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
INTERVIEW WITH DR. RICHARD JOLLY

September 19, 1996

This is the second of five interviews with Richard Jolly, former Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF for Programme. In this interview Dr. Jolly gives his impressions of Jim Grant and their early work together in the Society for International Development. He speaks of Jim's invitation to him to join UNICEF and a memorable experience at the Executive Board. Early days in the Front Office are described. The beginnings of GOBI and the use of global funds to accelerate Child Survival are treated in full. Personal anecdotes are part of the recollections.



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Interview Dr. Richard Jolly by Sheila Barry-Tacon. J. Grant
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**Second Interview with Richard Jolly, former Deputy Executive Director
By Sheila Barry Tacon**

1. SBT: This morning we will be talking about your relationship with Jim Grant and how he persuaded you to join UNICEF. But first, your friendship with Jim Grant.
1. RJ: I first met Jim was in the mid-1970s.
2. SBT: That far back?
2. RJ: Yes, well, that doesn't seem very far back! It was in connection with SID, the Society for International Development. By then, SID had been in existence for about 15 years. It was the largest professional non-governmental body concerned with development. It probably had about 4 or 5000 members. But it was very American and very AID-oriented in its core focus. Paul-Marc Henri, who had been Administrator of UNDP and was then President of SID, decided that he needed to set up a Steering Committee in order to look at new ideas, new thinking for SID. He created a committee under Chief Adebo. A report was produced and presented to the Governing Council at SID's annual meeting. It met with enormous controversy, some wanting the old SID, some wanting the new. Paul-Marc Henri combined both forces and said: "What we need is an implementation committee to look at these different views and see what should be done." Jim Grant was appointed to be one member of that committee and I was appointed to be another. The Chair was Ismail Sabri-Abdullah of Egypt. Maurice Strong was also a member, and there were a few others. That committee met several times in 1974 or 75 - I am not sure which- but it meant that I found myself working alongside Jim and so we got to know each other. Jim was, as always then, his enthusiastic, irrepressible self. I remember with pride that even then we used to compete just to see who could leave last for the airport and still catch the plane.....
3. SBT: You probably beat him on that.
3. RJ: Well, I remember one time when I think we allowed ourselves 25 minutes from the middle of Paris to takeoff and we both made it, something like that. That was typical of the humor on the side but basically Jim's development convictions and Jim's positive enthusiastic can-do side appealed greatly to me. Did I have that in myself at the time? I had a lot of it for reasons already made clear. But I think, to be honest, I was always a little bit more the academic and at that time I was particularly under the influence of Dudley Seers and structuralist views which made for more caution - a tendency to doubt that all the evil forces in this world and the forces of inequality and reaction could or would succumb to enthusiasm. I am pleased and perhaps, even proud to say today that in those wonderful 14 years I had in UNICEF with Jim and under Jim's leadership, Jim led us all to show that miracles could occur. So I now have a more positive view than I had then, although none of us totally change. Many difficult issues still remain.

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I should refer to one occasion that really impressed me a lot about Jim, at the time that a SID meeting was held in Algeria, a big conference, perhaps 400 or 500 people. Jim Grant made a superb statement drawing the parallels between South Africa and the global economy at the time. Those were the days when the call was for a New International Economic Order. Algeria was important as an oil producer and was very much a leader for the new cause. Jim pointed out that the income distribution in South Africa, with about 80 per cent of the income going to the whites and about 20 per cent to the blacks, was not so different from the income distribution in the world between the income going to the industrial countries and the income going to the Third World. The shares of global population were, more or less, in inverse proportion between industrial countries and the Third World: 80% or more in the Third World and 20% in the industrial countries, were very similar to the 80% of blacks in South Africa and 20% of whites and coloreds. The point Jim made was that with this parallel in mind, you could see very clearly in South Africa, the reasons the labor market was controlled to allow blacks only to migrate with passes to the urban areas. Jobs were reserved for whites. Capital in South Africa was overwhelmingly owned by the whites. The police force was overwhelmingly controlled by the whites and so on. And then Jim turned and said: "It may not look at first sight as if this is what is happening by law in the international system. Indeed, it is not by law but by geographical ownership in monopoly. Industrial countries have their immigration laws -we don't see them as pass laws but they operate in the same way. They own the majority of capital. The military systems of the world are overwhelmingly controlled by the industrial countries etc." Obviously, this impressed me at the time but I think it makes an interesting point about Jim Grant because, although in some respects he was an American figure with a liberal American democratic set of perspectives and values- there was always very near the surface in Jim a full understanding of the more radical causes and often, an adoption of more radical forms of analysis. I think Jim very skillfully drew on this during his time in UNICEF. He was very sympathetic to the strong convictions and feelings of many people who came from the colonial system and not just in a superficial way or in an historical way, but in a way that related to continuing dominance of the international system by the industrial countries.

4. SBT: Do you think that was an important factor in his relationships with Heads of States and Prime Ministers?
4. RJ: I think it was.
4. RJ: It think it was certainly important with governments, with people. Jim was not one to make political speeches in a very overt sense. He certainly was nowhere near a person with dogmatic or Marxist or exploitative convictions in his mind about how the country system works or how the global system works but there was always enough sensitivity to this. That he was much much more aware and sensitive than many other heads of UN Agencies is the point I keep making. It was an important part of Jim. After all, he had worked in China when the capitalists versus nationalists versus the Maoist battle was alive and he'd been going back to China many times, of course.

Perhaps, I should also mention that Jim, on his side, came a number of times to IDS, Sussex. He was the founder and director of ODC, the Overseas Development Council in Washington, which was, in some senses, a parallel to the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, which I was directing. ODC was always more focused on immediate policy and more plugged into Washington. IDS was somewhat more academic and though we were largely funded by the Ministry of Overseas Development, we had, on both sides, a love /hate relationship and indeed in the late 1970s when Mrs. Thatcher first came in - in a whole set of complicated ways that I needn't relate here- they were trying to close down IDS, not directly, but as part of declaring it to be a QUANGO - a quasi non-governmental organization - which was one of the things that had to be cut and so forth. Jim joined in an international effort to write to the Ministry of Overseas Development, pleading the good cause of IDS and the great contribution it had made to international thinking on development and to international policymaking and, indeed, to Britain's reputation. I must say I remember that letter, it was, without a doubt, the most powerful of all the letters we received - and we must have received a hundred from well placed people around the world. When Jim wanted to indicate his support and write a letter...

5. SBT: He did it very well!

5. RJ: He did it very well, in part, because, as I learned from him, you mustn't hesitate. If you are going to support something, pull out all the stops, every adjective, and then when you've got the thing drafted very strongly, go through, as Jim couldn't resist doing, and redraft, to add yet another subclause with five more positive adjectives here and never mind gilding the lily or adding superlative to superlative.

