Chron Ref: CF/NYH/OSEB/HST/1996-081
File Sub: CF/HST/INT/BRI-002/M

1851Q

Ed Bridgewater and Jack Richman

By Jack Charnow

20 May 1985

Table of Contents Page

80 pp + 0b

1851Q ... 25 July 1985

Ed Bridgewater and Jack Richman

By Jack Charnow

20 May 1985

New Paltz, New York

Recruitment in UNICEF

Charnow: Ed, how did you get to come into UNICEF?

Bridgewater: Well, Jack as you know, I was in UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in the food division where I had been from early 1946 until I was interviewed early in 1947 by Karl Borders first and eventually by Maurice Pate. My background was in the grain business. I've been with an exporting firm in Canada for a number of years prior to the war. I was contacted in London, England by someone who had already been on the staff of the United Nations Relief and Rehabiliation Administration because he had known my background and asked if I would be prepared to join UNRRA and from UNRRA where Karl Borders was Chief Executive Officer at one point. I suppose some of my work, at least was known by Karl and when he joined the staff of UNICEF suggested that he contact me which he did and a bit later, I was interviewed by Mr. Pate.

The original discussion was one of a sort of a feeling out in the sense that they knew that I had the background in food stuffs, particularly in purchasing food stuffs. He was very interested in various aspects of the work I had done, but we had gone on from there to discussing the emoluments and the like. I had had intentions after the war to go into the grain export business because I'd had offers from exporting firms in New York and I therefore asked Mr. Pate how long he expected UNICEF would be in existence. He hesitated but thought perhaps three years. That seemed to suit with my plans very well. I'd enjoyed my work with UNRRA and dealing mainly with government agencies in the United States and Canada and through some of the delegations in Washington and Australia, but I had no field experience, so three more years of the type of contacts I was having at that time sounded as thought it would be an educational one. I said if I was offered the task, I would be very pleased to accept. Rather to my surprise, two days later, Mr. Borders called me to his office and said that they decided that I was the one to take on the role of the Chief, Supply Division.

Charnow: In discussing salaries what did Mr. Pate offer you in comparison with what you had been earning?

Bridgewater: Well, he did not exactly offer. He asked what I was earning. In those days I guess it was certainly in keeping was the effort I was putting into it, but nevertheless he thought perhaps I would be good enough to accept a modest cut in the salary. I asked him what the expected volume of business

might be, and he said he thought maybe $50 million maximum. And I then said, "Well Mr. Pate if the man who is undertaking this purchasing for you has $50 million to spend, I think it would be advisable to pay him a salary sufficient to allow him to live at his present standard of living at least, otherwise there might be great temptation to play favorites with some of the suppliers he would have to deal with in return for favours." I thought that would end it, but he accepted that in the manner intended.

Getting started

I was still engaged in the work of closing up food divisions in UNRRA so I wore two hats for a period of several months. Part of the day I would be writing the UNICEF supply manual and part of the day I would be finishing off the work in UNRRA upstairs in the Dupont Circle Building.

Charnow: What where the problems you immediately faced?

Bridgewater: Well, the first problems where to get some form of procedures and we adopted very largely the US Navy purchasing procedures but a very short version. We accepted the fact that it was necessary to have a competitive bidding when that time arrived but at the outset, we were dealing with a very modest sum. The only money we had was about $500,000 which were proceeds of an emergency food collection in the United States.

Later of course, we inherited the residual assets of UNRRA, a fairly substantial sum, and with US and Canadian contributions it began a relatively feverish activity in acquiring food stuff both by purchase and through donations from governments. The first actual purchase was whole milk powder and skimmed milk powder which utilized the total $500,000 we had at that time. That was our very first shipment of milk powder ????? to Europe. Then we gradually acquired staff. Very few secretaries, an accountant, a statistical person more or less rather than an accountant although if qualified, and a shipping officer, Barney Fraser. He had some assistance in the form of one Wayne Davidson and the movements began from various United States ports. A couple of ports out of Canada, again, mainly food stuffs. As the work progressed, the procedures were enlarged and we found sufficient number of papers around Washington to write our own bidding procedure and bid form using partially the UN form and partially the US government forms.

Charnow: How about the UNRRA experience?

Bridgewater: Well, the UNRRA experience was varied, but my specific job was in fact, obtaining the grain necessary to keep the monthly allocation moving. We were spending about $50 million a month on grain for the nine countries of Europe that suffered from the war. For the most part, we had excellent relations with the United States Department of Agriculture, the Canadian Wheat Board people, and the Canadian Commercial Corporation. We had in UNRRA though, such a rapport with the people in the Pentagon

that when a country was running short of grain, we could borrow cargo that were afloat, and repay from our next assignment. A very fine working relationship all done by telephone rather than have to go through the ninety copies of applications we would make out for milk that was donated later on. And I remember several instances when it was obviously you cannot repay shiploads to exact penny, we would either give some, say milk powder or something of that nature in addition to the shipload of wheat that we had borrowed or vice versa. If we gave back a few more tons than what was on the ship when we had borrowed, we would get something for it.

Charnow: You said the forms and the procedures mostly came from the United States, rather than from UNRRA?.

Bridgewater: The United States government, and to some extent it was Navy. It was really a Navy procedure. I guess our forms and procedures were very similar, with the necessary word changes. UNRRA used the forms for some of its purchases, but most of the grain was handled by allocations. Allocations meetings took sometimes fifteen days a month to settle. All of the participating countries were arguing their needs daily. And when the allocations meetings were finished, the allotment for each country determined, then the various governments who were able to export grain were simply, let's call it, requisitioned. It wasn't a matter of bidding. You had what the going price was

in that particular country. It was reasonably stabilized. There was nobody gouging at UNRRA, but it wasn't competitive.

Milk Procurment

Charnow: In a number of countries wasn't what UNICEF was doing just continuing the supplementary feeding programmes which had been started with UNRRA help?.

Bridgewater: I think that in part that was true, but UNRRA's work and mandate was to provide food for those who had suffered as the result of war. They didn't distinguish between mothers and children and fathers and grandfathers, etc. Our effort was directed towards the children and mothers and therefore the supplies we initially shipped was milk powder and it would be distributed to schools and institutions. Eventually it became a wider distribution where it went out even to the villages and was distributed to families. But whether or not you could say it was a continuation of what UNRRA was doing would be very difficult to determine in some situations, although certainly it would be true with several others.

Charnow: Didn't UNICEF introduce a lot more milk powder than had been in UNRRA?.

Bridgewater: There is no comparison whatsoever. We were first and foremost, I guess, the really large distributor of skimmed milk powder. We were receiving powder as donations first of all. We got donated powder from surplus food programmes in the United States, Canada, and Australia and only later on did we begin to buy milk when the surpluses evaporated, and it no longer was subsidized in the United States and some other countries too. Milk then became a saleable product for export. Although we were really towards the end of our feeding programme at that time, we did purchase, in the open market by competitive process, a fairly substantial quantity of milk product, both whole and skimmed. But we took whatever we could in a way of surplus foods when they were available. As a matter of fact UNICEF undertook a contract with the United States Department of Agriculture whereby we purchased their entire stock of over a 100 million pounds of skimmed milk powder. That literally eradicated the surplus. We paid one cent a pound for that sixteen cent product.

Cod Liver Oil Vitamins

Richman: Didn't UNICEF also pioneer in the vitaminizing of the milk powders?

Bridgewater: We take credit for being one of the first to introduce vitamins in milk because, after all, skimmed milk, although it had valuable nutrients minus fat, the children certainly needed additional vitamins. From the mass distribution standpoint, we were certainly the pioneers.

Cod Liver Oil

The first liquid vitamin was cod liver oil, then later it was encapsulated - gelatin capsules for a much easier distribution in assimilation of actual product. Cod liver oil, probably distasteful to some, had to be distributed by spoonful which was a sort of tedious task - mostly done in the school rooms where as capsules could be dispensed through clinics or by just giving the mother a weeks ration or two weeks ration depending on how far she had to walk to come and get the ration together with milk or whatever else was being issued at that time. And sometimes, I know they had weekly distributions and othertimes it was monthly.

And as our programme expanded in terms of commodities, the issue would include some soap in addition to some powdered milk and they'd need other things when they were available.

Charnow: Would you say that because of our interest in widespread distribution of milk that was enriched with vitamins or encapsulation of a cod liver oil that we helped accelerate the commercial production and economics of this so it became part of the overall scene?

Bridgewater: That's a very difficult question. First of all, vitamins were added by a supplement in the form of the liquid cod liver oil and then the capsule. In later years when baby foods were part of the project in some countries, it was possible then to add the vitamins to the various components of the mixture and you had a vitaminized, fortified product which was then distributed by various means but most often an infant food. It certainly had to have some form of impact, but I can't imagine it was in anyway instrumental in the present day fortification of milk. It could have had something to do with it but I don't believe we could take credit for that.

UNICEF and Medical Supply Technology

Charnow: Jack, are there any examples, from the medical field, where our interest in something expedited or accelerated. Development - slash in which some western technology was adapted for widespread use in developing countries because of UNICEF?

Richman: I think there were a number of instances where UNICEF helped in both the poineering of the certain medications and also the progress and the quantity aspect of them. But whether we have had a tremendous impact on the culture and the manufactoring processes that are being utilized today is questionable.

DDT

We did get involved at the very early stage in malarial projects. Malaria, was fought in those days, very largely through the use of the wettable DDT powder and I suppose UNICEF was concerned, since it was the second largest purchaser after the USAID. And in that sense, we probably inspired a number of manufacturers to expand their production to seek new markets overseas that they had not looked at before. In fact, UNICEF was also encouraged to help in the building of certain plants overseas as well—in India, in Pakinstan, and in Egypt—so that we did have an impact in those days creating I suppose, many silent springs. But the number of lives that were saved by the spraying of DDT perhaps compensated for the environmental effects of the distribution of this powder.

Smallpox

There are other areas that UNICEF helped to develop. In the production of smallpox vaccine we shipped large numbers of freeze drying equipment to different countries to help them make the product themselves and to arrive at the point where todays smallpox has been completely eradicated.

