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Prepared by Hayward
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of Labrousse (2)

NOTES ON HISTORY OF UNICEF "POLICY"

1. The following notes trace some of the main periods of the development of UNICEF policy, particularly from the point of view of issues concerning the Fund's present role and policies. They are written for use "within the house" at a time when the Board, conforming to a tendency throughout the United Nations in the last few years, has asked for more attention to evaluation, to see what has been really accomplished, and what experience might indicate to be desirable modifications of UNICEF assistance policies.

2. Much of what we have inherited from our history appears to need little discussion, and is only to be accepted with gratitude. The staff is widely imbued with a spirit of service to countries. This has given them relations of confidence with many people responsible for services benefiting children and thus they constitute a wonderful instrument for promoting and assisting the improvement of the situation of children and youth. A great deal of experience has been built up about the best policy of assistance to numerous categories of programmes in the fields of disease control, health services and nutrition particularly, and the requirements are understood and accepted by cooperating specialized agencies. UNICEF has also a particular reputation for the choice, procurement, and delivery of supplies. Confidence among contributors is sufficient to produce a steady, if only slowly increasing income, expected to amount to \$34-\$35 million in 1965.

3. Some issues seem to be perennial, and may require progressively different answers as the situation of assisted countries evolves. An example is the relation of help or services for children to services for the family or the community in all age groups. UNICEF has of course a general approach - to accept and even to preach that the child must be reached through his family and community; to try to encourage rather than distort the best part of development of community services, which are generally on functional lines;

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and to evaluate aid to general services on terms of benefit to children. For example, aid for wells for clean water in villages interests UNICEF as a major factor in child health - the fact that it helps the whole community is for UNICEF only a bonus. Here there are problems of public relations - the benefit to children is not direct and visible enough. There are many practical problems about how to administer aid to such projects. The same problems underlie at the international level, difficulties in the relation of a fund for children to specialized agencies dealing with functional fields such as health, agriculture, education, etc.

4. In any evolving organization certain solutions, good in their time, become outdated by events, but tend to persist at different distances from the centre - among the agency's staff, specialized agency staff, informed government opinion or public opinion. Like the perennial issues, they need some attention to prevent their becoming "lilies that fester". They have been singled out below as "survivals".

5. Obviously, the development is not as neat as suggested by the four periods described below. Most things had a beginning before the period in which they are here recorded as the dominant features. The interpretation is a personal one.

6. In retrospect the policy appears too pragmatic, but this judgment would be modified by a fuller historical perspective than can be attempted here. At the Fund's foundation, few people expected it to last long, and many doubted that it would do more than disburse UNRRA's residual assets. In 1950 with the emergency period over, it was directed to serve children in the developing countries with aid for long-term projects, but subject to reconsideration in three years. In that year it received contributions of \$7 million only. In 1953, it was made "continuing" (not permanent) by omitting to provide for further automatic review. The countries being served were in no mood to support long and careful studies by international organizations or to undertake them themselves. They wanted simple, practical help - and fifteen years later we are still struggling to find the way to promote country interest in children and youth problems and to organize an effective service of advice.

I. The Emergency Period - 1947-1950

7. UNICEF spent the greater part of its resources on milk distribution to school children in Europe and China. Everything was distributed without charge to the recipient or his family.
8. As far as the distribution of milk was concerned, WHO and FAO met with UNICEF and agreed on standards, which were then applied by UNICEF without further reference to the agencies for each project. This procedure was soon superseded by "technical approval" for each project. Technical advice on the individual project is needed where it is complicated. That it is extended to all projects seems to have served as an excuse for agencies to give far too little general guidance about meeting children's needs in the fields of health, nutrition, social services, etc.
9. During the "emergency" period, many programmes of long-term action were begun, and also action outside Europe and China was prepared. BCG vaccination of children against tuberculosis was begun with the cooperation of the Scandinavian Red Cross Societies and was supervised by a Medical Committee of the UNICEF Board at a time when WHO was only an interim commission.
10. Milk conservation (equipment for pasteurizing or drying milk) was also begun as a means of helping European countries to provide milk permanently to carry on child feeding. Equipment was also provided to a few countries for the manufacture of penicillin and DDT.
11. The Board's Chairman during this period, Dr. Ludwig Rajchman, gave strong leadership to the Board, and UNICEF took the initiative in deciding how to use its funds. Unfortunately, he had bad relations with WHO. On his departure it was necessary to "mend fences" and the pendulum began to swing too far in the following period towards determination by agencies of UNICEF assistance policy; to be followed by a swing back to UNICEF influence in later periods.