He also, let me say, had been influenced considerably by the ILO employment mission reports. He'd not been a member of the missions, I don't think anyone from ODC had, but he was highly aware of the Kenya Mission Report and "Redistribution and Growth," the volume that I had helped edit initially as an IDS project and then taken over by the Bank, coming out as a Bank-IDS volume. It was, I think, very worthwhile with Hollis Chenery, a leading economist who was Vice-President of the bank at the time. Then in 1976, Jim republished as an ODC publication the basic document of the World Employment Conference dealing with the first ideas on basic needs.

6. RJ: At the time Jim had two major projects going in ODC that very much fed into UNICEF work subsequently that I was aware of on my side. One was their own, ODC's work on basic needs, and Jim, as I recall, gave certainly one or two strong speeches on this theme and then Jim sponsored Morris D. Morris, an old friend from his college days in Berkeley, to prepare a book to be published by ODC about the PQLI, the physical quality of life index, which was an index, country by country, that he hoped would focus on the physical quality of life as opposed to GNP, gross national product, and thus direct attention to human values. Perhaps, one should say just a little about the PQLI. At the time Jim was quite successful, in a modest

way, at promoting it. I remember at one SID meeting, he showed me with delight an editorial in the London Times praising the usefulness of this and saying country performance should more be judged by such human indicators. Interestingly, on my side, and IDS' side, our opinion was that this was very flaky statistically. We didn't use the word "flaky" at the time but flimsy statistically and ultimately, without any professional support among professional statisticians for a very good reason. Mostly, and again, this isn't the place to elaborate, the arguments against what are known as composite indices, such as IQ, in which various elements are added together and divided up in some way, and then you say this is intelligence or this is development or this is whatever, in this case, this is the physical quality of life. In the case of PQLI, it was a measure of literacy, on education, a measure of life expectancy and child mortality added up and divided by three. Jim had a professional respect for my views on this and it pained him enormously. Well, that's excessive. It pained him somewhat over the 1980s. When it came to the State of the World's Children Report, he would say: "Could we not include the PQLI measure there?" And I always gave what, at the time, was my very honest and clear view. Look, Jim, you are the Executive Director and if you want something in, it will be in, but I give you my professional advice and that is, I don't know any professional statistician who gives any credibility to PQLI and therefore, I would advise you, don't do it." So except for a minor paragraph or two in two reports, PQLI was not mentioned. The final point however - this should be noted in a recording that relates to history - is that in 1990, Mabub ul-Haq in UNDP started the Human Development Report and included something that was called the Human Development Index. It was remarkably like the PQLI, except that it included a measure of income and not just life expectancy and education. For the record, I met with Mabub and others and said, in my view, all these arguments hold against it and so forth. But they pressed ahead. I must admit they have had enormous success and now as architect of the Human Development Report in UNDP, I've taken over from Mabub and I continue the HDI, let me admit. What is very interesting is that the opinion of professional statisticians has shifted, not for any reason or professional conviction about the index. The index still has many, not all of the same weaknesses of the original PQLI, but what has been shown now by Mabub ul-Haq, perhaps it was Jim's vision and insight twenty years earlier, is that you won't drive out the narrowness and misplaced focus on GNP income per capita, or GNP growth rates by just pointing out the weaknesses. But you will drive it out by focussing on something that at least is better, even if it is not the best, or even if it is not quite adequate and that I think is the ultimate argument for HDI and the argument which Jim had put out that was only partially successful in the 1970s with PQLI.

- 7.RJ: Well, that's a bit of a long detour so let's go back to the more general issues before I come to Jim's invitation to me to join him as Deputy Executive Director. There was another figure at the time that was very important to both of us and that was Barbara Ward, Lady Jackson, a British economist, although she spent much of her life in the United States in the late 60s and early 70s at Columbia where she held the Albert Schweitzer Chair of International Relations. Interestingly, she had been an editor of the Economist, the journal, and at a very early stage in her life she had written with eloquence about the Marshall Plan. She was a leading figure, but it should be noted that those professional economists in the academic

world at Columbia would never treat her as a serious economist. That is why I think she had the Chair of International Relations, not Economics. At that time in the 60s, and in the 70s, she was continuing to produce a wonderful series of visionary documents about different aspects of development and the need for international reform. She wrote a series of books on Spaceship Earth, the basic document for the Habitat Conference in Vancouver.. She played a very big role in SID with her unashamed appeals for moral commitment and idealism and Jim and I and..

7. SBT: I always thought of her as a humanist.

7. RJ: A humanist is not quite the right word because she was a deeply convinced Catholic. When she died shortly before I came to UNICEF, a solemn Requiem Mass in Westminster Cathedral in Britain was held for her.

8. RJ This brings us to 1981. At that point I had been Director of IDS Sussex for 9 years and was beginning to wonder what I might be doing next. I had received an invitation from the United Nations University to go and be the Vice Rector in charge of social sciences and, more or less, at the same time, I remember the phone rang and it was Jim, by then about a year and a half into being Executive Director of UNICEF, and he came right to the point and said would I be willing to join him as his Deputy. Obviously, I was very fascinated from the beginning. I didn't have enormous doubts. It was a total surprise. It hadn't crossed my mind because I'd never worked for any part of the UN full time - I'd done lots of short term consultancies - but I'd really had no involvement with UNICEF.

I also thought of UNICEF as very much a children's organization. Although I'd had quite a lot of interaction with children, I thought of myself as a development economist and UNICEF as much more directly concerned with the technicalities of health or whatever. But anyway, Jim said would I join him and then he said would I come to Geneva where he was going to be in the next few days. So I did that. As I recall, even though in a typical Jim way, he said could we meet and talk about it at length in a few days time, the phone call went on for three quarters of an hour or was it an hour and a half - it was actually much more embarrassing than that. My young son kept snakes in our house at that point. He had, in particular, a corn snake about three feet long and I had taken it out for exercise in the house when the phone rang. So I dashed back and shut the door but didn't put the corn snake back into its cage, forgetting that our old house - 500 hundred years old - had gaps under the doors of about an inch and a half to two inches high. So the conversation with Jim went on, eventually concluding with agreement that I would meet him in Geneva so we could talk further. I dashed back to the room and to my horror, no snake! I actually removed the floorboards in several rooms and the carpets for a day or two after that. We only found the snake about nine months later - dead in the roof of the house. Snakes can live for some months without food. This unusual dimension of Jim's invitation to join UNICEF I had almost forgotten until this moment.

