraints facing these populations. The image of the displaced as idly waiting for food aid to arrive stands in sharp contrast to their engagement in activities that place them in vulnerable and often risky positions in order to survive. Such "coping strategies" among the war-displaced do not form the basis for sustainable development, as is commonly assumed.

Nevertheless, the reduction in general food aid rations in the Northern Sector has been based on assumption that the emergency is over in government-held areas such as Khartoum, Ed Da'ein, and Wau. Donors are also sceptical about the continued need to provide substantial food aid, arguing that Sudan produces sufficient food surplus in most years to sustain its own population (Esmieu, 1996, March 30).

However, the nutritional status of the populations in government-held areas has not shown significant improvement, and in some cases has actually deteriorated in recent years. What this suggests is that for many of the displaced the emergency is not over. Rather, the war-displaced remain subject to military insecurity, and to insecurity in entitlements to land and employment. As one relief official in Wau explained to the Review Team:

WFPs policy is OK if there is peace and no further influxes. But the war continues. Destabilisation is intensifying in some areas. To move away from relief to rehabilitation will mean people are left without assistance." (Wau, 1996, April).

Not only have food rations been reduced, but food aid has been increasingly repackaged as agricultural support or food-for-work (Watson, 1996, April 9; Fardino, 1996, April 11). Rather than promoting food security, however, the reduction in food aid rations appears to be forcing displaced populations to intensify other survival strategies. At the same time, analysis of food insecurity in the case study areas suggests that the rate at which rations have been reduced has outpaced the rate at which alternative sources of food and income-generation have expanded.

#### **7.5.4 Targeting and Distributions**

Pressure on the war-displaced to achieve self-sufficiency is thus taking place in a context where food security is being undermined, and where non-relief based strategies for survival are being eroded, as evidenced in continuing high rates of malnutrition. In such a context, targeting of food aid necessarily becomes more problematic. It is interesting, therefore, to review how targeting mechanisms are being developed. The food aid policy of the NGO ADRA, now the lead agency for food aid in Khartoum, is instructive in this regard.

In 1995, ADRA undertook a review of a three year food aid programme in the Khartoum displaced camps. In the context of declining food aid, and the need to make less food go further, the report recommended better targeting and "incentives to graduate the malnourished child quicker and prevent future faltering" (Dysinger et. al, 1995, April/May: 25). Family dry rations sizes were reported to be generous, based on a family of seven people. There was concern that dry rations had become "an incentive to keep a child malnourished" (Pearson, 1995, May: 12). The proposed solution, which has subsequently been adopted as policy, was to reduce household food rations and place more emphasis on wet feeding.

Behind this policy is a widely-held view that people were manipulating the relief system at the expense of children:

We are refusing additional dry rations for supplementary feeding, because we felt that people were deliberately keeping their children malnourished in order to maintain access to rations (Teller & Staddon, 1996, April 1).

The premise for the new policy is that this problem can be resolved by providing incentives to parents to maintain the nutritional status of children. However, if the child continues to lose weight, then rations are withheld from children and parents.

This punitive approach to the issue of malnutrition raises a number of issues. First, it fails to recognise the contribution of other factors to malnutrition. As the ADRA report itself notes, lack of food is not the only cause; illiteracy and ill-health can also be factors in malnutrition. Illiteracy among mothers in Jebel Awlia displaced camp, for example, was found to be 88% (Pearson, 1995, May). Further, the approach fails to acknowledge the depth of the crisis facing the Khartoum war-displaced, which forces parents to utilise

extreme measures as strategies for survival. For example, no surveys have been conducted among the war-displaced to determine why people are selling food, nor do household surveys form part of the joint assessment. As one aid worker commented to the Review Team:

The UN never opens the door of the displaced to see what is really happening (1996, April).

The notion that war-displaced abuse relief also assumes that they are aware of their entitlements to relief, and that they actually receive these entitlements. However, this has not always been the case. For example, a report on Al Salaam describes how lack of experience, "petty differences", and the lack of clearly defined roles of the COD and the four Sudanese NGOs responsible for the camp led to duplication of ration cards, meaning that the camp population did not know which cards were correct (CARE, 1992, May 5). Further, food aid distributions are reported to be random; they are also reported to be failing to take into consideration the size of the family; as a "coping strategy", larger families consequently attempted to register to receive food aid more than once (CARE, 1992, May 5: Annex 1). The report also notes that police providing security for the distribution were seen collecting jerry-cans and soap, with the permission of the site manager (CARE, 1992, May 5).

In Ed Da'ain, SRC has been assigned by the Local Relief Committee to distribute food, which is usually delivered to the camp by SCF (UK). The diversion of food aid supplies was reported to have become institutionalised, with complex alliances having been formed between merchants, politicians, rural authorities and the Dinka hierarchy; one confidential source informed the Review Team, for example, that he estimates "leakage" at approximately 25%. This, combined with the fact that 20% of food aid needs for the war-displaced have been allocated to host communities, suggests that the war-displaced actually receive only around half of their food needs. Efforts to introduce ration cards to overcome diversion of food aid have been rejected in three camps, apparently because these efforts were unacceptable to the local chiefs.

In Wau, where distributions until this year were conducted by the Local Relief Committee, the displaced have their own view of the effects of the reduction in food aid:

...when the Kawaja came here, he said 'we have to care for the poor'. When we moved to the camp, the government and the NGOs did not continue to help us. Hunger is killing the strong, so the poor have not future. Let us go back to the old system, so the poor may survive.

It is important to note the reduction in food aid rations yields benefits to the commercial agricultural sector. The limited amount of food aid available during the agricultural season, combined with limited access to land and farm inputs, has forced the war-displaced to become increasingly dependent on local labour markets. In some cases, there is an explicit linkage made between the reduction of food aid and the labour potential of the war-displaced. The Executive Manager of the NGO Muwafaq, for example, complained that it was difficult to get the displaced to work on their agricultural projects, and suggested that food should not be distributed during the period

of land preparation and harvesting, on the grounds that people will not want to work if they receive food (El Din A. Bary, 1996, April 3).

In both Wau and Ed Da'ein, war-displaced people noted the lack of mechanisms available to them to raise concerns about distribution mechanisms:

We don't complain because we would be told it is none of our business, and that food will be withheld and we will die of hunger.

We cannot complain that there is cheating on food because we would be arrested.

In neither case did war-displaced people feel there were opportunities to raise their concerns directly with the UN, either because they perceived monitors to be unsympathetic as a result of their involvement in the organisation of distributions (Wau), or because they claimed that at no point had the UN systematically sought their views on distribution systems (Ed Da'ein). Moreover, the displaced are acutely aware of the particular set of local power relations that have emerged around the relief system, and their own place within this system:

The main issue is the stoppage of food rations. We did not complain. Now the rain is falling and we have no seeds and no food. We will agree to anything you say (Interview in Wau, 1996, April 10).

## **7.6 Information and Analysis in the Northern Sector**

### **7.6.1 Lack of Analysis of the War Environment**

Lack of information has frequently been cited as a constraint by UN agencies and NGOs in responding to the needs of the war-displaced. While this may be true, the above discussion also suggests that OLS programmes reflect a deficit of analysis as much as a deficit of information. As a result, OLS operations show a striking lack of innovation in response to working in a conflict environment. Indeed, with the shift in emphasis to development, some programmes that were in place prior to the war as part of UN country programming have been resumed as though the war did not exist; for example, UNICEF's water programme in Bahr el-Ghazal, and UNICEF's project for women's home gardens.

In a complex political emergency, the quality of the relationship between humanitarian agencies and affected populations is determined by quality of access and the extent to which a "humanitarian space" has been created (Minear & Weiss, 1995). In the Northern Sector, although access for international humanitarian agencies has increased geographically, the actual ability of war-affected populations to be in direct contact with these agencies has declined. Not only do state security concerns restrict access to local communities, but resources are increasingly channelled through local organisations that have not sufficiently demonstrated their autonomy from governmental and political

agendas in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The crisis in resources and management affecting government counterparts is also important here.

It in this context that development activities have been resumed. However, the resumption of developmental activities has not responded to the specific new environment the war has created. Indeed, the only acknowledgements of this new environment that the Review Team is aware of within UNICEF are linked to more global concerns such as Children in Exceptionally Difficult Circumstances. Despite the fact that OLS resources account for a substantial amount of UNICEF's programme in the Northern Sector, the 1996 UNICEF Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Sudan devotes only 14 pages to the effects of war and displacement (UNICEF, 1996).

## **7.6.2 Assessments, Monitoring, and Evaluation**

The lack of analysis among UN OLS agencies of the environment for developmental programming created by the war is, in part, a function of the scope and quality of OLS information. Although the issue of assessments, monitoring, and evaluation has been dealt with elsewhere, this section considers information with specific regard to the Northern Sector.

### **7.6.2.1 Access and Information**

The poor quality of information on war-displaced populations in the Northern Sector is a reflection of the poor quality of access available to UN agencies and NGOs.

Since 1991, the GOS has permitted only two major socio-economic surveys of displaced and squatter settlements in Khartoum, in 1992 by CARE and in 1994 by OXFAM. Both surveys were co-ordinated by the National Population Committee (NPC). Only the CARE survey included some displaced camps, however - Al Salaam Omdurman and Jebel Awlia - and was aimed primarily at establishing a new registration system for the camps through a head count. The OXFAM survey of basic needs was conducted in the Dar es Salaam resettlement sites in Omdurman, Khartoum, and East Nile provinces. Since the NPC is not a research institution, both studies have been criticised for their methodological weaknesses (May et al., 1995, March). Importantly, the CARE survey noted that the unreliability of information on displacement all over the country means that each NGO conducts registration for the section of the population it alone is concerned with; as a result, there is an unequal distribution of ration cards (CARE, 1992, May 5).

### **7.6.2.2 Assessments**

As noted earlier, assessments conducted by OLS in the Northern Sector do not themselves collect primary data, but rely mainly on government sources to determine the size, status, and needs of displaced populations. In this way, considerable control is



exercised by Government in the definition of OLS responses to the needs of the displaced.

The UNHCU, together with the RRC, is responsible for co-ordinating the joint OLS assessments. These joint assessments are not systematically presented as OLS assessments, either at field level or in subsequent reports. The lack of clarity regarding the status of assessments contributes to the poor visibility of OLS in the case study areas. Hence, an important opportunity for dialogue with local authorities and beneficiaries concerning the identity and purpose of OLS is lost each year.

In Khartoum, the number of agencies participating in assessments grew from nine in 1993 to 17 in 1995. In Wau, some 15 people from 10 different agencies were involved in the 1995 assessment (RRC et al., 1995, October 1-8). Increased participation of agencies has not increased the quality of the assessments, however; for example, the degree of beneficiary participation remains extremely limited. Consequently, the experience and priorities of beneficiaries is not reflected in assessment reports, nor do they build on an analysis of the impact of interventions in previous years. Importantly, this means that critical changes in policy, such as the reduction in food rations, or use of food for agricultural support, cannot be properly understood. In Ed Da'ein, for example, displaced people reported that their views on the effectiveness of distribution mechanisms had never been sought prior to the visit of the Review Team. In Khartoum, a recent report concluded that:

The Khartoum displaced must be the least consulted group in the history of humanitarian aid (Meadows, 1996).

Further, in both Ed Da'ein and Wau, there was a strong perception that those undertaking assessments arrived with a predetermined set of assumptions about what was required. As the perception of the emergency has changed, the focus of assessments has also shifted from relief needs to rehabilitation and basic services. Thus, in Ed Da'ein one Rural Council reported that:

In 1994 The Committee of the Displaced came with some organisations and said that relief for the displaced would stop. But then they saw the conditions in the camps, and so relief was extended for 1994. But it was emphasised that people must become self-sufficient in 1995 (Fardos, Rural Council).

Similarly in Wau, the Local Relief Committee chairman reported that assessments of needs of newly displaced people were not undertaken, because there were no additional resources likely to be available.

The Review Team was struck by the fact that assessment reports comprise little more than a description of services and organisations in the displaced camps, and do not provide a clear plan of action for different sites. They also do not assess the capacities and constraints facing different agencies involved in humanitarian response. Indeed, the Review Team felt that assessments in the Northern Sector are limited to an analysis of material needs, rather than the mechanisms by which a humanitarian programme could attempt to fulfil these needs. Consequently, there is no distinction made between the

material content of relief operations, and the processes which determine its humanitarian impact and effectiveness.

The quality of assessment reports is also uneven. The Review Team found it unsatisfactory, for example, to read statements about the situation in Ed Da'ein such as the following in the 1995 assessment report:

...there were no medicines whatsoever in the camps. Generally the displaced looked very healthy, and there was no serious outbreak of disease, except in El Ghora where around 10 women died after giving birth. There is no midwife in the camps and therefore it could result in poor health.

This type of statement, unsubstantiated by analysis of data available on health centre utilisation and morbidity patterns, or by rapid epidemiological surveys, does not provide sufficient empirical information to determine planning priorities, nor does it enable even a basic evaluation of existing health and nutritional status. Similar broad and unsubstantiated comments are found for other sectors in other years, and particularly in recommendations. Thus, the 1994 Ed Da'ein assessment concludes that there is a need to "find a long-term solution to the drug supply problems" without defining either what the problem is, or what strategies might be feasible. As a result, the same recommendations are repeated year after year, without reference to why earlier recommendations were not implemented.

The translation of assessed needs into allocation of resources is also opaque. Although field-based staff participate in the assessments, they do not participate in report writing. Poor information flows between field level and Khartoum, where final allocations are decided, results in local staff being confused as to how decisions regarding allocations are made. For example, the WFP monitor in Wau recommended a half ration for the three month cultivation period; this was subsequently amended in Khartoum to a quarter ration for six months without explanation to local WFP staff (Watson, 1996, April 9). Similarly, international NGOs reported little correlation between assessments and the allocation of drugs to displaced camps in Khartoum (Higgins, 1996, March 27). Local authorities also do not receive copies of assessment reports, again reducing the visibility of OLS and weakening its links with key local actors.

Substantial weaknesses in the assessment process combined to give an impression to the Review Team of an annual ritual of unclear function, delinked from both evaluation of previous interventions, and on-going operations and monitoring.

### **7.6.2.3 Monitoring**

An innovation with regard to monitoring activities in the case study areas has been the re-establishment of UNICEF field offices. These are present in Wau and Ed Da'ein. The former was established in May 1993; the latter was only established in 1996 prior to the arrival of the Review Team.

With the opening of a sub-office in Wau, UNICEF has greatly expanded its activities. This expansion means that the target population of UNICEF is much wider than the war-displaced, and includes general war-affected populations. However, the expansion of UNICEF activities has not been matched with improved monitoring. For example, it was reported that supplies to Aweil were not accounted for as "it has been difficult to travel to Aweil for the whole of 1995" (Wani, 1995).

WFP has both an international monitor and a national monitor based in Wau. The international monitor, appointed in 1994, reported that he felt under-utilised, particularly since there had been no distribution in Wau since September 1995. He was therefore unclear what his role should be during the dry season. Also, if a contract is signed with the Sudanese Red Crescent to distribute food aid, then the position of international monitor is likely to be closed, and instead a "roving" monitor will visit Wau regularly. Although likely to be more cost-efficient, the Review Team was concerned that WFP provides adequate monitoring and support to its contracting NGOs:

The presence and quality of international monitors is very important to us; they provide us with protection and enable us to resist the political pressures we face (Fardino, 1996, April 11).

In Ed Da'ein, a WFP monitor reportedly visits every 45 days during the period when relief aid is distributed. However, none of the displaced communities were aware that WFP monitors were sometimes present at distributions, nor were WFP aware of some of the problems reported by beneficiaries and by SCF (UK) (Adly & Bailey, 1996, April 20). SCF (UK) also felt that it was undersupported by WFP in its negotiations with the local authorities regarding food aid and food security issues.