Vitamins

The other diseases such as xerophthalmia, we helped to develop a capsule of vitamin A together with the Helen Keller Institute and we through competitive means to have the manufacturers in various countries produce this product so that the vitamin A that was effective was properly capsulated for immediate use by

the individual child. That therapy still exists today and I believe that UNICEF is still one of the foremost suppliers of vitamin A capsules for that purpose. The model that was used for that capsule was one that I think had been I think brought out by Bridgewater in the vitamin A's and B's that had originally been shipped as a supplement for feeding. And this was a very neat adaption of the tubular capsule where you could squirt the contents into the mouth of a child that couldn't swallow or an older child that swallowed the capsule entirely. The capsule was made with a little tip which could be slipped on which made it easy to squeeze the tubular type capsule into the baby's mouth rather easily.

Charnow: How, did that work? Did you go to somebody and say can you develop something like this or did you have somebody in UNICEF design it?

Richman: The firm who was making these soluable gelatin capsules was making a variety of sizes and shapes. And it was easily understood by them when I explained our need so they simply showed me a tubular type capsule which they had been using, it was very much larger than we needed, but they knew that they could make a mold for something smaller. It was a type of capsule they used for lighter fluid. You take the top off and you squeeze the fluid into your lighter. And this smaller version was then introduced and the formula made into these capsules and distributed wisely.

ORS

Bridgewater: It's interesting to note that they also almost went back to the larger tube style in trying to arrange for a package of the salts used for combating diarrhoea, the ORS. The ORS was tried in that form of capsules, but we found that it was entirely too large to ship, irregularly shaped and difficult to pack as well and rather expensive as a difficult packaging method for supply of that product so we then went to the packet. We tried to utilize in many of these instances forms that were already available on the market, we didnt°t really invent these ourselves, although some of our nutrition experts I know, had some Rube Goldberg affairs in trying to arrange for the individual use of the vitamin A, for instance for xerophthalmia, and they have some very intricate and expensive devices that they had considered before we recomended that they utilize this to package.

Baby Scales

Charnow: What about the story of baby scales and weighing and so on?

Richman: Well, baby scales were a need for certain of our clinics the mother and child health clinics that we were establishing on a world basis. And we started originally with a commercial scale that was not entirely satisfactory because the bottom was rather flat and sitting on a table that is in a flat fashion, but hollowed out so that spiders were able to built nests underneath, and we got a number of complaints of that nature that they were difficult to keep clean so that we then were

obliged to modify the commercial unit. And in undertaking the small modifications of just required putting it on legs, we also decided to do other things as well with the scales, so that we wound up with a UNICEF model that was not commercially made or even being commercially sold at that stage. The calibrations on scales were also a matter of discussion with our advisers in World Health. They were insisting on very, very minute calibrations going down to even five grams. As I recall extensive correspondence with several of their doctors who were insisting on a five gram calibration, even though that might have increased the cost of the scales to UNICEF by two or a hundred percent more. We were then shipping scales with a ten gram calibration. One of our arguments, was "Well how do you know whether you are weighing the child before or after it has urinated," and of course we never got satisfactory answers, to our just simple questions. But we prevailed in this matter and we never did get down to the five gram scale at any volume. Those scales were available on the commercial market, but they were being made in small quantities so they were very expensive.

Field Feedback

Charnow: I guess this raises the question of suitability determined by field experience plus economics and its influence on supplies.

Bridgewater: Our feedback was not entirely satisfactory. We did after a while enclose sheets asking for comments from the field.

We never got good feedback in that fashion and unfortunately we were not very well manned in our Supply Division, and we did not have the personnel to send from point to point to try to extract this information from the users. And we got lots of complaints.

Oversophisticated supplies

You mentioned sophisticated material before. One of the larger issues and complaints was that a lot of the stainless steel hollow-ware that we sent down, the basins, the enema pans, the bed pans, and other implements, were so pretty and in a sense so expensive that many of the clinics could not afford to use them and instead locked them behind closed doors. We also heard that if any of these were stolen, that the persons in charge of the clinics or the nurses were then personally responsible to pay for whatever was missing. And that was another reason for not using the so-called fancy stainless steel utensils. On the other hand, we had shipped the less expensive and at that time perhaps more standard porcelain type of hollow ware or enamel type and we found again that in the shipping process, there was a tendency for the enamel to chip. In use it would chip very easily and rust in the tropical climates that we were servicing was so immediate that it destroyed the thickness and the cleanliness of these instruments and utensils which were supposed to be sanitary when used. So that even though we were paying twice as much for stainless steel at that stage, we thought that it was a cheaper way to service the clinics that we were establishing.

Now that was one, of the complaints; that we were sending entirely too sophisticated items. They were thinking a great deal of the stainless steelware that was sent to many of these countries.

Charnow: I recall a sort of impression that there was a certain amount of pressure on the part of the specialized agency people and the government people, many of whom in the ministry of health had been trained in western oriented schools who felt that what UNICEF was providing was second class stuff. And also some comments some of which you have made, Jack, that you weren't getting too much feedback from the field people themselves who were complaining about what they were getting. On the other hand, you get these horror stories of these refrigerators arriving where there was no electrical outlet and that sort of thing, that there weren't maybe sufficient maintenance instructions or sufficient training on the part of the local people. I have heard of complaints of oversupply, and in under use. It seemed a big problem which was more internal than external; fortunately not a lot of it seemed to hit the newspapers. I'd like both if you to elaborate on this issue, which seems to have been almost a part of the corridor gossip over years in UNICEF, I do remember the role of our Deputy Executive Director in charge of Programmes, "Dr. Borcic, who would laboriously go through supply list saying that's too fancy-cut it out." And other people blamed him for spending so much of his time going through supply lists, and said why don't we trust the people,

why don't we decentralize, why are we doing so much at Headquarters. Who wants to take this first, you Ed?

Bridgewater: I would like to take this, some of it at least. First of all we've jumped many years. And we can go back to the stage which we really started our Medical Supply Operation, at which we can, but, to go into this phase of sophistication. When a project was receiving vaccines, it would have been absolutely useless to send vaccines without some form of refrigeration, none of which was available. The governments knew it, our people knew it. The other thing to remember is, when the refrigeration was requisitioned, put on the supply list, the supply people had no right to question it. They were usually asking for the current model of refrigerator, but nothing five years ahead of the time. It was standard household refrigerator at first. Various sizes were available depending on the size of the institution. But generally speaking, it might be considered sophisticated if that refrigerator went to some little hamlet far out in the bush where there was no electricity. Although we did provide some kerosine operated refrigerators where it was said that kerosine was available, and some were, in fact, combination types, electric/kerosine type. The real sophisticated equipment came later. And as I say, a refrigerator for the purpose it was intended if ordered, was ordered by the programme people in the field who should've known whether or not there was necessary power or fuel to see that they were operated, and to see that they got in the position.

Utensils are not sophisticated. It's a matter of economics whether you supply enamelware or whether you supply stainless steelware. Stainless steelware can be cleaned easily and will last virtually forever.

It is possible that there were situations were staff might have been responsible for missing utensils. I can't imagine very many bed pans being filched from the various clinics and health centers, I don't know who would want a pair of dental forceps. Particularly, if the nurse in charge or whoever was charged with that, she might keep it locked up. But if ever a dentist did come along, he certainly ask for some of that nature otherwise he couldn't perform any dentistry. Those were the simple medical types. The truly sophisticated, I have grave questions myself as whether they should have been provided. Jack has a much deeper and better understanding of that phase and I would much prefer that he undertake to provide your answers.

Richman: Firstly, Dr. Borcic was very, very helpful in reducing the number of extravagant types of items that were finally purchased for these different countries. It was part of the function of our Supply Division as well, to review these lists, and to bring to the attention of the individual countries, that the requests were somewhat too sophisticated, and that they could perhaps be substituted with something less sophisticated.

Charnow: But it was mere suggestion?

Bridgewater: It was only recommendations. We did not have the authority to modify those lists ourselves. And very much of our time was taken with these recommendations to both the programme people at headquarters, as well as directly to the countries.

Charnow: How successful were you?

Richman: Well we were not very successful. But we continued to fight what we thought was the good fight. And we didn't get the co-operation of the programme officers with some exceptions. There were several of them notably those in Africa, who I think were very sympathetic to this kind of review. And they would try to modify some of those requests, but on the other hand, they were also to some extent, without the authority to insist on the modifications being carried out.

Standard Supply List

Towards that end we thought that what would be useful, would be guidelists for these countries, partly as a result of the variation in requirements for each of these countries, and some variations were expected and were necessary for certain countries. Not everybody could use the same type of instrumentation that was necessary, let's say for a western country in which the people are just built somewhat differently than they are in Africa. And we had expected that there would be differences in requests.

However, we thought that if we standardized through the means of these guidelists, that we not only would facilitate the operations of our people in the field and reduce the number of extraneous requests as well, but that it will also assist in getting the materials to the field more quickly. And for that purpose after we did establish guidelists with the co-operation of the various sister agencies, WHO, UNESCO, FAO, and others, we then were able to foresee the demand that would be created and it help Mr. Bridgewater in the formulation of his needs for a centralized warehouse to handle all of these materials.
Now the guidelists were the product not only of the sister agencies, but also largely due to UNICEF input, through the Supply Division in addition to some Programme Division support. But the individuals were concerned very largely with the guide lists, were those in the Supply Division. And George Mar in particular, who was sent over to Supplies from the Programme Section was extremely instrumental and helpful in formulating these guidelists, and getting the approval of the different agencies. Incidentally, the person who gave the different names of Flora, Dinah, and Isis etc to these lists, was Joe Parenti, who was also a member of the Supply Section rather than Programme Section.

Bridgewater: Another aspect of the supply list deserves some mention. In health projects the number of items necessary to fulfill the needs of the various countries, increased enormously. And with each and every programme officer in the field having his own

idea of what was required, obviously with the help of government officials who were making the request, the Supply Division was faced with a task of trying to acquire the individual preferences, which meant, thousands of orders, of relatively small items, which made it terribly expensive to administer.