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8. RJ: I then went to Geneva and I remember Jim taking me out for a nice dinner and, in his somewhat one sided way, talking to me for two or three hours about the excitement of UNICEF, the opportunity of UNICEF, all the things that he was involved in. Although it does stick in my mind that surely three quarters, if not more, of his conversation was about UNICEF in Kampuchea. He was at that time totally immersed in the Kampuchea work. He was flying every few weeks to Kampuchea. He was caught up in the emergency side of UNICEF and certainly, many times later, at the time of the African crisis and famine in the mid 80s, the origins of Lifeline Sudan in the late 1980s, and in some of the emergency operations in the 1990s, Jim would refer back to Kampuchea and say we must never again allow UNICEF or the Executive Director to get so involved in an emergency so that the silent emergency, the bigger cause, the factors affecting 90-95 per cent of children in this world get neglected. I think Jim, in a very real way, learned the hard lesson and subsequently, always felt that tension. Perhaps, I should say here, I always felt the tension. He overdid the tension to be honest. I felt that this was an issue when what was needed was just that little bit more of management detachment, that you say 5-10-15 per cent of UNICEF's effort must go on emergencies, which we always recognized and a management structure must be set up to make sure that side of the work is carried forward fully with enthusiasm and, at appropriate moments, with leadership from the Executive Director and other senior staff and then, in parallel, in a very rather detached, non-emotional management way, top management must give three quarters or more of its attention to the ongoing issues of the silent emergency. In other words, that wasn't Jim. Jim found it very difficult to..

9. SBT: To let go..

9. RJ: Well, not so much to let go, but to compartmentalize management issues in this way. Whatever Jim was on for that particular moment - that minute, that five minutes, that hour - that morning or afternoon, that day - totally absorbed him. The enthusiasm and the preoccupations were contagious, wonderfully contagious, but there was a certain element of his management weakness, I think, to be frank, in not being able quite to switch from one to the other. He would switch. In another hour he'd be on to something else, if that is the way the time table was going and I mean going, not set up in advance. But..

10. SBT: I remember those long days.

10. SBT: But your point on emergencies, was the type of structure you described put in place?

10. RJ: Well, I do believe so.....

10. RJ: My early involvements were almost entirely on the sort of normal programming side. The emergency element for me personally, only really emerged in the mid 1980s with the African issues and that was when it was much more an interagency effort, although we did wonderful things in UNICEF as we'll come to. Later, the issue of how much of UNICEF's efforts should go into emergencies became a very major point of debate with the Board. I think it

was in 1992-3, although the seeds were sown in the earlier stage.

11. RJ: Well, I accepted Jim's offer. He must have approached me in either July or September. There were two things that I had forgotten - very important ones, not significant, but meaningful for me personally. Jim said he was going to China and would I come and join him so I'd have the chance of seeing something of UNICEF in the field. So I did which was doubly exciting for me because I had a daughter who had at that time just completed about one year of Chinese studies as a young thirteen year old.

11. RJ: I said I'd love to come and could I bring my daughter and again, this isn't the moment to go into all the family history of it, but it led to my daughter spending two months in China which cemented her own fascination with China. She subsequently went back for two years of study and she is now there as a UN Volunteer. She's totally fluent in Chinese and there she is in Beijing and at this moment, she's in Szechuan. That was a glimpse of UNICEF in the field and I met a number of UNICEF colleagues because one of those annual courses was being organized in Beijing at the time.

11. SBT: That was the last UNICEF interregional seminar..

11. RJ: I didn't realize it was the last.

11. SBT: Well, they had gotten to be quite expensive; there were now many more staff so it was no longer a practical thing to do. Those of us who were there found it to be a wonderful experience.

12. RJ: Much more significant, I think, in the larger things of history and a point which actually has not been properly written up in the histories (and probably shouldn't be), but I would like to record it, was the Executive Board Meeting in October, 1981. Jim had asked me to come and I think, in all good faith, had imagined that it would be one of those lovely Board occasions when the Board was exhilarating as it was during its main two week meeting in the summer. And so Jim said, "Come over and you'll get a feeling for the Board."

12. SBT: Well, that was a bad introduction!

12. RJ: It was, well, it was perhaps, a bad one and perhaps not but the Board was very fraught. It was an emergency meeting to look at budget issues almost entirely. I think the meeting was only for two days. I came in and I don't even remember whether I was formally introduced as the Deputy Executive Director to come.

12. SBT: I don't think so, no.

12. RJ: I don't think so but I certainly played quite a major role, if I may say so, because the situation was extremely fraught. The gossip conversation was that Jim might have to resign and the

focus of the dispute was the budget that Jim had submitted or perhaps, more correctly, it should be put, had been submitted in the name of the Executive Director which allowed, as I recall, an increase of 394 posts and also the setting up of a planning unit or an analytical unit in New York. Well, these were tough days in the policies of many industrial countries, the early days of Thatcher/Reaganism, cutting budgets down. Again, we didn't call it downsizing and the mood of a budget with 394 additional posts was totally out of sympathy with that situation so there was an extremely strong reaction. Then, there was a strong reaction against what was seen to be Jim Grant's overly academic ideas, setting up an analytical unit in New York, sneeringly referred to as Jim wanting a brain in UNICEF. Amazingly, some people thought the strength of UNICEF was not having a brain but being an expert, grassroots, practical get on and service delivery sort of organization. This was very very fraught and I actually found myself in the corridors behind the scenes with the Chairman of the Board and a few other governments listening and interacting with them and trying to find a way forward. I like to feel I was somewhat helpful although my knowledge of all the other people who were playing a parallel role I'm sure at the time is such that I can't really make any considered judgment as to what were the critical issues, who were the critical players to produce a resolution.

12. SBT: I think what happened there might even be relevant today as people try to look back a little bit because there was such a misperception both on Jim's part and on the Board's part. The gulf was so enormous and no one was willing to move very far and they wanted to make their positions quite clear. It was unfortunate because it was a situation that could have been avoided. He could have had it in time but he wanted it immediately and therefore, he ran into opposition and he ran into Mr. Heyward, in particular. He had already gone through this with Labouisse. The same thing happened.

12. RJ: That I didn't know.

12.SBT: Yes, this was a repeat but more so because Jim was obviously much more dynamic and aggressive about his wishes. And UNICEF was moving in a different direction at that point, towards decentralization. Harry was ready to give up the Regional Directors and leave all the power in the field offices. So the administration had moved to thinking in field terms rather than in headquarters terms, reducing the priorities that had been previously placed on country offices. They had moved that far in their own development thinking. So Jim with his headquarters orientation, he couldn't see it, and therefore, he got clobbered.