In Khartoum, there is a WFP officer responsible for monitoring the food situation in the displaced camps, although his time is split with other duties. However, despite the continuing deterioration in the nutritional status of the displaced in Khartoum, WFP has virtually disappeared from the Khartoum displaced camps as an operational agency. In late 1995 responsibility for co-ordinating food aid interventions was effectively delegated by WFP to ADRA, an international NGO. This followed from ADRA's predominant role in channelling USAID food aid into Sudan; ADRA's experience in establishing monitoring mechanisms to account for USAID food were seen to be better than the monitoring capacity of WFP (Fadl, 1996, April 16). At the time, ADRA had been proactive in establishing a dialogue with COVA, the KSRC, and RRC concerning food and supplementary feeding policies in the displaced camps. WFP reportedly did not participate in these discussions, despite the fact that in 1994 Khartoum was the primary focus of its operations. When the OLS assessment mission in 1995 revealed that ADRA had sufficient food in the pipeline to cover the needs of the officially-recognised camps, the WFP Director decided to handover responsibility for monitoring of the relatively small WFP allocation of food aid to ADRA.

Significantly, however, ADRA had no written contractual obligations to follow distributions as specified by the OLS assessment. It was simply assumed that ADRA would follow the same procedures for determining distributions as WFP (Belah, 1996, April 1). To the knowledge of the Review Team, the only written contract between WFP

and ADRA with respect to the Khartoum displaced relates to the use of WFP supplies of materials to make Premix (Fadl, 16 April 1996).

The lack of a nutritionist working within WFP further compromises its monitoring capacity. In Wau, WFP depends on information from the UNICEF nutritionist; in Ed Da'ien, it is dependent on SCF (UK) to provide information on nutrition and the food economy. In Khartoum, UN OLS agencies depend on NGOs such as ADRA and SCC to monitor the nutritional status of populations that the UN supports through rations and supplementary feeding. The dependence on information that is generated outside of OLS funding and contractual frameworks is problematic for the ability of OLS Northern Sector to fulfil its monitoring obligations, and to ensure the appropriate allocation and use of food resources.

Given the size of the population and scale of resources allocated by OLS to displaced populations in Khartoum - estimated at USD 12 million in 1994 (Painter, 1996, March 26) -the lack of UN capacity to monitor the impact of its programmes was of concern to the Review Team. The Review Team was also concerned by WFP's effective withdrawal from the Khartoum displaced camps, and from future negotiations over food policy in Khartoum, especially given the current framework guiding ADRA's interventions in the displaced camps, considered further below.

## **7.7 The Implications of Contractual Obligations and Standards for OLS Northern Sector Programming**

The establishment of a clear contractual framework is crucial to ensuring the accountability of UN partners, and to ensuring that operational modalities of partners are in line with OLS principles and UN standards. However, as described in Chapter 4, the definition of contracts within OLS remains poorly developed. The implications of this for programme activities are considered in this section.

In general, there are no particular contractual obligations for NGOs receiving OLS as opposed to non-OLS resources, or for NGOs working in OLS as opposed to non-OLS areas. For example, GOAL reported that:

We have a three year contract with UNICEF [to handle essential drugs]. Since the Khartoum displaced came under OLS there has been no amendment to that contract which has been in place since 1993. I hadn't thought about how transparency, neutrality, and accountability fit into our programming (Higgins, 1996, March 27).

The lack of attention to humanitarian principles, and to monitoring the capacity of NGOs, is illustrated by the kind of contractual situations that presently exist in the Northern Sector. An example from Ed Da'ien is revealing in this regard.

SCF (UK) is contracted by WFP to store and deliver food aid to the displaced camps in Ed Da'ien. The contract states that SCF (UK) "will be responsible for the receipt [of

food aid] and the related secondary transport, monitoring and distribution" (WFP, 1995, June 6). Following the decision of the High Committee for the Displaced to make the Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC) responsible for camp management, however, SRC has been nominated to carry out distributions on the ground. SRC is not paid by WFP for its work, which is done by volunteers. Rather, it has received small grants from the Commissioner and from SCF (UK) over the years, but these have now ceased. The SRC office in Ed Da'ein lacks its own transport capacity to monitor the work of its volunteers in the ten camps. By 1996, the SRC funding situation had deteriorated to the point that it was unable to field its monitors, and to sustain its role in management of the camps (Idris Hassan, 1996, April 3).

In this case, WFP does not have the contractual framework to ensure the accountability of its implementing partner. Different interpretations of SCF (UK)'s role in distributions persist, and the decision of the Commissioner that SRC should play this role make it unclear who should be responsible. In addition, although SRC is responsible for managing valuable WFP resources at the field level, it does not have the financial resources to enable it to properly fulfil this task. The view of WFP is that if the Commissioner wishes SRC to participate in the distributions, then he should pay them to do so (Adly, 1996, April 20). However, this stance fails to deal with situation as it exists. Because of the lack of clarity in the provision of overhead costs, it is unclear whether SCF (UK) was also being paid to physically conduct the distribution in the camps - if so, then a share of this overhead should be allocated to SRC automatically. If not, as SCF (UK) understand, then appropriate arrangements should be made to ensure that the NGO actually responsible for distributions has the resources to fulfil its responsibilities.

This example from Ed Da'ein also illustrates a more general concern; namely, the limited capacity of the UN to monitor the performance of its NGO partners. While the decentralisation of UNICEF's operations in Wau, for example, has helped to address this issue, UNICEF's limited capacity in Khartoum and Ed Da'ein means that NGOs do not benefit from monitoring visits that ensure technical standards are in place. Thus:

There is no co-ordination to see who is doing the work, it is not organised around monitoring. UNICEF has not monitored our work on the ground, they only look at our reports. If they are not doing it for us, maybe they are not doing it for others and therefore are not in a position to see what impact they are having and therefore what need to be changed (Higgins, 1996, March 27).

The lack of a clear monitoring and co-ordination framework contributes to uneven standards in the implementation and coverage of OLS programmes. The importance of the UN in establishing a rigorous regulatory framework is heightened by the fact that it is NGOs, including those receiving OLS resources, who are primarily responsible for delivering services to the war-displaced. In the absence of government support for these services, the UN has an obligation to ensure that these services conform to agreed minimum international standards.

The absence of such standards is having serious implications for people's health. Different health centres provide different services, depending on the capacity of

individual agencies, their interests, and the interests of donors. In Wad el Bashir, for example, MSF France and the Fellowship for African Relief (FAR) share the aim of reducing high levels of malnutrition, as reported by ADRA. However, neither agency can meet the needs of the whole population, and they run different programmes. While FAR provides some dry rations and an MCH service, MSF France provides neither. In the feeding centres, there appears to be no clear admission and discharge criteria corresponding to national or international standards.

With regard to health coverage, Jebel Awlia displaced camp in Khartoum has 11 clinics for 14,000 people - or one clinic for every 1,272 families; in Wad el Bashir, however, there is only one clinic for every 2,938 families (Mohamed El Badawi, 1995, April). The absence of the Ministry of Health or UNICEF from the camps also means that no single agency takes responsibility for the co-ordination of health services. This has resulted in some serious problems for EPI coverage, reported to be less than 30%. Given the emphasis that UNICEF places on EPI, the problems of EPI coverage in the displaced camps in Khartoum, in close to the UNICEF national office, is disturbing. Similarly in Ed Da'ein, while UNICEF has provided essential drugs over a period of several years, and has had an EPI programme in the Province, no data is available showing the access of the displaced to either service.

In general, the Review Team felt that, while UN agencies in the Northern Sector are severely constrained in their choice of implementing partners, little effort has been made to develop mechanisms to ensure compliance with accepted professional and humanitarian standards, or to ensure that partners have sufficient resources to fulfil their operational responsibilities. Indeed, the Review Team felt that it was difficult to escape the conclusion that NGOs are seen primarily as means of distributing material supplies, rather than as part of an integrated humanitarian system, and able to use OLS supplies to realise clear policy objectives.

## **7.8 Public Welfare Provision in the Midst of Structural Crisis**

In addition to a humanitarian crisis, Sudan is also experiencing an economic and financial crisis. The GOS is implementing financial stabilisation and structural adjustment policies; unusually it is doing so in the absence of structural support from international financial institutions. Since the early 1980s, Sudan has been plagued by strongly fluctuating growth rates, high inflation, and severe balance of payments support problems. As a result, the economy has turned increasingly inward, with the share of exports of GDP at less than 8%, one of the lowest among developing countries in the world. By the end of 1994, Sudan's external debt stood at USD 18 billion, the equivalent of USD 800/capita. Attempts to reform the economy through enhanced agricultural production, liberal marketing arrangements, and greater privatisation, have had little success. By the mid-1990s, there was increasing recognition that reforms could only be successful if they received appropriate support from regional and international financial organisations, particularly in minimising the negative social impact of stabilisation policies.

However, the capacity of the GOS to attract development assistance has declined sharply. During the period 1980 to 1987, net annual official aid amounted to USD 40.4/capita, representing 63% of domestic investment. Capital inflow peaked in 1985 at USD 1,907 million, falling to USD 127 million in fiscal year 1993/4. In April 1994 the GOS set in motion policies to reverse this trend, and to pave the way towards resumption of external economic and technical assistance, by resuming payments to the International Monetary Fund. However, bilateral grants to finance commodity imports and development projects have not improved, and humanitarian aid now accounts for 37% of aid, almost half of which is provided through multilateral organisations.

The wider economic crisis in Sudan has important implications for humanitarian operations. First, there is considerable pressure for humanitarian aid to become more developmental, in order to bridge the growing gap in investment finance since the early 1990s (GOS, 1996, April). Second, in the absence of development assistance and adequate public welfare financing, there is increasing encroachment by other groups into humanitarian resources targeted at the war-displaced. In the case study areas, where there are no public services in the displaced camps, international agencies are increasingly substituting for government services. This raises the issue of how the international community can both protect the relief entitlements of target populations from external pressures, and sustain basic services for war-affected populations in the absence of government finance. Third, the absence of recurrent government finance begs the question as to whether or not developmental relief interventions can be - or indeed, should aim to be - sustainable.

Federalisation has been one response to the financial crisis, since it has delegated increased responsibility for financing from the centre to state, provincial, and Rural Council levels. UNICEF has recognised the potential problems this entails:

...(the) sudden delegation of responsibility for social services to the states and rural councils without adequate systems to finance these can be counterproductive (UNICEF, 1995, December).

The impact of the federalisation policy on OLS programmes and beneficiaries is illustrated in the financing of drug supplies. The State Minister for Health, Western Bahr El-Ghazal, summarised the situation as follows:

GOS policy is for cost-recovery on drugs; they are not providing any free drugs any more. This has placed a good number of people in trouble. There are few exemptions on the grounds of destitution; the majority suffer because of the lack of drugs. The State has to buy drugs from the federal government; over the years there has been a decrease in the amount of drugs supplies and the flow is not regular. We used to receive huge quantities which went to the rural health centres. Now the quantities have reduced, and only a few centres are able to receive drugs. GOS drugs do not go to health centres. As security improves, we are reopening more PHC units and staff are going back. In 1995, six units reopened. UNICEF goes and checks, and drugs are distributed by UNICEF and security, the waybill is signed by the nurse. Theoretically States have more right to collect taxes than in the past, but this practice is limited by security, and

therefore we can't collect taxes on cattle. We receive grant in aid from Khartoum (Michael, 1996, April 11).

What this example highlights is a contraction in public financing, at the same time that there is a planned expansion in service delivery. In this context, the government has become increasingly reliant on agencies such as UNICEF to provide basic inputs such as essential drugs.

In Khartoum, health centres in the displaced camps are under increased pressure due to the limited health services in the GOS hospitals and health centres (Mohamed El Badawi, 1995, April). During a visit to Wad el Bashir displaced camp, the Review Team interviewed several women from outside the camp who had travelled to the MSF France and FAR centres because they could not afford the cost of government health services. Indeed, at the MSF France centre, 33% of patients came from outside the camp. Hence, there is a hidden population in Khartoum being served by the international community.

In Ed Da'ein, UNICEF and SCF (UK) provide essential drugs to MOH-run clinics in both host villages and the displaced camps. These drugs are targeted primarily at the displaced, and therefore are provided free - a situation in contrast to UNICEF and GOS general policy in the North. An explicit assumption of the drugs programme is that, by providing equal benefits to the displaced and host populations, tensions between the two can be reduced. However, the accessibility of health services and drugs differs markedly between the two populations. The displaced noted, for example, that when they go to the health centre there are frequently no drugs.

Similarly, the water shortage throughout South Darfur is reported to be reaching a critical level. In 1992, ten boreholes were built by the UN and NGOs to provide for the immediate needs of the displaced, and in the longer-term to contribute to the development of water supplies for the host community (Abdeen, 1996, April 3). Initially, the water was provided free to the displaced, with an assumption that charges would follow in subsequent years, and that the government would take over the running of the supplies. Over the years, however, as their own boreholes have dried up, the host community in Ed Da'ein has become increasingly dependent on water supplies planned to benefit the displaced. Responsibility for sustaining the supply has been shifted on to the host community. Several of the water yards are now divided in two - the host community drinking from one side, and the other side reserved for the cattle of the host community and the displaced. Moreover, the acute pressure on water is generating considerable fear among the displaced; in Adila, for example, one displaced Dinka commented to the Review team:

Water can be cut off at any time. If this happen our only choice will be to fight.

Similarly in Fardos:

Conflict with the host community over water is imminent here.

In effect, there has been a steady encroachment by the host population into resources supplied to the displaced. This is in large part driven by the fact that Rural Councils now



have responsibility to buy drugs, since they are no longer provided free by the federal government. Relief resources targeted at the displaced are thus managed and controlled by the host community, who are themselves experiencing a decline in access to basic services. It is not surprising, therefore, that they claim priority access. Humanitarian aid in this context has become the fig leaf used to hide the structural crisis in public financing. Attempts to target resources at those most in need - the displaced - are eroded by a failure to protect their access to relief resources.

The UN humanitarian programme can do little to address the structural financial crisis in Sudan. Not only are the resources for infrastructural development not there, at the same time that the funding base for OLS Northern Sector is declining, its coverage is reportedly expanding:

In 1994, we have managed to continue our assistance to 1.7 million affected people in 85 locations. Furthermore, we have managed to assist an additional population of 232,000 in 74 new locations. This does not include the 35 new locations this year covered by mobile medical teams on the barges with a total population of 500,000 (Tayarah, 1994, October 29).

Like the GOS, the UN is attempting to expand its operations in an environment of contracting finance. The shift towards capacity-building in UN programming in part reflects the lack of resources to develop new infrastructures. However, in the absence of effective mechanisms for remunerating and supervising public sector staff, the provision of material supplies or training will not of itself contribute to the effective functioning of public services.

## **7.9 Humanitarian Aid as a Conflict Reduction Strategy**

In 1996, the UNDP Resident Representative stated:

We want to attempt to insert in our operations the notion of conflict resolution (Jaeger, 1996, January 30: 3).

Since its inception, OLS has been seen as a mechanism for reducing conflict and enhancing security. The idea of using humanitarian operations to enhance conflict resolution has gained momentum globally and within Sudan in recent years, as evidenced by programmes such as corridors of tranquillity, and attempts to secure cease-fire agreements to implement Guinea Worm eradication. The case studies, however, raise the question of whether or not humanitarian aid can and should be used as a tool for conflict reduction in the Northern Sector.

In Ed Da'ein, it has been argued that by providing relief to both host and displaced communities, the risks of violent conflict between the two can be reduced. Hence, the host community in Ed Da'ein has received a proportion of free food aid, seeds, and drugs over the years. These allocations have been deducted from the total allocation of resources to the displaced in Ed Da'ein.

However, although aware of the risks of violence, the international community has also relied on authorities to control access to relief resources which are themselves implicated in the history of violence against the Dinka in Ed Da'ein. In the view of the Review team, this apparent paradox stems from a programmatic emphasis on material deprivation, to the exclusion of an analysis of broader political and economic relations of power in the context of internal warfare. Consequently, the role of humanitarian aid in protecting - rather than simply assisting - war-displaced populations has been neglected.