Survivals

12. "What is UNICEF? It is powdered milk." (President Sukarno, January 8, 1965.)

13. "UNICEF is charity". (Perhaps the only disadvantage of greeting cards, outweighed by many advantages, is to perpetuate this one.)

14. "UNICEF is imported supplies". During the post-war inflation, there was little difficulty in getting local money for child feeding, but on the other hand all external supplies were very scarce. The idea still lingers that UNICEF should concentrate on supplying imports, rather than using grants-in-aid more generally to help the strategic elements in a country's programme from the point of view of children, including help with local expenses where this is the bottleneck. UNICEF's aid is of course not enough to be a significant element in a country's foreign exchange balance.

15. Another survival from the European period was the mental picture of UNICEF being solicited with requests for assistance to reasonably well-prepared projects, and UNICEF's main role would be to choose among them and cut them back to conform with its resources. Gradually it came to be recognized that the greatest lack of the developing countries was personnel for direction and management, and that UNICEF and international agencies had to take a much more active role of fostering initiative and "promoting" desirable programmes.

II. Spreading Out of Europe with WHO as the Senior Partner - 1951-1957

16. The Assembly decision of 1950 to prolong UNICEF - for three years - and to direct it to help children in the developing countries, was the result of a fight. Some of the main contributors began with a proposal that the Fund could be terminated, since the task it had been given was virtually completed. As an amendment, the U. S. A. proposed that UNICEF become an agency through which policy towards children's problems should be discussed, formulated, and recommended to developing countries, together with technical aid. The needs of the children were felt to be so vast, that the material aid available would not be effective. The developing countries saw this as a sort of "social commission for children" without sufficient resources of material aid to accomplish anything practical. They emphasized the need for imported supplies over advice, which could be obtained from the specialized agencies. The eloquent plea of the under-developed countries to do for their

children, what had been done for Europe, carried the day. Thus one of the conditions of UNICEF's continuing as a Fund, with material aid to dispense, was to emphasize its coordination and lack of overlapping with specialized agencies, especially WHO. The "imported supplies theory" appears as our first "survival" into a subsequent period, but it may have been an inevitable political choice. Actually the text of the 1950 resolution authorized UNICEF to provide "supplies, training, and advice".

17. An important UNICEF initiative of this first period of long-term aid to the developing countries was the spreading of assistance out of Europe first into Asia, then the Middle East and Latin America. UNICEF also elaborated some general programme criteria (see below).

18. There was a geographical extension of milk distribution, milk conservation and BCG campaigns. Milk distribution came to be based not on milk bought by UNICEF but on surplus milk available at nominal cost (1949-1953) and then free (1954-), on which UNICEF paid only the overseas freight. The distribution later came to be directed more to the infant and toddler reached through health centres, than to the less vulnerable school child, milk for school feeding being supplied by United States voluntary agencies working overseas.

19. New programme content was largely in the field of WHO, though this does not mean that WHO took all, or even the main, initiative. The most important professional group in the Board were doctors, and the head of the Programme Division in UNICEF was a public health man. Countries had health projects in a readier state than in other fields, such as nutrition or welfare. Nutrition has remained up to the present a difficult field, if one wants to go beyond handing out food surpluses. Education was not thought of. Another factor favouring health was that WHO was more decentralized than other agencies, and could be pushed into deploying technical advice in countries to help in the preparation of projects.

20. Mass campaigns. "Health" was at first mainly mass disease control campaigns. Yaws, malaria, leprosy and trachoma were accepted for assistance, each with the prior agreement of the UNICEF/WHO Joint Health Policy Committee, representing the Boards of the two organizations. These were all important

diseases for children, and campaigns in the developing countries began to be organized largely on the basis of auxiliary personnel, a point of great importance owing to the shortage of professional personnel. Some, like yaws, by its "miraculous" cure by one shot of penicillin, could encourage local populations to contribute to setting up health services. Others, like malaria, had to be cleared up in some regions before anything else could be done.