12. RJ: And there was always a feeling in Jim's mind subsequently that he had been a bit set up for that in which the 394 additional posts were made to look like net additions. In fact, they were new posts and, in a technical sense, I think about half of them were regularizing posts of people in positions that were already there. I think even of the others that were not in that category, there was a lot of gross addition offset by savings elsewhere. Jim remained a bit sore about that but I think one need no longer in the slightest apologize for Jim's magnificent and wonderful contributions over his fifteen years. I think one can perhaps look back on the

first year or two with interest and perhaps, learn some historical lessons. People can start and make a number of mistakes in the first year or two and it takes a little longer to find out the strength of an institution and its weaknesses to find out ways to combine the energy and vision of a new leader with the best of the old. Why I feel this is an important point to stress is because of its general implications for UN leadership as a whole. There are still people in the UN even as we are talking, Europeans are pressing in UNDP, that Gus Speth should not continue after this, his first term. He's been there three years and I don't mind recording for history my view that Gus Speth, the present Administrator of UNDP, has actually done very well. He has something of Jim Grant's vision, he's highly conscious of Jim Grant's role model as a very successful UN leader. But I continually say to myself you can't expect people coming from outside the UN system and immediately take over and get everything right in the first few months. It's much more complicated than it is for someone, say a minister, taking over within national governments or people being appointed to university positions or CEOs of big corporations. Therefore, I think, in general, one needs to think of periods of appointment that should be more like six or seven years without renewal or then a system as with UNICEF and UNDP in which you have four or five year appointments but you reckon that if things go well there should be a renewal because it is not possible for real new leadership to take over properly within less than two or three years.

12. SBT: It gets more complicated as time goes on.

13 RJ: Let us come to those early days as seen from Jim's administration and myself, joining formally in January 1982, two years after Jim had been Executive Director. Perhaps, I should say something about the evolution of key programme priorities in the Jim Grant era.

14. SBT: Could we start first though with your own perceptions when you first came to UNICEF and your ideas that you brought with you. You said you had some views about coming to UNICEF and your own role and how you saw children and development.

14. RJ: Well, I really knew then much, much less about all this than I do now.

14. SBT: How did you see your role when you first came to help Jim in this situation? Starting off on a whole new direction for an organization?

14. RJ: Not necessarily. That's not my inner being. I think that's a bit more what I consider as the American management style when the new CEO has to come in with a whole new vision and cast doubts on so many things that went before. I don't think it is so much a European style. It's certainly not my personal style but anyway, my role was not Executive Director. My role was Deputy, although I was in charge of programmes and Jim had, as I indicated, never doubted that programme issues had to lead and administration had to follow, a view that I still believe in most passionately - not in a self-centered way, but as a matter of organizational system and efficiency and effectiveness. So, I certainly came to work with Jim. I was extremely lucky when I joined UNICEF, not only because of Jim's friendship and

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support which was obviously personal, but Jim was always, to the end, generous and supportive and, in my whole experience, wonderfully open to everyone. He was not a person who just interacted with the top few people, as interestingly, MacNamara did. MacNamara, at that point, was largely seeing only his Vice-Presidents and travelling up in a separate elevator.

But to come back to Jim. Jim was always open and Jim always preferred to travel in a mini bus rather than a car. If he had to travel in a car as long as there were five or six other UNICEF people in the back seat and three more in the front seat, Jim was happier than if there were only two. If you ask Allison, my wife, you'll hear many examples of this.

The Front Office at that time had Maggie Catley-Carlson as the Deputy Executive Director for Administration and for Operations, strictly, and Tarzie Vittachi as the Deputy on the External Relations side. I think the title changed a little in the last two years but Tarzie was there in the Front Office. My impressions of Dick Heyward and Charles Egger and, for that matter, Herman Stein, were that they were very much around. My frank view was that Dick Heyward was the giant among giants. Jim made a lovely speech in praise of all three. History must record that Dick did so much, in his wisdom, and I think, in all ways, his loyalty not only to UNICEF, but his quiet loyalty (to Jim) even though at times he would differ from him. I don't have any personal experience of Dick Heyward with Harry Labouisse but we had two or three nice dinners. When I arrived, in early 1982, two of the giants were leaving, Charles Egger going back to Switzerland and Herman Stein back to Case Western University but Dick, we found an office for him and quite right too.

14. RJ: So we had this team and we used to meet, perhaps a little too much, twice a week in Front Office meetings. Jim was feeling that he very much wanted to go from the preoccupations of Kampuchea to developing priorities for children in more normal situations. Jim initially was caught up in the somewhat unfortunate Sterling Forest Meeting in which a number of UNICEF people had met for a two or three day retreat in Sterling Forest. Again, I wasn't there but there were reverberations because the in-house mood of that meeting was that Jim had brought in several outsiders as if they had the real wisdom and UNICEF colleagues didn't know what they were about. I think that's probably an exaggeration but that was the way that some people spoke about it. In fact, it was Karl Eric who told me about this meeting in Geneva just before I joined, as I recall. We plotted together in the nicest possible way on how we could set up another meeting in which there could be more listening to UNICEF people and share experiences.

So to come back to my impressions of the first year, it was very much working with Jim on programme priorities and to give content. Jim was stressing, at that time, the need " to change gears and the need" to do more for less," slogans which in their own management way are still around and unless they are backed up with a specific focus, to my mind, are very weak. Jim realized that. He wanted to get to a focus. Somehow, the concerns of Sterling Forest had not really produced that. Nor in- house did it seem that the elements were really

there for such a focus. I think I should point out that I was very encouraged from the beginning to find a strong field element in UNICEF and to find the country programme approach, which was at that time early 1982, had been running for ten years in quite a strong form and for twenty years in some form. It really was in 1964, as I recall, in Bellagio, where the elements of the approach were really identified. The programme approach was nowhere near, in my view, as professional, and solidly based on analysis as it was later, but in relation to the rest of the UN system, UNICEF was the only agency that had a programme approach based on the country situation and, at that point, the only agency apart from UNDP with a large majority of its staff in the field. Another point that I was very impressed with was the high proportion of UNICEF staff that were national officers - much, much higher at that time than UNDP or any other part of the UN.

15. SBT: Was that because UNICEF had invented that category?

15. RJ: Yes, UNICEF had invented it and some people would say it was such a brilliant idea because it provides staff at much lower cost which was true, but the real issue, of course, was that you had people who really knew the local situation. These were all points that impressed me greatly. I think it is worth repeating what I said in the beginning, that my own experience in development had started as a community development officer in Kenya so in many ways I found the approach to country work emphasizing the values and sensitivities of community development compatible, even though things had advanced a lot by the early 1980s. The very preoccupations with the issues of health and education and water supply - on all of them, I had done work at different points of my professional life in economy so I felt I was among congenial colleagues, even though the first field visit I'd paid was to India and I would never treat Dave Haxton, let me say dear Dave Haxton, as a simply congenial colleague. I mean Dave was always sending cannonballs from Fort Delhi in the direction of New York so that my arrival was greeted in more or less traditional fashion. I say that in a sneaking love/ hate way. I can admire many things that Dave Haxton did and still does in his leadership from outside UNICEF in much of the work being done on iodine deficiency. Let me come to the...