Unlike Ed Da'ein, little analysis appears to have been made of the implication UN relief provision to peace villages. In Wau and elsewhere - for example, the Nuba Hills of Southern Kordofan - the formation of peace villages has been linked to political and military objectives. In Wau, for example, the creation of peace villages in 1992 was seen as a means of securing the strategic railway line (RRC et al., 1992, December 22/23). In such a context, the implications of UN assistance must be seen not just in terms of material need, but in terms of how such assistance may be implicated in the conduct of the war. As one aid worker commented to the Review Team on the Nuba Hills:

We have to question whether our work is pulling people from the other side. It bothers me that we are only working on the government side. I know what we are doing is supporting a government programme, building up peace villages and supporting the Popular Defence Forces. There has to be a balance on the other side. We are doing good work, but there are bigger political issues that need addressing (Khartoum, 1996, April).

Among the UN and international NGOs, a common idea is that the presence of international agencies will somehow limit further abuses against the Nuba people. However, the continuing crisis among the war-displaced in Khartoum suggests that the presence of international agencies has actually done little to mitigate against abuses.

Further, the focus of some UN programmes suggests that there has been a fundamental failure to adopt programming to the fact of internal warfare and its associated risks for some populations. In this regard, it is difficult to understand how humanitarian assistance can be made to contribute to conflict reduction. UNICEF, for example, is supporting Child Friendly Village schemes in some 29 villages in Southern Kordofan. The fact that UNICEF is able to support such schemes, in a context where internal warfare has placed children at great risk, led the Review Team to question the extent of UN understanding of realities facing beneficiary populations, and the degree to which development initiatives have been explicitly delinked from the political context in which they operate.

Of particular concern are the three UNDP Area Rehabilitation Schemes (ARS) in Wau, Kadugli, and Juba. These projects, although funded outside of OLS, nevertheless utilise OLS resources provided through UNICEF and WFP. The ARS are an extension of the UNDP Area Development Schemes. Implemented together with the GOS, ARS support agricultural rehabilitation, and are intended to tackle the problem of inadequate food production, to "pave the road for sustainable development" (UNDP, 1995, March 12), and to "reduce dependence on emergency assistance in areas affected by civil strife"

(UNDP, 1996, February 22: 1). They also form part of UNDP's strategy of linking peace and development, as currently being explored through the Barcelona Peace Process (UNDP, 1996 March 28).

The extent to which self-reliance is feasible at all is questionable, however, when, in the words of one aid worker:

The population in Southern Kordofan is primarily women and children and old people. The modern structure of government is breaking down, as are the traditional structures (Khartoum, 1996, April).

In Southern Kordofan the objectives of the ARS include supporting the Peace Administration to:

...resettle [returnees] in peace villages and then promote agricultural development to strengthen their attachment to land (UNDP, 1996, February 22: 10).

Given that the Nuba have been dispossessed of their land, this statement suggests a disturbing degree of ignorance of local realities. Moreover, the Review team was concerned that such programmes represent a de facto accommodation by the UN with disaster-producing policies of the government.

In general, given the highly politicised nature of the developmental agenda in Sudan, and its implications for access of the displaced to relief resources, much closer scrutiny of the application of the relief-to-development continuum, and of claims that aid can be used as a conflict management tool, is required.

#### **7.10 Protection of the War-Displaced**

The only clear attempt by OLS to address disaster-producing policies directly has been public advocacy regarding the war-displaced in Khartoum. The efficacy of this approach is nevertheless a subject of debate. The view of the UNDP Resident Representative is that the issue of war-displaced in Khartoum is not one of human rights, but a problem of poor management and co-ordination (Jaeger, 1996, April 17). The Review Team felt, however, that the provision of humanitarian assistance and the issue of protection are inseparable; as one report noted:

...almost by definition, the displaced's primary need is for security (Meadows, 1996: 4).

Security for the displaced, however, has to date primarily been defined in terms of security of land tenure, as a precondition for longer-term urban development projects that international NGOs and the UN are interested to support. Further, public advocacy has generally been limited to opposing demolitions of displaced settlements, or to addressing technical issues such as standards of health care and basic services. While

not denying the importance of these, the failure to incorporate a rights-based analysis for protection of the war-displaced has meant that protection advocacy has been limited to addressing the symptoms of government policies, rather than the policies themselves. The need for a rights-based analysis is particularly important given evidence of human rights abuses that are beyond the realm of material deprivation. For example, various reports, including those prepared by the UN's Special Rapporteur, have documented the arbitrary arrest of men, women, and children (Biro, 1994, February 1; Africa Watch, 1992, July; Minority Rights Group 1995).

Perhaps the worst human rights abuses have to do with the abuses against children. The high percentage of children among the war-displaced population in Khartoum is recorded in a number of documents. One study in 1990 estimated the number of street children to be over 40,000, the majority from displaced or squatter settlements. In 1992, 50% percent of the population of the two official displaced camps in Khartoum were children under 14 years of age (National Population Committee, 1992, December); in 1994, 48% of the population in the squatter resettlements were children under 15 years of age. In 1992, the government launched a programme to remove vagrant children from the streets of Khartoum, ostensibly as a social welfare measure. However, many children rounded up were reportedly sent to camps where they received military training (African Rights, 1995, February).

The lack of public advocacy on abuses against children is particularly alarming given the UNICEF and the government's commitment to the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. As one UNICEF staff member commented:

Government concerns continue to be security, rather than the needs of rights of the child (UNICEF, 1996, March 28).

While the 1996 UNICEF Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Sudan comments on the plight of unaccompanied minors in South Sudan and Kenya, and the abduction of children by rebel forces, no comment is made on similar abuses against children in North Sudan, which have been documented elsewhere (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1995, September). This is a serious omission, but in line with the apparent lack of serious attention given to this issue by UN agencies in the Northern Sector. There is an apparent unwillingness to engage in debates concerning the Rights of the Child for fear that this will compromise UNICEF's operationality. However, the Review team felt that all UN agencies needed to more seriously confront the question of whether their material assistance can be effective without a framework that links the delivery of material supplies with wider principles of neutrality and protection.

In 1990, USAID identified protection and security as issues for the displaced (USAID, 1990, February 15). However, the strategy was to strengthen the presence of international NGOs as a means to preventing human rights abuses, rather than to engage in direct engagement with government policies. This strategy has contributed to the government's view that international NGOs are the implementors of Western government foreign policy in Sudan (El Amin Osman, 1996, April 4), which has led government authorities to restrict international NGO activity on the grounds that they are hostile to the present regime (Eldin Ibrahim Bannaga, 1992). Importantly, the

Review team felt that international NGOs have neither the capacity nor the mandate for protection of the displaced; hence, the de facto assignment of responsibility for protection to international NGOs, as a result of the failure of bilateral and multi-lateral organisations to engage directly with the government on this issue, is highly problematic. This is especially the case since it is the responsibility of the UN to define the overall political framework for humanitarian operations.

International debate concerning the mandate of different UN agencies for protection continues, and some progress has been made in recent years. A recent report, for example, noted that the UNDP Resident Representative should "...bear in mind his or her responsibility for representing the UN system as a whole which is bound by international human rights and humanitarian standards (Cohen & Cuenod, 1995, October: 38).

In July 1993, the Inter-Agency Task for Internally Displaced Persons, created by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, concluded that both protection and relief needs would have to be addressed in situations of internal displacement. It called upon the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator (the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs) to actively use inter-agency consultative mechanisms to allocate "responsibilities to address the plight of internally displaced persons". The Task Force further recommended that Emergency Relief Co-ordinators should serve as a reference point for assistance and protection on actual or developing situations of internally displaced persons that might require a co-ordinated international response (UN, 1993, July 5). The Resident Representative in Sudan was notified of his responsibilities in this regard in July 1995 (Hansen, 1995, July 31).

Given the available instruments of the UN, the Review Team was deeply concerned by the UN's failure to develop an explicit framework for protection of the war-displaced in the Northern Sector. The importance of DHA in providing active leadership on the issue of the displaced cannot be overemphasised; indeed, Cohen and Cuenod concluded that DHA's performance in co-ordinating assistance to the displaced will be seen as the "litmus test" of its readiness to play a leadership role in UN responses to complex political emergencies (Cohen & Cuenod, 1995, October). In Sudan, however, the protection role of DHA to date has largely focused on negotiation of access. While negotiation of access constitutes an important part of a protection mandate, the quality of such access, and decisions about the type and quality of assistance, are also central.

At the OAU Co-ordination Conference on Assistance to the Displaced held in Khartoum in September 1995, the GOS confirmed their view that internally displaced populations could not be the subject of protection interventions by the UN or other bodies, as this infringed upon the state sovereignty. The GOS also rejected moves to extend the mandate of the UN to include the internally displaced. Mustafa Ismael of the DOD/KSRC noted that:

The internally displaced do not need protection, they only need assistance...If the UN nominated a special body for IDPS, the GOS will reject it (Colthoff, 1995, September 20).

For donors, the impasse that has been reached with regard to internal displacement in a chronic political emergency also has important implications. This relates both to the donors' central role in debates concerning the global mandate of the UN with respect to internally displaced persons, and the donors' central role in adequate financing to sustain humanitarian inputs in a chronic emergency. One UK aid official, consulted on the UK's position on the issue, suggested that the donor community is "sitting on its hands", and looking to the UN to negotiate the thorny path between the primacy of sovereignty and that of protection. Such an approach by donors does not support the UN in this difficult task.

### **7.11 Implications of UN Policy Failure**

The analysis of OLS Northern Sector suggests that a major failure of international and UN policy has occurred, particularly with regard to the crisis of internal displacement. The fundamental issue of protection for the large, internally-displaced population within Sudan has remained unaddressed. The origins of this failure are linked to a number of factors, including the lack of clarity with regard to the mandates of different UN agencies in applying the existing international instruments for the protection of war-displaced populations globally, and the poorly-developed contractual framework which guides UN operations in the Northern Sector. In effect, the UN is constrained by the sovereignty of the Government of Sudan from confronting disaster-producing policies which create vulnerability among those displaced by the war.

While in part reflecting managerial and organisational problems, the UN policy failure in the Northern Sector represents a more fundamental flaw in the conceptualisation of chronic political emergencies, and especially the contradiction of demanding that the UN ensure the neutrality of its operations in a context where a sovereign government is also a party to the conflict. In this regard, the policy failure of the Northern Sector does not just lie with the UN, but with the international community in general.

## **8. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT, FUNDING, LOGISTICS, AND COST EFFECTIVENESS**

### **8.1 Information Management**

#### **8.1.1 Overview**

In previous chapters of this report, the quality of information gathered by OLS has been considered. In this chapter, the Review Team considers the question of information management, and reviews the efficiency, coherence, and level of co-ordination of various information systems within UN OLS agencies.

With regard to information systems, the Review Team found a highly uneven and in many cases highly problematic situation.

This situation is the result of various factors, including some that are external to the UN OLS agencies. Over the past two years, for example, the shift to a food economy approach has intensified demands for different kinds of data. In some cases, this has created the need for coalitions with partner organisations, whose motivations and reliability in surveying and reporting cannot always be taken for granted. As will be seen further below, information collection and dissemination is sometimes hostage to the wider political framework within which OLS operates.

In addition, the Review Team heard frequent complaints from agency personnel that donors, while clamouring for more and better information, did little themselves to support the units and processes necessary to make this possible. For example, the UNHCU in Khartoum had five field monitors in 1993; it had to lay off all of them in 1994 as a result of funding shortages, and was able to hire only one in 1995. Moreover, as will be seen below, the orientation of some key information systems is toward producing data required to meet donor requirements, rather than maximising the ability of field offices to understand the impact and coverage of their operations.

Within the UN agencies themselves, the information landscape is highly uneven. With the building of a stronger knowledge base over the past two years, quantitative as well as qualitative data has undoubtedly become richer. However, the Review Team found that the various information systems scattered throughout OLS were not sufficiently integrated to maximise the coherence (and hence analytic capability), efficiency, and transparency of this data. Rather, UN agencies - captive as they are to turbulent environments, divergent interests, and crisis management - have never found time to develop Management Information Systems adequate to the size and complexity of OLS.

#### **8.1.2 Information Systems at Different Sector Levels**

The quality of information systems within UN OLS agencies differs according to sectors. Not surprisingly, the most efficient are found in logistics, and this is true for both UNICEF and WFP, and for both Northern and Southern Sectors. In large part, this

is due to the nature of logistical information itself, where measurable variables are straightforward, and where measurement indicators have a common denominator (such as weight, or CIF value).

In general, the Review Team found the logistics sections to be operating in a relatively coherent and open manner with regard to information.

After logistics, the most efficient information systems reside with section heads, and here we refer specifically to UNICEF. At UNICEF, section heads manage sector-specific information systems that are internally relatively coherent. However, data from these systems could not be adequately understood by the Review Team without detailed explanations from section heads about format changes, discontinuities in staffing, changes in monitoring priorities, and other related issues. Consequently, the coherence of sector-specific information is highly dependent on the institutional memory of sector heads themselves. Moreover, while these systems may be internally efficient, they are sometimes impenetrable by, and resistant to, the needs of other sections.

Further, sector-specific information management is in some cases problematic as a consequence of the nature of the sector itself. With regard to UNICEF's health program, for example, the complexity of health-related interventions, and the dependence of UNICEF on a large number of implementing organisations, make coherent documentation of this area extremely difficult.

Finally, information available for specific sectors is affected by the interests and procedures of partner organisations, and by technical and security-related problems in data collection and transmission. A measure of the difficulty can be seen in a recent survey that attempted to collect data on schools supported by UNICEF Southern Sector. Questionnaires were sent to 1,200 schools in 1995. By April 1996, only 200 had been returned, many of them filled in by SRRA and RASS secretaries, rather than the teachers who were targeted to provide information. It is therefore impossible to verify whether or not the majority of the 1,200 schools exist. Although training of local counterparts to OLS field monitors is underway, their contribution will not be realised for some time, and may in any case be conditioned by their own concerns and perspectives (Odido, 1996, April 10).

The most problematic area of information management, however, occurs in Monitoring and Evaluation. Information Officers, crushed by the task of documenting the performance of their agencies, and often poorly supported and trained, are expected to produce information upon which their agencies stake far-reaching claims to populations served. The discussion that follows is primarily concerned with information related to Monitoring and Evaluation.

### **8.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Information Systems**

With regard to monitoring and evaluation information, the Review Team found that data varies greatly between the UN agencies. Figure 8.1 below distinguishes major types of



data to which the Review Team had access, according to the years for which they are consistently available.

**Figure 8.1:** Years for which key OLS data is available:

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
<i>Global indicators:</i> UNICEF value of supplies		■	■	■	■	■	■
<i>Global indicators:</i> WFP global yearly tonnage					■	■	■
<i>Financial indicators:</i> DHA grants tracking.					■	■	■
<i>Detailed activity indicators:</i> UNICEF access to locations					■	■	■
<i>Detailed activity indicators:</i> WFP food aid deliveries						■	■
<i>Detailed activity indicators:</i> UNICEF seeds distributions						■	■

While WFP has more detailed data on the geographic areas served by OLS, its information systems are not well-developed over time. For example, it was not possible from WFP's data to reconstruct global yearly tonnages of relief commodities delivered to South Sudan prior to 1993. UNICEF, on the other hand, does have figures for the early years of OLS. Conversely, WFP tracks data for its 1994 and 1995 deliveries down to specific geographic areas, whereas UNICEF has less detailed information about specific locations, as a result of a policy of handing over inputs to area offices.

Generally-speaking, the Review Team found that UN OLS agencies were not able to articulate a well-prioritised set of information objectives with regard to Monitoring and Evaluation. Indeed, for some key variables, it has become accepted that no information is available.

For example, WFP country directors do not know the annual expenditure of their OLS sector operations. As will be seen further in the section below on cost effectiveness, this is because WFP headquarters in Rome does not produce the relevant annual statements. UNICEF Northern Sector, on the other hand, produces large figures for numbers of beneficiaries, but has no established definition of what a person in the war-affected zones must receive in order to be counted a beneficiary. Further, in the context of a policy emphasis on decentralisation and reliance on local implementing partners, the lack of detailed information on how access was used, how inputs were distributed, and the impact those inputs had, is scarcely felt by OLS staff to be a problem.