Influence Of The Midwifery Kit

And we began then with acquiring the items for the midwifery kit, first through a hospital supplier in New York City, who, when he did not personally carry in stock a few of the items that were in those initial kits, he would actually acquire them and bring them into his own establishment. He then eventually put them together as kits. We in Supply Division and I'm not sure who gave us a hand in that regard, devised an aluminum box to prevent rust etc., and, which would separate all the items which we could foresee for these simple kits. And we had these boxes made to our order. Thousands and thousands of them for many, many years.

Third Basement Warehouse

As the volume grew, we found it much more economic to buy these items individually and bring them into our little facility in the third basement of the UN Headquarters where the UNICEF warehouse started.

And from the midwifery kits, grew other standard lists primarily to cut down on providing these individual tastes and to reduce the work load. And of course the supply which were screened time and time again, and I know Jack Richman put in many days of meetings with not only specialized agency people,

but with our Programme Division staff and others, in producing the various lists, which eventually came to be a very popular resource in our offices throughout the world. The little warehouse in the third basement at one point was building out into the driveways and ramps of the basement garage. We were forced to move our premises overseas. But by then we were in fact carrying several thousand standard items, all due to the use of supply standard supply lists.

Important Aspect

Charnow: Were the supply lists something new in international supply aid? Would you say that this is something UNICEF developed out of it's own need, which now could be considered an important contribution?

Bridgewater: I would say that definitely. Aside from armed services in various countries where they would have catalogues for the various items available, I know that there would be no other agency that started anything of that nature. No one has every been distributing articles so numerous in terms of quantitive and variety that UNICEF has been undertaken all these years. No other agencies can compare in that sense. Many, as you know, obtain many of their articles from the UNICEF warehouse in Copenhagen. The volumes got to be very substantial and even beyond my wildest expectations. They were not only a great help to our staff, but a means of handling the requirements at reasonable administrative costs which was always uppermost in the mind of the Supply Division.

Relations to Utilizing Difficult Currencies

Richman: We are given a great deal of credit for being able to spend some of the difficult currencies that were contributed to UNICEF. In part the expenditure of these currencies was facilitated by the availability of a central warehouse that could do the packaging for the individual project as required. For instance, we were able to utilize our Polish currency let's say for the midwife box itself or various drugs which were available inexpensively from the government producing agency in Poland. We also utilized Bulgarian currency for that purpose as well as ruraly from the USSR, Sweden and Norway were able to contribute to stainless steel, hollow-ware to our warehouse operation. In that we could make an efficient use of the difficult currencies unlike some of the other UN agencies who did not have that kind of facility.

The credit, I think very largely, should be given to the warehouse that was initiated by Mr. Bridgewater. And the follow through in the expenditures was also, I think a great part of the efforts that were expended by Ed and his different visits to these countries where it was one of our foremost preoccupations success: how do we spend all of this money that is so difficult to otherwise utilize?

Charnow: Did the problem of utilizing difficult currencies also sometimes influence our programmes since we could only get certain types of goods and therefore you would have to say to our programme people that's all we have put it into a programme someplace.

Relation Non-Covertable Currancies To Programming

Richman: In the early days, there were very few governments making fully convertible contributions very, very few. In fact, many of the contributions had only 10 percent constability and the rest had to be used within the donor country.

Soap

That meant that we had to seek either commodities or products that were available and suitable for our needs or if you like, try to impress upon the programme people, that for example they may now consider soap a number one priority. That it was an essential item for health. Instead of something in a way of a manufactured article, they might have to use a portion of our contribution from a country that could provide soap such as Australia, and in that sense, yes, there was an influence on our programmes but I don't think it was major.

DDT

We seem to be able to programme the expenditures of the more difficult currencies which I would consider fairly reasonably success for items that were in fact required. And that included DDT for instance. We had one of the first bi-lateral agreements between the USSR and the United States where the USSR provided the DDT which moved on Polish ships to the United States and was formulated in the US to the standard specifications established by WHO. It was a non-convertible currency in every sense of the word.

In relation to DDT purchases, there was also a quantity that was purchased annually from South Africa. Again, utilizing a very, very difficult currency and this was shipped to nearby Zanzibar along the east coast of Africa very largely, and we were able then to spend the monies we got from that country which was otherwise had been almost impossible to spend.

Compromises On Force And Quality

Charnow: Well, were there significant compromises on the prices or quality?

Richman: To my knowledge We never once compromised on quality. It made no sense. Either economic or otherwise, but price concessions were very difficult to evaluate. You see there were exchange rates, five or six exchange rates for virtually every currency in the world except for the dollars, I'm talking about the US and Canadian. Pound sterling was relatively firm. A few of the western European countries relatively firm, but there were exchange rates which varied, very, considerably. It would be very difficult then, to compare the most value to be obtained with a given amount of dollars. If you wanted to use a currency that was very, difficult to spend for an article required, you might be able to buy a pharmacuetical in the United States at a price cheaper than, shall we say the Bulgarian government which was ready to release the same product according to the standards, if you measured at the UN exchange rate, or you wanted to go to the currency market.

I think what we did and sometimes we did have options where the same product could be obtained in several different countries where currencies were more or less difficult to move and when possible, we took the best and most economic of those currencies and used them for the purchase of that same product. I remember visiting Bulgaria, well several times, but originally to obtain pharmacueticals, mainly simple pharmacueticals used all over the world and price was not a consideration with them. They had the facilities, they had the manufacturing capacity, they had a very well run plant, and we were asked just to name our price. Now, we didn't say it was only worth one dollar a thousand for tablets of this type, we simply gave them a good price. A price which we had paid previously and felt was a fair practic. In other instances, we had to pay more because the country could not see itself writing down the output of that factory to meet our price. They had a level to which they could not drop and that was it. Those were negotiations, obviously, and was not a matter of competitive bid. You could not go in a competitive bid when you had difficult currency to dispose of.

Bridgewater: To amplify that a bit, if I may, there was a general instruction in the sense that in purchasing from these countries, that we should not exceed the world price by more than 10 percent or so at one stage and we were guided very much by that so that I don't think that we brought from these countries at a non-competitive price at anytime.

With regard, however, to the quality, I think that we were perhaps a little more lenient with the products received from some of those countries and we might be with some of the more competitive articles from the Western countries. We were not so lenient as to disregard established criteria, but the methods of manufacturer sometimes used by these countries were less exacting than, let's say, standards in Europe and Western Europe or in the United States. And we understood that we had to expect and accept some of the minor deviations from our normal standards.

Midwifery Kits

Charnow: Can we go back for a moment to the question of the midwifery kits. I had always been under the impression that this was an idea of doctor Leo Eloesser who had developed this and that this was a major contribution by UNICEF in using auxilary workers and a forerunner for primary health care.

Bridgewater: My activity in that was that it would be cheaper to get these articles into one location and have them packaged as a unit rather than to try to distribute each little individual article to the government and have them make distribution of the needle, five needles, or whatever.

Elloesser / Borcic

Richman: When Leo Eloesser returned from China, he had several ideas about the midwife kits and he was in fact the first to propose the use of the special assortment of articles for use by a lower trained personnel. However, his concept at that time was to carry things in two canvas bags and we proceeded with his assembly on several occasions and the canvas bags themselves were quite expensive as well as the types of materials that he had recommend for inclusion. Dr. Eloesser, I think, appreciated that it was not the best way to approach the subject. Later when Dr. Borcic arrived, he was the one who was very largely responsible for the concept of the aluminum box.

Design For The Box

And in working with Dr. Borcic, we invited the aid of a manufacturer, a national hospital supply company, through an individual named Jack Erbank and he and Dr. Borcic with George Mar on the sidelines and myself as well.

We all had an input into the design of this particular box and the national hospital hospital supply companies, who made the first designs and reduced the original size of the tools, which were relatively expensive. At that time they cost about $30,000. They were able to furnish the box to UNICEF for the first four or five years. Thereafter, with the advent of the Copenhagen warehouse where the shipment from the US to Copenhagen was relatively expensive for a hollow product of that kind, we then looked to

using our currency in Poland to have the box manufactured there at a competitive rate. As a matter of fact, the first samples that we got from Poland of the first year or two was so identical that they included the name of the national hospital supply company at the bottom until we finally convinced them that they couldn't do that. But that was another way we had then of utilizing these currencies, you see and obtain a product that was fully consistent with the needs of the countries and not the other way around. We almost invariably purchased articles from these so called difficult currencies that were essential for these programmes, rather than to try to build a programme around it.

Penicillin

Charnow: We were large purchasers of penicillin for our endemic syphilis and yaws programmes. Do you want to say something about the prices of penicillin and our effect on them?

Bridgewater: I don't think that there's very much that we can say as to the effect on prices. We were at the outset, relatively small buyers of penicillin but the purchases grew and as volume purchases always tend to bring about a better price, we then, of course, benefited from not only the larger volume we were obtaining, but penicillin became much more widely used all over. Plants were enlarged, facilities everywhere were directed, manufacturers had competition, prices came down.

We discussed penicillin in Rome at a conference in December 1948. Sir Alexander Flemming had only shortly before produced the substance. I remember being so brash as to introduce a paper to that meeting on penicillin. I read about penicillin for the first time on my way up from South Africa to Rome. Now, I can tell you, I knew more about penicillin than anybody in that meeting and I knew practically nothing, except what I read in that magazine article.

Richman: Actually we started to get the amorphous style of penicillin in 1945 when I was with the US army. And in 1949, the price of penicillin, as I remember to UNICEF, was about $1.75 or so per vial. That same size vial later came down to about .12 cents per vial. As Ed so correctly stated, it's entirely due to the quantities that were made for commercial use rather than for UNICEF.