21. Mass campaigns seemed a natural continuation of UNICEF's earlier role. It had saved children's lives in Europe; now it was to do the same for the greater "emergency" of the developing countries. Statistics of "beneficiaries" (the number of children fed or cured or vaccinated) were compiled, and used for fund-raising purposes, which some Board members feel needed the support of dramatic results. Even today national committees preparing fund-raising campaigns select assistance to disease control for disproportionate emphasis.
22. Cost of project personnel. UNICEF's initiatives in these fields even became an embarrassment to WHO, through the demand placed on that organization for advisory services and project personnel. This variant of the problem of children's services versus community services appeared as a financial problem between WHO and UNICEF in 1953 when WHO received \$5 million for a technical assistance programme which had been prepared by WHO two years earlier at a level of \$9.5 million. WHO wanted to use the funds to which it had access for "its" programmes, and thought that UNICEF should pay the whole cost of what it wanted to do. Their position was even stronger when UNICEF wanted to begin projects that had not been foreseen in WHO's budget, which is prepared about two-and-a-half years in advance of its fiscal year (and UNICEF was always more ready to reimburse for the period until the next budget came into effect). The UNICEF Board considered that if WHO had the function of providing advice, WHO should provide for it financially - each agency should finance its own functions. The discussion absorbed a lot of the time of the Board 1953-1956, and ended when WHO included in its regular budget for 1957 provision for the payment of project personnel. This transition was eased by the growth of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA) which also covered the cost of many project personnel.

23. When nutrition came to be important, the same problem arose with FAO, and the same points of view were advanced on both sides. FAO considered that the cost of these services would be a distortion of its programme, and one decided on by the governing body of another organization. However, FAO's regular budget is only about half the size of WHO's, and unlike WHO's has never included provision to pay project personnel that were not covered by EPTA. UNICEF is reimbursing FAO for them to this day, but "reluctantly". More recently reimbursement has begun to UNESCO. This is on a smaller scale so far, largely for the period until posts can be taken over by EPTA, and fortunately has not provoked the type of controversy entertained with WHO and FAO.

24. Why doesn't UNICEF accept the argument that if it decides on a project, it should be prepared to pay for all the international costs? Partly because of the theory of division of functions. For some, UNICEF is the supply agency. But it is the specialized agency, and not UNICEF, that determines how many project personnel are needed; the agency will not give technical approval unless adequate international personnel is provided for. Moreover, this position has been abused by requests for excessive personnel for whom UNICEF would pay; views are more reasonable if the agency is paying. If there is to be real partnership in assisting the country, both agencies should contribute financially.

25. Malaria. Malaria is the outstanding example of WHO leadership. UNICEF became the major international financial partner in a worldwide eradication campaign launched in 1956 by WHO. This came to absorb as much as one-third of UNICEF's resources each year. UNICEF met the international expenses of Latin American campaigns excluding Brazil and Venezuela, and some campaigns in the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia. AID then came into the picture with financing the large campaigns in Asia and in Brazil. Malaria has cost much more than was planned when the Board agreed to assist eradication. The model eradication cycle was to contain an "attack phase" of spraying all houses in the infected area with DDT, repeated for three years. Unfortunately, it has generally proved necessary to continue for much longer, and in some areas it has not yet proved possible to interrupt transmission.

26. Malaria is a nice illustration of the logically different assistance principles of UNICEF and a specialized agency. For UNICEF it would be logical to assist malaria campaigns, where malaria is a major problem of children (in heavily infected areas, it is a major cause of child mortality), even if only control is attainable and not eradication, e.g. tropical Africa. The eradication objective of WHO requires malaria to be eliminated even from countries where it is a minor public health problem, e.g. Egypt and North Africa. The UNICEF Board laid down UNICEF's position clearly in January 1964: "UNICEF may participate in new campaigns if . . . (ii) the country considers malaria a major problem in child health . . ."