In the absence of clear information objectives, a proliferation of local initiatives have taken place, often dominated by strong personalities and limited by their individual

skills and tenures. Some of these developments have produced interesting insights, or have shown directions in which future efforts can be extended. For example, the Household Food Security Section in UNICEF Khartoum produced a simple cost-benefit analysis for its seed distribution activities. Similar efforts were made in the Southern Sector, relating agricultural success to health problems such as guinea worm infection rates. In other areas, creative initiatives did not materialise due to funding cuts. For example, a plan to create profiles of all locations serviced by UNICEF Khartoum in 1995 was interrupted, because key staff positions could not be filled.

Other problems in monitoring and evaluation arise from the diversity and seemingly arbitrary succession of computer applications used for data administration and analysis. In some cases, several systems are used concurrently in the same agency, with little or no automated interfacing, requiring multiple entry of the same data, and severely limiting information management capacity and analytic capability.

The WFP logistics office in the Southern Sector is a case in point. WFP Lokichokio uses a program written in Dbase to keep track of air operations. Dbase is used also by the WFP logistics office in Nairobi for air cargo reporting. However, data for commodity tracking is kept in a different program. For the WFP regional operation, data is logged with the help of a WFP proprietary system introduced by the Transport Co-ordination Unit in Kampala, and differs from the one that WFP Khartoum uses. Neither of these systems is used for OLS Southern Sector, however. Instead, two entirely different applications are used side-by-side. For certain types food, fuel, and aircraft reports, the logistics officer relies on his own personal program written in Access. At the same time, charge codes for the same food commodities - known as Shipping Instructions (SIs), and necessary to satisfy donors requirements - are kept in Lotus 1-2-3, a spreadsheet application (Maj, 1996, April 17).

The problems posed by many different kinds of computer applications is exacerbated by the transfer of statistical information from tables in word processing programs - which can be managed by administrative support staff - to spreadsheet programs - which require specially trained personnel. Increasingly, statistical data is also being transferred to database applications, which require an even higher level of training and expertise. The Review Team noted that there is a lack of adequate support for this transition, in the form of personnel, computers, and training. Further, insufficient understanding of electronic information management (a consequence of poor technical and training support) is also creating a lack of motivation to follow proper procedures in maintaining and safeguarding data. For example, in several places vast amounts of data were lost because the practice of keeping back-up copies was not maintained.

In general, the Review Team felt that the root cause of problems in information systems is a weak leadership regarding the purpose of monitoring and evaluation activities. Only in areas where massive complaints were made does direction appear to be given; for example, the computerised information system which is under design for Lokichokio cargo handling. Hence, the Review Team felt a more proactive and coherently-planned leadership in information management is needed.

#### **8.1.4 Special Issues of Concern: Populations on Either Side of the Conflict**

Population figures in Sudan are a highly politicised matter. Relief flows are determined by, among other things, estimates of populations in need, and whether these populations live in government or rebel-controlled areas. At the same time, figures for needy populations tend to be seen as equivalent to the total population in any given area. As a result, UN OLS population figures are used as substitute indicators for the number of people living on either side of the conflict; as such, they have acquired enormous significance, and are highly contentious. As will be seen below, however, such a substitution is not valid.

Evidence of the politicisation of OLS population data is seen in the statement by the GOS that OLS "avoid inflating the number of the beneficiaries in areas where mutineer rebels are present, and conduct surveys all over the country with the participation of the Government, the United Nations and the Voluntary Organisations" (CGOS, 1996, April, point 10).

In addition to UN OLS figures, parties to the conflict have advanced their own population counts. For example, the SRRA, invoking its obligation under the SPLM Agreement on Ground Rules "to provide accurate and timely information regarding the needs and the situation of civilians in their areas", estimates a total population for Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, Upper Nile and Southern Kordofan Regions of 6.8 million (SRRA, 1995, November 10). While SRRA does not explicitly state that this population lives exclusively in rebel areas, SPLM's organigram of administrative structures makes clear this is the operating assumption. The 6.8 million figure contrasts sharply, however, with GOS statements that a few hundred thousand civilians are living under SPLA administration (GOS, 1996, March 28).

The reaction of OLS agencies to the politicisation of population figures, and divergent claims by the warring parties, has been different for North and South. In the Southern Sector, the discussion on population figures in needs assessment documents for 1994 and 1995 indicates an enlightened caution. In the 1995 document, no fewer than five pages are devoted to methodical caveats, the comparison of various census data, and local NGO estimates regarding populations, before advancing an estimate for planning purposes of 4 million people in South Sudan, including some government-held towns (UN, 1995, November).

In this document, South Sudan includes as Bahr-el-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria. Including all government-controlled towns, the document estimates a total population of 5.1 million; of these, 3.9 million are the sum of Southern Sector 1994 assessments, and the balance of 1.1 million people are from Northern Sector assessments. The latter figure is very close to the estimate of 1,060,478 people reported in the OLS Northern Sector Assessments in South Sudan, the Transitional Zone, and the Khartoum Displaced Camps for 1994 (UN, 1995, January), endorsed by the GOS Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation.

Significantly, the Southern Sector speaks only of an estimated population, and does not claim that this number is accessible to OLS assistance. In fact, UNICEF Nairobi rules out the concept of an estimate of the population serviced by OLS at large (Nicols, 1996, April 15). However, estimates of populations reached by particular sector programs are produced. For example, the population with potential access to health care facilities was estimated to be 1.13 million for 1995 (UN, 1995, November). This figure is down from 1.5 million in 1994, due to insecurity. This amounts to 28% of the population having access to health care services.

The Northern Sector also uses caution in determining populations. However, as noted in the Northern Sector Needs Assessment document for 1994: "Estimated population figures were primarily reported by local authorities in the areas assessed. The figures were not confirmed by the assessment teams and no census or headcount was undertaken as part of the assessment exercise. No accurate population figures are presently available for most of the areas covered. Frequent population movements further complicate the demographic picture in the assessed areas. Therefore, the population figures included in this report are only indicative of actual civilian populations in the assessed areas" (UN, 1995, January: 6).

Despite the problematic situation of having to rely on population figures generated by local authorities, UNICEF Khartoum states categorically in its 1995 Program Review that 3,690,000 displaced and war-affected persons were accessible from Khartoum, of which 2.5 million were targeted for UNICEF assistance, and of which over 2 million were effectively reached (UNICEF, 1995).

A related problem arises here - that of the definition of a person assisted, and the method of counting beneficiaries. Since another UNICEF Khartoum document uses a figure for access to vulnerable populations that is the same as the number of beneficiaries (MacCarthy, R 1996) one is led to suppose that the entire population deemed accessible was counted as being assisted. Even if the statistics were based on program specific outputs, however, it would be virtually impossible to calculate the union of all sets of persons who, during the year, benefited from this or that program component.

When the Review Team pointed out the difficulty of comprehensive beneficiary counts and requested that the spread of various program activities over the 202 locations with access be documented, such information was not available with the single exception of seed distributions. While some of the few output indicators consistently maintained for the past three years do indicate program growth, the spread of assistance over the many locations and 2 million needy people remains a matter of faith. The Review Team thus considers this claim by UNICEF Khartoum unsubstantiated.


For WFP, the population issue is slightly different. Claims to total population, or population that can be accessed (as opposed to effectively assisted) are not made. The validity of beneficiary claims is, rather, connected to the flow of information from field to the country offices, a problem that is detailed below. Here we simply reproduce the figures as contained in the WFP 1995 Annual Report. Accordingly, in 1995, as many as 1,179,387 persons in the South, the Transitional Zone, and Khartoum needed emergency

food aid; in the same document it is noted that WFP, plus NGOs operating in Khartoum and in the South, provided assistance to 1,749,727 persons (WFP, 1995).

When we pieced together all the figures that the two UN OLS agencies provide for the persons in need, and those whom they assisted in 1995, a paradox appears. The people who received assistance actually outnumber those in need. For WFP, the two figures have been noted above. For UNICEF, these figures are compiled from the number globally claimed by the Northern Sector plus, as a minimum for the Southern Sector, those who had access to the health care programs supported by UNICEF (we have no means of knowing how many more were reached by its other sectors). Although the agencies themselves do not make these sums, they are implicit in the claims made in their program reviews.

Figure 8.2 indicates the paradox of assisting more people than were identified as in need, for both WFP and UNICEF, against a total population of 6,426,559 estimated to live in the South, the Transitional Zone, and to be reached in the Khartoum displaced camps:

Figure:8.2



The excess of persons supposedly assisted over those in need demonstrates the shakiness of the entire monitoring and reporting enterprise. Even so, the numbers are less than half the total population estimated to be living in the three concerned OLS regions: South, Transitional Zone, and Khartoum displaced camps. While UN OLS beneficiary figures are likely inflated - and more so for Northern Sector - they do not, and even when amended will not, speak to the question of how many people live on which side of the conflict.

### **8.1.5 Special Issues of Concern: Comparing Numbers in Need Versus Numbers Served**

The Review Team received from WFP detailed information regarding the delivery of relief commodities early in the Review process. Needs assessments were also obtained, but from different documents and at a later date. Comparing the two, we were struck by the discontinuity between information used for needs assessment, and information used for reporting needs fulfilment.

While needs were assessed for populations living in an area such as a former rural council, deliveries were reported against a much larger number of different locations. No attempt was made to correlate the two sets of data; hence, it was not possible to understand the extent to which the stated needs were actually met.

When the Review Team asked about this, we were told by the WFP office that collates reports from both sectors that WFP Khartoum has no idea where most of the locations, for which deliveries appear in the reports, were to be found on the map (Alaman, 1996, April). The important question then arises how WFP is able to continue using an information system that apparently cannot identify the specific location of its beneficiaries, or correlate this data with needs assessment reports.

Emergency food needs are projected using assessments made in specific geographic areas prior to the Consolidated Appeal. During the program year, populations in need are, where possible, reassessed. Indeed, some areas are reassessed several times, depending on logistics and the need to continue assistance for several months. Monthly delivery plans are prepared, breaking deliveries down according to locations and weeks. In the Southern Sector, most locations are accessed by air. Flight permits are sought for these, often with a number of spare locations included should the GOS refuse access to the primary destinations.

For logistics reasons - to document which locations were actually used, to calculate block hours, etc. - delivery reports indicate locations, quantities, and number of beneficiaries present at distributions, multiplied by an average family size where appropriate. (As noted above, they do not, however, refer to the same locations indicated in assessment reports).

For the Southern Sector, when delivery reports reach the OLS Nairobi office, data on beneficiaries and data on commodities are processed separately. Commodity data is copied to the logistics section, which tracks each commodity separately. Logistics has no particular interest in the areas serviced as such; its major concern is to be able to close Shipping Instructions so that reporting requirements for donors can be satisfied, and to keep track of those lots for which customs exemptions need renewal within a 45 day deadline. Hence, as discovered from an examination of Spreadsheet formats, there are no tonnage totals calculated for deliveries to individual locations; rather, the focus remains on tracking individual commodities. Commodity reports and beneficiary figures are then copied to Khartoum for report integration, but in separate communications.

WFP Khartoum keeps beneficiary statistics and commodity delivery information in separate files (in 1995). Over time, this separation has encouraged a number of anomalies. First, in the Northern Sector, beneficiaries do not necessarily constitute those people actually served during the reporting month; rather they may include persons reassessed as being in need but supplied later, or, if access to them was lost, not at all served. In effect, this means that the ability to distinguish between those requiring assistance and those actually supplied disappears. Consequently, as many as 39 out of 177 locations in the WFP 1995 datafiles indicated the presence of beneficiaries, but did not show any actual deliveries.

Second, while data on beneficiaries is kept monthly (more specifically, a cell in the spreadsheet is reserved for each location and each month), data on deliveries to a location is kept cumulatively over the course of the year, leaving no monthly entries with which to verify beneficiary claims. This is because, as noted above, commodity reports forwarded from Nairobi do not total the amount of all commodities delivered to a specific location. Instead, the Information Section in Khartoum is left with the tedious job of adding total weights commodity by commodity and entering these manually into location cells in the spreadsheet.

The way the system functions at present has important implications for the calculation of total beneficiary figures. Such calculations are also affected by the security of flight destinations. It is not unusual, for example, for a population in need to have to travel to different distribution points, depending on the extent of access to individual locations at any given time. Since statistics are kept at the level of locations, some groups of beneficiaries are reported under several locations during the same month, or under location A in one month, and location B in the following month.

The formula used to calculate yearly beneficiaries adds all monthly figures for a location, and divides by the number of months with entries. Thus, a double-counting effect is built into the system, which cannot be cross-checked because information on commodities actually delivered has been structurally separated from data on beneficiaries.

When this was pointed out by the Review Team, WFP abandoned the above formula for the final version of the 1995 Annual Report. Instead, figures for populations in need were simply used as approximations for populations assisted, with an additional 500,000 beneficiaries added for barge operations, and 200,000 beneficiaries served by NGOs from Kenya and Uganda.

Although this discussion points to serious deficiencies in the information systems of WFP, it should also be noted that WFP staff were open in discussing the shortcomings of the system as it stands. Moreover, during a special exercise with the Review Team, WFP Nairobi succeeded in correlating assessment and delivery reports, and in the process creating 18 cluster areas for which 1994 versus 1995 deliveries, as well as 1995 needs assessments and deliveries, could be meaningfully compared.

For the Review Team, the problems in information management detailed here have less to do with technical competence among WFP staff than with the direction that

accountability flows in OLS more broadly. OLS operations are logistics and access-driven, and reporting is designed primarily to satisfy donor requirements. Hence, delivery reports are constructed according to delivery locations, rather than areas noted needs assessments, and they concentrate on donor-driven concerns such as Shipping Instructions and customs exemptions, rather than real beneficiaries.

Indeed, under the present system, it would be more honest to report straightforward commodity figures only. However, as was pointed out to the Review Team, donors and executive boards insist on having beneficiary figures, no matter how unreliable, or even fictitious, the complex context of OLS renders them.

#### **8.1.6 Management of Needs Assessments Information**

Annual OLS needs assessments form the basis of the annual UN Consolidated Appeal, and as such have enormous significance. In the North, this significance is greatest, since annual assessments are said to determine the operational field of OLS (Painter, 1996, March 24).

Considering its importance, the Review Team spent considerable time examining the assessment exercise. The results of this examination have already been discussed in previous chapters. Here, the experience of the Review Team in obtaining information concerning assessment reports is discussed.

The first task was to obtain annual assessment reports for the duration of OLS. Reports from 1991 to 1995 for the Southern Sector, and for 1994 for the Northern Sector, were provided in advance of fieldwork. Attempts to find reports for the missing years in Khartoum failed, for the simple reason that do not exist; 1994 is the only year that an assessment report was written for the Northern Sector.

For the Northern Sector, from a search of UNHCU box files, two assessments of specific locations for 1993 were found; no assessment reports could be found prior to 1993, however, although one UNHCU staff member remembered vaguely that an assessment must have taken place in 1992. Further attempts to trace the missing reports were then made with WFP, where some joint (OLS) assessment reports prior to 1993 were found, but again relating only to specific locations.

For 1995, the Review Team was informed that an assessment report was not prepared by the UNHCU for the Northern Sector, due to delays in the recruitment of the Information Officer. For 1993 and before, reasons for the lack of assessment reports are less clear. In 1993, attempts were made to combine the Northern and Southern Sector assessments in one report, but eventually this was only done for food security information from household interviews, and the report was prepared by the Southern Sector. No reports were written, however, using information from the broader area assessments, which included other sectors. It appears that this was at least partly due to differences in the quality of information between the Northern and Southern Sector. Between 1990 and 1993, UNHCU took part in the FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission,



and it may be that the report from this mission was seen as sufficient, even though this includes the whole of Sudan, and only assesses food aid needs.

Some form of assessment was carried out in mid-1990 to adjust needs for populations assisted under OLS II, and also in late 1992. For the latter, it is unclear whether these were OLS assessments done in preparation for the Appeal. For both, it is impossible to say how many locations were assessed, as we cannot be sure that all area reports were found. At the end of 1991, UNHCU prepared regional profiles for the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission, which was deduced from the report of the FAO/WFP mission and seeing regional profiles without date or author in the WFP files.