15. SBT: The shaping of focus..

21. RJ: Yes, the shaping of focus in 1982 in two very specific ways: first was Jim's search for focus actions that could tackle what he was treating as the main outrageous silent emergency issue of the time - the fact that 40,000 children were dying every day and what could be done about it; and then, the second: how these ideas and focus on child mortality - infant mortality as it was initially being presented- could be used to influence and give greater focus to the whole of UNICEF's country programme approach. On both of those issues, beginning perhaps, in the middle of 1982 and running through the middle of 1983, I think we made major progress. In 1982, an informal consultation was held for a weekend in UNICEF Headquarters in New York on issues of tackling children in poverty, issues of nutrition, and otherwise. This meeting was set up like many Jim liked, as an insider/outsider meeting, but not a formal

interagency meeting. We devised, over the 1980s, many ways of involving some of the best people in WHO and in other parts of the UN system, without making it a formal meeting with formal representation. A formal meeting was the beginning of getting second rate representation and all the interagency sensitivities and jealousies. In this case, it was an informal consultation, a hand-picked bunch of people, about 25 or 30 of us. There is a report prepared by Hossein Ghassemi who was the Senior Advisor on Nutrition at the time, and that document gives the list of participants - many names that will be recognized both from within UNICEF: Dick Heyward, Dave Haxton, Karl -Eric Knutsson, Theresa Albanez, and so forth, Jon Rhode and from outside, a number of specialists from the areas of agriculture, nutrition, development and poverty, etc. including Carl Taylor, Nevil Scrimshaw, representation from the Bank, from IFPRI in Washington, someone from ODC. The meeting was significant because it was very open-ended in its inputs. In its first few hours, I remember Michael Lipton saying that the problem of poverty was not so much just poverty, but was the problem of the ultra poor and that a large part of child mortality and children's problems were concentrated among families in that category of the ultra poor. If UNICEF was to put its concentration in programmes on that, it could make a big difference (in wonderful leadership). Then there was the strong nutritionist dimension emphasizing that nutrition was not one intervention but an outcome of many interventions and UNICEF, with its long tradition of the multi-dimensional approach, convergence approach, I think was the phrase Heyward used to emphasize at the time, could make a big difference in that way. There was also, the presentation by Jon Rhode, as I recall on Saturday, perhaps in the late afternoon, early evening, in which he presented some of the immediate ready-to-go interventions for children that were available technically but enormously underutilized in practice. He had a growth chart which, as he was speaking, he pulled out and presented. Certainly, he must have mentioned oral rehydration - he certainly did mention the oral rehydration issue which Jim had already begun to be aware of through the then head of the Supply Division...

16. SBT: Heino Wittrin

16. RJ: Yes, Heino Wittrin. Then the issues of breast-feeding and certainly, of immunization, but I don't remember the visual aids with these other elements but I certainly do remember Jon Rhode with the growth chart. So those ideas were presented and the meeting closed on Saturday evening somewhat uncertainly, although almost certainly, the idea of a particular focus on a core of interventions such as growth monitoring, oral rehydration, breast feeding and immunization had been identified. What I do remember with some clarity is Sunday morning when Carl Taylor asked to begin the meeting and explained that he had not slept the night before because, as he said, 'Jim, I have known you for thirty years and I could see in your eyes your excitement at that presentation of these elements of focus which later became known as GOBI, and Carl Taylor said, Jim, I beg of you, I beg of you, don't overfocus, don't imagine that there is a limited number of simple technical interventions. It's all more complicated.' Well, one could at this point say, in spite of the warning, the rest is history. But certainly, there was quite a lot of debate and I think in a rather Jim Grant manner, certainly,

there was no consensus in the meeting that GOBI must be the way forward. The issues were debated and you can see in the report that many elements of nutrition and other elements or strategy were summarized, but you will find there on page 4, in the foreword, Jim's reference to 'a serious commitment to this revolution - a child health revolution - by governments and people that could reduce malnutrition, disability and deaths among children in most developing countries by at least half before the end of this century and in many countries within a decade.' Jim noted that the mortality of children was, at that time, exceeding 40,000 each day and also referred to the parallel he often made between the Green Revolution in the 1960's in expanding grain production in many countries in Asia and the parallel that was potential at that time with these elements of GOBI in the area of health.

16. SBT: Richard, at that time - not necessarily at that meeting but outside that meeting, was any attention ever given to looking at what had come out of Year of the Child and all the new interest surrounding children?

16. RJ: My impression is that Jim and the others of us in the Front Office were far too little aware of the Year of the Child and what came out of it. I certainly was very little aware. I think if you had asked me about it then I would have been aware but like many people outside the UN system today, one has this deep skepticism about UN promotional devices. Now I see it in a totally different way and I can see and I know many of the remarkable actual events that have followed from the mobilization that can accompany one of these years and indeed, the Year of the Child was exceptional, even by the this standard. But with that mood, I didn't take it very seriously. I don't recall Jim taking it very seriously although he was a candidate at that point to be Executive Director and had therefore, been attending the UNICEF Boards so he must have been much more aware.

16. SBT: Because all the issues of abuse, the urban problems, interest in early childhood development, concerns and issues that UNICEF had sort of skirted around during the previous decade came to light. I think the thrust was in reaching those UNICEF hadn't reached. When it re-emerged, the thrust was towards children in difficult circumstances and the Convention.

17. RJ: I think the point to make is that all the issues of child abuse and the issues related to the Convention were very clearly ones that Jim was very skeptical about, and I would say largely myself as well in the first half of the 1980s, not that they were unimportant and certainly, not that we were totally insensitive to them, but Jim was searching and I was very much with him on this, searching for actions that could go to scale and make a difference quickly. It needs to be said that for many UNICEF staff members, including some of the best, there was not that sort of conviction that one really needed to do that. At the time, a lot of UNICEF projects and programmes existed on a very small scale. I remember my own involvements with some of the early childhood education programmes or some of the programmes in support of income generating activities for women. Sometimes, relatively large sums of the UNICEF country programme money were going into activities where the beneficiaries might

number 50-100 sometimes, just in two or three villages and you asked, 'what are you doing?'