Our purchases of penicillin for yaws, were fairly considerable, and the contracts were sought after by the foremost manufacturers of penicillin. But they were still not sufficiently large to influence the downward path of the prices at that stage. That, I think, was probably due to improved methods of harvesting of the penicillin, other manufacturing processes and the demand for penicillin in a commercial sense. It wasn't so much a matter of dosage as of the type of penicillin. I think UNICEF could perhaps be deemed responsible for the widespread introduction of procaine penicillin in oil, so called "PAM". Now "PAM" was something that was promoted originally by WHO. There

was a doctor who at that time provided the specifications for this micronized type of procaine penicillin that had a more lasting effect in the blood than the normal penicillin that was being utilized at that time. I'm not positive that it was a product of Dr. Gouf's creation, but he certainly latched into it and UNICEF as a larger supplier for yaws at that moment was the agency who undertook, I think the largest procurement of procaine penicillin in oil.

Bridgewater: Longer lifetime in the blood. It remained in the bloodstream much longer than the standard penicillin.

Richman: We were able to give dosages of about 4 cc's or 4 millilitres of usage and it was sufficient to cure a child who had a rather bad case of yaws. In Haiti, yaws was more or less eradicated as well. Although I understand that it has again risen in that country now.

Also UNICEF,pioneered in very large vials of procaine penicillin for use in Haiti in the form of 100ml where normally the vial sizes were 10ml. Now with the use of the 100ml, we were able to reduce the cost drastically and the WHO doctor who was resposible for the programme at that time, insisted that it wasn't necessary to introduce a needle into the vial to withdraw the dosage at each time, but that it could be poured into the syringe from the top because of the anirobic action of the penicillin and would not contaminate the penicillin in doing it in that fashion.

And that is, I think, the method that was used to work on others very large problem on yaws in Haiti and also in Indonesia.

Charnow: So what I deduce from that is that because we found it to be a more economical and a better way, we encouraged a widespread adaption or manufacture by somebody which otherwise wouldn't have taken place as early.

Richman: I think you're correct. I don't think that the need for procaine penicillin and oil would have come about at that stage without the influence of WHO and Dr. Gouf at that time in trying to establish a longer lasting type of penicillin. Although I might say that it was sought after by the experientalists in Europe and in this continent. It was appreciated that the penicillin, the crystaline penicillin at that time did not linger long enough in the blood to be effective in many instances against infections of many diseases.

Immunization in Early Days

Charnow: I wonder, now if we can talk a little bit about our early experiences with immunization and combined vaccines. As you know, this is a current issue and UNICEF and WHO are currently embarked in a very large effort to have a large expansion of immunization. A lot of people in UNICEF are somewhat surprised to know that we've had a history that goes back, say 30 years with immunization. But what were the problems then? Why did it not spread?

Vaccine Production

Richman: I'm not certain I can answer why it did not catch on at that stage. However, UNICEF was asked to provide certain material assistance to some of the countries in South America, and WHO recommended an expert from the University of Michigan who gave us a very short list of articles that she felt would be useful for these countries.

Charnow: When was this?

Richman: This was approximately 1953 or 54 if my memory serves me and she included in these lists, walk-in incubators, off-set bottles to grow the culture on, and the culture media that we purchased in Japan at that time. The quantities were not terribly large and although, I understand that some of those countries still maintain laboratories, especially in Colombia, I believe. In fact in Colombia, I did see some where our original walk-in incubator was still being utilized after 20 years. The costs to UNICEF at that time was not terribly high, it was not an important article as I recall at that stage. However, in about 1974, 1975 we were approached Dr. Henderson of WHO, and a plan was offered to UNICEF for our support in the protection of children against dyptheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, and the measles using also BCG vaccine as an indicator for those children that had been immunized since BCG leaves a trace mark on the arm of the child.

Incidentally, we should get back to BCG because that is one of the important vaccines that UNICEF promoted, but in relation to this, I should add that also what was produced in Colombia and Venezuela was only dyptheria, pertussis, and tenuous BCG. They ran into problems with the pertussis because it is a rather difficult product to grow properly and I think we then wound up with just the dyptheria and tetanus. The plan that Dr. Henderson proposed, including the transport and the vials and the carriers for the vaccine and everything else at that stage was supposed to cost just about $4.00 per child for a complete immunization which was considered by Mr. Labouisse to be just about in range for UNICEF to support so that we undertook the supply of the initial vaccines with the extended cooperation of WHO at that time. We had full cooperation and working agreement with several of the sections that were involved in the production and promotion, utilization of these different vaccines. Dr. Henderson was appointed as the general manager for this programme and in the early years, while was some kind of an importance to the programme, there seemed to be a plateau that had been reached. Now, as I understand it, more recently, this plateau has again leaped upwards and that there's a large growth that is presently taking place with the vaccination campaigns.

BCG Vaccine Production

Charnow: Can we now turn to BCG?

Bridgewater: Where would you like to turn to, 1948?

Charnow: Yes.

Bridgewater: Once again, I had very little to do with the vaccines of any kind, but I did have the pleasure and good fortune to meet with Dr. Johanna Holm a few times when the International Tuberculosis Campaign was organized. After that, I did find a man in Copenhagen who arranged to manufacture shipping containers that were to be sent from the nearest Danish serum institute. But that is about my extent of activity in the actual procurement of the vaccine.

Richman: At the early stages, the only form of BCG vaccine available was the liquid BCG which had a very limited shelf life and had to be kept under refrigeration at all times. The box that was made in Copenhagen was very helpful in shipping of the vaccine from country to country. Our warehouse supplied not only the vaccine from the State Serum Institute in Copenhagen, but it also shipped empty folded cartoons to many different countries so that they could ship from the local manufacturer to the rural where they were being put to use.

Charnow: Was it a cardboard box?

Richman: It was a cardboard box with a metal can containing a liquid.

Bridgewater: It was like metal slabs which were little boxes frozen. We had no dry ice in those days.

Richman: We had no dry ice, nor did they have, at that stage, have the so-called cold dogs or the plastics that are being utilized today, which incidentally, UNICEF experimented with at a very, very early stage. The liquid vaccine was later subplanted by freezed dried vaccine when certain equipment made by Edwards in UK and by some other firms in Germany and the United States was introduced. UNICEF would purchase and supply this equipment to different countries, Indonesia, West Africa, Dakar, Argentina and in other areas where the technology was sufficiently advanced for them to utilize this kind of a product. Manufacturing was kind of a problem. The equipment that UNICEF shipped to Dhaka was particularly effective and efficiently used to the extent where the product made by the Dakar laboratories became an intrical part of the supply to areas, especially in Africa and surrounding Dakar where the demand was for a somewhat different type of BCG vaccine then was used in the Asian areas or Latin America. WHO investigated the product extensively and then gave its authorization for UNICEF to purchase and supply to other countries as well as to the country side around Dakar. In the same way the equipment we supplied to Indonesia finally was approved by WHO after perhaps ten years of trials.

The process of certifying the use of the vaccine was rather difficult for WHO in once since because they were extremely careful to ensure that a vaccine that would not be harmful to the individual child was being produced. In the very early days, this vaccine had caused deaths in a great number of children and had formed into disuse for many years and WHO was extremely anxious that this kind of incident not be repeated. And for that reason also, even so well established the firm as a connaught laboratories in Canada was not given approval by WHO for sale to UNICEF for distribution of these countries because for many years they were not sure if the product was being properly produced.

Problems in Vaccine Production

Charnow: You mentioned the long time it took to get certification on the immunization production facilities. Would you like to expand on that a bit?

Bridgewater: While, I'm not fully conversant with all of the trials and tribulations countered in the countries which had received equipment for the production of vaccine, I had been fortunate in being one of the few privileged of going through large laboratories producing these vaccines commercially and for UNICEF also. And in my estimation, the production of the vaccine is one of the and difficult things to produce in a standard and continuous manner without disastrous effects.

One slip, by one worker in the chain will cause the entire batch to be scrapped because it will not pass the testing procedures, which in some instances is as long as three months. When you speak of sophisticated equipment, I think of production equipment for vaccines and the like as being highly sophisticated. And what is essential, in my way of thinking, is to ensure that if any support is given to a government for a production of a product of anything at intricate as a vaccine, the support should include an expert who has had several years in the actual production of the product. Otherwise, you have no one who can train the local technicians in each step of the process and the importance of the exact following of the instructions in every instance. Otherwise, they are going to have continuous problems. And I'm sure that is why many of these countries that had received the equipment took so long to receive the approval of the WHO for distribution of the product turned out in those laboratories.

Richman: In about 1978, UNICEF supported the production of a variety of vaccines in Pakistan and towards that end they introduced the equipment in Pakistan, it was my understanding, that eight years later has still never produced a single vial. Whatever the reasons have been for the delay in the production, I'm not certain, but I think that if Ed's advice is followed and that trained personnel be taking on to assist in the production at the initial stages that a lot of the problems that are encountered by these countries could be avoided.

But there must be a realization of the difficulties in this kind of manufacture that requires the advise of outsiders. You cannot rely upon the knowledge of well-intentioned people within the countries who have gone outside the country to learn about production to come back and practice it. You must have experienced personnel on the spot to teach and train the locals to make the product efficiently and not just depend upon the so-called know-how.

Reimburseable Procurement

Charnow: Do you want to say something about reimbursable procurement?

Bridgewater: Well, we did a fair amount of reimbursable procurement for the governments and for other UN agencies. The purpose, generally, was to take advantage of purchasing power. When the requirements for UNICEF and the requirement for governments were added together they made for the purchase of a very substantial quantity of an article and it usually brought about a reduction of price. There were also instances when looking at requests from governments we saw that there might be an article that would suit the needs just as well but be lower in price and equally or better suited, in that case we would question the request and offer suggestions as to what might be substituted and save them a little money.

Richman: One of the advantages in the reimbursable procurement was that we were able to utilize our warehouse stocks, do earlier replenishments, utilizing our difficult currencies. We've obtained advantages for UNICEF as well as for the government.

Local Procurement

Charnow: Can we turn now to local procurement and local production?