27. Preparation of next phase. Towards the end of this period, the criticism began to be heard in the UNICEF Board that UNICEF was using its money for general health purposes rather than for children's purposes. A more technical criticism was that countries should not be asked to put up the local personnel and finance for a series of separate mass campaigns, but should be encouraged to develop basic health services, and an "infrastructure". An even more technical criticism was that the results of mass campaigns cannot be maintained without skeleton health services on the ground. Unfortunately, WHO's intellectual strength in the fields of public health, maternal and child health, and nutrition has never approached that of its resources in the fields of the various mass campaigns.

28. A WHO expert committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Martha Eliot, had recommended extensive UNICEF assistance to maternal and child health, as early as 1949. But this fell on deaf ears, probably because of the mystique of mass campaigns already referred to. Assistance did begin to midwifery, largely through the distribution of simple midwife kits to those who had followed elementary courses. Help to midwifery is easier to organize than child care, since midwives are paid by the client, not the state.

29. Late in the fifties, Sweden took the lead in arguing that UNICEF should devote all its resources to maternal and child health. The soundness of the point of view that UNICEF should apply a strict criterion of benefit to children was somewhat obscured by being clothed in the example of Scandinavian maternal and child health services which could not be set down in developing countries until several decades of more general development had

been accomplished. One of the main elements of a reviving UNICEF initiative was to select for emphasis in its aid a WHO concept of basic health services (a rural health centre with satellite sub-centres). Its services are for the whole population, but in practice it is mothers and children who used it most.

Project criteria - 1951-1957.

30. UNICEF'S assistance policy at this time consisted largely of Board decisions on particular fields as being eligible for UNICEF assistance, e.g. malaria control, MCH.

31. Limitations with respect to types of programme which could receive aid and types of supplies which could be offered became the main means of restricting country requests to a volume that UNICEF's resources were able to meet. In this way, countries were spared the embarrassment of asking for what they could not have, and loss of time in preparing projects for which resources would not be available. The recipe for equity was to make available to requesting countries only aid for approved categories of programmes and types of supplies. Thus attention in the Board was directed to the nature of individual projects and conflict about how much goes to each country was avoided. For this reason, projects are still presented to the Board in functional groups in each region (one group of projects for basic health services, another for mass disease control campaigns, another for education, etc.) rather than grouped by country, in relation to the particular needs of children.

32. Rather formal criteria were suggested for judging the value of projects. In June 1951 the Board adopted the following criteria for determining priority among projects (Document E/ICEF/178/Rev.1, para. 30 (E/2013)):-

- "a) The urgency of need for that project particularly if the denial of it would cause immediate and heavy loss of children's lives, or serious impairment of child health.
- "b) The financial assistance required in the context of UNICEF's resources and its current and future obligations.
- "c) The relative importance attached to the project by the requesting government.

- "d) Projects which would help to complete or perfect work already undertaken or accomplished, in preference to wholly new projects; this, however, should not preclude aid to wholly new projects meeting urgent needs, particularly when UNICEF assistance would help initiate new government activity in a given field.
- "e) Projects which would be of long-term value in preference to those of short-term benefits.
- "f) Projects which through continuation by the country, or solution of a problem, would not require recurring assistance from the Fund.
- "g) Projects which are well adapted to the financial, technical, and administrative possibilities of the country, due consideration being given to appropriate technical approaches.
- "h) The possibility of benefits of a project also being made available to other countries."

33. Matching. The concept of government responsibility has meant that in all cases the administration of UNICEF-assisted projects is entirely in the hands of the government, or local agencies designated by them. This principle was further reflected in "matching", i.e. a government must be prepared to provide from its own resources at least as much as they requested from UNICEF. This is in one sense the financial reflection of a vital requirement for a project's success - that the country should be interested, concerned, and involved; and also that UNICEF should not substitute its aid for this country's own effort and resources.

34. Financial matching became the record of the value of all that the country was providing, and thus became married to the idea that the country would put up all the local costs. For some types of project, this vastly exceeds the 50% that was at the basis of the matching idea, and which was recently adopted by the Special Fund. UNICEF still publishes that matching amounts to $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 times the value of its assistance - certainly an understatement. During this period, there was a tendency to overelaborate the arithmetic of matching. An attempt to define matching as the additional resources to be put up locally because of UNICEF assistance proved unworkable. A codification of matching policy, reasonably flexible, was adopted by the Board as recently as 1960.