The need for seriously evaluating the potential of a small scale beginning to move to scale was not part of the analytical programme work at the time and for that reason there was a great deal of skepticism about these activities basically. I think, in terms of history, it should be put that because Jim had such a large vision and was so determined to find ways for UNICEF to contribute on the global scale, country by country, village by village, and to make a difference on the global scale, we saw by the end of the 80s, how it could be achieved. I think there was always a squaring at the circle. It wasn't that one turned one's back on the individual child or many of these problems but Jim showed how one could find such ways of mobilization that the individual concerns of people for literally millions and millions of children could be expressed in practical ways that added up to a global impact.

18. RJ: Let me just say a bit more about the process of taking the ideas of GOBI and turning them into what became the crusade for child survival and development revolution. There were some doubts at the time that we should be calling it a revolution. But Jim was right. We saw, by the 1980s, a revolution at least as widespread as the Green Revolution, I think you can argue much more widespread in its impact and effectiveness, but, at the time, there was a debate. Secondly, the ideas hatched in that meeting at the end of September really burst on the world in the State of the World's Children Report which was written by Peter Adamson at the end of 1982. I think that was the very small book version. I haven't checked back on it before this tape but my memory is that the GOBI elements were included but a major part of the document, it was certainly the days of the rather short version, was on the nutrition gardens programme in Colombo in Sri Lanka. I also had my own worries at this time because Jim saw the State of the World's Children Report as a policy document and I, in my rather bureaucratic manner, always thought it should be seen as a promotional document and that we should have an edition for the field, a quite clear policy directive or probe which would summarize what we expected country reps to do about it. I actually think, if I am allowed to say this on tape, that I was right. At the time Jim didn't like this way of putting it because it seemed to imply that what was in the State of the World's Children report was not policy. But I was making a more bureaucratic and administrative point that if you want to instruct your field staff to do something, you need to give a directive.

19. RJ: Let's see. For some while, we didn't have a clear field instruction on the implementation of the GOBI elements which, in retrospect, I think was a mistake. I think a third point to make, of course, was that GOBI became something of a cause célèbre in what emerged as a battle with WHO, the World Health Organization. I think Maggie Black's history brings this out. But UNICEF had been such a big player in the meeting on Primary Health Care at Alma Ata and the theory of Primary Health Care had been challenged subsequently, by two Americans, Julia Walsh and Ken Warren, and that this battle had become focused as the battle between Comprehensive Primary Health Care and Selected Primary Health Care and it was seen by many parties that UNICEF and Jim Grant by emphasizing GOBI were very specifically trying to implement the selected primary health care view. That, in all my knowledge, was a very unfair identification of the origins and the practicality of GOBI with this theoretical

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presentation of the selected primary health care case. There certainly were parallels but I don't think Ken Warren was at all influential on Jim's main thinking even though he attended one or two meetings. He certainly wasn't present at this September meeting that I was referring to. I did get a chance subsequently in the publication, Social Policy and Medicine in an article with Carl Taylor to put down our view of the issues towards the end of the 1980s. Carl Taylor, who was, after all, at Alma Ata, argued in that document or helped, as we both argued together, that in the original Alma Ata definition and approach to primary health care, there was always the recognition of the need for some focus, some selectivity on a certain number of key elements initially as a matter of practicality. Later it would broaden out. And thus, GOBI could be interpreted in that way. From this early stage, I think many of us gave the interpretation that these were high priority starting points that could be used for going to scale rapidly after which, not just the health system, but other parts of development action in relation to child mortality and others would need to be broadened. So that approach was there even though in UNICEF and in meetings with WHO, there was a lot of debate around it. I think I would like to end this comment by two references to WHO.

One historian came to me at the time and said: "Be careful, Richard before you overreact to some of the attacks from WHO on these issues." I am forgetting the historian's name for the moment but he was at Columbia.(Fruchtbaum). "My reading of 30 or 35 years of UNICEF/WHO relationships was that they were the most creative periods for both organizations that grew out of a period of intense debate and even confrontation. I think that's a very important lesson for the whole of the UN. I can argue that very specifically between the UN System and the Bretton Woods, the World Bank. You can argue it between UNDP and other parts, etc. Bureaucrats hate confrontation and differences. Academics, of course, love it. And media people love it. But actually, it can be very productive and surely, when we look back at GOBI and how at the end of the 1980s, and WHO's own evaluations of progress for Primary Health Care, you'll see that they reckon Primary Health Care was strengthened particularly because of the actions being undertaken in immunization and oral rehydration.

20. SBT: Of course you also had two very strong personalities at work, Mahler was..

20. RJ: Yes, Mahler was one of the great, great Director-Generals of WHO, committed, creative and tested and always frequently pointing out that his first two years of learning so much were as a UNICEF -- (volunteer)- in the 1950s.

20. RJ: I think we have done GOBI.

21. SBT: Perhaps, you might address the 1983 Board and the Board paper, Country Programme Allocations and Global Funds. This is where you really began to make an imprint on UNICEF.

21 RJ: Yes, yes. I am very glad that this element is there because the Board paper, in a very real administrative way, I think, provided Headquarters support for much of the implementation

of the GOBI child survival development priorities. We gave quite a lot of thought to the paper. In some ways, it was perhaps, as you implied, the first of the new efforts to be more systematic in providing a frame for the country programme approach. That was a different frame. It was not just a response to the country situation though that, I hope, was always there to the end, but it was, as Jim used to say, providing corporate priorities within which the country programme would be set so you had a demand and a supply side. I think that was a very important part of the mixture that made UNICEF, not only continuing at country level as an effective and responsive partner, but able to make these dramatic changes also, at regional and global level..

21. SBT: Much more proactive.

21. RJ: Yes. Now the paper. The first point was that instead of allocating UNICEF country programme funds to each country in relation to GNP, the average income of a country, we consciously incorporated child mortality as well so this twisted the criteria to give extra weight for countries which were in greatest need in terms of high child mortality and...

21. SBT: Was this not done before?

21. RJ: Yes, well, I think it was. I suppose my thought at the time, to the extent that I remember it rightly, was that it was an example where UNICEF's intellectual consistency and analysis of what it was doing was less solid than perhaps might have been and I thought the paper was quite good. So we introduced child mortality, initially infant mortality, but then we adjusted it to being under 5 mortality which actually was a better indicator and more reliable statistically and then we incorporated the traditional GNP per capita and, of course, something in relation to total population, child population. The other element that was equally important, was vital to my mind for another really 10 years in UNICEF, were global funds and although that finally went out of fashion, I believe, was never fully understood by many field people. I remain absolutely unregenerative in my thinking. It was a very important and interesting part of UNICEF's programme support mechanisms. Interestingly, UNDP about three years ago, introduced it with total support from their Board just when UNICEF, for various reasons, was abandoning it. What did it do? It identified all the special new actions that might need to be undertaken by a country implementing the child survival and development priorities and provided a modest amount of special additional resources which a country could have in order to implement these new priorities. Very simple. It avoided upsetting the existing agreed programme but provided additional resources for new things, particularly in the short period of restructuring and, of course, it provided a certain incentive for the go-ahead country representative to have some additional funding in order to get the programme under way, and new priorities of the programme underway.