Finally, although assessments are referred to in the Plans of Action for OLS I and II, we found no record of these assessments. For the Northern Sector therefore, we have no information about assessments done in late 1989, 1990, and 1991.

For the Southern Sector WFP assessment reports are available for 1989 and mid-1990, as part of an adjustment of needs for OLS II, but they are not available for the following year. It appears that, for both sectors, regular joint annual assessments started with the initiation of the SEPHA appeal in 1992.

In terms of food aid needs, assessments of war-affected populations are incorporated within the annual FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply assessment mission from 1990 forward. These reports however, cover emergency food aid needs for the whole of Sudan, including drought-affected and displaced people not necessarily included under OLS. In late 1990, a special WFP/NGO/donor mission, separate from the FAO Crop Assessment mission, estimated the food aid needs for drought-affected and displaced in Sudan. This report estimates numbers of drought-affected and displaced for the South, but does not separate these by areas under GOS and SPLA control. For the north, no distinction is made in the report between drought-affected and displaced.

OLS assessments are sometimes, but not always referred to in FAO/WFP Reports. From 1993 at least, both WFP Northern Sector and WFP Southern Sector worked out food aid needs based on the OLS assessment results, prior to the FAO/WFP mission. Food aid needs for OLS as a whole are then combined in a meeting with both Sectors, either in Khartoum (in 1994) or in Nairobi (1995), or by fax (1993). These estimates for food aid needs are then adopted by the FAO/WFP mission, and also go into the SEPHA appeal.

However, the stage between the OLS assessment and how the information is used to estimate food aid needs is rarely recorded. OLS assessment reports, when they exist, rarely give recommendations in terms of the quantities of food aid required, and FAO/WFP assessment reports do not desegregate the estimated food aid needs by location for Northern and Southern sectors, or even between OLS and drought-affected populations in need of food aid. With the assistance of WFP staff present at the time of the review, the Review Team was able to separate Northern and Southern Sector needs by area or location for 1995, and tables existed that showed the calculations for 1996. This information is not available for the years prior to 1995, however. For this reason, the only year for which the Review Team was able to plot food aid needs against deliveries was 1995.

Food aid needs for 1992 and 1993 for the Southern Sector are also based on an annual assessment exercise. In 1992, the Southern Sector assessment was apparently part of the FAO/WFP mission, as well as part of preparations for the SEPHA Appeal; indeed, this is the only time that any OLS assessment report gives clear recommendations about actual quantities of food aid required.

Assessments in the Northern Sector are less clear in these years. In 1991 and 1992, UNHCU took part in the FAO/WFP mission, but OLS is not mentioned, nor is there a distinction made between populations that fall under OLS and other populations in need of emergency food aid. At the same time, no separate OLS assessment was done for these years that could tell the Review Team the needs of populations under OLS. For example, the 1991 FAO/WFP assessment report estimates food aid needs for displaced populations and refugees in the Eastern State, Northern State, and Khartoum, as well as in Darfur and Kordofan. In Darfur, this includes displaced populations in North Darfur as well as in South Darfur. Of particular interest here is the inclusion of the Khartoum displaced - 342,000 displaced in Khartoum are considered to be in need of food assistance throughout 1992. Similarly, the assessment of food needs for 1993 includes 146,000 displaced in Khartoum (FAO/WFP, 1993, March). However, information provided to the Review Team by UNHCU indicated that the Khartoum displaced were not included under OLS until 1994 (Painter, 1996, March 24).

What this review indicates is that food aid needs for populations under OLS are not specified in OLS assessment reports, with the exception of the 1991/92 Southern Sector report and the June 1990 WFP/OLS assessment, also for the Southern Sector. While FAO/WFP assessment reports specify the food needs of Sudan as a whole, it is not always clear which populations fall under OLS, and which are to be covered by general Sudan drought relief programs.

Ideally, assessments are not only used as the basis for the Consolidated Appeal, but also, and perhaps more importantly, for prioritisation of program interventions, planning, and co-ordination. Considering that there is only one report of a Northern Sector assessment, it is difficult to see how this information was used to plan interventions and develop strategies. It is also difficult, for the same reason, to understand how it is possible to monitor trends over time.

Further, since assessments for the Northern and Southern Sectors have only been reported together once, it is difficult to form a picture of populations assisted by OLS as a whole. While it is true that the situation in the North and South is different, much could be gained by combining and cross-checking information from both sectors, especially in terms of understanding and assessing the impact of population movements between locations. Population movements between Khartoum and the South are evident from some reports, as are population movements between GOS-held towns in the South and surrounding rural areas. However, in the absence of an overall combined analysis, it is not possible to gain a sense of the ways in which these movements relate to each other and to events such as changes in security conditions, crop production, trading patterns, or other factors. This, in turn, weakens the capacity for early warning.

A major component of the annual assessment exercise is estimating the actual number of people in need of assistance. In addition, needs assessments should also determine the specific requirements of these populations, as well as how such needs are to be met by available resources and modalities of implementation. Although it is understood that the specific objectives of a needs assessment exercise will vary, the Review Team found assessment reports rarely include these components, and indeed rarely state the specific objectives of the exercise. For the Northern Sector, since no overall assessment reports exist, assessment objectives cannot even be ascertained retroactively from the reports themselves.

Although covered in more detail in previous chapters, it is worth reviewing again the main issues the Review Team noted with regard to the content of assessment reports.

First, the Review Team noted that most assessment reports appear to concentrate on service delivery, rather than on conditions and needs. For example, information may be provided on how many clinics exist in a given location, how many feeding centres, and how many latrines, but little or no information is given on morbidity and mortality rates (although main diseases may be mentioned, and nutritional survey results are sometimes reported). Information related to food security, on the other hand, rarely includes data on the distributions of food aid, seeds, tools, and other inputs. Overall, implementation mechanisms are rarely indicated, and the impact of past interventions is never described.

Second, while numerous assessments, monitoring, and evaluation reports are made on a regular basis by all OLS agencies, the Review Team found that there is little attempt to build on existing information to expand the analytic capabilities of the annual assessment exercise. Instead, the same baseline data is re-collected over and over, with an eye toward the Consolidated Appeal. While one-off rapid assessments, using checklists of basic questions such as those employed in the Northern Sector, may be justified at the start of an emergency operation, after seven years both the operational agencies and the donors should be able to distinguish baseline data that needs only periodic updating from new kinds of investigations that provide greater depth of understanding.

Third, NGOs interviewed by the Review Team also reported that much of the information gathered in the annual assessments is already available, in greater depth and detail, from their own assessment and program reports. While UNHCU notes that they are obliged to report on all sectors due to their limited access, it is difficult to substantiate this claim, since WFP now has international food monitors in many locations, and UNICEF's decentralisation policy has led to greater penetration to local levels. Hence, the Review Team felt that much greater use of existing information could be made, and energies could be focused on the gaps in knowledge for the annual assessment, rather than treating each assessment as if the locations were being visited for the first time.

Fourth, some indicators in the Northern Sector have been monitored consistently over the years, at least for some locations. This data can be used to monitor trends; for example, market prices, which are of obvious importance for displaced populations in GOS areas, and which are generally recognised as good indicators of food security in

famine early warning systems. The Review Team was thus surprised to find that no one in the Northern Sector thought of using information available on market prices to monitor trends over years, including comparisons of prices for different locations. The same is true for information that is already available on the prevalence of malnutrition, which is not used to analyse trends that would shed substantial light on the overall pattern of food insecurity relative to other factors.

For the Southern Sector, analysing specific variables over time to see trends is more difficult, since assessments have on the whole been different every year. This has the obvious disadvantage of rendering comparisons between years problematic; on the other hand, it results from a continuing effort to improve information gathering, and as such the Review Team is reluctant to be overly critical in this regard. Southern Sector Assessments have also focused on filling in gaps in information, rather than re-collecting the same basic data every time (a key problem with the Northern Sector, as noted above). An important reason for this is that baseline information on the food economy of different areas has been collected since 1994, and more recently, the development of a health information system has added to this baseline picture.

However, the Review Team noted that, as in the Northern Sector, Southern Sector reports do not incorporate existing information from NGOs, or from other monitoring systems. At the same time, the Review Team noted that the process of incorporating such information, given the large number of implementing partners in the Southern Sector, is daunting; in 1995 alone, for example, over 200 assessments had been done in the Southern Sector.

## **8.2 Funding Patterns**

### **8.2.1 Overview**

Donors contribute to OLS in response to Annual Consolidated Appeals, launched by the UN for all their humanitarian operations in the Sudan. Donors also contribute to NGO programs in Sudan that are not normally included in the UN Appeal, although NGOs in principle report all grants received for OLS to DHA.

This section analyses funding patterns based primarily on statistical data from the DHA Financial Tracking Unit, and from UNICEF. The section considers the issue of funding from five key angles:

- \* The total amount of resources provided, and shares provided to UN and NGOs.
- \* Sources of funding for specific program types.
- \* UN agency requirements and donor responses.
- \* The importance of various donors in OLS funding.
- \* Funding for Northern and Southern Sectors.

## **8.2.2 Overall Volume and UN/NGO Shares**

In Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4 below, funds received for Consolidated Appeals for Sudan from 1993 to 1995 are presented, broken down according to requirements and grants received, and by donors. As can be seen from the Figures, the international community has given more than half a billion dollars to the Consolidated Appeals for this three year period, to both UN agencies and to NGOs.

As reported to DHA, contributions to NGOs (as well as other non-UN agencies such as ICRC) totalled USD 255 million for 1993 to 1995, while UN agencies received USD 311 million. In Figure 8.3, however, these totals appears slightly different. The difference depends on how one handles USD 18 million and USD 53 million worth of emergency food aid channelled through NGOs in 1993 and 1994, respectively. It should also be remembered that the sum includes USD 24.5 million for UNHCR's refugee operations, of which an unknown amount was used to assist drought-affected populations in North Sudan.

In Figure 8.4, grants for refugee assistance, although not primarily used for OLS work, are kept in the calculations. For greater realism, NGO-channelled food aid is also transferred to the non-UN sector. After the transfer was made, we noted 287 records of contributions made to UN agencies between 1993 and 1995, totalling USD 264 million. DHA tables work out this total differently, at USD 258 million (as seen in Figure 8.3); we have not been able to elucidate the difference in calculations, although we suspect it is based on different ways of accounting food aid.

**Figure 8.3: UN Consolidated Appeals for Sudan Agency Appeals and Donor Contributions, 1993 - 95**

Agency	Year				Response
	1993	1994	1995	Total	
DHA					
Requirements	\$ 300,000	\$ 300,000	\$ 198,000	\$ 798,000	44%
Contributions	\$ 261,916	\$ 86,758	\$ 1,000	\$ 349,674	
FAO					
Requirements	\$ 8,093,000	\$ 1,277,500	\$ 1,846,150	\$ 11,216,650	7%
Contributions	\$ 161,202	\$ 298,600	\$ 365,000	\$ 824,802	
UNDP					
Requirements	\$ 788,000	\$ 1,755,000	\$ 4,911,000	\$ 7,454,000	24%
Contributions	\$ 480,000	\$ 525,000	\$ 766,000	\$ 1,771,000	
UNHCR					
Requirements	\$ 13,744,500	\$ 4,370,000	\$ 15,609,400	\$ 33,723,900	73%
Contributions	\$ 13,733,538	\$ 2,664,409	\$ 8,133,856	\$ 24,531,803	
UNICEF					
Requirements	\$ 41,393,000	\$ 46,923,200	\$ 43,573,000	\$ 131,889,200	54%
Contributions	\$ 21,456,740	\$ 22,084,231	\$ 27,622,072	\$ 71,163,043	
UNV					
Requirements	\$ 720,000	\$ 100,000	\$ -	\$ 820,000	17%
Contributions	\$ 108,953	\$ 29,180	\$ -	\$ 138,133	
WFP					
Requirements	\$ 116,785,280	\$ 122,930,429	\$ 26,434,912	\$ 266,150,621	60%
Contributions	\$ 65,833,206	\$ 78,922,409	\$ 13,768,323	\$ 158,523,938	
WHO					
Requirements	\$ 12,713,000	\$ 8,280,000	\$ 8,510,000	\$ 29,503,000	1%
Contributions	\$ 298,507	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 298,507	
<b>Total Requirements</b>	<b>\$ 194,536,780</b>	<b>\$ 185,936,129</b>	<b>\$ 101,082,462</b>	<b>\$ 481,555,371</b>	<b>53%</b>
<b>Total Contributions</b>	<b>\$ 102,334,062</b>	<b>\$ 104,610,587</b>	<b>\$ 50,656,251</b>	<b>\$ 257,600,900</b>	<b>53%</b>
<b>Response</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>56%</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>53%</b>	
<b>Outside United Nations</b>	<b>\$ 116,834,960</b>	<b>\$ 110,590,520</b>	<b>\$ 81,163,995</b>	<b>\$ 308,589,475</b>	
<b>Total Contributions</b>	<b>\$ 219,169,022</b>	<b>\$ 215,201,107</b>	<b>\$ 131,820,246</b>	<b>\$ 566,190,375</b>	

**Figure 8.4: Donor contributions to the UN Sudan appeals**

Donor	Year			Total
	1993	1994	1995	
Australia	\$ 1,060,610	\$ 545,475	\$ 404,000	\$ 2,010,085
Austria	\$ 43,860	\$ 90,090	\$ -	\$ 133,950
Belgium	\$ -	\$ 1,760,456	\$ -	\$ 1,760,456
Canada	\$ 4,002,143	\$ 6,411,964	\$ 3,155,649	\$ 13,569,756
Cyprus	\$ -	\$ 5,000	\$ 1,500	\$ 6,500
Denmark	\$ -	\$ 644,122	\$ 1,621,622	\$ 2,265,744
EU	\$ 15,727,632	\$ 25,346,977	\$ 6,644,996	\$ 47,719,605
FAO/TCP	\$ 90,000	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 90,000
Finland	\$ 709,410	\$ 1,380,944	\$ 802,471	\$ 2,892,825
Germany	\$ 117,647	\$ 299,401	\$ 803,478	\$ 1,220,526
Indonesia	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 24,984	\$ 24,984
Ireland	\$ 461,706	\$ 71,428	\$ 264,706	\$ 797,840
Italy	\$ 623,053	\$ 741,118	\$ 65,118	\$ 1,429,289
Japan	\$ 9,014,020	\$ 5,139,009	\$ 3,609,591	\$ 17,762,620
Micronesia	\$ 300	\$ 1,000	\$ -	\$ 1,300
Netherlands	\$ 12,553,436	\$ 14,204,812	\$ 17,431,672	\$ 44,189,920
New Zealand	\$ 54,054	\$ -	\$ 100,000	\$ 154,054
Norway	\$ -	\$ 80,469	\$ 2,668,338	\$ 2,748,807
Others	\$ 478,964	\$ 3,155,403	\$ 557,948	\$ 4,192,315
Spain	\$ 135,935	\$ -	\$ 50,000	\$ 185,935
Sweden	\$ 6,396,522	\$ 4,960,265	\$ 2,089,426	\$ 13,446,213
Switzerland	\$ 727,310	\$ 1,874,250	\$ 819,672	\$ 3,421,232
Turkey	\$ -	\$ 10,000	\$ -	\$ 10,000
UNHCR General Program Funds	\$ 9,621,682	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 9,621,682
UNICEF National Committees	\$ 4,167,239	\$ 3,625,889	\$ 2,271,352	\$ 10,064,480
United Kingdom	\$ 2,457,118	\$ 3,890,271	\$ 3,645,728	\$ 9,993,117
USA	\$ 37,371,990	\$ 33,787,125	\$ 3,624,000	\$ 74,783,115
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 105,814,631</b>	<b>\$ 108,025,468</b>	<b>\$ 50,656,251</b>	<b>\$ 64,496,350</b>

Despite small discrepancies in the way various amounts are allocated, it is possible to identify a number of key trends in funding patterns from these Figures.