35. Low cost per beneficiary was also a criterion. This reflected a policy of assisting the average child rather than the special case or the handicapped, as a first step in developing countries; and the economy of prevention rather than cure. Thinking about this criterion is being modified in appropriate cases by taking account of the benefit conferred, as well as the cost. Moreover, so many projects now produce indirect beneficiaries (e.g. the training of people to work in services benefiting children). The number of beneficiaries cannot be counted, though the number is certainly large, and the per caput cost therefore low when measured over the long run.

36. The desire to avoid assisting "show places" in capitals led to an emphasis on projects benefiting rural areas. Also, rural areas were considered to be a more important target because they contained 80% of the population of developing countries and the services there were more rudimentary than in the cities. The significance of the part of this population that was moving into cities was seen in later periods.

37. Considerable attention also was given to whether or not UNICEF should provide this or that type of supply, rather than to the object for which grants were being given. This derives from a primitive state of country administration; if you can't have much confidence in a plan of operations directed to objectives in which you are interested, better give types of supplies as specific as possible to your field of interest. For example, one wouldn't give radios for schools unless reasonably confident that they would be used there, and kept in repair, and that there was going to be an adequate programme of school broadcasts. This may be contrasted with a midwifery kit, or a package of drugs for health centres, which are specific for common children's diseases (though some could also be used for adults) and not harmful if administered by unskilled people.

38. There was quite a lengthy discussion before it was first grudgingly accepted that UNICEF could provide stipends for training people inside the country, this proposal running up against the "imports only" survival. This was a vital policy hurdle. Until UNICEF could assist training in the country, which in practice means largely assistance with local costs, many important needs could not be assisted because there were not the nationals available to man the necessary services. In certain fields such as education and

social services, training was the basic approach open to UNICEF and the imported training aids were not of significant help to countries in establishing training schemes. By now, UNICEF is spending about one-quarter of its resources on in-country training, not all in stipends, of course.

39. Corresponding to the idea of the mass campaign, which is promoted by international organizations and undertaken by groups of countries within a region where similar conditions apply, is the concept of international experts, specialists in the particular field concerned, who visit a country briefly and persuade it to adopt the standard methods that have been worked out. Later international "project personnel" come to help execute the project. Tailoring to the needs of the country, and participation of national officials in planning projects were not much emphasized, and this weakness still exists as a survival among some agency staff and perhaps some UNICEF staff. (In the sixties, for example, an agency staff member was found arriving in countries with a plan of operations on stencil, ready to be run off in the second day of his visit.)

Survivals

40. "UNICEF is disease-control campaigns". The beauty of the logistics of disease-control campaigns still holds some of our staff entranced.

41. "UNICEF can be regarded nowadays as the junior branch of the WHO". (UN Office of Public Information, 1964.)

42. "UNICEF is a supply agency". This is still held among some agency personnel who will suggest to governments what project and what supplies they should request from UNICEF without prior consultation with UNICEF. This is still held by some government officials who give priority to projects in terms of supposed availability of UNICEF assistance, rather than what the country would propose to do about the problem; and perhaps some of our own staff still think the only important thing to discuss is "what UNICEF can provide."

43. "UNICEF is not a technical agency." In this there is an important truth. It would be intolerable if UNICEF were to proclaim technical policy, even for children, in the functional fields of health, education, nutrition, etc.

44. Furthermore, UNICEF provides very few technical services - engineering for assisted milk plants, the food technology for local production of weaning foods (in cooperation with FAO), and advice and help for setting up preventive maintenance for field vehicles. The same type of question arises in 1965, about UNICEF's promoting, financing and organizing advice to countries about taking account of children and youth in their national development.

45. ECOSOC has laid great emphasis on the avoidance of overlapping, and the interpretation of this is still a problem for UNICEF. The "survival" thinking is to assume that all important questions are technical. Thus the technical approval of WHO became and remains a veto power for a health project. Technical approval is a necessary condition, but the "survival" is to regard it also as a sufficient condition. In the Executive Board it has been made clear that technical approval by an agency puts no obligation on UNICEF to provide material aid.

46. "UNICEF programmes". The idea that international agencies run programmes in countries, rather than assist countries to run them, received an apparently undying impetus in the period of post-war disorganization (e.g. teams of Scandinavians administering BCG vaccinations). It survives in the publicity of agencies, in public opinion in advanced countries, and as an occupational hazard of international staff.