22. SBT: It also allowed for different kinds of cooperation, other partners in the process.

22. RJ: Yes. Most global funds were used at country level and always were, but it was also a mechanism, a fund within UNICEF for support eventually of the State of the World's

Children Report, new partnerships with NGO groups etc., as you said. But most of those were global, at international level. I felt because of that that the speed with which the UNICEF country offices took up the priorities of GOBI was quite impressive and certainly, I believe, because of global funds, that was faster than would have been otherwise. It meant you could take on new priorities without having to sacrifice existing things (and unfortunately, it had occurred at a period when we had made adjustments.) We were then getting rising revenue so it was possible to provide funding of that sort. I should say here that there was always great fears from the field that global funds were taking resources from normal country programme efforts. When David Haxton was being particularly strong on these matters, I retain a little pride that I said that global funds were a matter of less than 4% of total resources and, to the end, they never exceeded 4% of total UNICEF programme expenditures which is a trivial amount for programme.

23. SBT: A good selling point.

22. RJ: Yes, good selling point as it would be put. I should comment that many of these ideas, the demand approach, for example, Nyi Nyi's leadership, the creative insights of many, many people that I won't attempt to summarize here, really were brought together in a succession of meetings that followed the unfortunate Tarrytown. They became known as Mohonk meetings, initially held in the Mohonk Mountain House in upstate New York where indeed, I think many Quaker meetings were held at the end of last century, many related to international issues. There was a very modest ambiance about the place, by no means modest in the most wonderful surroundings, or in the quality of the food provided. The Mohonk Meetings were held there, usually with 50 - 80 UNICEF field people and perhaps, 20 or so from Headquarters. They did a great deal to mobilize practical awareness on the new priorities, to exchange views on how they could be turned into practical action at country level. They identified many country experiences and they provided an enormous platform for Jim to motivate and mobilize everyone for the cause. And also, for people to realize that Jim was a very subtle understander of development issues. Often outsiders at the time would say to me, "But how can you work for a man who actually believes that development can begin with a little packet of ten cent oral rehydration salts?" And probably, a hundred or more times - particularly with cynical British colleagues, former colleagues - I would point out that they just didn't have a clue about Jim Grant. Take Jim on on the subject of debt adjustment policy, the sources of the Green Revolution, the detailed aspects of getting the electrolytic balance right to cope with dehydration, the virtues of breast-feeding - Jim had a vast knowledge of all these and was a formidable advocate, for all his legal forensic skills could be brought to bear. I think that was probably a major part of building up the acceleration in practical commitment. I want to slip in one personal point because it was mostly joked about but it was actually a bit of method in my madness at the time.

The meetings became known as the Mohonk Meetings not just because they were held there, but because on the first or second evening of the first meeting, I had bought a big hunting horn in the shop in Mohonk Mountain Cottage with a big balloon at one end you could

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squeeze, and out would come a very deep honk. It was totally ridiculous. I had bought it because some people there - let me say Dave Haxton - had a way of raising the emotional tension in these meetings with either skepticism or accusations of people not knowing or not listening to the field. David, his words could be very nasty and very disruptive at such meetings, was a very powerful character.... But he was also very effective. There were a number of people in UNICEF who both admired him and had learned a lot from him as, indeed, I have, but when Dave was raising the tension in one way or another or others, I had my Mohonk which was so absurd that everyone just laughed. It wasn't just so much used against Dave or anyone but it introduced a note of distraction from any tensions. I should say as this is contributing to the history, that a real confrontation between Jim Grant and Dave Haxton came probably in 1983, it might have been in 1984, but quite early on, in an Executive Staff meeting. Dave had really gone, frankly, too far. I don't even remember the issue but it doesn't greatly matter. In a way that can only be described as subversive and clearly disloyal and threatening to the Executive Director, Dave made his points in the room and there was a confrontation. I think Jim showed his maturity and his ability to avoid the surge of blood and emotion that can often get roused and Jim stared down Dave Haxton. I don't know whether you were present but it must have been something like a minute. It seemed like five minutes. Nothing was said but Jim kept his focus on Dave's eyes. Dave looked back at Jim and the rest of us were spellbound in rapt attention until in the end Dave said something like, yes, Mr. Executive Director. and by using the words that formally acknowledged that Jim was Executive Director, the meeting then resumed and on we went. Probably others, Dr. Nyi Nyi almost certainly, will remember the immediate cause but as I say, it doesn't matter, but it was very significant. Dave was, at times, not fully realizing the situation. He was upset, to be honest, when Karl-Eric was appointed as Deputy Executive Director for Operations following Maggie Catley-Carlson, and it was quite a tense period. Dave came to New York for one of the meetings. It was the Board meeting with Regional Directors all present, and Dave was implying, at that time, that he thought he ought to have been appointed as the most senior person. Well, anyone who looked at the nationality balance would have known there was no way that Jim Grant, an American, could have appointed another American for one of the three Deputy positions. I raise that - I don't know, I leave it to you whether one should cross out that little bit. That's a trivial point but the confrontation is important for what it says about Jim's patience and style.

24. RJ: Let me say more about Jim's patience and style. I think I heard Jim swear literally in UNICEF, using some sort of four letter words, probably five times in fourteen years.

24. SBT: I never heard it.

24. RJ: And it was extremely rare. They were very mild words but it's a measure of Jim's positive spirit, his civilized style, his American nature without sharing any of the Washington sort of in-house talk and styles. If you think back to the deleted expletives of Nixon, not that that's a particularly relevant example, but Jim was amazingly generous and positive behind the scenes as well as in public, as I know myself.

25. RJ: I want to make one or two final points in relation to the programme issues in the first four or five years of the 1980s. Increasingly, the State of the World's Children Report played this major role, not only promoting the basic messages of GOBI FF, elaborating them into GOBI FFF, but reporting increasingly, on progress as we began to see these ideas work out. The evidence emerged of acceleration, introducing a number of other elements of subtlety and range in the message. It's a dumb thing to say that the State of the World's Children Report repeatedly concentrated on immunization, oral rehydration and the GOBI elements. There was a sense in which Jim Grant kept that as a major focus because, with hindsight, we can see he realized it would take time and concentration to achieve it. But it is not true that those were the only messages of the State of the World's Children Report. I think if you go back you will find that there was never an issue, or hardly ever not an issue, where land reform was not mentioned. Military spending was mentioned as a great diversion and waste of resources, the broader need for Africa-action on poverty, the need for agricultural development, rural development etc.. These elements were there. They weren't the central focus.