First, contributions to NGOs have been larger than those to UN agencies for the three year period 1993 to 1995. Since not all NGO funding received is reported to DHA, NGOs will in fact have received a larger share than is indicated.

Second, when the drought disaster was over in 1995, contributions decreased. This decrease was sharper for the UN than for NGOs. In 1995, contributions to UN agencies were less than half of what they had been in 1993 and 1994, although this is mitigated to some extent by the value of WFP food stocks carried forward to 1995.

Third, over the three year period the donor community underwrote the Consolidated Appeals at a level of only 53% of stated requirements. Although this percentage is affected by the way DHA reported food aid contributions, and although NGO appeal figures are not known, the Review Team nevertheless feels confident to say that in 1995, only 50% of requirements were met by donors.

The pattern of donor funding for the three year period, and the shares of funding provided to UN agencies versus NGOs, is illustrated graphically in Figure 8.5 below.

Figure 8.5:



### 8.2.3 Sector Requirements and Donor Response

Information on the sectoral composition of grants received is available only for the UN agencies, and is provided in Figure 8.6 below. The Figure illustrates the dominance of the food sector, including emergency food aid, nutrition programs, and Household Food Security interventions aimed at rehabilitating local production. In comparison, other program shares are small. The fact that multisectoral activities make up only 15% of the total is indicative of a high degree of donor earmarking.



**Figure 8.6:**

<b>Sectoral composition, 1993 - 95</b>		Of OLS sectoral programs	Of total
<b>I. OLS sectoral programs</b>			
<i>Education</i>	\$ 4,604,665		3%
<i>Emergency Food Aid</i>	\$ 73,435,298		55%
<i>Health</i>	\$ 11,981,493		9%
<i>Nutrition and Food Security</i>	\$ 15,762,021		12%
<i>Water and Sanitation</i>	\$ 8,407,701		6%
<i>Multisectoral and sundry</i>	\$ 20,170,580		15%
(Subtotal:)	\$ 134,361,758	100%	51%
<b>II. Refugee Assistance</b>	\$ 20,852,111		8%
<b>III. Logistics</b>	\$ 97,563,057		37%
<b>IV. Program Support</b>	\$ 11,719,424		4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 264,496,350</b>		<b>100%</b>

As can be seen from the Figure, humanitarian activities in the Sudan are logistically demanding; not less than 37% of all UN receipts go to logistics. At the same time it should be remembered that the UN provides logistical support to NGOs for free, including the transport of their own program inputs. Hence, the USD 97.5 million cited in the table actually supported a greater volume of OLS logistical activity than Figure 8.6 suggests.

The same holds true for program support, given the manifold co-ordination and support functions that the UN provides to NGOs participating in OLS. The 4% that program support receives as indicated in Figure 8.6 thus appears very low, and we must suppose that a considerable amount of support costs are charged to programs. The low figure indicated may also reflect a genuine lack of donor support for this budget item - seen, for example, in the fact that monitoring and evaluation units have been unable to fill key posts.

Hence, the Review Team felt that for an operation of the size and complexity of OLS, program support appears profoundly underfinanced, and consequently dependent on major transfers from logistics and sector-specific budgets.

#### **8.2.4 UN Agency Requirements and Donor Response**

Given their specialisation, comparisons of funds received for individual UN agencies tends to follow donor funding priorities for different types of interventions. Within the

Consolidated Appeal, UN agencies not only received different levels of donor support overall, but also different levels of response to stated requirements. Figure 8.7 indicates these levels.

**Figure 8.7: Response to agency appeals**

<b>Agency</b>		<b>Total 1993 - 95</b>	<b>Response</b>
DHA	Requirements	\$ 798,000	44%
	Contributions	\$ 349,674	
FAO	Requirements	\$ 11,216,650	7%
	Contributions	\$ 824,802	
UNDP	Requirements	\$ 7,454,000	24%
	Contributions	\$ 1,771,000	
UNHCR	Requirements	\$ 33,723,900	73%
	Contributions	\$ 24,531,803	
UNICEF	Requirements	\$ 131,889,200	54%
	Contributions	\$ 71,163,043	
UNV	Requirements	\$ 820,000	17%
	Contributions	\$ 138,133	
WFP	Requirements	\$ 266,150,621	60%
	Contributions	\$ 158,523,938	
WHO	Requirements	\$ 29,503,000	1%
	Contributions	\$ 298,507	
<b>Total Requirements</b>		<b>\$ 481,555,371</b>	<b>53%</b>
<b>Total Contributions</b>		<b>\$ 257,600,900</b>	

As can be seen from Figure 8.7, UNHCR had the highest level of donor response to stated requirements, followed by the WFP. In fact, WFP's level of donor response in relation to requirements rises if the NGO-channelled part of its requisitions are removed from the calculation.

### **8.2.5 Importance of Various Donors**

For the period 1993 to 1995, contributions to OLS were raised from 22 countries, the European Union, various UNICEF National Committees, and a small number of NGO and private sources. DHA tables also make note of 156,000 MT of sorghum donated to OLS by the GOS in 1993, but this food is not monetised. DHA also noted some internal contributions from UN agencies, but for our purposes, USD 1,857,230 of carry-over funds from 1993 is excluded from analysis.

The USA emerges as the largest donor for the entire period, contributing USD 75 million to the UN agencies covered by the Appeals. The US contribution is trailed by those of the European Union (USD 48 million) and the Netherlands (USD 44 million). These three donors together account for 63% of all contributions for 1993 to 1995. However, over the space two years, the importance of individual donor countries changed substantially. Figure 8.8 ranks donors by their relative importance in 1993 and in 1995:

**Figure 8.8: Donors ranked by their 1995 contributions**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Rank 1993</b>	<b>Rank 1995</b>
Netherlands	3	1
European Union	2	2
United Kingdom	8	3
USA	1	4
Japan	4	5
Canada	7	6
Norway	20	7
UNICEF National Committees	6	8
Sweden	5	9
Denmark	20	10
Switzerland	10	11
Germany	16	12
Finland	11	13
NGOs and Private	13	14
Australia	9	15
Ireland	14	16
New Zealand	17	17
Italy	12	18
Spain	15	19
Indonesia	20	20
Cyprus	20	21
Belgium	20	22
Austria	18	22
Turkey	20	22
Micronesia	19	22


### 8.2.6 Funding for Northern and Southern Sectors

As well as being earmarked for specific programs, donors contributions to OLS are also earmarked according to Northern and Southern Sector. However, the extent to which funds were earmarked in this way does not appear in DHA grant tables until 1995. In that year, out of a total of USD 51 million, DHA reports that USD 5 million and USD 11 million were earmarked for Northern and Southern Sectors, respectively. These figures refer to funds received in addition to other grants that are understood to be used

predominantly in one sector or the other - for example, those for air operations. Hence, it is difficult to exactly determine funding shares for the Northern and Southern Sectors from DHA grant tables.

A different set of indicators of North/South sector shares is available from agency expenditure data. Such data is available from UNICEF, and for a longer period of time than DHA financial data covers. The variable that allows for comparison of Northern and Southern sectors is expenditure authorisations, known as Program Budget Authorisation (PBA) callforwards. Although several million dollars may be carried over as unutilized authorisations from one year to the next, PBAs called by sector nevertheless illustrate the magnitude of respective sector strength. Yearly sector totals are presented in Figure 8.9 below.

**Figure 8.9**



In this Figure, the growing difference between Southern and Northern Sector spending after 1992 is clearly visible. This is explained in large part by the higher logistical costs of the Southern Sector operation - USD 14.4 million in 1994 and USD 7.6 million in 1995 for UNICEF-rendered services alone.

At the same time, the difference between Northern and Southern Sector spending is also influenced by the fact that the UNICEF Khartoum office administers both OLS Northern Sector programs, and UNICEF's country program - a situation distinct from UNICEF Southern Sector, which administers only the OLS operation. Looking at expenditures that UNICEF Khartoum charged to the OLS cost centre, Northern Sector annual averages were fairly constant at approximately USD 11 million for the period 1991 through 1993. Expenditure for OLS then dropped to USD 7 million in 1994, and USD 6

million in 1995, when larger shares of available funds were channelled to parts of the Sudan country program.

PBA data is summarised by year and project type in Figure 8.10 below

**Figure 8.10: UNICEF / OLS: PBAs called, by project type and year**  
*Northern Sector*

PROJECT TYPE	Key	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total	
EPI	1	#N/A	\$ 271,000	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	1,065,777	\$ 70,754	\$ 1,407,531
Health	2	#N/A	\$ 1,900,630	\$ 4,651,918	\$ 1,370,554	\$ 1,896,534	\$ 164,598	\$ 1,111,450	\$ 11,095,682	
Nutrition	3	#N/A	\$ 830,096	\$ 4,077,657	\$ 259,929	\$ 436,204	\$ 253,943	\$ 180,021	\$ 6,037,850	
WES	4	#N/A	\$ 1,640,000	\$ 7,093,413	\$ 2,363,295	\$ 2,549,417	\$ 661,460	\$ 1,002,122	\$ 15,309,707	
Shelter	5	#N/A	\$ 182,079	\$ 400,819	\$ 2,791,808	\$ 1,036,358	\$ 520,826	\$ 324,812	\$ 5,256,701	
Logistics	6	#N/A	\$ 393,995	\$	- \$	- \$	1,003,343	\$ 140,604	\$ 129,973	\$ 1,667,916
Education	7	#N/A	\$ 50,000	\$	- \$	- \$	588,955	\$ 767,434	\$ 801,927	\$ 2,208,316
Household Food Security	8	#N/A	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	152,660	\$ 294,877	\$ 1,447,537
Planning	9	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A
Monitoring and Evaluation	10	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A
Program Support	11	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A
<b>Total</b>		#N/A	\$ 5,267,800	\$ 16,223,806	\$ 6,785,586	\$ 7,510,811	\$ 4,727,302	\$ 3,915,935	\$ 44,431,240	

*Southern Sector*

PROJECT TYPE	Key	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
EPI	1	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A
Health	2	\$ 861,115	\$ 2,074,199	\$ 2,044,516	\$ 3,816,718	\$ 797,870	\$ 1,787,853	\$ 11,382,270	
Nutrition	3	\$ 251,441	\$ 887,354	\$ 437,694	\$ 1,556,693	\$ 824,195	\$ 147,457	\$ 4,104,833	
WES	4	\$ 146,186	\$ 602,215	\$ 469,686	\$ 784,666	\$ 500,490	\$ 972,259	\$ 3,475,501	
Shelter	5	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A
Logistics and Airdrops	6	\$ 35,596	\$ 3,197,825	\$ 3,979,035	\$ 4,853,447	\$ 8,727,838	\$ 14,414,571	\$ 7,552,896	\$ 42,761,208
Education	7	\$ 38,176	\$ 71,729	\$	- \$	- \$	108,537	\$ 974,990	\$ 1,193,431
HHFS	8	\$ 101,526	\$ 1,765,029	\$ 530,862	\$ 1,140,692	\$ 1,120,436	\$ 3,317,929	\$ 3,021,456	\$ 10,997,930
Planning	9	\$ 24,572	\$ 127,330	\$ 2,749	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	\$ 154,651
Monitoring and Evaluation	10	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	\$ 101,459
Program Support	11	\$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	- \$	\$ 2,455,345
<b>Total</b>		\$ 137,122	\$ 6,284,344	\$ 8,272,723	\$ 8,948,783	\$ 16,006,350	\$ 19,963,591	\$ 17,013,714	\$ 76,626,628

*Both Sectors*

PROJECT TYPE	Key	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
EPI	1	\$ -	\$ 271,000	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 1,065,777	\$ 70,754	\$ 1,407,531
Health	2	\$ -	\$ 2,761,745	\$ 6,726,117	\$ 3,415,070	\$ 5,713,252	\$ 962,467	\$ 2,899,302	\$ 22,477,952
Nutrition	3	\$ -	\$ 1,081,537	\$ 4,965,010	\$ 697,623	\$ 1,992,898	\$ 1,078,137	\$ 327,477	\$ 10,142,682
WES	4	\$ -	\$ 1,786,186	\$ 7,695,628	\$ 2,832,981	\$ 3,334,082	\$ 1,161,950	\$ 1,974,381	\$ 18,785,208
Shelter	5	\$ -	\$ 182,079	\$ 400,819	\$ 2,791,808	\$ 1,036,358	\$ 520,826	\$ 324,812	\$ 5,256,701
Logistics and Airdrops	6	\$ 35,596	\$ 3,591,821	\$ 3,979,035	\$ 4,853,447	\$ 9,731,181	\$ 14,555,176	\$ 7,682,869	\$ 44,429,124
Education	7	\$ -	\$ 88,176	\$ 71,729	\$ -	\$ 588,955	\$ 875,970	\$ 1,776,917	\$ 3,401,747
HHFS	8	\$ 101,526	\$ 1,765,029	\$ 530,862	\$ 1,140,692	\$ 1,120,436	\$ 4,470,589	\$ 3,316,333	\$ 12,445,466
Planning	9	\$ -	\$ 24,572	\$ 127,330	\$ 2,749	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 154,651
Monitoring and Evaluation	10	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 101,459	\$ 101,459
Program Support	11	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 2,455,345	\$ 2,455,345
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$ 137,122</b>	<b>\$ 11,552,144</b>	<b>\$ 24,496,529</b>	<b>\$ 15,734,369</b>	<b>\$ 23,517,161</b>	<b>\$ 24,690,893</b>	<b>\$ 20,929,649</b>	<b>\$ 121,057,868</b>

While these various indicators - grants, authorisations, expenditure - are not fully comparable, they do document the preponderance that the Southern Sector established after 1992.

## 8.2.7 Problems in New Trends of Donor Funding

Our analysis has been based on yearly figures that do not reveal the interaction between donors and UN agencies on a shorter time scale. The Review Team was told, however, that in the two past years donors have tended to make commitments in more piece-meal and short-term fashion, thereby compromising both funding certainty and flexibility for OLS agencies. This has special and important repercussions for the planning of logistics, where relatively large contracts are involved. Failure to contract transporters in a timely manner due to funding uncertainties compounds the difficulties of access and coordination, and negatively affects programs. Hence, the Review Team noted that donors must be aware of the penalties - in terms of the interests of program beneficiaries - that the new trend in donations to OLS involves.

## 8.3 Logistics

### 8.3.1 Overview

The distinction in the nature of logistics between the Southern and Northern Sectors of OLS can be seen in the difference in amount of relief commodities handled by air versus other kinds of transport modes.

In 1995, for example, the WFP Northern Sector moved only 470 MT of relief food by air; an additional 6,992 MT were moved by land and train, and 3,733 MT by river.

In contrast, the WFP Southern Sector moved 9,791 MT by air out of Lokichokkio in 1995; an additional 2,855 MT was moved by road. To this should be added 27,000 MT of relief commodities arranged by NGOs and trucked by land, mainly to Equatoria, and the supply flights of UNICEF (for which we do not have complete data for any year). For the Southern Sector, air cargo volume actually shrank between 1994 and 1995.

### 8.3.2 The Southern Sector

WFP Nairobi, arriving at a slightly different tonnage from the above values, breaks deliveries down for both 1994 and 1995 as indicated in Figure 8.11 below:

Figure 8.11: WFP air cargo ex Lokichokkio

Region	1994		1995	
	Food (MT)	Non-food (MT)	Food (MT)	Non-food (MT)
Bahr-el-Ghazal	4,906	358	3,157	268
E. Equatoria	1,297	161	85	34
Jonglei	7,554	546	6,184	299
Lakes	1,733	258	464	253
Upper Nile	1,341	161	176	29
W. Equatoria	602	682	27	457
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,433</b>	<b>2,166</b>	<b>10,093</b>	<b>1,340</b>



From Figure 8.11 it is possible to see the prioritisation of relief flights to the needy areas of Jonglei and Bahr-el-Ghazal during 1995, when OLS faced budget and access problems. Equally striking is the high and increasing share that Western Equatoria held in non-food cargo. What this indicates to the Review Team is that development efforts have taken firm root in OLS policies, and are not being dislodged by logistical constraints. This is corroborated by another observation: OLS NGOs, generally considered in the frontline of development efforts, contributed a low portion to the total WFP-handled food air cargo (less than a fifth), but accounted for two thirds of the non-food tonnage in both years.