III. Expanding the Fields of Assistance beyond Health - 1957-1961

47. In addition to taking the initiative to push assistance for basic health services, UNICEF took the initiative in a 1957 submission to the Board (prepared of course in preceding years) to expand assistance for what has come to be called "applied nutrition". The main idea is to use the channels of community development to interest village people in growing and using the types of foods that would be needed for the adequate nutrition of their children. Technically, this is a joint field of interest of FAO and WHO.

48. It became clear that milk would continue to be scarce and expensive in many of the tropical countries UNICEF was assisting. Therefore, other

sources of protein-rich foods for young children should be developed for urban populations, the protein ingredient coming from vegetable sources or fish. The WHO/FAO/UNICEF Protein Advisory Group started its work in 1956.

49. In 1959, the Board on the recommendation of the United States delegation, accepted the policy of assistance to social welfare services benefiting children.

50. Assistance to Africa became important.

51. During this period, it came to be recognized that UNICEF's finances could be used in cooperation with other ministries than the health ministry and departments concerned with "milk conservation". The fact that health ministries in some countries had all the help they could absorb with their existing personnel and local finances - especially where their finances were strained to the limit for the malaria campaign - pushed in this direction.

52. It was also pointed out that action in different fields was complementary. Ignorance is a big factor in ill health and malnutrition, which in turn produce dull pupils or absentees from school. It is poor planning to push health services too far without strengthening education, and on the other hand a school should have clean water and latrines - and so on.

53. This in turn brought relations with other specialized agencies (FAO Divisions in addition to the Dairy Branch, Bureau of Social Affairs). WHO ceased to have the exclusive call, as they felt, on UNICEF's assistance, and this new position was accepted by Dr. Candau if not by all his staff.

54. A few queries were raised by contributors, however, to ask why if UNICEF assistance was to be used as an auxiliary to specialized agencies' functional programmes, it would not be better for countries to make their contributions directly to these agencies. This position was the more dangerous in that it is unlikely that what is now contributed to UNICEF would in fact be transferred to services, ~~and~~ though WHO, FAO, and UNESCO have all opened funds for voluntary governmental contributions.

55. Perhaps the most important and useful way to work with other ministries turned out to be not to work with them singly, but to assist general services frequently of the community development type. The greatest obstacle to UNICEF'S carrying out its task is the absence of country channels actually reaching children. About two-thirds of school-age children are in school (a higher proportion for boys, lower for girls). Less than 5 per cent of pre-school children are served by health centres, and school dropouts and adolescents are hardly reached at all. Hence the need to use all possible existing channels - schools, health services, agricultural and home economics extension, and social welfare and community development services - and to get them to perform general educational services as well as their specialized departmental services. An incidental effect is that many of UNICEF'S best projects have become increasingly difficult to classify.

56. This advance brought new problems for specialized agencies, which were set up originally to provide highly specialized advice to developed countries, rather than to promote general polyvalent services in developing countries. One of the effects of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance has also been to encourage this evolution in the specialized agencies. In UNICEF it means that a single project could be of interest to 3 or 4 agencies from among WHO, FAO, UN Bureau of Social Affairs, UNESCO and ILO. Several agencies may wish to be consulted, and may judge that they should give their technical approval and sign the plan of operations. They may even want to visit the country where the project is being prepared, which in practice can never be done together. Fortunately, several agencies usually call on one of their people already on the spot serving other projects, etc. Some simplification of procedure was agreed to after study by a sub-committee of the Administrative Committee on Coordination.

57. The decisions of this period, sometimes quite detailed in respect to sub-categories of programmes that could be assisted, opened the door to many very useful possibilities. This made the need more felt for a more explicit guiding philosophy. Sometimes UNICEF was criticized for following a "Christmas tree approach" to countries - these are the types of assistance approved by UNICEF - what would you choose? This led to concern

in the Board, which persists, about the fragmentation of UNICEF assistance into small projects, each approved on its merits, but lacking impact in too many cases.