Bridgewater: Well, certainly there have been pros and cons for a very great many years in the respect of the purchase of the locally made articles versus those manufactured in the more industrialized method. I know there were many times when we could not see the advisability taking a locally made article, which though acceptable in appearance and otherwise, generally was not of the same quality and often at a higher price, although there were certain occasions where the price was lower. But on a dollar value analysis basis, I don't think there have been any local purchases of significance where true benefits have been derived outside of the factor of what I might term, local employment. Some jobs may have been created as a result of those orders. More than likely, it was simply additional production of the same number of staff because I don't think, certainly at my time, the local purchase quantitative element was enough to warrant increase in the staff of any of the production facilities.

Richman: If a local product was broached, we would normally look into it rather carefully. On many occasions we found that the suggested supply from a local source originated from an overseas source that we were buying from ourselves, or that we could buy from at a much lower price. What was being proposed to UNICEF was to buy through a local importer rather than from a local producer. That was happening very frequently. Then again, many of the items that were proposed for local procurement were individual articles which we normally listed on our different guides which we carried in Copenhagen as part of assemblies. For instance, there would be a proposal, let us say, to procure stethoscopes in India. Well these stethoscopes were a part of the assemblies that were making up for the different centers and to take one item out just made no practical sense in that it was very difficult to follow up to all of the mother and child health centers with a single item, when 99 per cent of the items were being supplied from Copenhagen as a package. That happened very frequently.

I have noted a comment that Supply Division didn't want to buy from third country sources. I suspect that the third world country source that is thought of is Korea. As present, purchases are being made from Korea, but the Lord knows they do not need UNICEF's assistance in trying to support their industry. They are doing very well on their own. And what we are doing buying in Korea is to take funds that have been contributed by other countries to UNICEF and taking the business away from those countries.

When we are building up a source of supply in a third world country at a lower price than can be obtained from the original source, we are at the same time building up ill-will from contributing countries which may someday reduce the level of contributions that we are getting. So I'm not sure that it is a wise procedure to buy from some of these third world countries who do not need UNICEF's procurement,

Charnow: Both of you have are giving examples of problems or difficulties or a departure from the overall principle. Are you in favor of the principle? Would you suggest some safegards to prevent the Problems? You know there are political pressures for this for local procurement.

Richman: I don't know that there is any procedure for determination except for an item-by-item basis. For instance we would receive requests for the local purchase of an article that is manufactured in an industrialized country and being sold by a distributor in the region or the actual country that would receive and use the unit. Duty would have been paid, freight would have been paid, and obviously a mark-up to the distributor. That kind of local purchase should be screened out complete. Now if there was volume local purchase of an item that meets our own standards of quality, which would in fact bring about an increase in, shall we say, either the number employed or in higher wages, I think you could make a case for it, even though you may have to use hard currency to support that kind of programme. But those are relatively few.

Charnow: You are suggesting then the guidelines to indicate situations in which local purchases are desirable and acceptable and where there are not?

Bridgewater: It would be relatively easy to set out guidelines and certainly there is enough experience here in the organization now to do that type of thing. And of course it starts in the field and our people in the field should also be strong enough to show the government officials in particular countries, the guideline criteria, but also instances, as Jack pointed out, where it would make absolutely no sense to have one item that could be locally produced even of a quality and price which would be an advantage to UNICEF and a benefit to the country if it meant that someone then had to undertake not only the paper work, but the physical work of distributing that single item, say to several hundred health centers. There's no economic benefit there despite the fact that there might be a slightly higher production of that item in that particular country. If it is truly significant, I think you could write a criteria that would be fair to both and an advantage to both, but it has to be more than just local preference and pressure on our representatives in the country before they exceed to that request. With respect to local procurement, at a very early stage, Mr. Bridgewater arranged for tools from the Willy's company in the United States who was the provider of the jeep to us, to be sent to a factory in India and local procurement was undertaken of the vehicles that were manufactured in India for UNICEF's use. This period and these purchases lasted for many years.

Perhaps it it even done today, but that is one again, perhaps the lesser known or discussed areas where supply did venture into local procurement and into introduction of local production of articles of consequence and that was utilized in our programmes.

Local Production

Pakistan Surgical Instruments

Charnow: On the question of the production, one of the things that has been cited very often in UNICEF literature are the surgical instruments from Pakistan. Are there anymore such instances?

Bridgewater: Nothing that could go for magnitude, I believe. It came about because the government of Pakistan was paying high, subsidaries for local manufacturer who were able to export their goods. The subsidaries where then used by the manufacturers to import luxuries. And the manufacturer then made a profit on the luxuries, while taking a lost on the article he sold at sometimes below cost. Now at the first the quality of those instruments wasn't all that great, but gradually they greatly improved because they were manufactured by the machines of the most modern type and have now increased their volume very substantially, Jack would know more about that than I, but certainly their volume has reached significant proportions in some of those more simple instruments.

Richman: It's interesting to note the Pakistan instruments have now been carried in our Copenhagen warehouse for the past 15 years. They proved to be both good quality instruments as well as relatively inexpensive procurement and of benefit to local effects of labor and the government. We find that the use of these instrument has expanded in both international commerce on the whole as well as UNICEF. We're glad to have been perhaps the focal point for this industry to increase their capacity. UNICEF was not only responsible for the large initial orders to many of the suppliers and the way they were produced, but we also insisted on better inspection procedures, more modern equipment for drop forging and manufacturing the instruments and in general we have upgraded the entire tone of that industry in the country. I don't know whether that same thing has been repeated, however, in other types of production. There was one stage when we were trying to procure a large number of simple scientific kits for India and we looked to the traditionally Indian manufacturer of scientific instruments as well as to the more modern operations in Chandigar which was a government sponsored area where there were new advances in teaching and science, and simple science equipment was being promoted. We found, however, that the traditional manufacturers in India would not accept the recommendations of the science center in Chandigar. And what UNICEF was winding up with were rubber balls with uneven walls that would bounce erratically, cylinders that would not stand up properly, etc. and we had so many problems with the science

equipment that our recommendation was to drop that type of procurement locally and to revert to international procurement again.

Water Pumps

Charnow: What about the situation on the water pumps? Did we not experiment with a prototype and provide technical assistance for local manufacturer adapted to the local conditions and maintenance problems?

Bridgewater: Yes we did. In fact, there were many prototypes investigated in various countries——anything from cast iron pumps to wooden pumps. We had highly qualified technical people working on this problem. We had the assistance of the Battel Institute and the design of the simple hand pump. We have had some local purchase of water pumps that were far from being adequate due mainly to the low quality of the castings-the cast iron pumps. Generally speaking, the principle of pumping water is the same when you're speaking of hand pumps. You can only lift it so far but the head of the pump, the stand and the hand and the plunger, all intrical parts of pumping water can be made differently, designed differently and different materials can be used. Certainly a lot of effort was put in to finding or trying to find a pump that was suitable for all occasions and of course that just isn't possible——although many of the prototypes could be used in several areas.

Charnow: Are there any lessons from experience of this type of thing for UNICEF in the future?

Bridgewater: I guess there could be many lessons. I think the approach was reasonable——qualified experts, people who knew what they were talking about when they were talking about pumping water, and the engagement of experts from an institute. An examination of the production facilities in the local country would, of course, be a must because there are a lot of people who would possibly gain from being given the job but aren't necessarily capable of building the thing you see on the drawing paper. I think the major areas of that search were adequately covered, although I'm not certain that we ever did find the perfect water pump.

Transport

Charnow: Shall we now go on to the whole business of the provision of transport?

Bridgewater: Transport goes back a long way, and so many different uses were envisaged that it would be difficult to determine the priority of where you would start. We had situations where transport was absolutely essential, such as the distribution of food stuffs in an emergency or distribution of other emergency supplies. We had situations where medical personnel had to find ways and means of reaching the people in the villages.

We tried and I think fairly well in the early days in providing the vehicle that was suitable, reasonable in terms of price range, adequate for the duty envisaged but with no great frills. As a matter of fact, some of the earlier vehicles were even provided without air-conditioning in some of the hottest countries on this earth. But as requirements grew for projects such as the malaria eradication and other big mass campaigns, there was a tendency to provide units that were larger than required in the sense of capacity. Most of the terrain capacity was overstated, possibily by the local officials. Certainly, in the initial stages, and perhaps for a long there were not sufficient number of trained mechanics or maintenance personnel to properly care for the vehicles, even though UNICEF provided spare parts to the best of our ability. The need for proper maintenance begins from day one. It was covered not only by manuals, but we had regional transport advisers looking into the various maintenance facilities, whether or not any real benefits came about, I am not able to say. In the days of the big Exodus from East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, I visited five of the largest refugee camps. If it had not been for our fleet of trucks there would have been no way of getting that food stuff to the camps.

Now I don't know how many thousands of vehicles were provided for transport in the years of UNICEF's existence. I know it's many, many thousands and I know there has been abuse. I've heard of it practically in every country I have visited and I think you will find that it's true in respect in vehicles

donated by any agency whether government or voluntary. And it's certainly true of other UN agencies. I don't know how that can be overcome. The answer is not to stop the provision of transport, it's to better oversee the request initially, then do your very best to enforce the maintenance requirements and see to driver training and things of that nature locally which can only be done by UNICEF staff in the field.

Charnow: There was a period in which we provided a lot of support to the services to set up vehicle maintenance systems and facilities. I don't whether you have any feelings, whether that has made a permanent impact in the countries themselves.

Bridgewater: I do not have first hand knowledge of it. We had six transport advisers at one point. Some benefit certainly must of come about from their presence in the region. Those men where qualified in automobile and truck maintenance. They were also, I think, very well qualified to give assistance to the governments in the establishment of workshops, and training of mechanics, but they couldn't do the whole job. He just has to take a look in for two or three days and then go on to the next country on his schedule, but there has to be impact after all this time and effort.

Richman: A great deal has been said about the use of four wheel drive vehicles at UNICEF and to a large extent, those statements are correct. We started initially, I think with four wheel drive

vehicles, and then later we looked into the use of simpler, vehicles where ever possible. The trend was further into use of a two wheel vehicles——motorcycles and bicycles. The utility of have, I think been underestimated. Midwives and the amphilaries in the health services were using these two wheel vehicles to help bring assistance to the clinics in the rural areas. I think that is one of the major enterprises that UNICEF undertook that has not been fully reported.