However, cargo figures give only a partial view. The transition from emergency to development favoured by the Southern Sector calls for an increasing number of meetings, program visits, training workshops, and other events for which passengers must be transported.

OLS has responded to this escalating demand for passenger transportation; in 1995, there were some 11,000 passenger return trips between Lokichokkio and South Sudan on OLS aircraft (Maj, 1996, April 17). Similar data for previous years was not available, but the Logistics Co-ordinator at Lokichokkio estimates that outbound passenger figures rose from 300 per month in 1994 to 900 per month in 1995. Recently, there appears to have been a reduction in such traffic; for example, the Sudan-bound passenger table prepared by WFP Lokichokkio for January 1996 shows that 457 persons from 38 agencies were flown to 32 different locations.

In addition, commuting facilities have been expanded between Nairobi and Lokichokkio. At the time of the review, European Union/ECHO-operated flights carried 35 passengers between these two points five times a week. The air operations undoubtedly help to keep organisational networks in the South well connected with their sponsors based in Kenya.

In general, the Review Team received the impression that, despite the compression of air cargo due to access and funding limitations, WFP has remained an effective logistics agent for the UNICEF/NGO-led operation.

### **8.3.3 The Northern Sector**

For the Northern Sector, developments in logistics are of a different kind; in 1994, the sector expanded its barge and train operations, due to greater access as well as cost-cutting strategies. In 1995, however, both of those transport modes suffered sharp reversals. No relief trains arrived in Wau, and barge cargo dropped to less than a fifth of its 1994 volume, representing considerably more than the proportional reduction in total WFP relief food. The number of barge voyages also dropped, as indicated in Figure 8.12.

**Figure 8.12: WFP barge operations**

Year	Voyages	Total cargo (MT)
1991	9	7,788
1992	10	14,351
1993	16	22,128
1994	27	23,155
1995	7	3,968

Source: WFP Khartoum, Logistics section, April 1996

Similarly, UNICEF barge missions were reduced from 11 in 1994 to only three in 1995 (Tayyara, 1996, March 28). Problems in obtaining flight authorisation, and restrictions that NGOs face in the use of radio equipment, have greatly reduced confidence that OLS operations could, in future, be wholly dependent on river and rail corridors, as well as on secondary transport from GOS-held towns such as Malakal.

#### **8.3.4 Comparisons Between Sectors**

As a result, ideas concerning improvements in logistics vary greatly between Northern and Southern Sectors. In the North, difficulties are attributed chiefly to restrictions in access by the Government of Sudan. UN agencies in Khartoum, therefore, are not susceptible to the same kind of criticism as UN OLS agencies in the South, since it perceived that access - the key component of the operation - is beyond their control.

In the South, rebel movements are rarely accused of obstructing access for OLS air operations. Rather, Southern Sector NGOs direct their criticism of UN agencies toward the issue of persistent cargo backlogs. In particular, NGOs claim that UNICEF has provided poor leadership on this issue, and has been insensitive to the priorities expressed by NGOs. As a solution, NGOs operating in the Southern Sector want a greater say in decision-making concerning the prioritisation of cargo. The UN agencies maintain, on the other hand, that there is a legitimate difference between OLS priorities and NGO priorities, and that its cargo prioritisation has been weighted toward the former.

In general, the Review Team felt that it was not in a position to evaluate the technical competence of logistics sectors. However, with regard to the issue of cargo prioritisation in the Southern Sector, the Review Team was surprised to note how little the extent of free access to cargo transport was questioned.

Few NGOs have the resources to pay for the movement of their inputs (Vicary, 1996, April 13). They receive transport of cargo and passengers for free, and expect to continue receiving it for free. The demand for transport, therefore, is limited only by opportunity cost - in other words, whether or not organisations could make better use of their resources in places other than Lokichokkio and South Sudan. The demand for transport to South Sudan is also increased by the increased movement of people between Nairobi and Lokichokkio.

The Review Team felt that, regardless of improvements in management, demand cannot be possibly met and frustrations will continue as long as NGOs are not required to pay for transport, and therefore have no incentive to balance transport decisions with other aspects of their budgets. In an April 14 meeting of NGOs, this problem may have underpinned the proposal that UN, NGOs, and donors consider contracting out the air operation to a private company (Philippino, 1996, April 4). In the meantime, some of the bigger NGOs have formed a consortium to buy cargo space privately. While this should help reduce the cargo backlog, such arrangements have their own dangers; they may, for example, complicate logistics management, and marginalise smaller NGOs.

### **8.3.5 Timeliness in Commodity Delivery**

Timeliness in the delivery of relief commodities is crucial for those operations that need to take account of seasonality, production deadlines, or continuity of inputs. Food relief prior to harvest, the provision of seed prior to planting, and regular supplies of medical kits are some examples.

For UNICEF, Letters of Understanding are signed with participating NGOs that state the quantities of key program inputs and their approximate delivery times. For WFP, the aim is to deliver the greater part of annual food aid needs during the first half of the year. Indeed, the WFP Southern Sector set itself a precise objective in this regard - that in 1996, some 79% of the 18,609 MT relief food needed during the entire year should be distributed between January and the end of July.

Complaints about delayed deliveries are common. There is a the backlog of cargo physically in OLS warehouses, awaiting onward transport. Discontent with this kind of situation has been most vocally expressed in Lokichokkio, as noted above. In general, problems with onward transport of cargo take different forms. First, it may happen that transport of food aid is prioritised, when participating organisations agree that seeds should have priority for the time of year. NGOs may also have different priorities related to their specific programs, as for example when cement bags for the construction of clinics are held back for considerable periods of time.

Secondly, overseas procurement may run into delays and frustrate work schedules. This is held notably against the UNICEF centralised medical supplies from Copenhagen. Third, constraints may arise from factors that lay outside of OLS agency control; for example, insecurity, lack of access, and donor decision-making.

In order to assess the timeliness of deliveries, the Review Team concentrated on a case study of monthly food deliveries by WFP. These provide a useful indicator of

timeliness, and can also be matched against a precise objective stated by WFP itself - that 79% of yearly food needs be met the end of July in the Southern Sector). It should be noted that data for the Northern Sector was not accessible. This objective is relevant for the years 1994 and 1995; years previous to 1994 were drought years, and hence represented extraordinary circumstances with regard to the timing of food commodities.

The Review Team obtained data from the WFP Nairobi logistics office. Figure 8.13 below presents this data (which, at least for 1994, differs from that found in other sources).

**Figure 8.13: WFP relief food deliveries (MT), Southern Sector 1992 - 1995**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Needs S. Sector, whole year</b>	<b>Deliveries, whole year</b>	<b>Deliveries January - July</b>	<b>Deliveries, whole year vs. need</b>	<b>Jan. - July vs. total deliveries</b>
1992	93,192	3,980	2,023	4%	51%
1993	55,000	22,739	9,243	41%	41%
1994	62,040	24,854	18,172	40%	73%
1995	21,311	12,289	10,382	58%	84%

According to its own standard, WFP deliveries were thus timely: 73% in 1994 and 84% in 1995 of all relief food was distributed in the first seven months of the year.

At the same time, these figures must be considered in the broader context of the total amount of relief commodities delivered during the year. As seen above, in 1994 only 40% of needs were met for the entire year. For 1995, the figure is approximately 60% of total needs. Hence, relative to actual needs of beneficiaries during the period of lowest food supply, beneficiaries received only approximately 30% of requirements during this critical period. Comparison of the two indicators thus suggests that timeliness in delivery is less determined by logistics per se, than by overall access of the operation and levels of donor support.

NGO views regarding timeliness are more critical, however, and focus more specifically on logistical arrangements. NGOs noted, for example, that in March 1996, OLS failed to place heavy lift aircraft in Lokichokio for the fourth year running, which could have ensured that seeds as well as food commodities were moved in a timely manner (Philippino, 1996, April 4).

## **8.4 Cost Effectiveness**

### **8.4.1 Overview**

The cost of large-scale relief operations is an important issue for donor governments. The fact that OLS is a long-running operation has made this a pressing issue. It should not be forgotten, however, that the war has been running even longer, and it is because

of the war that OLS exists. Moreover, there is a danger of seeing cost-effectiveness within a narrow national focus.

As an informal safe area program, OLS is part of an international trend to contain and ameliorate the humanitarian effects of internal war. Refugee populations are increasingly unwelcome. In so far as OLS assistance can be argued to be dissuading Southern Sudanese from becoming refugees in neighbouring countries, it may be saving a potentially higher bill.

Regarding OLS, a major concern has been its heavy reliance on expensive air transport. Since the early 1990s, there has been a pressure to make greater use of more cost-effective road, rail and river transport. While this is understandable, an attitude exists among some donors and agencies that that the issue is mainly a technical matter. As if, in a war situation, modes of transport, points of origin, and so on, have no political bearing. However, an examination of the negotiations that have formed the various OLS agreements give a different picture. These modalities are just as sensitive as destinations and deliver points. Indeed, where agreement has been reached on corridors and transport modalities, it has usually been as part of a political balancing act.

This situation is illustrated in the 1994 negotiations that led to the first signed OLS agreements. The agreements of March and May, which largely served to improve air access to South Sudan, were reached under IGADD auspices. Beneath the apparent success of the 1994 agreements, however, a different story was played out. A tale which has direct relevance to the current question of cost-effectiveness. This concerned the failed attempt to increase savings by the approval of cross-line modalities for road transport. During 1993, as Southern Sector activities expanded, the long-standing donor concern to reduce transport costs was restated. Through DHA intervention, this resulted in January 1994 proximity talks between the warring parties in Nairobi (Traxler, 1994, Jan 27). The intention was to open more cross-border road routes from Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries. A proposal which would only work if, after the fashion of Bosnia, modalities were agreed allowing convoys to pass across GOS and movement lines.

While the January proximity talks achieved broad agreement on principle, as the negotiations proceeded, it became evident that the conduct of both sides was dictated by military considerations (bid). Since mine clearance would be involved, the warring parties were anxious that any cross-line arrangement should not weaken either their defensive or siege lines. In March an agreement was signed which covered only the general principles underpinning humanitarian aid (GOK, 1994, March 23). Between March and the May agreement on implementation, the need to increase cross-line access was returned to. In these meetings, the government opposed cross-border access from neighbouring countries. Not without a degree of self-interest, the movements accused it of pursuing a military agenda (SPLM/A, 1994, April 12; SPLM/A United, 1994, April 13). Despite lobbying by IGADD members, the attempt to gain a cross-line agreement again failed. This was attributed to both military sensitivity (Tayyarah, 1994, May 15) and that any agreement on fixed crossing points may have contradicted GOS territorial claims (O'Brien, 1994, August 1).

The implementation agreement of May 17 (GOK, 1994), apart from promising to continue to examine the issue of cross-line modalities under IGADD auspices, allowed for an expansion of OLS largely along existing lines. Especially the approval of 77 flight locations in South Sudan - a more than three-fold increase over the agreement of September 1992. OLS, however, continued to press the issue of securing a cross-line agreement until at least the end of 1994 (UNICEF/OLS, 1994, November). Despite the knowledge that it did not have government support.

Since 1994 and the stalling of the IGADD mediation process, the question of improving cost-savings through a cross-line agreement has slipped from view. It has been replaced by increasing GOS pressure that cost-effectiveness can be improved by moving more, if not all, OLS commodities along improved routes originating from the North. Moreover, since November 1995, it has rejected the tripartite basis of the 1994 agreement. Because GOS and frequently suggested such a switch would produce large savings, using available information the following is an attempt to estimate what that magnitude might be.

#### **8.4.2 Cost Effectiveness and Reporting**

The Review Team found a number of challenges in studying the issue of cost effectiveness, as a result of limitations in the production and dissemination of financial information within OLS.

First, in the Consolidated Appeal, UN agencies calculate what the cost of their operations will be for the coming year, and compare this with grants received from the previous year. This enables WFP, for example, to estimate unit costs. However, the Consolidated Appeal does not include a comprehensive income and expenditure statement for the operational year just completed, nor does it provide an expenditure projection for the operational year during which the appeal is prepared.

Second, financial information is uneven within the UN/OLS agencies themselves. The two main agencies of OLS - UNICEF and WFP - observe different practices regarding financial information-sharing between their respective headquarters and field offices.

For example, UNICEF field offices receive comprehensive income and expenditure statements on their operations at the close of annual accounts each year (Gerity, 1996, April 26).

WFP headquarters, on the other hand, does not prepare annual statements of income and expenditure for field offices. Instead, WFP headquarters monitors expenditures according to projects, which may comprise only a portion of the total operation and which may be ongoing for several years. Further, WFP field offices are not privy to many contracts paid directly by Rome, and are told little about sources of funding outside a current year's grants, including WFP's own reserves (Oberle, 1996, April 26). While the present system is designed with an eye toward facilitating WFP's accountability to donors (McMahon, 1996, May 14), it does render cost control in the field problematic; in effect, WFP field offices do not know the total cost of their operations.

This asymmetry from what is considered normal financial reporting practice is odd, but has a parallel in another reporting disparity. As seen earlier, WFP assesses annual needs for specific areas; WFP delivery reports, however, do not refer to these areas. Consequently, it is not possible to analyse the extent of needs fulfilment from the delivery reports.

To respond to concerns for greater transparency and effective cost control, it may be useful in future to produce for the Consolidated Appeal tables comparing the final income and expenditure figures for the previous year, projections for the year being closed, and the requirements for the appeal year side-by-side. This would also make for greater realism than the Appeals offer at present, since requirements are often undersubscribed by donors, and contributions are not necessarily made on a financial year basis.

### **8.4.3 Innovations in Cost Reporting Within Field Offices**

When field offices do not know the major cost components of their operations, an analysis of cost effectiveness becomes difficult. Nevertheless, various units in the Northern and Southern sectors have made efforts on their own initiative to shed light on cost structures that are of particular concern to them.

Not surprisingly, the most advanced cost effectiveness thinking is to be found in logistics. Many contracts involving logistics are made locally, and the logistics sections of both WFP and UNICEF maintain efficient information systems. Further, cargo weight provides a straightforward common denominator for different types of cost comparisons. Examples of relevant cost-effectiveness studies in the logistics sector include:

- \* Cost effectiveness study of OLS aircraft operations (Cowater International Inc., 1994, September 15).
- \* Possibilities of a cross-border pipeline to South Sudan from western Ethiopia (Middleton, 1994, October).
- \* Comparative cost of barge operations (WFP, 1996, March 26)

There have also been advances in the cost thinking of some program sections, which are linked to a general relief-to-development continuum approach, and epitomised in the oft-quoted observation that one kilogram of airlifted food for Juba is eight times more expensive than arranging for it to be grown locally (Jaeger, 1996, March 24). Notable among these are the UNICEF seeds distribution and veterinary cost recovery programs. The most detailed and ambitious study to date, however, is a feasibility study on buying and transporting surplus food commodities from Western Equatoria, for use in neighbouring regions; this study was included in the broader objective of revitalising the Western Equatoria economy through the expansion of an NGO-led barter scheme (Anyanzo, 1995, September: Table 6).

Finally, in 1995 the WFP Country Director submitted to the GOS a table indicating costs and food aid quantities delivered by various transport modes (WFP, 1995, March 4). It is important to note this communication, since, as will be seen below, certain assumptions concerning transport costs were communicated to the GOS as a result. WFP's table was a variable cost-only model, with different global CIF values and transport rates for each sector and mode of delivery. Importantly, no fixed costs were assumed. According to the table, the Country Director estimated that it cost USD 696 for WFP to field one metric ton of relief food.

#### **8.4.4 The Issue of Malakal Versus Lokichokkio**

Although the focus of this section is economic, it is worth placing the issue of cost effectiveness in a wider context. While usually considered an issue of concern mainly to donors, cost effectiveness has also become an issue for both sides in the conflict.