58. UNICEF aid should be significant, and have an impact. But if it is wrong to spend one-third* of our resources on a single campaign like malaria, how is impact to be gotten? This question is raised in a more radical way when it is asked whether the small amount of material aid passing through UN channels can have any real impact on the situation of children and youth, in view of the immensity of the needs among the one billion children and youth of the under-developed part of the world. More constructively, it could be argued that we should concentrate on aid to the few countries having the most effective development effort, as has been advocated for general development aid. This has not been raised in the UNICEF Board. The conflict between the criteria of efficiency of aid and need for aid is a recurring one. The Board tends to put more weight on need. It feels that already we tend to "give to him that hath", and would welcome more aid to countries where the need is greatest (see below, para. 73).

59. These considerations lead to aid for the small project with a potential to be extended as part of national policy, and with national or bilateral resources. That UNICEF aid should be a "catalyst" was said so often that some Board members suggested that the word be dropped. The big project, to which UNICEF provides all the aid necessary to make it go, can leave behind worthwhile results, and it is less costly in staff time and overhead. But it is not UNICEF's function to back only sure winners. Rather it should help departments, usually very conservative in their approach to problems because of the small margins on which they have to work, to experiment with the introduction of new methods. So the small pilot project has its important place while seeking to avoid the "pets" of individuals.

IV. UNICEF Policy of Assistance to the Main Problems of Children - 1961-

60. In 1961, the Board put an end to the long history of accepting progressively additional fields of assistance, and decided that it was ready

* By now it is down to one-fifth.

to consider requests in whatever field it was agreed that there were priority problems of children in the country concerned.

61. Education. The immediately visible effect of this decision was to allow assistance to education and vocational training, bringing inturn relations with UNESCO and ILO. This was particularly appreciated by African countries who are inclined to give education top priority on the social side of their development effort. UNESCO's regional conferences on educational plans have publicized the need for several billions of dollars annually in each region. So how could UNICEF's aid be effective? The answer seems to be in a concentration of aid for teacher training - training the teaching personnel of teachers' colleges, and training teachers for secondary and primary levels. Many believe there is also a need to promote "education as preparation for life" with a practical or vocational element, in contrast to a surviving ideal that education leads only to a white-collar job.

62. Country approach. From a philosophical point of view, however, the 1961 decision had a deeper meaning. The situation of children should be studied in each country. A priority should be worked out for the problems for which action is possible. UNICEF assistance should fit into the strategic points of such national programmes. So far this has not been extensively put into practice. Most countries have not yet developed either a national policy for children and youth, nor even a machinery for considering it. National policy is proposed and carried out by ministries, and questions about children and youth typically cut across ministries.

63. The country approach requires an amount of preparation in the country and by the country that we have not yet found a way to stimulate, except in a few cases. It is naturally much harder to find generalists than specialist advisers. One line of approach is for UNICEF staff to develop themselves to assume this role. Some do it remarkably; others feel that they need to be able to call on help to promote the idea of the country approach, and this help has not yet been found. Some feel that the whole idea, is not very clear. Some have felt that an emphasis on planning depreciates the supply work and expediting in which UNICEF made its reputation.

64. Specialized agencies with which we are cooperating are beginning to offer some countries their help to plan education, health and agriculture.

Nevertheless, it is very difficult for them to join with UNICEF in helping countries to take an overall view of children and youth problems. Their traditional response would be to send a team of advisers for a short visit-- which countries do not want - rather than to join in support of a resident "generalist", who is in any case hard to find. There is also a fear that UNICEF is getting above itself, and that it cannot give advice on taking account of children in national development, without getting into functional fields where it has no competence.

65. There are of course UN agencies that do take a wider view of development problems though usually with an emphasis on economic aspects. When economists are approached they usually take a year or two to accept that it is professionally sound to be concerned with the preparation and development of the rising generation. The UNICEF Board decided to try to interest these agencies - predominantly economic but beginning to be more concerned with social aspects - in taking account of children and youth. The Board decided in 1962 to enter into closer relations with the Regional Economic Commissions and Planning Institutes, and bilateral aid agencies where they were willing. The World Bank and development banks also have this general view, but UNICEF has not yet effective relations with them. There are some beginning relations with the Special Fund, because UNICEF has given some assistance to projects that were related or supplementary to a few Special Fund projects. Within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the main relations have been with the Bureau of Social Affairs, and mainly in relation with its specialist function as adviser on social welfare.