Supplies In Emergency Situations

Charnow: I guess one of the main elements in UNICEF's reputation has been it's rapid provision of supplies in emergency situations. Would you like to say something about that.

Bridgewater: Emergencies always seem to come on a long weekend. Jack and I have spent innumerable Labor Days, and other holidays, trying to find ships, trying to find factory people who were willing to listen to our problems on a holiday so that we could get, whatever was required on to a ship or on to an aircraft or whatever it might be.

Richman: We dealt with emergencies as if it were an everyday affair. There were emergencies within the emergencies. With the coming into being of our UNIPAC warehouse we were able to stock in our warehouse the articles essential for immediate life saving purposes. Blankets or kitchen equipment, or medical equipment.

Bridgewater: At first, all medical items came from the UN headquarters building to Kennedy. I was once there with Cardinal Cook for the loading of an aircraft which we and the Catholic Relief Services shared. In fact, there are pictures of that.

Richman: One of the early emergencies was sending the equipment for making of rehydyration fluids to Thailand and in that respect, we accumulated autoclaves, waterstills, bottles, caps for the bottles, and other related material and loaded two planes as I recall. Subsequently, another emergency arose in Thailand for that same reason, cholera and we were able to obtain several plane loads of fluids almost overnight where none seemed to be available from commercial sources. Luckily we had already arranged for similar fluids to go to the Philippines only the day before, so that when Mrs. Sinclair called us for immediate availability of this to meet the request of Sam Keeny for Thailand, we were able to assure the quickest possible shipping by US army aircraft which was made available to us. I think two or three airplanes came into Arkansas to pick up the materials that we had already located for the Philippines but we sent it to Thailand instead.

Calibre Of Supply Staff

Charnow: Would you say that part of the reason that we were so effective, aside from being set up as an emergency organization and a supply organization, is the calibre of the early people that we recruited who were all doer types?

Bridgewater: I think it something to do with it, certainly. Everybody was dedicated to their work. There were no such things office hours. There was a spirit, which was the most effective which sort of unificated a group of people from different walks of life, different backgrounds, different countries, even different experiences. But when everybody pitched in the unified effort it usually produced a pretty good result. And to my way of thinking, it did a great deal to add to UNICEF's reputation.

Richman: Not only at headquarters, but also in Copenhagen. Even the common laborers there worked all hours in order to meet the requirements for our emergency shipments. The shipping section there arranged for the aircraft almost immediately and within 24 hours we were able to load a plane and see it on it's way to meet the emergency need. We were dealing with a lot of different nationals, although at first most of the recruitment had to be done from four or five countries. As additional nationals were brought in there were problems, and training was necessary to bring some of the less experienced people up to standard. But all-in-all, I think we did pretty well. As far as New York is concerned, we had a very cohesive group. For many years, I think we had a great group. As a matter of fact, people worked hard and long and would stay as long as they were required without any questions and only asked for compensatory time off. Was UNICEF they were working for and they meant it.

Coordination Of Supplies In Emergency

Charnow: In providing various supplies for emergencies, do you think that we made a contribution outside UNICEF generally on the kind of relief that one supplies in certain situations?

Bridgewater: Yes, when with the various church organizations and other voluntary groups and occasionally other UN organizations each agency would accept the responsibility for a certain type of provisioning or commodity or supply article to avoid duplication. As for the exchange of experiences and ideas, I would have to say, in my opinion, was rather limited. Each agency had a concept which didn't necessary mesh with the UNICEF ideas and as a consequence, you seldom heard anymore on that particular subject or nothing was done to bring about a change for the improvement of the activity overall.

Relations Supply, Programme, Comptroller And Field

Charnow: Now can we turn to the relations between Supply, Programming, and Comptroller.

Headquarters / Paris Supply Relations

Bridgewater: The first overseas supply office was in Paris. From our little headquarters in Dupont Circle in Washington we started the establishment of the Supply Division in Paris.

Since our operations were confined at that time to Europe—the countries that suffered from the war, we looked to the Paris office and they were given the anatomy after a screen of requirements at the Headquarters. They undertook, not only the purchase of but the payment for those goods, directly from the finance officer there. We had a type of rivarly that was in fact beneficial. We had initially Sam Keeny whom, I had known from the UNRRA days, we were the very best of friends. We didn't see eye to eye on everything. But our compromises seemed to be the solution that was best and it was give and take on both sides. I think all-in-all it worked out pretty well.

Charnow: Do you recall the issues on which there was a difference?

Bridgewater: There were of course, many differences which aren't worth mentioning, but I do recall once, an emergency purchases on wheat in Egypt which because of my background, I felt was something less than desirable. Egypt does not produce the best wheat in the world and there is a great tendency to leave as much stones, sticks, chaff, and other inedibles in the grain as is possible to get away with. I had a strong feeling that we were being done in by taking that material. Obviously there was a reason for the action——the proximity of the product to the need as compared to carrying it from some more distant country. This time I can't remember whether it was an emergency or just a local purchase by the Chief over there.

The Supply Division didn't grow in Washington, it began its growth in New York and Paris.

There were a number of differences in the technical aspects of the articles that we brought and there were times, I'm sure when a decision as to where the articles were to be brought questions on both sides of the Atlantic. Sometimes we had misgivings in passing things over to Paris and vice versa. They sometimes questioned our reason for retaining the undertaking of a purchase in the other countries of the world that were then available to us. Generally speaking, the relationships, I think were pretty good.

Relations With Comptrollers Division

Dealings with Comptroller's Division were always very healthy. We had good cooperation at the working level, I think everywhere in the Division, with the exception of one man. I had some differences with the Comptrollers, arising out of both of our desires to do the best possible job we could. Our comptroller Stanley Sroka was a banker and a damn good one and I was a so-called buyer and I felt I was pretty good at my job. There were times when I thought he was coming into my field and I know there were times when I was trying to usurp his prerogative and he got a little stuffy about it but I liked him nevertheless and I think he did a fine job.

Relations With Program Division

As for Programmes, there was quite a mixture of people and ideas and thoughts and backgrounds and some whose programming experience only began in UNICEF.

I don't accept programming as being an art, but it certainly is a concept and people with imagination would have to have that imagination supported with by some experience. Now unfortunately, the organization was formed at a time when there were very few people who were experienced in this type of operation. Very, very few and although we did train a few of them and some of them were very properly positioned in the field, I don't think we had nearly as many as we should have had. Or perhaps the reason was they weren't available. We did have to rely on the United States, Canada, and the Western European countries for the largest part of the staff, a few of Australians as well. Field experience was hard to come by and there weren't many available to us.

Charnow: I had the impression over the years that Supply was considered to be an arm, a facility for carrying out programming decisions that somehow or other, supplies comments, the expertise, the advise on programming policy and carrying it out was not sufficiently recognized and that you weren't sufficiently consulted on Programme policy decisions.

Bridgewater: Generally speaking, we were not consulted in the policy aspects or in the effects on currency problems. Programme policy would evolve without consideration as to where the money was going to come from. That began the very first day. For the longest time in the early years,

I personally at the beginning and then later with help from the others, actually plotted the use of the non convertible currencies, otherwise the money would have been staying in the books and it wouldn't be going to people because you couldn't spend rubles, and you couldn't spend Bulgarian lei, polish zloties, and Italian Lira. There wasn't in those early days, a sufficient understanding on part of the programme people of the necessity of discussion of what could we do in this area of work with our money content.

Now we on the other hand couldn't go looking for it either. I could tell you right now, we were too busy. We didn't go running down there and say, "Hey, what are you guys planning". That didn't happen, but certainly there were programme policy discussions which from time to time at least gave us the opportunity to lay out what might happen if certain decisions were made. I don't think it was all bad.

The Supply Division

Your mentioned you didn't have a single supply officer in the field. They belonged to the field. They belonged to Programme Division and they didn't come to us for any advise. problems could be eliminated by an understanding to make known the programme policy at the time is dreamed of even before it's formulated. I think that by that method, you avoid some of the pitfalls that have come about over the years.

Richman: The meetings between the Programme and the Supply personnel but only done on a very high level and whatever was

discussed at that level didn't trickle down to the working levels very well——whether in Programme or in Supply. So that we were for the most part just working rather blindly. It's true that the Programme people acted as if Supply were the arm of their own activities and we did comply to a large part with their requests. But as we mentioned earlier, from time to time, we would question the priority of them placed on certain aspects of programmes.

Financial Plans And Supply Division

I recall very vividly when they came along with a statement that UNICEF was going to enter into a certain type of a programme, and we didn't have the funds available. We couldn't dream of where we were going to get the money to implement that particular programme.

Charnow: Well, wasn't that rectified when we got into the business of a financial plan which was mostly worked out with the Comptroller?

Bridgewater: Well, yes. The financial plan did solve which you might term any major problem of that kind, but there was the necessity of making a lot of fast moves in various areas in order to make things meet at the proper time, because don't forget what we had on paper wasn't always in the bank. We had pledges and every other thing allocated until everything was finally brought down to the point where Stanley Sroka was working on a cash-in-hand basis. It was cash flow then.

He knew he had the money or it was coming in, it was just pledged.

Family Planning And Supplier

Charnow: Can we turn now to family planning. After the Board agreement that we could help in the family planning as part of MCH, as I recall it, we were restricted from providing contraceptives. It was other aspects of family planning.

Bridgewater: Yes, materials and transport were permitted, but no contraceptives or materials or equipment for the manufacture of contraceptives. Because UNICEF had experienced staff and the knowledge of the manufacturer of all of the various types of contraceptives, it engaged in the purchase of substantial quantities of contraceptives for UNFPA. And because of the availability of warehouse based in Copenhagen, they could be stored there ready for early dispatch upon receipt of a requisition from whatever country was to receive these articles.

Richman: These purchases proceeded for a number of years. We not only did purchasing and stockpiling of contraceptives but we assisted in developing certain types of packaging to identify the UNFPA products that were shipped to differentiate them both from the commercial and from what was then the largest supplier of contraceptives - the USAID.