25. SBT: There was always a mix of each.

25. RJ: There was a mix, and there was a consciousness that no matter how much we wanted to promote GOBI FF, GOBI FFF for these actions in reducing child mortality, the whole agenda for development had to be broader and that many others were involved. This leads me to remark on what we will come back to later, the impact of recession which I was much more involved with from 1983, but particularly 84 and 85 and the next few years which was the impact of recession on children and women and then, the whole effort to promote a new approach to adjustment policy in the international community. I won't go into it now except to mention that it's there as another important point. It's probably not necessary for me to touch on all the other elements because Maggie Black's history has analyzed them very well.

Clearly, the provision of additional resources by the Italian Government and indeed, by a number of other governments, for child survival was very critical. It's interesting that initially that money was provided for nutrition and, indeed, the Italian Government had been much impressed with Jim and had offered the money, as I understand it, entirely to UNICEF and it was Jim's sense of politics and Jim's commitment, genuine international commitment to other parts of the UN system, that led him unilaterally to suggest that the programme, the Joint Nutrition Support Programme (JNSP), should be implemented jointly with WHO and that is what we did. For some years, I was the key person, at least at Headquarter level, in negotiating and finding ways forward with WHO on that. Again, it is a rather separate story and not a totally happy one although I think, in the end, well, the most important conclusion from that experience was in Aringa, in Tanzania, where Urban Jonsson had used the Italian money to promote a participatory village level set of actions on nutrition, the AAA (triple A) approach of community involvement. That was a major effort growing out of JNSP but, in fact, supporting many elements of child health and broader development and then spreading

to other countries. There was also much of the early work on iodine deficiency and bringing down goitre, for example, in Bolivia which was supported by the JNSP.

26. RJ: The final point I would like to make on this relates to efforts to strengthen the country programme process. It was there, as I said, it had been first devised, grown out of the work of the Bellagio group in 1964. There had been a series of regional meetings in the 1970s with some publications arising so the country programme approach was well established in the early 1980s when I joined UNICEF. However, there was some obvious catches in it. I used to point out that if it was true that the country programme was devised by focusing first on the situation analysis of the country, then the programme was logically deduced from that to get priorities. You would be hard put then to explain why when one UNICEF rep changed to another, everything changed and yet..

26. SBT: (laughter) And it still does..

26. RJ: And it still does too often and your very laughter is exactly how that comment of mine used to be greeted at the 1983 and 1984 meetings. By then, I was beginning to understand a little bit about UNICEF. I like to make the point because it showed that I was aware of some of the reality of the country programming process and it was also, a way in which I could make a point of frank criticism when head on questioning of the great UNICEF programme approach was seen as questioning some of the basic theological truths of the time.

27. SBT: And, of course, in that period the analysis itself changed very rapidly.

27. RJ: Well, that I like to think was one of the things I worked on..

28. SBT: Did that come about because of skepticism on your part?

28. RJ: No, not from skepticism but from my academic convictions in IDS that there was a lot that could be done to improve the quality of the analysis. Some of the situation analyses were very boring and uninspired in content. The Country Programme papers going to the Board would begin with the number of square kilometers per country and the capital city and a few things like this. After four or more repetitive paragraphs of this sort, it would then begin to move to things relating to children. I would like to feel that if someone went back to look at the papers of the late 1980s, as compared with the early 1980s, they would see that increasingly, the first paragraph of the country programme started with some head on comment on the nature of problems for children in that country, be it the economic crisis the country was facing, the famine, or the fact that the country had been making great progress in child nutrition but always setting these children's problems in the broader economic, social political context, indeed, of the countries. Often, the political context was brought out too. But that just didn't happen and it just wasn't editing the country programme documents for the Board. It was a process in which - let me pay tribute to Dr. Nyi Nyi and Dick Heyward in the background and many others who helped to improve, first, to build up a set of manuals

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for the country programme process and in the key sectors - health, education, nutrition, water sanitation, etc.- and secondly, a process of improving the procedures for reviewing the country programmes and insisting that they were better prepared at every stage from the situation analysis to the preparation of the strategy, to the review of the country programme, to looking at the balance of allocation of expenditures, etc. That was going on with Programme Division, at the time it was PDPD, parallel with efforts to improve the medium term workplan. The medium term workplan, actually I remember in 1982 was in draft, was almost a totally tautological document that you knew to the extent that if there were any priorities, they were priorities focused on the needs of children. As Tarzie used to say, and others in Programme Division, we would give even more priority to the priorities that we had pursued in the last year which, in turn, had given even more priority than the year before and so forth.

To be continued

Title: INTERVIEW WITH DR. RICHARD JOLLY September 19, 1996

Annex A: Transcript Related Cross References to be confirmed before final distribution

Type of Item	Description	Work Unit code	Work Unit Record Series	Folder	Item	AMS or Electronic Location	Storage Device
Initial Registration: [Unedited Draft Version of Transcript]	HST Chron (Original Draft)	CF/NYH/OSEB/HST	1989 A5c1 AD Chron Files	AD-556 1996	1996-261	RAM96265.wpd	f:\workgrps\lrram
	RAM Chron (Original Draft)	CF/NYH/IRM/ISS/RAM	1990A55c AD-556 RAM Registry Item Logs	AD-556/RAM/96-03	1996-265	RAM96265.wpd	f:\workgrps\lrram
	RAM Chron	CF/NYH/EPP/RAM	1989 ALi ADM	AD-527/RAM/1999	1999-527	RAM99527.doc	t:\Workgrps\eppram/or/900-hst/lst-edit
Registered Edited Transcript [as of Oct. 1999]	History Interview Document Series [CF/HST/INT] for Reference/ Distribution	CF/NYH/OSEB/HST	1989 18i IN Hst Interviews	CF/HST/INT/JOL-002/M	Was 1996-261; now RAM/1999-527	See final above	See above
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AUDIO Tapes	Original Tape	CF/NYH/OSEB/HST	1989 14a IN AUDIO	TAPE/JOLLY-002/A ¹	1996-261		
	Transcript Copy	CF/NYH/OSEB/HST	1989 14a1 IN Aud Historical	TAPE/JOLLY-002/E	1996-261		
	Copies of Tape	CF/NYH/OSEB/HST	1989 14a IN AUDIO	TAPE/JOLLY-002/B,	1996-261		
				TAPE/JOLLY-002/C, TAPE/JOLLY-002/D	1996-261		
Tape legend:	A=Master tape; B= (Given to) Interviewer copy; C=(Given to) Interviewee copy; D=Loan copy; E=Transcript tape						
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