In particular, the GOS has stated that a major part of the operations presently run out of Lokichokkio should be relocated to bases within the Sudan. For accessing most of South Sudan, the GOS proposes a base in Malakal, which is supplied by Nile barges that move from Kosti. Air distances to major humanitarian intervention zones, such as northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and large parts of Jonglei, are also shorter from Malakal than from Lokichokkio.

The proposed transfer of operations from Lokichokkio to Malakal is contentious. The SPLA has stated it will not allow relief flights to run out of GOS-controlled towns. Further, OLS agencies have articulated a number of important concerns regarding Malakal, including: reliability of supplies and communications, security, living conditions of OLS personnel, and concerns about donor willingness to invest in a new logistical infrastructure.

The issue of moving a major part of logistics to Malakal has been raised at various times. WFP proposed the establishment of a logistics base there in the 1994 appeal, at a cost of USD 411,000 for a rudimentary structure. The matter was subsequently put on hold. Lately, another proposal has surfaced - that of using C-130 aircrafts based in Lokichokkio and returning there every evening, but doing the second of the days flight rotations out of Malakal. The WFP estimates that an investment of USD 80,000 would provide the necessary technical improvements to make this possible.

#### **8.4.5 Constructing a Model to Study Cost Effectiveness**

In this section, we construct a model that simulates the cost of operations using different transportation arrangements. The aim is to estimate the magnitude of savings that would be realised by shifting all deliveries to cheaper transportation modes and routes, under conditions of free access and free choice of transport modes. Having accomplished this, we will then modify the assumptions in our initial model to take account of restrictions in access and modes of transport, in order to test the sensitivity of presumed savings to such restrictions.



#### **8.4.5.1 Calculating a Baseline: WFP Food Transport in 1995**

We have taken WFP's 1995 food deliveries as the baseline for costing our model. This example is chosen because of the detailed data that is available on quantities delivered, transportation rates, and commodity values.

In 1995, WFP fielded a total of 23,841 MT of relief commodities to South Sudan. This included: from the Northern Sector, 470 MT delivered by air (to Juba), 6,992 MT delivered by land, and 3,733 MT delivered by river; from the Southern Sector, 9,791 MT delivered by air, and 2,855 MT delivered by land. Since WFP does not produce yearly statements, we have ourselves estimated the cost of the 1995 operation. Details of the technical assumptions made in this estimate are provided in Appendix 2.

According to our calculations, operational expenditure in 1995 broke down as follows: USD 6.3 million in the Northern Sector, and USD 16.1 million in the Southern Sector. (This assumes that 60% of all air deliveries for the year were made by C-130 aircrafts, before this type of aircraft was banned from OLS airspace). This calculation yields unit costs of USD 566/MT for the Northern Sector and USD 1,274/MT for the Southern Sector. It should be noted that the unit cost for the Southern Sector is higher than WFP's plan to supply emergency food aid at USD 1,090/MT in 1996, inclusive of aircraft and Lokichokio operations (WFP, 1996, April 9).

#### **8.4.5.2 Key Assumptions in Constructing the Model**

Five key assumptions have been made in constructing our model, which should be noted here in order to understand the limits of the modelling exercise; technical details of these are elaborated in Appendix 2.

\* Free access is assumed. That includes free choice of aircraft type. According to this scenario, 90% of food is delivered via less expensive airdrops from C-130 aircraft, and only 10% is landed on airstrips using Buffalo aircraft at a higher per ton and mile rate. As noted above, this was not the case in actual practice, since use of C-130 aircraft was not permitted as of July 1995. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to begin with the assumption of free choice of aircraft, to establish a baseline against which the cost effects of substituting cheaper arrangements can be meaningfully compared. The impact of restricted choice will then be re-introduced, to show its impact on costs.

\* Major costs include: purchase of food, field personnel, logistics (including infrastructure for field personnel and the transportation of commodities and personnel), and office costs. The direct food-related costs (CIF value, transportation) can be calculated using quantities, rates, and distribution patterns. Other costs, however, have been difficult to estimate. We assume that the full cost of offices and field personnel (including their logistics) in 1995 were underwritten by the grants effectively made during the program year, including USD 2.8 million for monitoring and USD 1.6 million for support costs. This USD 4.4 million comes close to the USD 4.5 million that WFP Rome estimates, but cannot break down into the two components (WFP, 1996, May 17). The grants values are, therefore, used as proxies values for monitoring and support expenses.

\* Fixed costs are indifferent to transfers between the Northern and Southern Sectors. In other words, office support for the operation comes at the same cost per MT of food delivered regardless of its origin in Khartoum or Nairobi. For the same reason, the simulation does not take into account the additional set-up costs necessary for Malakal to be used as an air operations base. Rather, support and logistics costs now attributed to Lokichokio will simply occur in Malakal in proportion to the volume shifted there. Since three-quarters of fieldtrips deal with assessment, and thus occur regardless of how much food is delivered, the cost of monitoring is also assumed to be the same for Khartoum and Nairobi.


\* Certain cost elements that the new arrangement would necessitate are not included. For barge and train operations - particularly for northern Bahr-el-Ghazal - secondary transportation costs from barge and train drop-points to distribution sites have not been included. Whereas many groups in need live within relatively short distance from one of the many bush airstrips, delivery by train and barge also requires onward transport to serve the entire catchment area. However, we are unable to define the costs of this onward transport in numeric terms. The omission may prove important, given the absence of trucks in most of South Sudan.

\* The potential of local procurement of food is not fully explored. Sorghum locally purchased in 1995 accounted for approximately 60% of cereals distributed by WFP Northern Sector. This left a potential savings of approximately USD 400,000 unused. However, we have not varied the proportion of locally purchased versus imported food for two reasons: first, food aid often comes as in-kind donations from donors (and the 1995 operation used large carry-over stocks from such donations), and second, the key variables with whose effect the model is concerned are transport arrangements.

#### **8.4.6 Analysis: Implications of Optimal Transport Substitution**

The 23,841 MT of relief commodities that WFP delivered in 1995 was sent to 138 different destinations, located in different areas. Looking at the history of conflict and needs, we can group these delivery points into 18 relatively homogeneous clusters, as shown in Figure 8.14.

•Figure 8.14: •“WFP Food Delivery Clusters”



	Region	Cluster
1	Bahr-el-Ghazal	Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal
2	Bahr-el-Ghazal	Wau Town
3	Bahr-el-Ghazal	Lakes
4	Equatoria	Western Equatoria surplus zone
5	Equatoria	Western Equatoria with IDP camps
6	Equatoria	Juba Town
7	Equatoria	Eastern Equatoria insecurity zone
8	Equatoria	Eastern Equatoria drought zone
9	Upper Nile	Jonglei war zone
10	Upper Nile	Pibor Pochalla area
11	Upper Nile	Western Upper Nile war zone
12	Upper Nile	Northern Jonglei factional fighting zone
13	Upper Nile	Sobat Chotbura war zone
14	Upper Nile	Renk Malakal
15	Transitional Zone	South Darfur
16	Transitional Zone	South Kordofan
17	Transitional Zone	Central State
18	Khartoum	Khartoum IDPs

Our model assumes that the same quantities of relief commodities must be delivered to the same destinations as in 1995. However, given our assumption of free access, we have optimised transport by substituting the most efficient modes. Details of the specific pattern of transport substitution used, and the way in which cost savings were calculated, are provided in Appendix 2. For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to highlight the following points.

According to our model, if deliveries are re-routed to optimise savings, we estimate that nine out of the 18 clusters of delivery sites will receive relief commodities through different transport modes than were actually used in 1995. Specifically, we estimate that as much as 10,385 MT of the total of 23,841 MT will be delivered via less expensive means, making greater use of river, road, and railway, and using Malakal as the base for the majority of air transport still necessary.

In our model, most of the re-routed 10,385 MT is now delivered by the Northern instead of Southern Sector. The new pattern of routing includes 4,296 MT supplied to the Northern Jonglei factional fighting zone by air from Malakal, and 3,303 MT supplied to Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal by train. Overall, this means a significant change in shares that the Northern and Southern Sectors have in the OLS operation. The Northern Sector will see its actual share of 47% of 1995 deliveries increase to 87% of deliveries in the substitution model; the Southern Sector will see its share decrease from 53% of 1995 deliveries to 13% in the model.

In terms of cost, implementing a full substitution of transport enables WFP to save an estimated USD 5.2 million, thereby reducing the total cost of the operation from USD 19.9 million to USD 14.7 million.

Although our model addresses concerns regarding cost effectiveness, it also throws up substantial new issues of a more structural and political nature, and begs the question as to whether or not opposition movements will agree to such dramatic changes in the share of the operation between North and South.

#### 8.4.7 Analysis: Comparative Cost

In the optimal-transport model we have constructed, most of the savings is made in the area of transport costs. Some savings are also made in procurement. Figure 8.15 below details costs for major components for both the 1995 baseline and our optimal-transport model.

Figure 8.15: Major cost components:

Cost	Baseline model	Optimal- transport model
CIF Value	\$ 5,613,673	\$ 5,378,246
Transport	\$ 9,862,988	\$ 4,935,122
Monitoring Fixed: Assessments	\$ 1,655,696	\$ 1,655,696
Monitoring Variable: Distributions	\$ 1,103,798	\$ 1,103,798
Support	\$ 1,644,350	\$ 1,644,350
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 19,880,506</b>	<b>\$ 14,717,212</b>

As can be seen in Figure 8.15, the savings thus realised would be 26% of the total cost. It should be remembered here that this savings is contingent on the operation of all of the assumptions noted above. Notably, it is assumed that the running costs of Malakal-based operations would be matched by savings in Lokichokio. Moreover, it is assumed that secondary transport needs from barge and train drop-points will not compress savings: in other words, that expensive trucks and road improvements will not be necessary, and that in areas supplied by surface transport, there remain no interior places dependent on air transport.

The 26% savings indicated in our optimal-transport model has been challenged by GOS representatives, who anticipated a much larger savings, and in this regard referred to transport cost figures submitted by WFP to the GOS in 1995. In the WFP's figures, however, transport costs absorb support and monitoring elements that are fixed in nature, and are not variable with the delivery pattern. In our model, these items are costed separately from transport, as fixed costs. Informally, WFP estimates air transport

savings to be in the neighbourhood of 60%, assuming that 5,000 MT per year would be flown out of Malakal (WFP, 1996, March/April). This is close to the 4,300 MT that we identify as shiftable to a Malakal air operation, with an estimated 52% reduction in air transport costs. However, as other cost factors remain high, the overall savings realised is far more modest than WFP's 1995 estimates for the GOS suggest.

#### **8.4.8 Testing the Model: Economies of Scale**

The 1995 WFP operation was considerably smaller than the previous year's operation. The cost of an operation commensurate with the scale of WFP deliveries in 1994 was estimated, in order to test the optimum-transport scenario for the effects of size.

In 1994, WFP delivered 85,129 MT of relief commodities. For the purposes of analysis, we can scale up our baseline of WFP's 1995 deliveries to reflect 1994 levels. This is done by assuming the following: that the destination of relief commodities remains exactly the same as in 1995, and in the same proportion relative to the total, that the ratio of local procurement to imported food is identical, and that CIF values, transport rates, and operational costs remain the same. By increasing the amount of food delivered to each cluster by 3.57 times, it is possible to scale-up the model to reflect the same level of operation as occurred in 1994.

When the scaled-up operation is costed according to the transport modes actually used by WFP in 1995, we found that total cost increased to USD 59.7 million. When the scaled-up operation is costed according to our optimum transport substitution model, however, the total cost is reduced to USD 41.2 million. This amounts to a 31% savings.

Thus, in our model, the savings rate does grow with the scale of operation, much as expected. In practice, however, costs for a larger scale of operation would also be affected by cheaper transport rates from large contracts, as well as by higher levels of investment in infrastructure needed for larger railway shipments and Malakal-based air operations.

#### **8.4.9 Testing the Model: Reduced Access and Limited Choice**

More importantly, the savings to be had from substantial shifts in transport routes and operational bases that we have modelled has to be weighed against the risk, and indeed the likelihood, that some of the basic assumptions we made will be violated. Foremost among these is free access to the areas in need, and free choice of transportation modes.


Consequently, we ran additional models to see the cost implications of restricted choice of transport modes. As noted above, OLS lost permission to use C-130 aircraft in July 1995. From then onward, OLS air transports had to rely on smaller, more expensive aircraft only. Keeping all other things equal, two modifications of our 1995 baseline were studied in order to simulate an extension of that kind of situation:

\* In the first model, the amount of relief commodities delivered remains similar to 1995, but no big aircraft can be used at all throughout the year. Deliveries by air rely instead on small Buffalo aircraft.

\* In the second model, no air delivery is possible; in retaliation, rail access is also blocked. Only areas accessible by road and river are serviced. The total amount of relief commodities delivered for the year therefore drops to 13,580 MT.

The impact of these various scenarios is calculated in terms of unit costs, or the total cost of delivering one ton of relief commodities. For comparison, we also look at the value of commodities when they arrive in Port Sudan and Mombassa. The average CIF value for all commodities, for both sectors, was USD 225/MT in 1995. These unit values are displayed in Figure 8.16 below.

Figure 8.16:



As can be seen from the graph in Figure 8.16, by the time relief commodities have been fielded, unit costs have increased to USD 834/MT, or more than three times the CIF value of the relief commodities. In our optimal-transport model, unit costs come down to USD 617/MT. This corresponds to the 26% savings noted above.

However, when access is reduced, unit costs go up. In fact, the international community pays dearly for refusal of access.

Delivering food according to the baseline pattern of 1995, but being forced to use only small aircraft of the Buffalo type, unit costs surge to over USD 1,100/MT. Multiplied by the total volume of relief commodities delivered in 1995, the difference in cost between year-long use of Hercules aircraft, and no use of Hercules aircraft, is close to USD 7.7 million.

Finally, we can see what happens when the two modes of transport that are most vulnerable to interdiction - namely, air and railway - are both eliminated as options. The exclusion of air transport brings big savings; unit costs go down to USD 681/MT. However, this is achieved at the price of a significant reduction in the amount of relief commodities delivered; 40% less relief gets distributed in the OLS areas, and particularly needy areas such as Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal can no longer be serviced.

#### **8.4.10 Discussion**

Using available information, it has been estimated in relation to 1995, that a saving of about a quarter of the total operational costs could, theoretically, have been saved by fully exploiting routes from North Sudan. This estimate however, needs qualification.

A number of commentators, including GOS, believe the estimate to be low. This is true if one simply examines transport costs in isolation. A straight substitution of aircraft costs from Lokichokio for Northern based access, for example, would indeed suggest a high percentage saving on *transport*. In the real world, however, transport is only one of a number of interdependent support and operational activities. Moreover, short of the complete closure of all international relief activities from Kenya, these represent relatively high fixed costs. It is when all activities are taken into account, which the Review Team considers more realistic, that a one quarter saving emerges.

This estimated saving, however, has been treated as tentative. Against a background of high fixed costs, there are good reasons to believe that even a quarter saving could not be realised. First, the model assumes free access and no restriction on aircraft type. Restriction is an important factor in driving up unit costs. If the past is a guide, free access cannot be taken for granted. Second, no set-up and running costs associated with the transfer have been calculated. Finally, the model does not take into account the need to transport to inland areas from rail and river drop-off points.

The political dimension of the substitution also has to be taken into account. The change would mean that approaching 90% of all OLS commodities for South Sudan would be originating from government controlled areas. One of the warring parties would gain a potentially great influence on the relief operation. From the evidence given in the Review, it can be taken that this would be rejected by the SPLM/A.

In this situation, the approach to cost-effectiveness has to have a broader focus. For example, as mentioned above in relation to the Appeal, improving financial transparency and tightening procedures is important. Regarding surface transport, the cross-line arrangement that was sought under the IGADD mediation process needs to be re-visited. At the same time, where appropriate, the investigation of other cross-border routes, for example, from Ethiopia, should continue. The aim would be to achieve and maintain a balance of surface routes between the warring parties. Regarding air-transport, apart from the need to re-instate the use of heavy lift aircraft, rotating some Lokichokio based aircraft out of Malakal makes sense. As with the opening of more surface routes, however, the Review considers that such proposals must be operationalised in the context of a comprehensive OLS agreement.