The purchasing was undertaken by just one or two people within the Supply Division. We tried to restrict the number of individuals who were identified with it or who were involved with it, partially because we were working on an agency thing and couldn't quite afford to devote as much attention to UNFPA as we did to most of the UNICEF procurement. But nevertheless we did involve ourselves in stockpiling efforts when we felt that certain shortages might occur with rubber and perhaps other products, and advised UNFPA,. Meetings were held with industry people to determine whether shortages would become industry-wide or just relegated to certain firms, and steps taken to set aside stocks was a result largely of UNICEF rather than UNFPA.

Shipping

Charnow: One of the aspects of the supply operation which people have taken for granted for many years but which was very important and highlighted in the early years was our shipping operation, the discounts we got, the dramatic effects of ships arriving and unloading, and so on and so forth, this also started pretty much from scratch.

Bridgewater: Very certainly. The initial operation of the shipment of milk which moved out of the east coast United States port saw the first action by Barney Fraser. Involvement in the distribution of goods from the far corner of the world obviously is going to take many, many ships of many different flags, and I would say, I think almost without fear of contradiction, that UNICEF has

used more different flags and different ships and different lines that almost any organization or corporation in the world. We have had from some full charters all the way down to little package ships. Each of these movements, whether an entire cargo or a single package, involves administrative operation, it requires bill of lading and manifest and invoices and payment freight bills and everything else under the sun. It is just a thing that went along smoothly and occasionally we did have an emergency requirement, occasionally we had to charter ships which meant a little extra effort on the part of our shipping offices - whether it be Barney Fraser, Ted Muskie or Ed Kenney, or people in Paris or old Joe Hendrixx who was there for many, many years, and after him, the man who is in Geneva now - I can't remember his name - Jack can fill it in. It is a manifold operation that generally speaking is almost trouble free. But you have claims from time to time due to breakage, you even have had casualties at sea which result in loss and of course that meant, in our case, a real loss, because UNICEF from day one determined that it would best be advised to be self-insured. We undertook to carry our own insurance because the diversity of shipment was such that the size of our loss would never likely reach the premiums we would have to pay on the conglomerate of shipments that would be made worldwide. I had my fingers crossed but I don't think we had any more than one loss at sea, I don't remember any significant, really significant loss, in comparison with the premiums that would have been paid.

Richman: No, there certainly was a saving.

Bridgewater: But the shipping operation continues to be, I think, a fine organization which functions without very much flag waving or trumpet blaring and perhaps not nearly as much credit as it's due.

Richman: One of the things which differentiated shipping by UNICEF from other organizations was not only the use of more flags as indicated, but the fact that UNICEF tried to buy their shipping from non-conference lines rather than from the conference and in that respect perhaps the definition is useful: the conference line has established rates for certain volumes or weights and they work on a schedule of costs. The non-conference people ship lines are usually the smaller lines and they would have to be bargained with or negotiated with in order to obtain the best freight rates that were available, and then compared perhaps to the conference, so that one of the functions of the Supply Division was to try to negotiate the best possible rates and therefore they would be obliged to look at the non-conference costs and evaluate them which was an additional chore that many other shipping people did not undertake.

In addition to that of course, later in our existence, the use of air freight became much more common and it was again the responsibility of the shipping section to look into the different air freight costs, determine whether an entire charter was necessary as was very frequently the case especially with the emergency shipments and added to the volume of work.

Early UNICEF Days In Washington

Charnow: Ed, you mentioned earlier the UNICEF Offices in Dupont Circle, and the hours of our work. Can you expand a little bit on the atmosphere, both physical and work-wise during those very early days when the staff was so small?

Bridgewater: I think I can describe it in almost one sentence: it was a very close-knit group. You were in the Dupont Circle building, you know that in general the office was small. The furnishings were generally spartan, certainly second-hand. I had a room that did have a bathroom, I felt very fortunate, but there were times when it was a very valuable asset to have because when you work 48 hours on stretch it was kind of nice to have your own shower! But no one had anything in the way of what you would call truly comfortable surroundings or lush surroundings, and no one had even what you would term a large office. We took what was available and certainly Maurice would not want to go seeking the comforts that might be expected of someone in his station. He took what was just an average size office, nothing special about it at all - no fancy decorations - a lot of papers; his desk wasn't littered, I don't mean that, but he had a lot of papers in the few bookshelfs that were around, and he earnestly sought to see that everyone else did the best they could with what accommodation was available, and there wasn't much available in that building; after all, we did just take over quarters from UNRRA.

The experience there was not all that long-lived. After all we moved to New York on the 1 January 1948. I was in that building '46 and '47, but my tenure in UNICEF was perhaps half a day for 4 months then a full day for the remaining 4 months in 1947, and my memory is not all that sharp. We had only myself, because procurement was relatively limited in those days, it was only milk, and Barney Fraser - he had a secretary and an assistant, I had a secretary, Karl Borders had a secretary, and we had Arthur Robinson who was our statistical accountant and he did his own typing. I am not so sure about the amenities for the administrative side of the operation and the Secretary to the Executive Board - what kind of an office did he have?

Charnow: Well, the thing that I remember about my office was that it was quite a come down from the office that I had in my previous job, but being a converted apartment building, there was a bathroom but the bathtub had a board across it and that was there I kept my bunch of files - that was my filing cabinet - nobody ever thought of even asking for a filing cabinet in those days. About the only time we got together was on a Sunday. So my memory is pretty much like yours.

Richman: If I can remember, the so-called Chateux in Paris did not have separate bathroom facilities for some of the people there. In fact, the bathrooms were the offices of many of the people.

Key Early Supply Staff

Charnow: Now, in the course of this trilogue, a number of names were mentioned. Perhaps you might like to think of some whose contributions might be mentioned.

Richman: I can certainly think of one who has not yet appeared in any of the statements I have read and that is George Marshall. My No. 2 first big man on the scene, a man with a healthy appetite and an enormous capacity for work, enjoyed a good time, enjoyed play but he was willing to put in as many hours as was necessary to get the job done. Jack, of course, came along.

Isabel Keenly

Isabel worked with me in UNRRA on a variety of different food stuffs, and she dug into other articles of supply as the supply lists changed in character and grew in terms of both length and quantity.

Charnow: Well, all of us, of course, felt that Lou Shapiro had made a special contribution.

Bridgewater: I couldn't agree more. I knew Lou as a field man. Jack knew Lou as a medical supply or a medical specifications officer in the real sense. Lou Shapiro was the first Chief of our Copenhagen Warehouse then he went into Greeting Cards and then subsequently after Greeting Cards he did come to headquarters as a Medical Specifications Officer to replace George Mar.

In that capacity he served very, very well and he was one of the most willing individuals to contribute that I have ever known. He was very sharp and keen. If you mentioned something, he did it the very next moment. He was a real go-getter and doer in that sense of the word, and he has always become part to comment on any enterprise he undertook - he had very valuable suggestions to make and for the large part they were very well taken.

Bridgewater: Another name I should have mentioned was George Mar because we had tried for the longest time to get George into the Supply Division and it finally came about, not too long before I actually retired, but George was always valuable whether he was in Programmes or with us, but much more so when he came into Supply, and we had much more access.

UNIPAC

Charnow: Ed, in the course of our discussion, the central warehousing and UNIPAC was referred to on several occasions, but perhaps you might comment about it in a fuller way.

Origin

Bridgewater: Earlier on we mentioned the midwifery kits and how after using a commercial concern in New York to assemble these items we then began buying the items individually and began bringing them into New York HQ building third basements.

At that early stage we had only one bay, in other words, the space between four columns, we had it wired off and we had Nick Angelini and Bill to handle that work. Well the volume continued to increase not only in midwifery kits but other medical items to the point where we were in fact having to put incoming goods in the down ramps into that third basement. UN took exception to that, blocking those ramps, and told us that within a reasonable space of time we would have to leave the building. We had of course recognised for quite some time that we were outgrowing the space and we began our investigations, first of all, by examining the percentage of intake of goods from particular countries. We were just then at that time beginning to buy very substantial volumes of pharmaceuticals, simple pharmaceuticals, stomach pills, as they used to call them. Most of those were coming through Europe, we had access to a pretty big facility in Norway, we got penicillin awaiting in Denmark, we had Polish goods coming in ever larger quanities. Other European countries were supplying, France and U.K.were suppliers, in terms of items, the total volume, a high percentage of goods were of European origin.

Choice Of Copenhagen

That really meant then looking at what facilities might be available in Europe. UNICEF from day one, practically, had received some 500 sq. metres of free storage space in Antwerp. Antwerp was an excellent port with of course arrivals and departures to all corners of the world.

However, the port of Antwerp extends about 23 miles up the river, and when you are bringing in package goods by trucks, you pay, in addition to the trucking fee, for waiting time to discharge your truck, and in addition to that, we of course were working in English, our documentation was in English, we could not afford the time for translation of documents, so that total examination of Antwerp resulted in a veto - no possibility. Economically and every other way it was not the place of locate. We went to Hamburg. Now the situation was alright there in one respect, we could move the goods around reasonably quickly and not too much trucking time would be lost or too much trucking involved that was out of the way; however, there were no buildings, there was just absolutely no buildings available other than one old grist mill, four foot stone walls, so that also went out the window. At other ports we had similar situations to contend with. We either had no strong government desire for us to locate or any concession, nor did we have the opportunity of suitable space.