66. The round-table conference at Bellagio in 1964, the regional conferences on children in national development to take place in Bangkok and Santiago at the end of 1965 in cooperation with ECAFE and ECLA, and some training projects designed to give trainee planners some orientation towards problems of children and youth, are all designed to prepare the way for more effective action at the country level.

67. We have to avoid the danger of losing sight of children in an interest in planning. Actually, our interest is not in planning as such, but in finding a proper place for children and youth in the development effort of each country.

68. Other New Problems. UNICEF's endeavour to look at its functions explicitly from the point of view of children and youth has placed emphasis recently on two generally neglected age groups:- the pre-school age and adolescence. They tend to be neglected because, in contrast with the school age, there is no convenient channel in the developing countries for reaching them. On the other hand, they are the crucial ages for the development of personality, and for the future contribution of the adult to his society.

69. In contrast with earlier periods, there is also much greater acceptance of the need to assist the urban populations, not in the show places in the centre of the cities, but in the shanty-towns that surround them, to which many youths and parents with young children are migrating from the rural areas.

70. The approach of analyzing children's problems and needs within each country could lead logically to having an average annual level of assistance to each country to be used for whatever are agreed to be its priority problems or which action is possible. Some argue against this idea for a number of reasons. Country quotas could only be set rather arbitrarily - it is difficult to go very far beyond child population and a very rough categorization of relative need, e.g. by national income per caput. An expectation would be created of annual allocations, with less attention to the value of the projects prepared. There would be direct competition among Board members of receiving countries with a tendency for Board members as a whole also to favour themselves as against the other 70-odd assisted countries.

71. Therefore we are operating on a hybrid system. We do have rough unofficial country "ceilings", in the sense that new projects will not be prepared in a country that appears to be getting a disproportionate share of assistance in relation to its child population. Almost any category of project can be submitted, in light of the particular needs of the children of the country, but the type of assistance is limited by precedent, and a feeling that equity requires that if we do something for one country, we should be prepared to do it for all. Some think that our staff need a guide of "what UNICEF can provide" for their discussions with country ministries; otherwise they wouldn't know where to stop.

72. This sometimes prevents a country approach from being followed. We would not do the logical thing for Country A because we could not afford to extend this type of aid to all requesting countries.

73. A particular form of this problem is:- How to avoid helping the countries with better personnel and administration, more than the countries "disinherited" in these respects, that are in most need of help for children. This is an old problem but was specifically recognized by the Board in January 1964, with the example of many African countries in mind. A number of African countries are being studied with respect to their ability to use "special assistance" to set up a basic structure for services benefiting children. This poses all the problems of getting a country approach to children's problems and needs.

74. The concern in the Board about the dispersal of UNICEF assistance on too many small projects, having no real impact, can be helped by the country approach. Assistance in each country should be concentrated on fewer main lines, but these lines may be different in different countries. It is still necessary, however, to keep a place for the pilot project which if successful will lead on to larger developments later.

75. Evaluation - to find out what lasting results have been obtained - remains a preoccupation of the Board.

76. Family Planning. The major policy question now coming rapidly over the horizon is whether UNICEF will assist family planning directly. The matter has been discussed in the Board, but not yet in the form of a proposal that UNICEF should give assistance, though a few countries have requested it.

77. UNICEF has given considerable aid indirectly, this being "unconscious" and unrecognized as such - through aid to networks of health services, assistance to the education of women through community development, etc. These are very important forms of aid if one believes that the social and motivational prerequisites for family limitation are important, as well as the availability of simple means. Establishing the value of the individual child, and higher parental aspirations for children have historically been important factors limiting family size.

78. Since this indirect assistance has not generally been recognized, we have the impression that some European governments preferred to increase their contributions to "economic" development rather than to UNICEF, because they felt that social progress was already in advance of its economic base, and that the effect of UNICEF assistance was to increase the population explosion.

79. Now, however, public opinion has evolved in Asia, where governments have put family planning clinics into health centres assisted by UNICEF. It is evolving very rapidly in Latin America. The subject is on the agenda of the next World Health Assembly, and on the agenda of the Asian and Latin American conferences on children and youth in National development. The question of Board policy will arise in a year or two.

EJRH