We then went to Copenhagen and at the time in the free port of Copenhagen, there was a large industrial organization, a Danish industrial syndicate which had during World War II been making munitions and guns and other things for NATO, having gone out of that business but was still a very large industrial concern. They were constructing new premises on the perimeter of the city of Copenhagen and were about to vacate the numerous buildings that they had in the free port. So we then examined other elements; at that time shipping from Copenhagen was excellent, frequent service all over the world, although that since has

changed we still have goods moved in Rheims as it is called, the goods are transported to the larger port but on the same freight rate as it would be from the larger port. Moreover there were two major considerations which I felt were extremely beneficial: No. 1, the government officials were anxious to have us, and they did not demand any documentation in or out for goods coming into UNICEF warehouse, in other words, the freedom of the port. All they asked for was permission to come in and inspect the records from time to time, which, of course, was readily granted, but to my knowledge, they have never taken up that small concession that was made. The labour force in Copenhagen was very stable and although there had been work strikes in the ports all over, you might say, the world, the situation in Copenhagen had been free of that type of thing - another advantage. But one of the biggest advantages which we came to realize very quickly, although it was known in a sense, was that English is virtually a second language in Denmark. We had access to labour force who, though maybe not fluent in English, were able to work from the printed English documents this was a tremendous advantage. Stable labour force able to work in English, the freedom of the port, and the courtesy of the government officials not only at the free port but government officials in various departments in Denmark, the generosity of the government itself, and buildings which we were able to obtain on a piece-by-piece basis as we grew and the Danish industrial syndicate moved out, we could occupy additional space; in other words, we did not have to rent an entire building and then only work 200 square feet of it.

We started with one small area and as their machines were moved out our little operations moved in, so we finally get a hold of one entire building that has grown and grown to its present day example of what I consider to be a very excellent warehouse conglomeration as it is today, with a lot of very dedicated and competent people, stable; those that have been on the job since inception were still there when I visited Copenhagen for the inauguration ceremony of the new building. I think that itself is attestation that the selection has been very beneficial to UNICEF. Using Copenhagen may have another advantage in that the city is relatively small and the airfield is fairly close to the port facilities so that you can move from the warehouse to the airport if there is an emergency very, very quickly, and that was something that could not be done elsewhere on the continent.

Bridgewater: However that was not part of the original consideration.

Why A Warehouse?

Richman: I would add something about why we went into warehouse operations. The requisitions from the field, the requests from the field would come in originally on a short form and for a limited number of items in large quantity, however, the make-up of the list changed some few years after I arrived in 1949 and we noticed that we were getting requests for a variety of items sometimes 30 or 40 items on a requisition and that there was a multiplicity of sets required. We were being asked for 10 or 20 and 30 sets at a time. It became fairly obvious that we either had to buy from a distributor who could handle the packaging of

all of these sets or to set up our own facility for packaging the individual components for those sets. For some while before we acquired the warehouse we were obliged to buy from distributors rather than from manufacturers even though occasionally the quantities for having items such as refrigerators or ovens for laboratory use or incubators or other large pieces of equipment, which could come from manufacturers. We tested the market on a number of occasions both for actual purchasing requirements and as an additional test to check against what our actual costs were; what we did was to issue two sets of bids and one was for actual purchasing needs, buying the sets from the distributor who had agreed to accumulate these articles for UNICEF use and do all the packaging himself, and one as if we were going to buy the components individually and then to see how much it would cost to had them all packed for us, and we discovered that there was at least a 30% differential in the purchase of the entire sets from the distributors. moreover, if we were to buy the components ourselves we were more assured that the articles would be properly packaged and would be identified with all of the instructions for use. So it became obvious that a warehouse facility would be of value to UNICEF if it could be factored in at a reasonable cost. And that was I think what we did initially with the third basement that was arranged for by Ed and later with the warehouse at Copenhagen.

Charnow: Ed, I had the impression that, like many other senior officials in UNICEF, you spent a great deal of time in travel. Would you talk a little bit about it?

Travel Of Bridgewater

Bridgewater: I did travel a great deal——as a consequence my family, I think, suffered from that, although not that it has been noticeable because they have turned out to be really wonderful kids, all three of them. My wife has had to put up with a lot because I was away as much as three months at a time. Not only that, I had to put up with the vagaries of air travel in the early days. I have travelled on aircraft without oxygen, I have travelled on aircraft with only two engines flying across the Atlantic, and in fantastic thunderstorms over the equator, in rickety old aircraft with one engine, in all kinds of weather, all kinds of climates, but in essence the travel comes about as a matter of necessity. Now, I know that there have been questions raised even by my own staff as to why I did not share the travel. Well, there were options to be considered. If Jack were to travel for 8 or 9 weeks, he would undoubtedly gain some benefits from it, but what a tremendous loss we would have in throughput. Who would do those orders when Jack was travelling! Now I can't do the orders, I don't have the background in the medical field that Jack has. I didn't travel for selfish reasons, I travelled for the Organization. I undoubtedly saw more manufacturing operations, more plants, more port warehouses in the recipient countries, I saw more goods lying idle which

had been requisitioned by the field, all of which were reported, of course. I had the opportunity to visit the various project sites, institutes, refugee camps, and I think every major activity we in UNICEF had ever contributed to or participated in. It was a valuable education to me, I did my best to convey all of my impressions on tape. But I have to admit that there were situations when I might have shared the travel a little more, I know it is being done today, but I think circumstances were a little different. For one, I think there is much more staff in the Supply Division than we had in those days because I, like Maurice Pate, didn't believe in over-staffing. I couldn't bear the thought of having too many people and we never did have too many people. I guess I would have to be totally responsible for that. I honestly felt that we were trying our darndest to help children all over the world and one way to do it was Maurice's way - hold down the cost. I traveled economy, and I didn't like it, it wasn't comfortable sitting in the back seat of an old stratocruiser; you know there is a jump seat of 3, I should say jumpseats, in the tail end of the stratocruiser, and once in a rush when I was going over to Paris and I got the last seat in this plane, and I am telling you, if you ever get seasick, you know what it is like to ride in the tail of an aircraft. When I got off the aircraft I couldn't walk a straight line if I had been paid a thousand dollars. Fortunately for me, having had experience in the air I never did have any qualms about flying, but I have flown in some pretty rickety aircraft.

I had, of course, travel which required me to look into our own supply operations in places like Australia, that I think that could have been shared. There were situations there that others could have covered as well, but it all boiled down to the fact that we just had sufficient people as it were to cover the various bases and I was the one that was doing the least amount of work, so I could be spared to travel.

I do know in fact that some benefit derived from it, I think, quite a bit, in the knowledge of availabilities of commodities and articles in virtually all of the countries then able to consider themselves a manufacturing country and we were able to negotiate some advantageous contracts which were beneficial to both sides. I have been a believer since day one that no contract is any good unless both sides benefit, but I have always done my best to see that UNICEF got the best possible value for its money and I am a solid believer, and continue to believe in value analysis, and that is a very important aspect of buying, so little practised by anybody I have seen in the UN agencies that I have visited. I know that I have preached value analysis to my staff, and I think they had a very good grasp of it, but in my view of other UN agencies after my retirement, I noticed that it was almost totally absent. That very major consideration just wasn't part of their concern. But so much for travel: I have done a lot, I have seen a lot, I have got a number of great, decent pictures and a lot of very fond memories, and I think a few friends.

Charnow: Well, I would like to confirm what you described in the Supply Division as being general practice in those days. Only the top officials travelled. It is only in recent years that the people, second, third, fourth, down the line, are getting the kind of experience they need to have, and I have often wondered about it. It affected me, it affected many other people who were in administration, who were working on the budget, over in programming and so on. Travel was considered a luxury which was accessible to a certain few top officials, but the idea of sending more than one official to attend a meeting or to do something else my gosh, no. In the early days, even a long distance phone call, was looked on with arched eyebrows; You only made long distance phone calls in the greatest emergencies.

Bidding System

I wonder if we can now turn to the question of bidding and contracts, the procedures we adopted. My own feeling, which is certainly confirmed by everything that I have seen internally and from comments of other people about UNICEF, is that we did not have a cumbersome system and yet we have emerged with a reputation of enormous integrity. Do you want to comment?

Bridgewater: I am in two minds about the bidding system. One - it's a very necessary thing in an organization handling what I term public funds. It is also I think a very necessary thing for the protection of staff, to preserve their integrity, because in a bidding process by natural gathering of knowledge, assimilation of information, you build up a list,

if you like, of reputable manufacturers of the various thousands of articles, and then when the requirement comes in for those articles you issue a tender which is a formal request for a quotation for a particular article or a series of articles. It is required to be delivered back to the organization within a set time, it remains in a locked box, so to speak, until the date of opening, it is then opened to the public and anyone attends and the various quotations are then tabulated and finally the tabulation is adjudicated by the responsible person. By that means if your basic list of suppliers is sound, it is fairly reasonable to expect that you would be getting the best possible price for the article required, all being subject of course to the parties meeting the specifications set out in the bid form, which was usually the case. We seldom had people who tried to slip something by. Every once in a while somebody did but they didn't usually get away with it.

But I also have a feeling that the bid process had a tendency to relieve people of any actual assessment of the prices being quoted. I then changed the word "assessment" to what I have termed value analysis. Nobody in UNICEF paid $694 for a hammer, I will tell you right now. Every one of us doing any buying knew pretty much what the article was worth, so there was none of this vast overpayment. But it does, I think, tend to relieve the thought process of the necessity of careful examination of the actual price. I have said it time and time again, I would much prefer negotiation, provided only you know the article, you know how it is manufactured, you know the actual real value of

the article, and you know the people who are capable of making it. Only in that way you can properly negotiate, but that also demands someone, I shouldn't say "demands", but certainly might cause someone to look into the integrity of the action, and that is why I say it is a very necessary thing for public servants or international civil servants to have the protection of the bidding system.

Richman: I ran into a purchasing system in the Irish Republic where for instance they would have a requirement for an x-ray unit which is of some consequence and value. They would obtain a bid from Phillips in Holland for that unit, take the written bid to Seaman's in Germany and show it to them and say, see this is the offer we got from Phillips—can you do better? Then of course Seaman's would do a little better. Then they would take the Seaman's offer to General Electric in the UK and say, look what we got from Seaman's, can you do better than this? Of course they wound up with an extremely low price and probably very, very good value. They expected that UNICEF would conduct the operations in the very same fashion which I refused to do. But they were aghast at our methods where we can be surprised by theirs as well.

Charnow: Well gentlemen, this has been a very useful joint interview which we have negotiated, and I will bid you my grateful thanks for the richness of what you have provided towards the record of UNICEF's expenditure.